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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines British-Chinese encounters in the half century before the Opium War, 
an under-researched medium term period that had profound consequences for both China and 
Britain. Unlike previous studies on China’s early relations with Britain or the West, this 
thesis is conducted closely from a perceptional point of view, with its principal focus on 
British people’s first-hand impressions of China and attitudes towards Chinese affairs as a 
result of these encounters. It shows that British perceptions of China, by and large, 
increasingly worsened throughout this period. During the two royal embassies to China, 
British observers from the Macartney and the Amherst missions presented similarly negative 
views of Chinese civilisation, but proposed conflicting measures in terms of realising 
Britain’s commercial and diplomatic objectives in China. In the run up to the Opium War in 
the 1830s, the image of a Chinese government manipulated by a capricious and despotic 
monarchy was gradually constructed and seen as the primary cause of China’s backwardness. 
China was hence increasingly envisioned as an isolated ‘other’ that could not be 
communicated with by appeals to reason or through normal diplomatic negotiations. In this 
context, a coercive line of action, supported by British naval force, was eventually regarded 
as a just and viable approach to promote the wellbeing of both British and Chinese common 
people. Although these developing unfavourable views about China did not determine the 
outbreak of the Opium War, they were certainly important underlying forces without which 
open hostilities with China would probably have been neither justifiable nor acceptable to the 
British parliament or people. This thesis also seeks to set this half-century of British-Chinese 
encounters in the context of Chinese history. It briefly describes how a changing image of 
Britain was developed by the Chinese government and people during this period. It shows 
that both local elites in the southeastern coastal areas and the elites at the imperial court in 
Beijing obtained credible as well as inaccurate information about Britain and its people. 
These early notions held in the southeast and in the Beijing sometimes had an impact on each 
other, but sometimes stayed distinct and unaffected. This situation partly explains why the 
Chinese government was caught off guard when a serious challenge from Britain occurred in 
the form of the Opium War.  
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Preface 
 
 
The First Anglo-Chinese War (1840-2), also known as the ‘Opium War’, was a fateful 
conflict that had profound consequences for the later history of both China and Great Britain. 
Although the periodisation of modern Chinese history as beginning with the Opium War has 
been challenged, 1  research on China’s early encounters with Britain prior to the 1840s 
remains inadequate.2 The Opium War itself, however, has attracted considerable attention 
from historians, but neither the more general explanation highlighting the irreconcilable 
conflict between Britain’s industrial expansion and China’s containment policy3 nor some 
highly specific causes,4 such as the domestic political crisis facing the Whig government in 
the late-1830s, is convincing enough to decide the debate on what caused the Opium War. A 
very important reason for this phenomenon is that most of these studies are either grand 
narratives, which have overlooked many important historical details, or specific ‘short-term 
(courte durée)’ studies that, according to Fernand Braudel, ‘centred on the drama of “great 
                                                          
1  Philip A. Kuhn, for example, has doubted whether the modern period of China’s history can be 
demarcated by largely external events. Instead, Kuhn suggests that ‘we can reasonably seek the beginning 
of the old order’s decline ... no earlier than 1864, the year the Taiping Rebellion was destroyed’. See Philip 
A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: militarization and social structure, 1796-1864 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 5, 8. 
2 John K. Fairbank pointed out in 1978 that, among existing studies, the first half of the nineteenth century, 
largely the pre-Opium War period, has been greatly under-researched. See ‘Bibliographical essays’, The 
Cambridge History of China, ed. John K. Fairbank, et al. (15 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), X, 596. 
3 For example, see David Owen, British Opium Policy in China and in India (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1934; reprinted, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), p. 168; W.C. Costin, Great Britain 
and China: 1833-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 20; Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the 
Opening of China 1800-42 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951), p. 215; Hsin-pao Chang, 
Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 2; Gerald S. 
Graham, The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. x, etc.  
4
 Glenn Melancon, ‘Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839-1840’, 
International History Review, 21 (1999), 855-74; Glenn Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium 
Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 5-6, 
133-9. 
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events”’ only.5 For these reasons, most research on the Opium War traces the causes back no 
earlier than the rise of the opium trade and thus fails to explore the British-Chinese 
engagements over a longer time span.6 In particular, there has not been any medium-term 
(moyenne durée) study on what attitudes and perceptions were developed as a direct result of 
the early encounters between Britain and China and how, ultimately, the idea of a war against 
China was justified in Britain, on the basis of the perceptions and images that had been 
gradually constructed from these encounters.   
        It is true that neither the history of early Sino-British contacts nor the western image of 
China is a completely new research field. Nevertheless, in order to explain the origins of the 
Opium War, existing research faces some major problems. First, most studies that have 
covered the pre-Opium War period, especially the half century before the war, are those 
which deal with long-term changes in the history of Sino-Western relations. These studies, 
such as Hosea Ballou Morse’s classic works, The Chronicles of the East India Company 
trading to China 1635-1834 and The International Relations of the Chinese Empire,7 have 
offered wide-ranging narratives of China’s engagement with the world over the centuries. 
The vast majority of them, however, have concentrated on political, economic and diplomatic 
actions, 8  rather than the perceptions and attitudes which developed as a result of these 
encounters.  
                                                          
5 Fernand Braudel, On History, translated by Sarah Matthews (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p. 
28. 
6 Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); 
Tan Chung, China and the Brave New World: a study of the origins of the Opium War 1840-42 (Durham, 
NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1978); James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992); Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China 
(London: Picador, 2011), etc. 
7 Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834 (5 vols., 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926; reprinted, London: Routledge, 2000); Hosea Ballou Morse, The 
International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 vols., London: Longmans, 1910-18; reprinted, Folkestone: 
Global Oriental, 2008). The latter book covers the period from 1834 to 1911. 
8 For example, G.F. Hudson, Europe and China: A Survey of their Relations from the earliest times to 1800 
(Boston: Beacon, 1961); Wolfgang Franke, China and the West (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967); John S. 
Gregory, The West and China since 1500 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); D.E. Mungello, The 
Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800 (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), etc. 
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        Second, previous books on western images of China or Asia, such as Donald Lach’s 
three-volume Asia in the Making of Europe and V. G. Kiernan’s The Lords of Human Kind: 
European attitudes towards the outside world in the imperial age,9 often fail to differentiate 
clearly between Britain and the West or between China and Asia. 10 Nor do they draw a clear 
line between first-hand and second-hand sources that were available to western readers. In 
most of the existing research, the British or western peoples’ direct discoveries from their 
encounters with the Chinese have been confounded with the images of China constructed 
upon some second- or even third-hand knowledge produced by those who had no experience 
of or direct connection with China. These studies, such as P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr 
Williams’ The Great Map of Mankind and Gregory Blue’s article ‘China and Western social 
thought in the modern period’,11 tend to dwell on how China as a civilisation was understood 
by the western public, especially by intellectuals, rather than what impressions were formed 
as a direct consequence of early Sino-British encounters.12  
        Although, in 1992, Mary Louise Pratt has pointed out in Imperial Eyes 13 the importance 
of studying cross-cultural perceptions from the perspective of ‘contact zone’ and recently this 
                                                          
9 Donald Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe (3 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965-93); 
V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: European attitudes towards the outside world in the imperial 
age (London: Serif, 1995). 
10 See also Western Views of China and the Far East, ed. Henry A. Myers (2 vols., Hong Kong: Asian 
Research Service, 1982); Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Jonathan D. Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent: China in the Western Minds (London: Penguin, 
2000); David Porter, Ideographia: The Chinese Cipher in Early Modern Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2001).  
11 P.J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New Worlds in the Age 
of Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Gregory Blue, ‘China and Western 
social thought in the modern period’, in China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological 
Knowledge, ed. Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
57-109.  
12 See also Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Chameleon: an analysis of European conceptions of Chinese 
civilization (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Adolf Reichwein, China and Europe: intellectual 
and artistic contacts in the eighteenth century (London: Routledge, 1968); Discovering China: European 
interpretations in the Enlightenment, ed. Julia Ching and Willard G. Oxtoby (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 1992); Raymond Dawson, ‘Western Conceptions of Chinese Civilization’, in The Legacy 
of China, ed. Raymond Dawson (Boston, MA: Cheng & Tsui, 1990), pp. 1-27; Gregory Blue, ‘China in 
Western Social Thought: with special reference to contributions from Montesquieu to Max Weber’, 
unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Cambridge, 1989). 
13 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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approach has been adopted by Ulrike Hillemann to the research of early British cultural 
interactions with China, Hillemann’s book Asian Empire and British Knowledge14
 
has not 
explored in detail the perceptions and images built up in the many accounts written by British 
travellers to China prior to the Opium War. In order to understand ‘how the networks of 
imperial expansion shaped diverse British imaginations of China’, 15  Hillemann tells her 
readers much about British interest in Chinese material culture and the Chinese language, 
about the activities of Protestant missionaries in China, and about Chinese contacts with the 
British in India and in southeast Asia. She has not, however, seriously studied how the 
changing British perceptions of China influenced the drift to war in the 1830s and she has 
entirely ignored Chinese perceptions of Britain over the decades from the Macartney mission 
to the outbreak of the Opium War. 
        Last, but not least, some other relatively recent studies, which have attempted to offer 
close cultural investigations of the history of British-Chinese relations, tend to focus on 
highly specific topics. For example, Elizabeth Hope Chang and Catherine Pagani have 
analysed the cultural awareness of China in nineteenth-century Britain, largely from the 
perspectives of aesthetic practice and material culture.16 The debate between James Hevia and 
Joseph Esherick, which prompted widespread discussion in both western and Chinese 
academia, has mainly concentrated on the court ritual of the Qing dynasty.17 Joanna Waley-
                                                          
14 Ulrike Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge: China and the Networks of British Imperial 
Expansion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
15 Ibid., p. 1. 
16 Elizabeth Hope Chang, Britain’s Chinese Eye: Literature, Empire and Aesthetics in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Catherine Pagani, ‘Chinese material culture and 
British perceptions of China in the mid-nineteenth century’, in Colonialism and the Object: empire, 
material culture and the museum, ed. Tim Barringer and Tom Flynn (London; New York: Routledge, 
1998), pp. 28-40. 
17 James L. Hevia, Cherishing men from afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Joseph W. Esherick, ‘Cherishing sources from afar’ in 
Modern China, 24 (1998), 135-61; James L. Hevia, ‘Postpolemical history: a response to Joseph W. 
Esherick’, Modern China, 24 (1998), 319-27; Joseph W. Esherick, ‘Tradutore, Traditore: A Reply to 
James Hevia’, Modern China, 24 (1998), 328-32. See also Ritual and Diplomacy: The Macartney mission 
to China, 1792-1794, ed. Robert Bickers (London: Wellsweep, 1993); Huang Yinong 黄一农, ‘Yinxiang 
yu zhenxiang: qingchao zhongying liangguo de guanli zhizheng’ 印象与真相：清朝中英两国的观礼之
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Cohen and Maxine Berg have paid particular attention to the presents offered to the Chinese 
by the Macartney embassy. The former concentrates on how British science and technology 
were perceived by the Chinese in the late eighteenth century,18 while the latter discusses the 
attitudes of British manufacturers and government officials towards their own products and 
technologies.19 Although, in these studies, much attention has been placed on the interactions 
between Britain and China in particular, rather than more generally between the West and 
Asia, the wider historical context, particularly the subsequent hostility between the two 
countries, has not been addressed. 
        Unlike previous research which has such limitations, this thesis scrutinises the crucial 
but understudied fifty-year period before the Opium War, a medium-term period that had 
profound significance for both China and Britain. It correlates three major encounters in this 
period, namely the Macartney diplomatic mission (1793-4), the Amherst diplomatic mission 
(1816-17) and the lead up to the Opium War (1834-40), with a special focus on how British 
observers perceived and interpreted China, such as its government, society and people, when 
these were met and confronted. Since Edward Said’s Orientalism has influentially challenged 
the patronising attitudes which western societies adopted when regarding their own identity 
‘as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures’,20 much 
attention is paid in this thesis to the presentation of these perceptions in the most unbiased 
manner possible. To serve this purpose, first of all, this thesis does not aim to justify British 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
争 (‘Impressions vs. Reality: a study on the guest ritual controversy between Qing China and Britain’), 
Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院历史研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute 
of History and Philology Academia Sinica), 78 (1) 2007, 35-106. 
18 Joanna Waley-Cohen, ‘China and Western Technology in the Late Eighteenth Century’, American 
Historical Review, 98 (1993), 1525-44; Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: global currents in 
Chinese history (New York; London: Norton, 1999), pp. 92-128. See also Michael Adas, Machines as the 
Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), pp. 177-93. 
19 Maxine Berg, ‘Britain, industry and perceptions of China: Matthew Boulton, “useful knowledge” and 
the Macartney Embassy to China, 1792-94’, Journal of Global History, 1 (2006), 269-88.   
20 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 7. Likewise, Elizabeth Hope Chang has stated 
that, instead of showing China as how it was, the vision of China in the nineteenth century was ‘in fact a 
reflection mirrored back to the European reader by a representation made by a Western writer’. See Chang, 
Britain’s Chinese Eye, p. 22. 
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prejudice against China, nor does it seek to claim that Chinese society was more advanced or 
better informed than it actually was.21 Moreover, since Said has admitted that the ‘backbone’ 
of his work is a ‘set of historical generalizations’ rather than some empirical findings built 
‘upon an exhaustive catalogue of texts’,22 this thesis examines a wealth of available primary 
materials on this particular period, partly as a response to Said’s warnings. By using these 
wide-ranging sources, some of which have received little attention in the past, such as the 
accounts written by some of the lower orders on the Macartney embassy (for example, 
Aeneas Anderson and Samuel Holmes)23 and newspapers published by British residents in 
China (such as The Canton Register, The Canton Press),24 specific contexts are provided 
wherever possible in this thesis to indicate that certain perceptions and images of Chinese 
society, such as the ignorance of the Qing courtiers and the hospitality of the Chinese people, 
were at least partly constructed to defend the authors’ own preconceptions, standpoints and 
actions. 
        Despite this effort to benefit from Said’s general perspective, it should be noted that, in 
order to be perfectly fair, it is also erroneous to assume that all these British observations on 
China were made to suit a particular purpose. Although it is undeniable that there were 
                                                          
21 Some contemporary historians have shown the latter intention. For example, Waley-Cohen has 
maintained that ‘the Chinese were extremely interested in technological advances and in what the West 
had to offer’. The evidence she has collected, however, is only enough to prove that certain facts about 
western science and technology were within the knowledge of a small-numbered elite class of the Chinese 
society, particularly the imperial court and some leading scholars. See Waley-Cohen, ‘China and Western 
Technology in the Late Eighteenth Century’, 1543-4. 
22 Said, Orientalism, p. 4. 
23 Aeneas Anderson, A Narrative of the British Embassy to China, in the Years of 1792, 1793 and 1794 
(London: J. Debrett, 1795); Samuel Holmes, The Journal of Mr Samuel Holmes, Serjeant-Major of the 
Sixth Light Dragoons, during his attendance as one of the guard on Lord Macartney’s embassy to China 
and Tartary, 1792-3 (London: W. Bulmer, 1798). 
24 The Canton Register was founded in November 1827 by Scottish merchants James Matheson and his 
nephew Alexander, together with Philadelphian, William Wightman Wood, who was the first editor. The 
Canton Press was sponsored by Dent & Co., a British firm and a direct rival to Matheson’s Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. The Canton Press was first published in 1835 but closed nine years later in 1844. 
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indeed some interest groups behind different views of China, especially in the 1830s,25 given 
the fact that so many of these writings were published anonymously, it is, in fact, impossible 
to be certain whether some particular commentator was disposed to promote a partisan view 
or was simply attempting to make impartial observations. Since, among the various authors, 
some must have tried to be disinterested and were probably seeking to be as objective as they 
could be, this thesis does not seek to prove how and why each of them made his comments. 
Nor does it attempt to draw definite connections between different views of China and 
particular interest groups. Instead, the changing perceptions and attitudes of China are the 
prime focus of this thesis. To explore what perceptions were developed as a result of the early 
contacts and confrontations between the two peoples, rather than to ascertain which 
individuals or interest groups were most accountable for the ensuing Sino-British hostilities, 
is hence a key objective of this research. 
        Furthermore, this thesis also seeks to find out the underlying causes as well as the 
immediate triggers of the Opium War from a perceptional point of view. To achieve this end, 
much importance is attached to those British people who offered first-hand observations on 
China, because in comparison with the multi-hand representations of China’s image made by 
those who had no experience of China, these direct comments on Chinese affairs are more 
likely to have had greater influence on the attitudes of government decision-makers. From 
Amherst to Napier, as well as some MPs who participated in the debates on the opium 
question, many of them placed emphasis on the ‘local experience’ obtained by previous 
British travellers to China.26 This fact shows not only that they believed that this knowledge 
                                                          
25 Some of these connections can indeed be drawn. For example, Greenberg has highlighted the relation 
between some leading British merchants in China, such as James Matheson, and manufacturing interests of 
Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow. See Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, pp. 175-95. 
26  For example, British Library, London: India Office Library and Records: India Office Amherst 
Correspondence, Lord Amherst’s Embassy, 1815-17, G/12/197/271. Letter from Amherst to George 
Canning, 28 Feb. 1817; George T. Staunton, Miscellaneous Notices Relating to China, and our 
Commercial Intercourse with that Country (London: John Murray, 1822), p. 238; Napier to Palmertson, 9 
Aug. 1834, in Correspondence Relating to China, presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of 
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was in some sense more reliable than other kinds, but also that the first-hand findings or 
perceptions probably exerted more influence on the opinions of these decision-makers who 
later travelled to China or helped to shape the development of British-Chinese relations. For 
these reasons, this thesis concentrates on what exactly was presented to British readers by 
those who did have first-hand knowledge of China, but refrains from assessing how these 
perceptions engaged with so-called ‘public opinion’. What the general public thought or how 
it responded to what it read is, in essence, very difficult to prove or perhaps impossible to 
know, more attention is therefore paid in this thesis to examining how parliament and some 
government officials responded to these first-hand perceptions, especially on the eve of the 
Opium War. They did, however, show by their comments and decisions what arguments 
might have influenced them and this thesis concentrates on these arguments. As Hillemann 
has claimed, in this sense, Britain itself, especially in the late-1830s, can be regarded as ‘a 
zone of contact … even though this was less immediate than in Canton’.27 Only when these 
changing viewpoints which were formed in the ‘contact zone’, as well as their impact on 
attitudes of the decision-makers, have been sufficiently investigated, can we ascertain, how 
such perceptions may have influenced why the First Anglo-Chinese War broke out and why 
this happened at such a particular point in time. 
        In addition to analysing how perceptions were developed on the British side, one chapter 
of this thesis is devoted to Chinese perceptions of Britain over the same period. By utilising 
some previously overlooked Chinese sources, this chapter traces how Britain was known to 
and understood by the Chinese government and people in the half century before China was 
forcibly thrown open. With some general knowledge about China’s internal history of this 
period, this chapter can help to confirm or challenge the reliability of some British attitudes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Her Majesty (London: T. R. Harrison, 1840), p. 8; Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 
9 Apr. 1840, Third series, vol. 53, 937. 
27 Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 12. 
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towards China, such as Qing’s dynastic decline which was highlighted by the Amherst 
embassy. This does not mean however that this thesis attempts to offer as detailed an analysis 
of Chinese perceptions of and attitudes towards Britain, since such an approach is not really 
practicable given the limited Chinese sources available, especially compared to the wealth of 
evidence presented by British commentators on China.  
        To be more specific, this thesis starts with a brief introduction of British and Chinese 
people’s knowledge of each other before the official Sino-British encounters took place. The 
main body of the thesis consists of three parts. In part one, two British royal embassies to 
China, the Macartney and the Amherst missions, are investigated and analysed. These two 
early official contacts are conventionally regarded as unsuccessful, simply because they both 
failed to achieve their primary diplomatic and commercial goals. If we take into consideration 
their impact on the development of British attitudes towards China, however, these two 
embassies tell us much of importance. In general, they encouraged initial official contacts 
with the Chinese government, as well as leading to more visits into the interiors of many 
Chinese cities and rural areas by British travellers. This experience helped the British 
participants in these embassies to acquire more accurate perceptions of China’s situation and 
circumstances at the time. As a result, some earlier knowledge introduced by Catholic 
missionaries about a developed and highly civilised China were challenged and proved to be 
problematic. 
        In part two, British perceptions during the immediate pre-Opium War period, namely the 
1830s, are closely examined. From the debate between the East India Company advocates 
and free traders in the early 1830s, to the controversy over the opium crisis at the end of the 
decade, the perception of a Chinese government manipulated by a capricious and despotic 
monarchy was developed and seen as the primary cause of China’s backwardness. China was 
increasingly envisioned as an isolated ‘other’ that could not be communicated with by 
10 
 
appeals to reason or through normal diplomatic negotiations on an equal footing. Thus, a 
coercive line of action, supported by a British naval force, was gradually deemed to be a just 
and viable approach to promote the wellbeing of both British interests and those of the 
Chinese common people.  
        Part three seeks to set this half-century of encounters between Britain and China in the 
context of Chinese history. It not only explains the major developments occurring in China 
over these decades, but reveals how a changing image of Britain was developed by the 
Chinese government and people during this period. In particular, it shows that both local 
elites in the southeastern coastal areas and the elites at the imperial court in Beijing obtained 
credible as well as inaccurate information about Britain and its people. These early notions 
held by the two elites sometimes had an impact on each other, but sometimes they remained 
distinct and unaffected. This situation partly explains why the Chinese government was 
caught off-guard when a serious military challenge from Britain occurred in the form of the 
Opium War. 
        This thesis, in short, seeks to present an innovative and rigorous study of the developing 
first-hand perceptions and attitudes produced as a result of British-Chinese encounters in the 
half century before the Opium War. It will not only reveal how the idea of a war against 
China was formed and justified on the basis of the images constructed over this period, but it 
will also attempt to reinterpret the history of Sino-British relations in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries from a perceptional point of view. 
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Introduction 
 
I 
British knowledge of China before the official encounters 
Before examining British perceptions of China during the early British-Chinese encounters, it 
is necessary to sketch what knowledge of China an informed British public could have gained 
or what a Briton such as Lord Macartney could have read about China, prior to these official 
encounters. In general, such information might have reached Britain from the following 
sources. First, some Catholic missionaries, especially the Jesuits who visited the Chinese 
empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, transmitted rather favourable images of 
China. In order to convert the Chinese to Catholicism, these Jesuits believed that it was 
necessary to ‘become an integral part’
1
 of Chinese civilisation. For this reason, they not only 
learned to speak and write the Chinese language, but also spent much time studying China’s 
orthodox histories, philosophical works, and religious texts. As a result of these dedicated 
efforts, as well as their expertise in western science and technology, some of these 
missionaries, such as Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-88), won the 
friendship of the Chinese literati and gained favour at the imperial court. It was because of 
either this close relationship with elite Chinese society or because of the necessity to justify 
their unconventional approach to converting the Chinese, that these Jesuit writings were 
mostly very laudatory of Chinese culture and government. China, according to these accounts, 
was in essence ‘a vast, powerful, and wealthy empire with advanced moral, political, 
                                                          
1  John D. Young, Confucianism and Christianity: The First Encounter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1983), p. 23. 
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intellectual, and religious systems’.2 In Louis Le Comte’s (1656-1729) Nouveaux mémoires 
sur l’état present de la Chine (1696), an influential work that was subsequently translated 
into English and published in 1697, the author spoke highly of China’s moral and political 
systems. Le Comte also praised the antiquity of Chinese civilisation, which he believed 
‘furnishes us [the Europeans] with an infinite number of examples of conspicuous wisdom’.
3
 
Another monumental work, the four-volume Description geographique, historique, 
chronologique et physique de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (1735), edited 
by Jean Baptiste Du Halde,4 was the largest and most comprehensive single product of Jesuit 
scholarship on China. Du Halde was ‘immensely positive about China’ and he appreciated 
‘virtually every aspect of its people and society’.5 In particular, Du Halde claimed that China 
was governed in such a philosophic and enlightened way that material prosperity as well as 
mental contentment could be achieved for a vast population and stability could be maintained 
over thousands of years. In addition to Le Comte’s and Du Halde’s works, the Jesuit 
sinophilic series, Lettres édifiantes et curieuses des Missions Étrangères par quelques 
Missionaires de la Compagnie de Jesus, which was published between 1702 and 1776, with 
its selective English translation Travels of the Jesuits into various parts of the world,
6
 was 
another important reference work for information about China. This series was clearly 
                                                          
2 Chong-kun Yoon, ‘Sinophilism During the Age of Enlightenment: Jesuits, Philosophes and Physiocrats 
Discover Confucius’, in Western Views of China and the Far East, ed. Henry A. Myers (2 vols., Hong 
Kong: Asian Research Service, 1982), I, 158. 
3 Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état present de la Chine (Paris: J. Anisson, 1696), p. 125. See Qian 
Zhongshu, ‘China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century’, in A Collection of Qian Zhongshu’s 
English Essays (Beijing: Foreign language teaching and research press, 2005), p. 151. This article was 
originally published in Quarterly Bulletin of Chinese Bibliography, New Series, 2 (1941), 7-48, 113-52.  
4 There are two English translations of this book: one published by John Watts in 1736 under the title The 
General History of China, the other published by Edward Cave between 1738 to 1741 in two folio 
volumes, which was entitled A Description of the Empire of China and Chinese Tartary. 
5 Mackerras, Western Images of China, p. 35. 
6 It was edited by the English author John Lockman. His first edition appeared in two volumes in 1743 
with a second one in 1762. 
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subjected to careful selection and editing, so that a similar idealised image of China was 
presented to its European readers.7 
        Second, under the positive influence of the Jesuits, some key philosophers of the 
Enlightenment became enthusiastic about China. From the mid-seventeenth to the late-
eighteenth century, the aforementioned Jesuit reports were widely read among European 
intellectuals. As a result, China was seen by many as an ideal model, which might be a 
rational alternative to the existing order of royal autocracy and religious intolerance in 
Europe. The German logician and mathematician, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), 
for example, was fascinated by Chinese culture. He believed that cultural exchanges between 
China and Europe were necessary and, in particular, ‘Chinese missionaries should be sent to 
us to teach us the aim and practice of natural theology, as we send missionaries to them to 
instruct them in revealed theology’. 8 In particular, Leibnitz admired the Kangxi emperor 
(1654-1722, r. 1662-1722), who was known to have tolerated Christianity and to have shown 
a strong interest in mathematics, philosophy and European science. Leibnitz regarded the 
Kangxi emperor as a model of a benevolent monarch, because although ‘being a god-like 
mortal, ruling all by a nod of his head’, he was ‘educated to virtue and wisdom … thereby 
earning the right to rule’.9 Voltaire (1694-1778), prince of the philosophes, was also highly 
laudatory of Chinese institutions. Since it was illegal to criticise openly the state or the church 
in his time, Voltaire employed China as a polemical weapon to cloak his attacks on 
obscurantism and misgovernment in France. In Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des Nations 
(1756), which lifted China ‘to the summit of her glory among the French’,10 Voltaire offered 
a panegyric of the rationality of Chinese culture and philosophy. He extolled the secular 
nature of Confucianism, because the religion of the emperors and the tribunals ‘has never 
                                                          
7 Du Halde edited volumes IX to XXVI, which covered the years from 1709 to 1743. 
8 Reichwein, China and Europe, p. 80. 
9 Donald F. Lach, ‘Leibniz and China’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 6 (1945), 440. 
10 Pierre Martino, L’Orient dans la Littérature Française au XVIIe et au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris: Librairie 
Hachette, 1916), p. 181, in Qian, ‘China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century’, p. 143. 
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been troubled by priestly quarrels’.11 China, moreover, was appreciated by Voltaire as a great 
ancient civilisation that was founded upon paternal authority and governed by an enlightened 
literary class, recruited by competitive examination not by noble birth. François Quesnay 
(1694-1774), the leader of the Physiocratic school, was another ardent admirer of China. 
Quesnay and his fellow Physiocrats highly valued the fact that ‘in China … agriculture has 
always been held in veneration, and those who profess it have always merited the special 
attention of the emperor’.12 Quesnay also eulogised the Chinese constitution as founded on 
wise and irrevocable laws so that even ‘the emperor himself is not immune from … censure 
when his conduct offends the laws and rules of the state’.13 Quesnay, unlike Voltaire, did not 
deny that the Chinese government was in essence despotic, but he asserted that the power of 
the Chinese emperor did not prevent China from having the best form of government, 
because ‘It is a generally established maxim among the people … that as they should have a 
filial obedience toward their sovereign, he in turn should love them like a father’.14 Although 
Quesnay’s high regard for China’s enlightened despotism was not shared by some other great 
European thinkers, such as Montesquieu (1689-1755), who condemned the oppressiveness of 
the Chinese government and discredited the Jesuits’ accounts, 15  European intellectuals’ 
admiration for China, on the whole, was striking from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-
eighteenth centuries. 
        Third, along with the appeal of Chinese moral and political systems, a general 
fascination with Chinese artistic tastes became an essential feature of European culture. As 
                                                          
11 Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des Nations et sur les principaux faits de l’histoire depuis 
Charlemagne  usqu’  Louis  III (1756; reprinted, Paris: Garnier fr res, 1963), p. 69, in Mackerras, 
Western Images of China, p. 38.  
12 Lewis A. Maverick, China: A Model for Europe (San Antonio, TX: Paul Anderson, 1946), p. 206. This 
work was originally published in two volumes, the second of which is the author’s translation of 
Quesnay’s works. 
13 Quesnay in ibid., p. 216. 
14 Quesnay, Le Despotisme de la Chine (1767), II, 226, in William Joseph Eaton, ‘The Old Regime and the 
Middle Kingdom: The French Physiocrats and China as a Model for Reform in the Eighteenth Century, a 
Cautionary Tale’, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, 10 (2006), 75. 
15 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, pp. 141-2. 
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commercial intercourse with China increased significantly from the late seventeenth century 
onwards, Chinese objects were more widely circulated in Europe. In consequence, a lively 
vogue for Chinese fashions, which was later known as ‘Chinoiserie’,16 spread over much of 
Europe. Under such circumstances, not only were Chinese porcelain, lacquer ware, silk cloth 
and wallpaper extensively imported and copied, but also a number of Chinese summer houses, 
pavilions, pagodas and bridges were constructed, as ornaments to royal parks and aristocratic 
estates throughout Europe.17 Britain, in particular, excelled in Chinese-style garden designs. 
Sir William Chambers (1723-96), a Scottish architect who had twice visited Canton 
(Guangzhou), was ‘the foremost authority on Chinese architecture and gardening at the time 
in Europe’. 18  Chambers published in 1757 his Designs of Chinese Buildings, Furniture, 
Dresses, Machines and Utensils and, several years later, he produced a more detailed 
Dissertation on Oriental Gardening (1772). Both of these books drew much attention from 
within and without Britain. In 1763, according to the Chinese model of gardening and 
architecture he learned, Chambers built Kew Gardens in the vicinity of London. Kew 
Gardens was perhaps the most well-known Chinese garden in Europe at the time and, in the 
context of Chinoiserie, Chambers’ designs were soon widely imitated in other countries on 
the Continent.  
        On the basis of the favourable accounts written by Jesuits and enlightened philosophers, 
as well as the widespread enthusiasm for Chinese material culture, Britain developed a 
considerable admiration for China, especially in the second half of the seventeenth century. 
Nevertheless, unlike Voltaire and Quesnay who were activists for social progress and 
                                                          
16 ‘Chinoiserie’ as a term to describe a European fantasy vision of China was not known in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. It is an expression of relatively recent invention, which first appeared in 
dictionaries in 1883. See David Beevers, ‘“Mand’rin only is the man of taste”: 17
th
 and 18
th
 Century 
Chinoiserie in Britain’, in Chinese Whispers: Chinoiserie in Britain 1650-1930, ed. David Beevers 
(Brighton: The Royal Pavilion and Museums, 2008), p. 13. 
17 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 86. 
18 Western Views of China and the Far East, I, 174. 
16 
 
political reforms, British admirers of China were ‘deeply sceptical about the achievements’19 
of their own age and tended to believe that British society and institutions were in a 
worsening state. China, for this reason, was interpreted by British commentators as a 
venerable and ancient civilisation that ‘had kept its pristine excellence to a remarkable extent 
in a world prone to deterioration’.20 John Webb (1611-72), for example, praised the antiquity 
of Chinese civilisation ‘with a dash of religious zeal’.21 In An historical essay endeavoring a 
probability that the language of the Empire of China is the primitive language (1669), Webb 
justified his admiration for China upon a biblical footing. Webb claimed that, prior to the 
Confusion of Tongues (confusio linguarum), Noah carried the world’s primitive language 
into the Ark with him and settled in the East. Because of the superiority and hence the 
independence of Chinese civilisation, the Chinese language had kept the original tongue that 
was common to the world before the Flood. In this respect, Emperor Yao, a legendary 
Chinese ruler, was even recognised by Webb as no other than Noah himself.22 Sir William 
Temple (1628-99), Britain’s most famous sinophile in the seventeenth century, agreed about 
the antiquity of Chinese civilisation by saying that the seeds of Grecian learning and 
institutions can be easily found in ancient China.23 Moreover, Temple pointed out that China 
in his own age was ‘the greatest, richest, and most populous kingdom now known in the 
world’, because, ever since ancient times, the ‘admirable constitution of its government’ had 
been ‘established upon the deepest and wisest foundations’.24 As with some Enlightenment 
thinkers from the Continent, Temple wrote very highly of the Chinese form of government, 
                                                          
19 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 132. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Qian Zhongshu, ‘China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth Century’, in The Vision of China in 
the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Adrian Hsia (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 1998), p. 45. This article was originally published in Quarterly Bulletin of 
Chinese Bibliography, New Series, 1 (1940), 351-84. 
22 John Webb, An historical essay (London: Nath. Brook, 1669), pp. 15-26, 44, 60, see Qian, ‘China in the 
English Literature of the Seventeenth Century’, p. 46. 
23 William Temple, The Works of Sir William Temple (4 vols., London: J. Brotherton, 1770; reprinted, New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968), III, 457. 
24 Ibid., III, 41, 328. 
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which was believed to have been established upon the wisdom of Confucius. Together with 
the fair and efficient system of its civil service examinations, the Chinese political system 
overall was regarded ‘in practice to excel the very speculations … and all those imaginary 
schemes of the European wits, the institutions of Xenophon, the republic of Plato, the 
Utopia’s, or Oceana’s of our modern writers’.25 As a result of Temple’s vigorous efforts to 
promote such positive images of China, Britain’s enthusiasm for Chinese culture ‘reached its 
highest pitch in the English literature of the seventeenth century’.26 
        Despite the fact that a similar esteem for Chinese culture and institutions can be detected 
in the British Isles as on the Continent, Europe’s respect for China declined first in Britain. 
From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the excellence of Chinese civilisation began to 
be doubted by British commentators. Publications censorious of China increased markedly, 
particularly during the second half of the century. Some reasons can be offered to explain this 
shift in British attitudes towards China at this particular time. Most immediately, the Kangxi 
emperor banned Christian missions in China in 1721. It deprived the Jesuits of the imperial 
patronage which they had long enjoyed at the Chinese court and most missionaries were 
expelled from China in the following years. In 1773, the Society of Jesus was also formally 
dissolved in Europe on the orders of Pope Clement XIV. These events resulted in Jesuit 
writers on China being unsupported by the authorities in China and in Europe. Moreover, to 
the British, who were largely Protestant, the Society of Jesus had always been ‘an equivocal 
and even sinister body’27 which could not be fully trusted. The Jesuit admiration for China 
was therefore undermined and could no longer be so relied upon to offer a positive image of 
the government of China.   
                                                          
25 Ibid., III, 332. 
26 Qian, ‘China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century’, p. 142. 
27 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 84. 
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        The values of British society and its changing preoccupations also helped to cause 
mounting scepticism about China and things Chinese. For one thing, from the very beginning, 
British fascination with China, especially among the literati, had been weaker than on the 
Continent. Compared with Voltaire and others in France who produced a romanticised image 
of China in order to veil their criticisms of the French government, British intellectuals were 
generally more satisfied with their own political system. Particularly after the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ in the late seventeenth century, Britain basically lost the ‘motivation to hold up 
China for utopian contrast with the home country which was prevalent among the French 
philosophes’.28 Moreover, in the eighteenth century, as British society was undergoing rapid 
but mainly positive changes, which reinforced the pride and sense of superiority of the British 
nation, far fewer Britons adhered to the belief that British civilisation was in decline. ‘Change’ 
or ‘progress’, instead, was widely accepted by the public as the natural expectation of 
humanity.29 For this reason, the antiquity and changelessness of Chinese civilisation, which 
was so much appreciated by Webb and Temple, lost their attractions. Increasingly, in Britain, 
‘China was not judged by how well it adhered to its ancient traditions but by how it 
performed at the present time in terms of military power, effective government, scientific 
knowledge, technological skill and the living standards of the mass of the population’.30 
Hence, a stagnant and backward image of China began to take shape. Adam Smith (1723-90), 
for instance, admitted that China used to be ‘one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, 
best cultivated, most industrious and most populous countries in the world’, but ‘[it] seems … 
to have been long stationary’.31 In order to avoid such a state of stagnation, Smith pointed out 
the value of cultivating an extensive foreign trade. If China engaged in such foreign trade, she 
                                                          
28 Western Views of China and the Far East, I, 38. 
29 David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1990). 
30 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 175. 
31 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.H. Campbell and 
A.S. Skinner (2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), I, 89. 
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would be able to ‘learn the art of … different machines made use of in other countries, as 
well as the other improvements of art and industry which are practised in all the different 
parts of the world’.32 Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), the author of Robinson Crusoe (1719), was 
more straightforward in his contempt for China. As he put it in Crusoe’s words, the Chinese 
people were ‘a contemptible herd or crowd of ignorant, sordid slaves, subjected to a 
government qualified only to rule such a people’.33 In a similar tone, Defoe belittled Chinese 
cities, architecture, commerce, and so on. Even the Chinese mode of husbandry, which had 
been particularly eulogised by previous commentators, was now deemed as ‘imperfect and 
impotent’34 according to European standards. As with Defoe, Sir William Jones (1746-94), 
the great Orientalist, held completely negative views of Chinese civilisation. In a speech he 
delivered to the Asiatic Society in 1790, Jones stated that:   
 
Their popular religion was imported from India in an age comparatively modern; 
and their philosophy seems yet in so rude a state, as hardly deserve the appellation; 
they have no ancient monuments; … their sciences are wholly exotick; and their 
mechanical arts have nothing in them characteristic of a particular family … They 
have indeed, both national music and national poetry, and both of them beautifully 
pathetick, but of painting, sculpture, of architecture, as arts of imagination, they 
seem (like other Asiaticks) to have no idea.35 
 
It was probably owing to these unfavourable views of China, which were becoming 
commonly held in eighteenth-century Britain, that Samuel Johnson (1709-84), in sharp 
contrast to Temple, categorised the Chinese as ‘East-Indian barbarians’. Although Johnson 
still acknowledged the Chinese people as ‘great, or wise’, this was ‘only in comparison with 
                                                          
32 Ibid., II, 681. 
33  Daniel Defoe, The Life and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719; reprinted, Edinburgh: James 
Ballantyne, 1812), p. 395. 
34 Ibid.   
35 William Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones (6 vols., London: G.G. and J. Robinson, 1799), I, 102. 
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the nations that surround them’,36 rather than in comparison to Britain or any other major 
European state. 
        Another crucial reason for the worsening British impressions of China in the eighteenth 
century was the rapid growth of Britain’s China trade. As a considerable number of Britons 
were now able to set foot on Chinese soil, merchants, rather than Catholic missionaries, 
became the principal source of the images of China that were transmitted to the British public. 
Nevertheless, the main contacts of these new visitors to China were no longer the upper or 
middle classes of Chinese society, such as the intellectuals or officials in Beijing, but the 
Chinese merchants and seamen who belonged to the lower classes and were much more 
disposed to take advantage of foreigners engaged in commerce with them. Since China’s 
external trade at this time was confined only to the southeast coast, the local authorities there, 
who operated thousands of miles from the central government, also tended to be ‘interested in 
soaking them [the foreigners] for money’. 37 As a result, reports about deceptive Chinese 
tradesmen and a corrupt government were constantly on the rise. George Anson’s Voyage 
Round the World (1748), according to Mackerras, was ‘the first full-scale attack on the rosy 
images of China which the French Jesuits were pushing’.38 Although Anson only skirted the 
coast of Canton, he formed a range of negative views of the Chinese character diametrically 
different from those that had appeared in earlier missionaries’ accounts. In particular, Anson 
was incensed at ‘the dishonest Chinese procurement practices that he encountered, from 
cramming ducks and chickens with stones and gravel to bloating hogs with water’.39 On the 
basis of these experiences, Anson concluded that ‘these instances may serve as a specimen of 
the manners of this celebrated nation, which is often recommended to the rest of the world as 
                                                          
36 James Boswell, Boswell's Life of Johnson: together with Boswell's journal of a tour to the Hebrides and 
Johnson's diary of a journey into North Wales, ed. L.F. Powell (6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934-50), 
III, 339; IV, 188. 
37 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 174. 
38 Mackerras, Western Images of China, p. 43. 
39 Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, p. 53. 
21 
 
a pattern of all kinds of laudable qualities’.40 In addition, with the increase in British-Chinese 
commerce, the East India Company’s employees in China also discovered that, whatever 
might be the theory, the Chinese officials in Canton ‘turned out not to be philosopher rulers 
but to be grasping extortioners’.41 In one of the Company’s reports to parliament, the Chinese 
government was even characterised as ‘the most corrupt in the universe’.42 Probably as a 
result of these new first-hand findings, the notion that the Chinese were in fact an extremely 
crafty and avaricious nation spread increasingly widely across Britain, especially within 
intellectual circles. Anti-Chinese writings hence kept emerging and, in general, their tone 
‘became increasingly rude and more contemptuous than ever before’.43  
        In sum, from the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth centuries, Jesuits and 
Continental philosophers had inspired considerable enthusiasm for China in Europe. With the 
changing values of British society, as well as the increasing first-hand knowledge about 
China, however, eighteenth-century Britain experienced a gradual decline in its admiration 
for the Chinese. Although the balance between favourable and unfavourable views of China 
was shifting away from the former and towards the latter, it should be noted that ‘at any time 
in the eighteenth century British readers were never wholly dependent on one set of sources 
rather than another’.44 By the end of the eighteenth century, despite the mounting scepticism 
about China, the British public still ‘enjoyed some freedom to choose what published version 
of China it would or would not believe’.45 It was in this context that Macartney and his 
retinue embarked on their journey to the Chinese empire, by which Britain, for the first time, 
began to take the lead in informing Europe about China. 
                                                          
40 George Anson, A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1740-1744 (London: John and Paul Knapton, 
1748), p. 525. 
41 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 170. 
42 East India Company, Three reports of the select committee, appointed by the Court of Directors to take 
into consideration the export trade from Great Britain to the East Indies, China, Japan, and Persia 
(London: J.S. Jordan, 1793), p. 82. 
43 Western Views of China and the Far East, I, 176. 
44 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, p. 174. 
45 Ibid. 
22 
 
 
II 
 Chinese knowledge of Britain before the official encounters 
In comparison with Britain’s understandings of China before the two countries’ early 
encounters, China’s knowledge about the outside world, especially Britain, was much less 
profound. By the end of the eighteenth century, the vast majority of Chinese people had no 
idea of modern geography. Only a very small number of well-informed Chinese were aware 
who the British were and in which part of the world they lived. In fact, over thousands of 
years, the Chinese empire had been the dominant force of its own Asian world. The oldest 
Chinese ‘world’ map, Hua yi tu (华夷图 ; Map of China and the barbarian countries) 
(1137),46 only contained some parts of present-day Korea and Vietnam in addition to the 
Middle Kingdom itself, while other surrounding countries only had their names listed beside 
the map. Although it can be concluded that the culturally superior Chinese empire did not 
believe that these nations deserved to share a space on this map, it can also be suggested that 
China at this time did not have an accurate geographical notion of its neighbouring areas, let 
alone distant Britain and western Europe. In the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the Chinese 
made some significant progress in knowing about their external world. For one thing, in order 
to impose imperial control over trade and to impress foreign peoples in the Indian Ocean 
basin, the Ming government sponsored a series of naval expeditions, particularly the seven 
voyages of Zheng He between 1405 and 1433. As a result of these expeditions, some of 
which even reached as far as East Africa, not only was China’s maritime influence 
strengthened, but the Chinese knowledge about the world increased accordingly. Moreover, 
during the Age of Discovery, as the new sea route to India was discovered, a growing number 
of Europeans were able to visit China. As a consequence, some Catholic missionaries who 
                                                          
46  Science and Civilisation in China, ed. Joseph Needham, et al. (7 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954-2008), III, 548. A rubbing of this map is held in Harvard’s Fine Arts Library.    
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served in the Chinese government began to introduce into China western geographical 
knowledge of the globe. 
        In 1601, as the first European invited to the Forbidden City, Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci 
arrived in Beijing and became an adviser to the imperial court of the Wanli emperor. In the 
following year, with the help of his Chinese collaborators, Ricci produced Kunyu wanguo 
quantu (坤舆万国全图; A map of the myriad countries of the world), the first European-style 
world map in China. This map not only showed that the world consists of three oceans and 
five continents, but also contained descriptions of the ethnic groups and main products 
associated with each region. Notably, among the 850 or so toponyms, the names of England 
and Scotland were first mentioned. They were transliterated respectively as ‘An-e-li-ya (谙厄
利亚)’ and ‘Si-ke-qi-ya (思可齐亚)’, presumably from the pronunciations of Anglia and 
Scotia in Latin. In 1623, another Italian Jesuit, Giulio Aleni (1582-1649), published in 
Hangzhou Zhifang waiji (职方外纪; Account of countries not listed in the records office), the 
earliest book on world geography written in the Chinese language. In this account, some 
basic information about European countries was introduced, together with another map of the 
world Wanguo quantu (万国全图; Complete map of all the countries). Compared to Ricci’s 
map, Aleni included in his work more knowledge about Britain. In the section of ‘An-e-li-ya’, 
its location, climate, as well as the facts that it was comprised of three ‘provinces’ (道, dao)47 
and that it had two universities were made known to the readers. In 1674, when the Qing 
dynasty was in power, the Kangxi emperor’s close friend, the Flemish Jesuit, Ferdinand 
Verbiest, presented another European-fashion map Kunyu quantu (坤舆全图; Full map of the 
                                                          
47 Aleni did not clarify which three provinces exactly comprised ‘An-e-li-ya’, but he did mention An-e-li-ya 
lies between latitudes 50°N and 60°N, a space which covers Scotland. This point, however, contradicts the 
notion that An-e-li-ya’s is separated from Si-ke-qi-ya in his own map. In this respect, some people believe 
the three provinces that Aleni mentioned were England, Wales and Scotland; while others point out that 
Aleni referred to England, Wales and Cornwall. See Xiangjiang Guoke 香江过客 , ‘Yinglun sandao 
tanyuan’ 英伦三岛探源 (‘On the origin of the “three islands” of Britain’), Fang yu 方舆, 1 (2010), 15-19. 
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world), along with an even larger geographical work Kunyu tushuo (坤舆图说; Illustrated 
discussion of the geography of the world). Largely the same information about Britain as had 
appeared in Aleni’s work was transmitted to the Qing officials and intellectuals.  
        Despite the fact that European missionaries had introduced to China western knowledge 
of the geography of the world, as well as some knowledge about Britain, these new views of 
China’s external world were not well received within China. In fact, not much interest in this 
evidence was aroused among the Chinese public, nor did it produce much of an impact on the 
world views of China’s traditional elite, the literati. As Ricci’s memoir has shown, the ‘world’ 
to most Chinese at that time was still a score of neighbouring provinces whose territories 
stretched in all directions to the seas.
48
 Ricci noted that:  
 
The Chinese think that the heaven is round and the earth is square. They firmly 
believe their country is located right in the centre of world. They do not like our 
geographical idea that leaves China in a corner of the east.49 
… 
The Chinese people consider all foreigners as barbarians who are without any 
knowledge. They also address foreigners as barbarians in daily lives … Even in 
written language, the words they use to refer to foreigners do not differ from those 
to describe beasts. The Chinese scarcely label foreign people more respectably 
than animals.50 
 
It was perhaps for these reasons that Zhang Xie’s Dongxiyang kao (东西洋考; On the 
countries in the Eastern and Western oceans) (1617), the Ming dynasty’s best geographical 
study on foreign nations, did not refer to Ricci’s opinions at all. Some other scholars, such as 
Wei Jun, were even much offended when they found that China was not placed in the centre 
of Kunyu wanguo quantu. Wei Jun maintained that:  
                                                          
48 Matteo Ricci and Nicolas Trigault, Li Madou Zhongguo zhaji 利玛窦中国札记 (The Notes on China of 
Father Matteo Ricci; originally written in Latin and titled De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas), 
translated into Chinese by He Gaoji 何高济, Wang Zunzhong 王遵仲, and Li Shen 李申 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1983), p. 179. 
49 Ibid., p.180. 
50 Ibid., pp. 94-5. 
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In recent years, Matteo Ricci has created an evil theory in order to confuse the 
world. … In Ricci’s work … what he described can be seen from nowhere; those 
places he mentioned cannot be reached on foot and, on the whole, nothing could 
be proved true … Let alone anything else, Ricci located the Middle Kingdom in 
his map in the northwest … how absurd and offensive this theory is!51 
 
Ji Xiaolan, one of the Qing dynasty’s most famous scholars and the chief compiler of Siku 
quanshu (四库全书; The complete collection of the four treasuries),52 was also dubious about 
the fresh ideas and information produced by the missionaries. In Siku Quanshu’s annotated 
catalogue, Ji Xiaolan remarked that Aleni’s Zhifang waiji was a book in which ‘many of its 
contents were odd and bizarre. They would not withstand investigation. It is almost certain 
that there is much exaggeration’.
53
 With regard to the missionaries’ theory that the world 
consists of five continents, the editors of Qinding huangchao wenxian tongkao (钦定皇朝文
献通考; Imperial comprehensive investigations based on literary and documentary sources) 
adopted a critical stance. In their opinion, this theory was equally ‘absurd and of a pretentious 
nature’. 54  Even though it was mentioned in multiple accounts of the missionaries, they 
believed that these westerners simply plagiarised each other’s studies, which were in essence 
utterly unfounded.55 
                                                          
51 Wei Jun 魏浚, ‘Lishuo huangtang huoshi’ 利说荒唐惑世 (‘On the absurdity of Matteo Ricci’s theory 
and how it causes confusion to the world’), in Shengchao poxie ji 圣朝破邪集 (An anthology of writings 
exposing heterodoxy), ed. Xia Guiqi 夏瑰琦  (8 vols., 1640; reprinted, Hong Kong: Alliance Bible 
Seminary, 1996), III, 183. 
52 At the height of the Qing dynasty, the Qianlong emperor commissioned Siku quanshu, in order to 
demonstrate that Qing scholarship could surpass Ming’s Yongle dadian 永乐大典 (Yongle encyclopaedia), 
which previously had been the largest encyclopaedia of the world. The Qing court’s ideology can be 
clearly observed from the selection of the works into Siku quanshu. Although some of the missionaries’ 
books were included, most of them were on astronomy or calendrical studies. If occasionally the compilers 
disagreed with some of points in the selected works, they usually pointed out that they were ‘improper’ 
views and added their own comments beside the texts. 
53 ‘Zhifang waiji tiyao’ 职方外纪提要 (‘A summary of Zhifang Waiji’), in Siku quanshu, ed. Ji Xiaolan 纪
晓岚, et al. (79337 vols., 1784; reprinted, Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), history category (352), 
geography section (594), 280. 
54 Qinding huangqing wenxian tongkao, ed. Zhang Tingyu 张廷玉, et al. (300 vols., 1787), CCXCVIII, in 
Siku quanshu, history category (396), political documents section (638), 713. 
55 Ibid. 
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        Although knowledge about the western world generally had little appeal for Chinese 
officials and intellectuals, this cannot be attributed entirely to the cultural conservatism of 
Chinese society. The missionaries’ ultimate aim in China was, after all, the conversion of the 
Chinese to Christianity. In order to arouse the Chinese people’s interest in the Christian world, 
these missionaries not only endeavoured to amaze the Chinese by introducing western 
science and technology, but, at times, indeed exaggerated the knowledge and achievements of 
the West. For instance, to create a paradisiacal image of Europe, Ricci alleged that Britain 
was a country in which no poisonous snakes and insects could be found and that, even if they 
were carried there from elsewhere, their venom would vanish as soon as they reached 
Britain.56 Given the fact that works produced by such missionaries were numerous, it would 
have been impossible for the Chinese to distinguish truthful and valuable knowledge from 
among the miscellaneous information provided. In addition, when it came to knowledge 
about Britain, although the British Isles were mentioned to Chinese readers, Protestant 
countries were not highlighted in the accounts produced by these Catholic missionaries. 
England and Scotland, by the time Ricci completed his Kunyu wanguo quantu, were still not 
a united kingdom and their power could not yet be compared with that of Holland, France or 
Spain. For these reasons, the Chinese people’s initial understanding of Britain, however 
minimal, was not largely drawn from the maps and studies of Catholic missionaries, but was 
largely acquired from another source: trade on China’s southeast coast. 
        Ever since the sixteenth century, European merchants from Portugal, Holland, and the 
British Isles had begun to explore business opportunities in East Asia. Under the Ming 
government’s maritime embargo, however, foreigners were not allowed to trade within 
Chinese territory. As a result, the British people’s earliest commercial intercourse with China 
was conducted with overseas Chinese who lived in southeast Asia and Japan. In the former 
                                                          
56 It was noted by Ricci on the margin of Kunyu wanguo quantu. 
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area, British tradesmen established and maintained a stable relationship with their 
counterparts from China. They also employed Chinese as sailors and assistants in trade. In 
Japan, the British not only exchanged products with Chinese businessmen, who resided there, 
but rented and eventually bought a Chinese merchant’s property as their factory in Hirado. 
Moreover, the Chinese used to help translate Japanese ministers’ letters to the British 
monarch from Japanese into Malay, so that the British could find a translator to read it.57 
These preliminary interactions between the British and Chinese people were neither 
permitted by the Ming government, nor known to the vast majority of people in China. It was 
not until the early seventeenth century that the British began to have some preliminary 
contacts with people in China proper and, as a result, were gradually known as the ‘Red Hair’, 
an epithet that coastal Chinese residents gave to the ‘foreign devils’. 
        In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had a stronger presence in Asia 
than the British did. The Dutch forces occupied Pescadores in 1622 and, two years later, 
established control over Taiwan, which was used as Holland’s trading post with mainland 
China. These activities enabled the Dutch to approach the Chinese market more effectively 
than any other European power, insomuch that the Dutch even dominated the Chinese coastal 
residents’ international contacts for a few decades. Since the Chinese at this time had no idea 
where these strange-looking beings were from, they called the Dutch the ‘Red Hair (红毛, 
Hongmao)’ or the ‘Red-haired barbarians (红毛藩, Hongmao fan; 红毛夷, Hongmao yi)’58 in 
light of their reddish hair colour. From the 1630s onwards, Britain’s determination to 
promote its commerce in China increased significantly. In particular, the British desired to be 
                                                          
57 Zhang Yidong 张轶东, ‘Zhongying liangguo zuizao de jiechu’ 中英两国最早的接触 (‘On the earliest 
Sino-British contacts’), Lishi yanjiu 历史研究 (Historical research), 1 (1958), 35-6. 
58  See Peng Zhaorong 彭兆荣 , ‘“hongmao fan”: yige zengzhi de xiangxing wenben – jindai xifang 
xingxiang zai Zhongguo de bianqian guiji yu hudong guanxin’ “红毛番”: 一个增值的象形文本——近代
西方形象在中国的变迁轨迹与互动关系 (‘A case study of the “Red Hair Barbarians”: on the evolution 
of western images in China’), Xiamen daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 厦门大学学报 (哲学社会
科学版) (Journal of Xiamen University (Philosophy and social sciences edition)), 2 (1998), 35-40. 
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able to trade with local merchants in South China. In 1635, a British ship, The London, 
anchored at Macau as the first British ship ever to enter Chinese territory. In 1637, in order to 
gain access to Guangzhou, a British flotilla commanded by Captain John Weddell passed 
through the Bogue, the mouth of the Pearl River, without receiving permission from the 
Chinese government. When local authorities resisted this intrusion, the British opened fire 
and captured a fort. The viceroy of Canton hence had to assemble a large number of troops so 
as to force the British to withdraw. This incident was in fact the very first confrontation 
between Britain and the government of Guangdong, but the Ming authorities did not attempt 
to ascertain from whence these foreign intruders had come. As the British also had reddish 
hair, the Chinese took it for granted that these seamen were from Holland. In consequence, 
when early Qing historians were compiling the history of the Ming dynasty,59 this conflict 
with the British was mistakenly placed in the Holland section.60  
        From the early years of the Qing period (1644-1912), there was a steady growth in the 
number of British merchants who came to trade in or near China. Because of these increasing 
face-to-face contacts, Chinese coastal inhabitants gradually perceived that the British were 
from an independent nation. According to the way most of them addressed themselves, their 
country was known as ‘Ying-ji-li (英吉利)’ or ‘Ying-gui-li (英圭黎)’, which was almost 
certainly transliterated from the pronunciation of ‘England’. With the passage of time, these 
designations for Britain (or England),61 instead of the Jesuits’ translation An-e-li-ya, were 
widely received and employed by both Chinese officials and the common people. As China’s 
commercial ties with Britain and other European countries strengthened, the Chinese people’s 
knowledge about Europe increased accordingly. In 1730, an influential study on knowledge 
                                                          
59 It is a Chinese tradition that every dynasty compiles an official history for the previous dynasty. 
60 It was not until the late nineteenth century that scholar-official Xia Xie discovered that it was the British 
rather than Dutch who caused this incident. See Xia Xie 夏燮, Zhongxi jishi 中西纪事 (Records of Sino-
Western relations) (originally 24 vols., 1865; reprinted, Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1988) , p. 14. 
61 Obviously, nobody in China at this time knew the difference between Britain and England. 
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of western world, Haiguo wenjian lu (海国闻见录; Record of things seen and heard about 
the maritime countries), was produced by Chen Lunjiong, a military official from Fujian. In 
his book, Chen Lunjiong not only made it clear that Britain was located to the northwest of 
France, Holland and Hungary, but noted Britain’s main products as well as its trade with 
India. 62  The publication of Haiguo wenjian lu demonstrated that, independent from the 
missionaries’ maps and studies, accurate geographical information about Europe as well as 
Britain had finally appeared in a work written by a Chinese author. 
        In spite of this progress in knowledge about Europe, the Chinese people at this time did 
not show much interest in knowing about particular European nations. Instead, they tended to 
recognise the Europeans generally as one people. For this reason, the Chinese remained 
unconscious of their previous mistake in confusing the British with the Dutch. They, on the 
contrary, enlarged the definition of ‘Red Hair’ to include all Caucasian-looking people. For 
instance, Chen Lunjiong maintained that ‘The Red Hair is the general name for all the 
northwestern [European] countries’.63 Lan Dingyuan, the former governor of Guangzhou, 
also stated that ‘The Red Hair generally refers to the island countries in the West. It includes 
Ying-ji-li, Castile, France, Holland, Portugal, Goa, and so on’.64 Even though a very small 
number of Chinese people were aware that Britain and Holland were two different hordes of 
‘Red Hair’, most of them erred in their understanding of the relationship between these two 
countries. Among different opinions, some assumed that Britain was affiliated with 
Holland;65 while others claimed that Britain used to be a part of Holland, but had since 
                                                          
62 Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian lu (1730; reprinted, Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1958), p. 
27. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Lan Dingyuan, 蓝鼎元, ‘Lun nanyang shiyi shu’ 论南洋事宜书 (‘On the south ocean affairs’) (1724), in 
Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian 近代中国史料丛刊续编 (Sequel to the collection of materials on 
modern Chinese history), ed. Shen Yunlong 沈云龙 (100 vols., Taiwan: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974-82), 
XXXXI, 115-6. 
65 Huangqing zhigong tu 皇清职贡图 (The Qing imperial illustrations of tributaries), ed. Fu Heng 傅恒, 
Dong Gao 董诰, et al. (9 vols., 1761; reprinted, Changchun: Jilin chuban jituan, 2007), I, 123.  
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become independent. For example, Yin Guangren, a famous scholar-official, asserted that, 
‘Holland [was], formerly known as the Red Hair in Ming dynasty. … Now Ying-ji-li, Sweden 
and Denmark are separate from it’.66 According to these views, it can be observed that, in this 
period, the term ‘Red Hair’ was broadly defined and employed in a very loose manner. 
Although the British were known as ‘Red Hairs’, all other European-looking people were 
also so called. They did not have to be either British or Dutch or have red hair or pale features. 
Even the dark-skinned Portuguese were Red Hairs.  
        In the latter part of the eighteenth century, as Britain overtook Holland as the world’s 
greatest maritime power, British merchants in China vastly outnumbered those from any 
other European nation. In consequence, more and more ‘Red Hairs’, who came to trade with 
the Chinese, claimed themselves citizens of Ying-ji-li rather than of anywhere else.67 This 
change gradually altered the Chinese people’s knowledge about who the ‘Red Hairs’ were 
and, increasingly, the ‘Red Hair’ was becoming an exclusive epithet that the Chinese gave to 
the British. By 1791, in which year Wang Dahai completed his Haidao yizhi (海岛逸志; Lost 
gazetteer of the islands in the sea), it can be seen that, unlike before, the Chinese were now 
able to distinguish the British from the original ‘Red Hair’, namely the Dutch. Wang Dahai 
stated that, ‘Ying-ji-li-ren are known to the Chinese as the Red Hair. Their country sits in the 
corner of the northwest sea, and is a neighbour of Holland. … Holland forms a triangle with 
the Red Hair and France’.68 These few lines showed that, by the end of the eighteenth century, 
                                                          
66 Yin Guangren 印光任 and Zhang Rulin 张汝霖, Aomen jilüe 澳门纪略 (A brief account of Macao) (2 
vols., 1751), II, in Xuxiu suku quanshu 续修四库全书 (Sequel to the complete collection of the four 
treasuries) (1800 vols., Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), history and geography category (676), 
699. 
67 In fact, it would be interesting to know how the Scots (as well as the Welsh and Irish) tended to identify 
themselves in Britain’s initial ventures to East Asia, especially when they encountered indigenous people. 
It is certain, however, that the Chinese people at this stage were not aware of the identity of Scotland, 
Wales or Ireland. They simply identified all the British as Ying-ji-li-ren 英吉利人, which means ‘people 
from the country of Ying-ji-li’. Also, no Chinese at this time seemed to know that not all citizens from 
Ying-ji-li were pleased to be designated as English. 
68 Wang Daihai, Haidao yizhi (6 vols., 1791, first published in 1806), III, 6, in Jindai Zhongguo renshi 
xifang jiqi lieqiang ziliao huibian 近代中国认识西方及其列强资料汇编 (Collected materials on modern 
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there were finally some Chinese who were able to clearly identify the ‘Red Hairs’ or the 
British and, at the same time, to locate them geographically correctly on a map of Europe. 
        In brief, although Catholic missionaries had introduced western geography and 
knowledge about Britain in the early seventeenth century, these studies did not greatly 
interest or convince the elite class of China, nor did they inspire the general interest of the 
Chinese public. It was by and large from the second half of the eighteenth century, when an 
increasing number of British merchants came to explore the Chinese market, that some 
coastal inhabitants gradually grasped some initial knowledge about Britain. Compared to the 
substantial second-hand and even some first-hand information about China available in 
Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China’s understanding of Britain in 
this period was extremely limited. It was, however, just as some informed Chinese were 
beginning to understand the identity of the ‘Red Hair’ as well as their geographical origin, 
that the Macartney embassy set sail from Spithead, England. The first official encounter 
between Britain and China was about to take place. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Chinese impressions on the Western powers), ed. Hu Qiuyuan 胡秋原 (2 vols., Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 
1972), I, 751-2. 
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PART I 
CHAPTER ONE 
British perceptions of China during the Macartney embassy (1792-4) 
 
The Macartney embassy of 1792-4, also known as the Macartney mission, was the first 
official encounter between Great Britain and China, the greatest western and eastern powers 
in the late eighteenth century. Since the mid-seventeenth century, the imperial government of 
China began to apply a highly restrictive policy to its foreign trade. In 1757, the Qing court 
further confined the country’s external trade to a small area outside the city walls of Canton 
and restricted it to being conducted through a handful of authorised local merchants. As 
Britain’s eastern trade expanded in the eighteenth century, particularly after the American 
War of Independence, the trade with China became increasingly essential to the British 
empire. The British government and the East India Company realised that China’s Canton 
commercial system posed a major obstacle to the expansion of British commerce overseas. In 
order to improve British merchants’ trading conditions in China and to establish a formal 
diplomatic relationship with the Chinese empire, an embassy led by Lord Macartney
1
 was 
appointed by the British government to travel to the imperial court of China. 
        Lord Macartney and his embassy reached China in June 1793 with various presents from 
the British monarch, including a variety of state-of-the-art scientific apparatus. Under the 
pretext of wishing to pay respects to the Qianlong emperor on his eighty-third birthday,
2
 the 
                                                          
1 George Macartney, 1st Earl Macartney (1737-1806) was regarded as the best diplomat available in 
Britain at the time to fill this job. In 1764, Macartney was appointed envoy to Russia, where he gained 
experience of dealing with an autocratic ruler, Catherine II. Macartney was also believed to be familiar 
with oriental diplomacy, because he served as the Governor of Madras (now known as Chennai) between 
1781 and 1785. Macartney, moreover, had the esteem of the East India Company and the support of 
influential friends in politics, such as Home Secretary Henry Dundas. 
2 ‘Qianlong’ was actually not the emperor’s name, but the name of his reign period, and so were ‘Kangxi’, 
‘Jiaqing’, ‘Daoguang’, and so on. 
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embassy was granted an imperial audience at the emperor’s summer resort of Jehol (Rehe, 
now Chengde) in September. The Chinese court at this time, however, had no idea of western 
diplomacy or the principle of free trade. External trade of China was deemed as a form of 
grace bestowed by His Imperial Majesty to those foreign nations who were willing to pay 
obeisance to the Chinese empire. In this context, Macartney failed to launch any official 
negotiations on the commercial and diplomatic objectives of the embassy. Instead, his refusal 
to perform kowtow, a ceremony required by the Chinese court ritual of kneeling and touching 
his forehead to the ground in front of the emperor, created much controversy. Although, at 
length, the Qianlong emperor made an unprecedented compromise in allowing the British to 
kneel upon only one knee, shortly after the audience Macartney received strong hints from 
the Qing government that the embassy should make an immediate departure. In early October, 
Macartney felt obliged to request permission to leave Beijing. Despite the fact that, during the 
return journey across China,
3
 the British embassy was treated with respect and civility by the 
Chinese authorities, none of its primary goals had been achieved by the time Macartney 
returned to Britain.   
        As the Macartney mission has long been considered as a defining episode in the modern 
encounters between China and the West, considerable research has been undertaken to 
interpret this significant event.
4
 Some commentators have maintained that it marked a missed 
                                                          
3 The embassy first proceeded by barge along the Grand Canal to its south end Hangzhou. They then split 
into two groups. Macartney and the main party travelled on inland waterways to Canton (with a short 
overland journey). The others followed the river from Hangzhou to the coast and the Zhoushan archipelago 
where the British ships waited. 
4  For example, see E.H. Pritchard, The Crucial Years of Early Angle-Chinese Relations, 1750-1800 
(Washington, DC: Pullman, 1936); Zhu Yong 朱雍, Buyuan dakai de Zhongguo damen 不愿打开的中国
大门 (The Chinese gate that was unwilling to open) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1989); Aubrey 
Singer, The Lion and the Dragon: The Story of the First British Embassy to the Court of the Emperor 
Qianlong in Peking 1792-1794 (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1992); Alain Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two 
Civilisations: The British Expedition to China in 1792-4 (London: Harvill, 1993); James L. Hevia, 
Cherishing men from afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1995). 
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opportunity for the Chinese to move towards some kind of accommodation with the West,
5
 
while others have argued that it was rather the result of competing world views which were 
uncomprehending and incompatible.
6
 The majority of these studies, however, were conducted 
from a political or diplomatic point of view. In particular, much attention has been paid to the 
controversy over the court rituals.
7
 This emphasis has placed limitations on our understanding 
of the Macartney mission. First, since only very few participants in the British delegation 
were well informed on the embassy’s official affairs, historians have previously focused too 
much on the accounts of the leading members of the mission, such as Macartney and his 
deputy, Sir George Leonard Staunton,
8
 but have overlooked the importance of the records 
written by some seemingly less important figures. By failing to compare these different 
accounts, most research in the past has failed to demonstrate that some of Macartney’s and 
Staunton’s attitudes were in fact self-serving views constructed to suit their own needs. 
Second, despite the fact that Macartney’s embassy did not succeed in achieving its 
commercial and diplomatic objectives, this visit provided these British visitors with an 
opportunity to make contact with various Chinese officials and people, as well as to cross 
through the interior of China. In consequence, detailed first-hand observations were brought 
back to Britain. The British at home were hence able to form more accurate and 
comprehensive perceptions of China’s situation at the time. This early knowledge of China 
obtained during the course of the Macartney embassy has not been sufficiently researched so 
far. Accordingly, in this chapter, not only will more attention be paid to test the fairness and 
                                                          
5  Zhang Shunhong, ‘Historical Anachronism: The Qing Court’s perception of and reaction to the 
Macartney Embassy’, in Ritual and Diplomacy: The Macartney mission to China, 1792-1794, ed. Robert 
A. Bickers (London: Wellsweep, 1993); Zhu, The Chinese Gate. 
6 Hevia, Cherishing men from afar. 
7 Ritual and Diplomacy, ed. Bickers; Hevia, Cherishing men from afar; Joseph W. Esherick, ‘Cherishing 
sources from afar’, Modern China, 24 (1998), 135-61. 
8 Sir George Leonard Staunton, 1st Baronet (1737-1801) was a close friend of Macartney’s. He served as 
Macartney’s secretary since Macartney was the Governor of Madras. Staunton was appointed in 1792 
Minister Plenipotentiary in the absence of ambassador, with authority to carry on the mission in case of 
Macartney’s death or incapacity. 
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reliability of the views advanced by the senior officials of this mission, but the perceptions 
and attitudes that developed as a result of this encounter will be closely examined.  
 
I 
Expectations and interpretations 
Six members of the Macartney mission have published accounts of their visits to China. 
When the embassy returned to Britain in 1794, Lord Macartney did not release his own 
journal. Instead, he gave his diary and correspondence to Staunton and urged him to produce 
An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China. 
This book remained as the most official account of the Macartney mission until 1962, in 
which year J.L. Cranmer-Byng edited Macartney’s journal as well as his ‘Observations on 
China’ and published them under the title of An Embassy to China. Two middle-ranked 
persons, John Barrow and James Dinwiddie, also printed records of their experiences with the 
embassy. The former, the comptroller of the mission,
 9
 published his Travels in China in 1804. 
The journal of the latter, the embassy’s technician,
10
 was edited and published by his 
grandson, William Jardine Proudfoot, in 1868. Lord Macartney’s valet, Aeneas Anderson, 
and a soldier named Samuel Holmes,
11
 although men from the lower orders, also had their 
diaries printed for the public. These two accounts appeared only a few years after the 
conclusion of the embassy, but they have been considered as either ‘vamped up by a London 
bookseller as a speculation’
12
 or as ‘nothing of value’.
13
 Among the works listed above, it is 
                                                          
9 John Barrow (1764-1859) obtained this post through Staunton’s patronage. He was then the private tutor 
of Staunton’s son, George Thomas Staunton.  
10 James Dinwiddie (1746-1815) was a well-known scientist in late-eighteenth-century Britain. His public 
lectures in science and scientific experiments gained him much fame across the British Isles. It was not 
quite clear why Dinwiddie was chosen to join Macartney’s embassy, but Dinwiddie’s ability to 
demonstrate Britain’s excellence in science and modern technology was probably a very important reason. 
11 Samuel Holmes was a sergeant-major in Macartney’s official guard. 
12 John Barrow, Travels in China (Philadelphia: W. E. M’Laughlin, 1805), p. 393. 
13 An Embassy to China: Being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor 
Ch’ien-lung 1793-1794, ed. J.L. Cranmer-Byng (London: Longmans, 1962), pp. 343-4, 346. In addition to 
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the first three that formerly received most attention, particularly on the parts relating to the 
kowtow issue. A complete survey of all these publications, however, tells us much more of 
importance about this British-Chinese encounter. 
        To begin with, as has been shown in the introduction, it is commonly known that there 
was a general decline in British opinions of China in the eighteenth century.
14
 This view, 
however, often leads to the assumption that, in the 1790s, British society had by and large 
reached a consensus on an unfavourable image of the Chinese empire. By examining the 
expectations of members of the Macartney embassy for their visit to China, it can be seen that 
British perceptions of China at this time were in fact not yet firmly established. According to 
his diary, we can find that, prior to the embassy, Lord Macartney indeed entertained an 
apparent distaste for China’s political and cultural practices, as well as great confidence in 
Britain’s superiority over the Chinese empire. At this time, with industrial advances 
transforming the landscape and society of the British Isles, enlightened ideas prevailed within 
British intellectual circles. Just like other celebrated figures, such as Samuel Johnson and 
Edmund Burke, both Macartney and Staunton, the former a member of the eminent Literary 
Club, the latter a Fellow of the Royal Society and an honourary doctoral degree holder of 
Oxford University, were convinced that science and progress were the key criteria for 
evaluating civilisations. For this reason, Macartney was not only confident about Britain’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
these works, there are a few unpublished manuscript journals kept by those in the retinue of Macartney’s 
embassy. They are: Stephen Else, Journal of a Voyage to the East Indies and an Historical Narrative of 
Lord Macartney’s Embassy to the Court of Pekin (London: Royal Geographical Society, 1793), B.K.S. 
case 260 H; William Alexander, Journal of Lord Macartney’s Embassy to China, 1792-1794, (London: 
British Museum), Add 35, 174 (I. 9); Edward Winder, Account of a Journey in China in 1793 in Lord 
Macartney’s Mission (Dublin: National Library of Ireland), MS 8799 (1). These materials are not 
preserved very well. Some parts are missing. Nevertheless, the useful contents of these accounts have been 
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superior learning and power, but determined to impress the Chinese with western science and 
technology. He maintained in his journal that:  
 
One great advantage indeed of the embassy is the opportunity it afforded of 
showing the Chinese to what a high degree of perfection the English nation had 
carried all the arts and accomplishments of civilized life; that their manners were 
calculated for the improvement of social intercourse and liberal commerce; that 
though great and powerful they were generous and humane, not fierce and 
impetuous like the Russians, but entitled to the respect and preference of the 
Chinese above the other European nations, whom they have any knowledge of.
15
  
 
This statement shows that, before he had even set foot on Chinese soil, Macartney had quite 
low expectations of the civilisation in China. To demonstrate the strength and ingenuity of 
Britain, rather than to find out about China, was one of the main objectives of his mission.  
        Nevertheless, it is important to note that this sentiment was not shared by all the 
members of Macartney’s embassy. In the accounts produced by others in the embassy, it can 
be shown that, unlike Macartney, a number of them actually had rather positive expectations 
for their visit to China. In this respect, Barrow wrote that, prior to the journey, he was 
informed that ‘The Chinese … are superior to all the Asiatic nations, in antiquity, in genius, 
in the progress of the sciences, in wisdom, in government, and in true philosophy; may, 
moreover, … enter the lists, on all these points, with the most enlightened nations of 
Europe’.
16
 Although there were doubts about these views, ‘upon the whole, however, the 
British embassy left England under a favourable impression of the people it was about to 
visit’.
17
 Moreover, Dinwiddie, a devoted scientist whose main job was to amaze the Chinese 
with Britain’s latest technology, was also one of those who were excited about the prospect of 
exploring China. He wrote:   
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To visit such a country – to have an opportunity of examining into the state and 
arts and manufactures there – was a theme of overpowering interest in the mind of 
an ardent philosopher, and it is easy to guess the feelings with which those 
favoured individuals, whom Government had honored on this occasion, set sail.
18
  
 
Henry Eades, the embassy’s metallurgist, even entertained the idea that China possessed 
some cutting-edge technology which was unknown to the rest of the world. According to 
Staunton’s account, Eades believed that ‘many improvements in the arts were practiced at 
Pekin, which were little known in Europe; among others, that of making a kind of tinsel that 
did not tarnish, or at least that kept without tarnishing much longer, than any that was made 
according to European methods’.
19 Although Eades eventually died on the road to Beijing, 
while he lived, this gentleman never stopped hoping that once he had acquired such 
techniques, he would be able to produce considerable wealth for his family. To this end, ‘he 
thought it not too much to shorten his own life, in a perilous voyage, for the sake of being 
able to communicate to his offspring, what would be the means of their prosperity’.
20 
This 
kind of evidence demonstrates that although, in the late-eighteenth century, elite Britons, 
such as Macartney and Staunton, might hold a firm belief in the inferiority of China’s 
civilisation compared to that of Britain, the views of other social classes were not necessarily 
the same. The latter’s expectations of what to find in China were more diverse and more 
inclined to be favourable. This contrast in opinions between different orders of the embassy 
can also be found as the mission proceeded. 
        In early October 1793, only a few days after the imperial audience, the Qing government 
sent some strong and clear signals to Macartney that the official business of the embassy had 
been concluded and the British should depart immediately from Beijing. This message was 
delivered in such a hasty and determined manner that even Macartney’s demand for a respite 
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of two more days was rejected. To most of the embassy members, who had been expecting to 
spend the winter in the Chinese capital, this quasi dismissal was sudden and disappointing. 
Some of them noted that the unexpected order to Macartney to leave without delay caused 
much hustle and bustle, as well as ‘a state of indescribable confusion’
21
 within the British 
delegation. Anderson claimed that ‘the manner in which the Ambassador was dismissed from 
Pekin was ungracious and mortifying in the extreme.’
22
 He wrote:  
 
Our surprise at such unexpected intelligence may be readily conceived, but the 
mortification which appeared throughout the palace on the occasion, was at least 
equal to the astonishment: …while our fatiguing pilgrimage was to be renewed, 
not only with all the humiliation that accompanies a forced submission to 
peremptory power, but with the painful despondency which arises from the 
sudden annihilation of sanguine and well-grounded hope. … But, though we 
might, in the first moments of surprise, be disposed to feel something for 
ourselves, superior considerations soon succeeded, and we forgot the trifle of 
personal inconvenience, in the failure of a political measure which had been 
pursued with so much labour, hazard, and perseverance; had been supported with 
such enormous expense, and to which our country looked with eager expectation, 
for the aggrandizement of its commercial interests.
23
  
 
This general sentiment within the British embassy, however, was well concealed in the 
narratives of Macartney and Staunton. Macartney’s diary entries for these few days were 
remarkably short. He simply explained that the reason given by the Chinese government was 
the extreme coldness of Beijing’s winter and he justified his own decision in only a few lines. 
Macartney wrote:  
 
It is now beyond a doubt, although nothing was said upon the subject, that the 
Court wishes us to be gone, and if we don’t take the hints already given, they may 
possibly be imparted to us in a broader and coarser manner, which would be 
equally unpleasant to the dignity of the Embassy and the success of its objects.
24
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        Staunton, in comparison, gave a more detailed explanation for the necessity of this 
sudden departure. Among other reasons, he pointed out that, due to the probable outbreak of 
war between Britain and France, a warship was needed to convoy British merchant ships 
back home. Since the embassy’s flagship, the sixty-four-gun Lion, was the best available for 
the time being, the British mission should lose no time in joining the Lion’s Captain, Sir 
Erasmus Gower, at Chu-san (Zhoushan).
25
 Moreover, with regard to the deep disappointment 
within the embassy, Staunton noted as follows: 
 
So sudden a removal was a disappointment to several persons of the Embassy, 
who had made their arrangements for passing the winter at Pekin. Judging of its 
temperature by the latitude of the place, a few minutes under forty degrees north, 
they were not aware of the violent effect of the great range of high Tartarian 
mountains, covered perpetually with snow, upon that capital, where the average 
degree of the thermometer, is under twenty in the night during the winter months, 
and even in the day time considerably below the freezing point.
26
 
 
In this manner, Staunton not only interpreted the extent of the frustration to be among only 
‘several persons’, but partly agreed with the Chinese on the justification for the embassy’s 
removal from Beijing. In comparison with that of other British authors, this interpretation 
was much more positive. As the most senior officials of the embassy, Macartney and 
Staunton tended to justify the departure as a sensible ‘decision’ based on rational advice, 
rather than an ungracious dismissal. In their journals, the bustle and depression across much 
of the British delegation was completely ignored. They did not even seem to have much 
regret for not remaining in the Chinese capital. In this light, therefore, the request to leave 
Beijing became neither unacceptable, nor inconsistent with the interests of Britain.  
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        Although from Anderson’s standpoint, the departure from Beijing implied the failure of 
the embassy’s political undertaking, Macartney and Staunton never accepted this conclusion. 
Throughout the return journey, they seemed anxious to prove this opinion wrong, even 
though none of them had clearly stated that his arguments were opposed to such a conclusion. 
In order to defend their view that the mission was not a failure, various viewpoints and 
images were raised and constructed. First of all, it was maintained that, despite the great 
distance from the imperial court, Macartney actually obtained a much more effective channel 
of communication with the emperor than he would have done by staying at Beijing. This was 
because, as Macartney and Staunton both maintained, the two Chinese officers conducting 
them on their return journey, Songyun and Changlin,
27
 were very kind and helpful to the 
British mission. Since they held ‘a regular and almost daily correspondence with the 
Emperor’,
28
 intercourse with the Chinese sovereign ‘was in fact maintained … more 
intimately … than while he [Macartney] remained in the middle of his court’.
29
 Owing to this 
favourable channel, Macartney eventually had a chance to advance some of the real 
objectives of the mission, such as the extension of China’s foreign trade and the 
establishment of a permanent ambassadorship in Beijing. Although these requests were all 
eventually turned down, Macartney suggested that it was due to the invariable laws and 
usages of China,
30
 rather than any particular ill feelings occasioned by his embassy. 
Moreover, he claimed that Songyun and Changlin were keen to impress upon him the opinion 
that the emperor had a good disposition towards the embassy as well as towards Great Britain. 
To account for this perception, Macartney spared no effort in collecting every positive sign 
that might support his own view. For example, the civility and respect with which the 
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embassy was treated along the return journey were taken as strong evidence that not only was 
the emperor not affronted by his refusal to kowtow, but he actually had a favourable attitude 
towards the embassy. For this reason, Macartney reported that some gracious messages had 
been conveyed to him by Songyun and Chnaglin that ‘the English merchant should be treated 
with kindness and favour’,
31
 even though Macartney had failed to attain from them any 
written statement of this generous intention. 
        Furthermore, it was maintained that, through frequent intercourse with these 
accompanying officers, and because of the British embassy’s presence in China, Chinese 
prejudice against the British was considerably softened and was gradually diminishing. 
Macartney claimed that it was completely understandable that the Chinese, as ‘one of the 
vainest nations in the world’,
32
 should have held poor impressions of the British in the past. 
Nevertheless, ‘By my Embassy the Chinese have had, what they never had before, an 
opportunity of knowing us, this must lead them to a proper way of thinking of us and of 
acting towards us in future’.
33
 Staunton added that, in recent contacts between the two nations, 
on the one hand, some Chinese senior officials had become convinced that Britain indeed had 
no other purpose in view than developing a mutually beneficial trade relationship with China. 
In addition, many more Chinese people had been given an opportunity to learn ‘some of the 
advantages which the English now had over them’.
34
 In consequence, their ‘superior 
knowledge and acquirements’ earned for the British ‘admiration, esteem, and consequent 
good treatment’.
35
 The Chinese perceptions of Britain were hence greatly improved. In order 
to highlight this important achievement of his embassy, Macartney earnestly emphasised this 
opinion in the conclusion of his journal. He wrote:  
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It is no small advantage rising from the Embassy that so many Englishmen have 
been seen at Pekin, from whose brilliant appearance and prudent demeanour a 
most favourable idea has been formed of the country which had sent them. Nor is 
it any strain of vanity to say that the principal persons of rank who, from their 
intercourse with us, had opportunities of observing our manners, tempers and 
discipline very soon dismissed the prejudices they had conceived against us, and 
by a generous transition grew to admire and respect us as a nation and to love us 
as individuals.
36
  
 
        Despite the fact that efforts had been made to demonstrate that the embassy was not a 
failure, it was evident from Macartney’s and Staunton’s accounts that it did not succeed in 
most of its primary objectives. Why this mission was not successful in achieving all its goals, 
therefore, became another important question which the British diplomats had to answer. As 
with the previous analysis, a range of images and perceptions relative to the Chinese affair 
were created to suit their explanations. According to the arguments of Macartney and 
Staunton, the principal cause was the prejudice and hostility of a very few powerful ministers 
who stood between the British visitors and the emperor, as well as between them and the 
Chinese people. To prove this, Macartney contended that, contrary to the common notion that 
the Chinese monarch had absolute control over all state affairs, the practical operation of the 
Chinese government was in fact quite different: 
 
Although the Emperor was styled despotic, and decorated with all the titles and 
epithets of oriental hyperbole, the power and administration of the State resided in 
the great councils or tribunals, whose functions were not to be violated or 
disturbed by court intrigue or ministerial caprice. … The government as it now 
stands is properly the tyranny of a handful of Tartars over more than three 
hundred millions of Chinese.
37
 
 
For this reason, when he was obliged to leave Beijing without achieving any of his main 
objectives, Macarteny asserted that:  
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from the observations which it has fallen in my way to make, I should rather 
imagine that the personal character of the Ministers, alarmed by the most trifling 
accident, the aversion they may naturally have to sudden innovation, especially at 
the Emperor’s late period of life … have been among the chief obstacles to my 
business.
38
 
 
        Compared to this general comment, Staunton’s criticism of these principal ministers was 
more specific. He pointed out that Fukang-an, one of the six grand councillors, and Heshen, 
the Colao,
39
 were the most blameable persons. Fukang-an, as introduced by Staunton, was a 
Manchu general who had governed many provinces, including Canton. Not long before, he 
had led a military campaign against the Gurkhas on the Tibet-Nepal border, where he claimed 
to have met interference from the British. Perhaps because of these reasons, no matter how 
hard Macartney endeavoured to please him, Fukang-an remained extremely hostile to the 
embassy. Fukang-an’s animosity towards the British was so obvious and strong that Staunton 
could not help exclaiming that: 
 
nothing was, perhaps, more desirable for its [Britain’s] interest in China, than 
that he should neither be continued in the councils of the Emperor, or be sent 
back to the vice-royalty of Canton, where he might oppress the factory there, or 
misrepresent their conduct and disposition in his dispatches to the 
government.’
40
 
 
Heshen, the minister who enjoyed the almost exclusive confidence of the Qianlong emperor, 
was considered by Staunton as ‘The Vizier of China, who … possess[es], in fact, under the 
Emperor, the whole power of the empire’.
41
 Although in his intercourse with the British 
diplomats, Heshen ‘indeed displayed all the good breeding and politeness of an experienced 
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39 Both Staunton and Macartney translated ‘Colao’ as ‘prime minister’. An analogy was apparently drawn 
between the British and Chinese political systems.   
40 Staunton, An Authentic Account, II, 274. 
41 Ibid., II, 210-11. 
45 
 
courtier’,
42
 it was apparent that his real attitude was the same as that of Fukang-an’s. In 
Macartney’s estimation, it was Heshen, rather than anybody else, who was behind various 
designs to render his embassy unproductive. For instance, he wrote that: 
 
It is much regretted that as the first Minister was determined not to give me such 
opportunities as I sought for conversing upon business with him, he had not 
appointed Sung-yun to attend to us from the beginning instead of the Legate [the 
earlier conducting officer], as possibly we might have been able by his means or 
through his channel to enter into negotiation, whereas the Legate did everything in 
his power to obstruct and disappoint us.
43  
 
        In conjunction with the perception that these senior ministers were responsible for the 
difficulties the British embassy had encountered, Macartney and Staunton presented a liberal, 
amicable and father-like image of the Chinese emperor. They insisted that he was ‘a leader of 
a calm judgement’,
44
 who had ‘a high esteem for the Ambassador and his nation … and … 
[was] determined to protect their trade’.
45
 Even on the controversy over kowtow, it was 
believed that ‘the good sense and liberality of the emperor himself, cloyed too perhaps with 
adoration, rendered him much more inclined than any of his advisers, to dispense with that 
ceremony in the present instance’.
46
 While, by contrast, it was those few ministers ‘more than 
the Emperor himself, [who] adhered to this antiquated claim of superiority over other 
nations’.
47
 With regard to the disposition of lesser-ranked mandarins as well as the Chinese 
common people, Macartney and Staunton also introduced a rather positive impression. The 
British ambassador noted that:    
 
most of the principal people, whom I have had opportunities of knowing, I have 
found sociable, conversable, good-humoured, and not at all indisposed to 
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foreigners. As to the lower orders, they are all of a trafficking turn, and it seemed 
at the seaports where we stopped that nothing would be more agreeable to them 
than to see our ships often in their harbours.
48  
 
By such means, the contention that the British embassy obtained respect and favour from the 
vast majority of the Chinese, including the emperor himself, was further strengthened. The 
success of the mission was unfortunately undermined only by the attitude of a handful of 
prejudiced Tartar ministers. 
        In addition, both these British diplomats maintained that, according to the character of 
the Chinese government, no concession could possibly be made all of a sudden, but provided 
with time and patience, good results might follow in due course. This attitude was largely 
drawn from Father Amiot, a helpful French missionary who had served in the Chinese court 
since 1750 and was regarded as ‘the spiritual leader of the missionaries in Peking’.
49
 Shortly 
before Macartney decided to request permission to depart from Beijing, a letter was received 
from Amiot with his views on and advice to the British mission. He claimed that, based on 
his knowledge and experience, the Chinese had no idea of commercial treaties and modern 
diplomacy, but, ‘they might be rendered sensible of them if applied to and solicited without 
precipitation, and managed with caution and adroitness, for nothing was to be expected as 
attainable on the sudden’.
50
 In light of this advice, Staunton was convinced that:  
 
such was the nature and practice of the Chinese government, that however adverse 
in the beginning to any new propositions, lest it should be surprised into an undue 
concession or improper regulation, the same matters might be brought again, 
when the offensive novelty of the idea was over, into a more serious and 
dispassionate consideration.
51
 
 
                                                          
48 An Embassy to China, p. 153. 
49 Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two Civilisations, p. 555. 
50 An Embassy to China, p. 153. 
51 Staunton, An Authentic Account, II, 335-6. 
47 
 
Since ‘the present mission had made such an impression throughout the empire’,
52
 and the 
emperor ‘entertained very kind intentions with regard to us’,
53
 beneficial consequences could 
still eventually be obtained ‘by time and management’,
54
 despite them not having been 
achieved immediately. According to this perception, nothing wrong had been done by the 
Macartney embassy to render it less productive than had been hoped. Given the character of 
the Chinese government, not only was the request to depart from Beijing justified, but 
favourable foundations had been laid for future British-Chinese contacts. The present mission, 
therefore, had not in fact proved to be entirely unsuccessful. 
        Notwithstanding these self-serving explanations offered by Macartney and Staunton, 
their views were not confirmed by all the other embassy members who published their views. 
Dinwiddie, in particular, was dissatisfied with many of their arguments. He asserted that, 
despite the fact that the heads of the embassy endeavoured to ‘look upon their treatment in 
the most favourable light’,
55
 it was indisputable that the mission was so shameful for the 
British that ‘no apology will satisfy’ the public when they returned home.
56
 Even though 
general assurances were allegedly made by Chinese officials in private conversations to the 
effect that the trading conditions of British merchants in China would be improved, ‘nothing 
that looks like an improvement has yet taken place’
57
 and ‘the Chinese are not likely to make 
any alteration in our trade’.
58
 In this light, in contrast to the contention that no immediate 
achievements were obtained because of the unique character of the Chinese government, 
Dinwiddie claimed that, ‘the behaviour of the gentlemen of the Embassy themselves was the 
principal cause’ of the embassy’s failure.
59
 First of all, since Dinwiddie’s main task had been 
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to impress the Chinese with various presents, he maintained that mistakes had been made in 
terms of the selection and presentation of these gifts. For one thing, the erection of some 
highly sophisticated machines should have been concealed from the Chinese before they were 
presented as a whole. As a result, what transpired was that the sensation they created was so 
much reduced that very few of the Chinese were impressed. Some of them even doubted the 
British mechanics’ ability to set up their own machines. For another thing, since the Chinese 
were only able to appreciate a limited number of the presents, ‘to have any good effect on the 
Chinese’, more military contrivances rather than scientific apparatus should have been taken, 
and ‘the guns ought to have been of a larger calibre’.
60
 Second, Dinwiddie complained that 
the leadership of the embassy was unprofessional and indecisive, to such an extent that ‘In all 
our operations, no plan or system has been adopted; no regular orders given, [or] at least 
adhered to’.
61
 For example, it was well-known that Heshen was ‘one of the most corrupt men 
in the empire’. Although the Colao always refused to receive a public present, he was in fact 
expecting ‘something considerable in a private way’.
62
 Failing to bribe such a key figure, in 
fact, rendered the mission fruitless. Moreover, in employing a suspicious Portuguese 
missionary as Dinwiddie’s interpreter, inconsistent and contradictory instructions were given 
by the heads of the embassy. This fact resulted in much embarrassment for Dinwiddie. Hence, 
he became further convinced that it was mainly the mistakes of Macartney and Staunton that 
had caused the failure of the mission. 
        Apart from the ill conduct of these leading British officials, Dinwiddie also attributed 
the embassy’s diplomatic failure to the ignorance and prejudice of the Chinese. As a devoted 
scientist, Dinwiddie actually seemed much offended by the manner in which the Chinese 
court viewed the British gifts. He noted that, when the emperor came to examine the 
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scientific instruments, he ‘expressed nothing observable in his countenance’.
63
 Many state-of-
the-art apparatus, such as the air-pump, were only regarded by him as ‘good enough to amuse 
children’.
 64
 When a variety of experiments were performed in the presence of Heshen and a 
number of mandarins, they ‘seemed little pleased with the most entertaining’.
65
 Even the trial 
that showed how a convex lens could set fire to wood and melt coins did not seem to excite 
the interest of any of them. Instead, the Colao asked: ‘How can an enemy’s town be set on 
fire by the lens? How will it act in a cloudy day?’
66
 These comments and attitudes showed 
how little the Chinese were acquainted with science at this time and hence they were 
considered by Dinwiddie as ‘truly provoking to a European philosopher’.
67
 Since the failure 
to impress the Chinese by these machines and experiments undermined the success of 
Dinwiddie’s official business, he entirely abandoned the positive image that he had 
previously entertained of China. It can be observed in his journal how, during the return 
journey, the Chinese were repeatedly accused of sheer ignorance and prejudice. These 
insurmountable obstacles were therefore seen by Dinwiddie as another important reason for 
the embassy’s complete failure.  
        Compared to Dinwiddie, the lower-ranked embassy members, such as Anderson and 
Holmes, did not comment so much on the management and result of the Macartney mission. 
Some of their observations, however, also revealed that certain important impressions 
introduced by the principal persons of the embassy deserve further examination. Most 
important, with regard to the reported cheerful disposition of most Chinese mandarins and 
people, Holmes maintained that this was actually not their real character. On the contrary, it 
was occasioned by their fear of offending their guests whom they were ordered to respect. 
Holmes noted that, ‘though, in many instances, they treated us with singular marks of respect, 
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yet all their attention to us seemed tempered with fear and dread; it was apparent enough that 
they wished us away from amongst them’.
68
 To demonstrate further that the attention with 
which the British embassy was received derived from the Chinese officials’ dread of 
displeasing their superiors rather than indicating any genuine hospitality, Holmes added that, 
apart from the principal ministers, who had no fear of any authority, most mandarins who had 
contacts with the British 
 
treated us with singular marks of attention and politeness, and were ever anxious 
to do us some acceptable piece of service, where it did not endanger their own 
personal safety; but the slightest deviation from any given order is punished with 
such severity, without regard to the rank of the offender, that all are very cautious; 
and more particularly, when that order respects any Europeans or strangers, of 
whom they are so unaccountably suspicious and fearful.
69
 
 
        According to this interpretation, Macartney’s claim that his mission obtained the 
goodwill of the majority of the Chinese was severely challenged. Furthermore, Anderson’s 
account suggested that Macartney and Staunton focused too much on the civility and respect 
the British embassy was receiving during the journey, but considerably ignored the 
disrespectful manner in which they were treated by the Chinese court once they arrived there. 
In particular, Anderson noted that, prior to the embassy’s arrival in Jehol, where the imperial 
audience was scheduled to take place, Macartney was anxious to create a favourable 
impression of his mission on those Chinese high officials who were supposed to welcome 
them at the city gate. To achieve this end, he was determined to impress the Chinese court by 
a glorious procession, so that repeated practices and rehearsals were made during the few 
days before the embassy’s arrival. To everyone’s great disappointment, however, when the 
embassy finally reached its destination, not only did Macartney’s highly anticipated meeting 
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with Heshen not occur on this occasion, but ‘not a mandarin appeared to congratulate the 
Ambassador on his arrival, or to usher him, with that form which his dignity demanded, to 
the apartments provided for him’.
70
 This dishonourable reception, as might be expected, did 
not appear in Macartney’s or Staunton’s account. Neither was any importance attached by 
them to the disappointment and frustration it generated across the embassy. To the lower-
order persons, who were not informed of official affairs, however, it did send them the very 
first signal that the success of the embassy was becoming problematical. Anderson wrote: 
 
Nothing, however, as yet transpired that could lead us to form a judgment as to 
the final issue of the business: as far as any opinion could be formed as to the 
general aspect of things, it did not bear the promise of that success which had 
been originally expected from it.
71
 
 
        Last but not least, there is evidence that not only did the heads of the embassy tend to 
describe the mission experience to suit their own purposes, but so did such middle-ranked 
men as Dinwiddie. Contrary to Dinwiddie’s assertion that the Chinese were too ignorant to 
appreciate the ingenuity of British presents and the principles of science, Anderson noted in 
his journal that:  
 
several of these presents, which a trial of them was made before the mandarins, 
were found to fail in the operations and powers attributed to them; and others of 
them did not excite that surprise and admiration in the breasts of the Chinese 
philosophers, which Dr. Dinwiddie and Mr. Barrow expected, who immediately 
determined upon the ignorance that prevailed in China, and the gross obstinacy of 
the people.
72
 
 
This evidence shows that, even though Dinwiddie kept criticising Macartney and Staunton 
for hiding their own mistakes and interpreting the mission in the most favourable light, he 
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himself showed similar intentions in describing his own role. Compared to the heads of the 
embassy, Dinwiddie had less reason to deny that his own task ended in total failure, but he 
did not mention the failure of some of his experiments in his journal at all. He attributed the 
failure of the embassy entirely to the misconduct of the British officials and the ignorance of 
the Chinese mandarins. These failures, however, could well have been due to Dinwiddie 
himself, as well as being a key reason why the Chinese spectators were not impressed by the 
British presents. On this basis, even the commonly held assumption that western technology 
at this time enormously exceeded Chinese understanding can be doubted. 
        To sum up, by examining and comparing various accounts of the Macartney embassy, it 
can be seen that men of different social ranks entertained diverse expectations for their visit 
to China. From a variety of perspectives, they also tended to interpret the occurrences on the 
mission in ways that suited their own purposes. Although the number of examples given 
herein is limited, the contrast between these different opinions strongly indicates that these 
authors indeed were self-serving in their intentions when they were explaining the actions 
and legacy of the embassy. It is understandable that all observers have their own perspectives, 
but, in the case of the Macartney mission, it has to be remembered that some of the key 
perceptions of the embassy’s members were at least partly constructed to justify certain 
standpoints and actions of the authors of them, rather than being entirely objective 
observations as they might appeared to be. 
 
II 
Discoveries and prospects 
Although the Macartney embassy did not secure any material concession from the imperial 
court of China, this mission did enable the British travellers to make contact with the Chinese 
government in a way that had never been achieved before, as well as allowing Britons to 
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traverse the interior of China for the very first time. The detailed observations they made 
during this experience built the foundations for British understanding of China in the 
nineteenth century. They were, however, another important aspect of the embassy that 
previous scholarship has failed to examine. Much first-hand knowledge about China gained 
at this time remains insufficiently investigated. A survey of the perceptions and attitudes 
developed during this significant encounter, therefore, is worth making and should prove 
valuable. 
        One of the greatest discoveries made by Macartney’s embassy is that China in the Qing 
dynasty was actually a country of two distinct nations, the Chinese and the Tartars. Unlike 
previous commentators who confounded these two peoples under the general name of 
Chinese, the British visitors had discovered that ‘although their appearance and manners are 
externally the same, a closer acquaintance soon discovers that in disposition they are widely 
different’.
73
 According to their observations, the Chinese were ‘more regularly educated, 
more learned and more patient than the Tartars’, while the latter ‘in general … prefer active 
military duty to tranquil or sedentary occupations’.
74
 Despite the fact that, after their conquest 
of China in 1644, the Tartars had adopted a lot of Chinese manners and retained a great part 
of the Ming dynasty’s government administration, they also paid much attention to 
preserving their own identity and to promoting Tartar culture within the empire. These 
measures, however, did not entirely merge the two nations. Instead, there had always been 
‘mutual jealousy and antipathy’
75
 between them. The Tartars regarded the Chinese as a 
conquered nation, while ‘The Chinese consider the Tartars in general in the light of 
barbarians’.
76
 Although the Qing emperor professed impartiality and wished to have it 
understood that he made no distinction between the two nations which he governed, ‘neither 
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Tartars nor Chinese are imposed upon by the pretence’.
77
 In this respect, Macartney claimed 
that: 
 
whatever might be concluded from any outward appearances, the real distinction 
is never forgotten by the sovereign who, though he pretends to be perfectly 
impartial, conducts himself at bottom by a systematic nationality, and never for a 
moment loses sight of the cradle of his power. … The Viceorys of the provinces, 
the commanders of the armies, the great officers of state are almost all Tartars. 
The detail of business indeed, and the laborious departments are chiefly carried on 
by the Chinese. … In all the tribunals of justice and finance, in all the courts of 
civil or military administration, an equal number of Tartar assessors is 
indispensably necessary to be present, in order to watch over and control the 
others. A Chinese may preside at the Board, and pronounce the opinion, but the 
prompter and manager is a Tartar who directs and governs the performers. These 
regulations and precautions sufficiently disclose the sovereign’s real opinion of 
his tenure of the empire, and how little he depends upon the affections and loyalty 
of his Chinese subjects.
78
 
 
        Macartney drew most of this intelligence from two friendly Chinese escort officers, 
Wang Wenxiong and Qiao Renjie. Through them, Macartney found that the predominance of 
the Tartars and the emperor’s partiality for his own nation were common subjects of 
conversation among the Chinese whenever they met together in private. In public, however, it 
was noticed that these two Chinese officials had to pay humble deference to Tartar mandarins, 
insomuch that they did not even venture to sit down in the presence of a Tartar officer of the 
same rank as themselves. These observations helped the British visitors form an impression 
that the internal conflicts between China’s two nations were so serious that to the Chinese it 
was like living under ‘a foreign tyranny’.
79
 On the basis of these perceptions, some of the 
British commentators gradually realised that the stability and integrity of the Chinese empire 
was becoming such a matter of concern for the Qing rulers that even a collapse from within 
was not entirely inconceivable. Barrow wrote that: 
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Whether this most ancient empire among men will long continue in its stability 
and integrity can only be matter of conjecture: but certain it is, the Chinese are 
greatly dissatisfied, and not without reason, at the imperious tone now openly 
assumed by the Tartars; and though they are obliged to cringe and submit, in order 
to rise to any distinction in the state, yet they unanimously load them with “curses, 
not loud, but deep, mouth-honour breath” … Whenever the dismemberment or 
dislocation of this great machine shall take place, either by a rebellion or 
revolution, it must be at the expense of many millions of lives.
80
 
 
These new images of China certainly differed from any previous assumptions held by other 
British observers. British knowledge about the Chinese empire was hence greatly 
strengthened as a result of this very first Sino-British official encounter. 
        Apart from the differences between the Chinese and the Tartars, the British embassy 
also realised that their visit to China was in essence an attempt to establish an amicable 
intercourse ‘with a suspicious and forbidding court’.
81
 Shortly after the delegation arrived in 
China, the caution and vigilance of the Qing government were clearly perceived by the 
British. Macartney noted that, ‘we have indeed been very narrowly watched, and all our 
customs, habits and proceedings, even of the most trivial nature, observed with an 
inquisitiveness and jealousy which surpassed all that we had read of in the history of 
China’.
82
 Moreover, particular care was also taken by the Chinese authorities to prevent the 
British travellers from making contact with the common people of China. During the journey, 
when the British wished to make some excursions from their boats into the towns or the 
countryside nearby, ‘our wishes were seldom gratified’.
83
 In Beijing, Holmes wrote that, 
except for Lord Macartney, ‘none of his train, gentle or simple, were ever allowed to leave 
the place appointed for them, not even to peep out of it, till permission was obtained’.
84
 This 
extreme suspicion by the Chinese government, however, was not merely restricted to visitors 
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to China. As the embassy proceeded, the British observers gradually learned that the same 
caution was applied to the subjects of the empire as well. Macartney maintained in the 
Chinese capital that, ‘The police is singularly strict. It is indeed stretched to an extent 
unknown I believe in any other city, and strongly marks the jealousy of the Government, and 
their unceasing apprehension of danger’.
85
 Staunton found that, ‘the provident attention of the 
Chinese government preserves carefully the exclusive advantage of giving information to, or 
withholding it, as it may deem expedient, from the body of the people’.
86
 For example, 
although an express mail system was well established, its purpose was solely to convey 
messages to and from the emperor and his court: ‘There is no establishment of a post for the 
general convenience of the people through the Chinese empire’.
87
 Neither were canals in 
China built to benefit the public. They were all ‘under the regulation and immediate 
inspection of the government, whose policy is to maintain an easy communication between 
the several parts of the empire’.
88
 It was through this strict control of information, the British 
commentators found, that the Chinese government not only developed a high notion of self-
importance among its people, as well as ‘invincible prejudices’
89
 in favour of its own customs 
and practices, but also learned to ‘undervalue in their eyes as much as possible the superior 
invention of foreign nations’.
90
 Even though it had been more than two centuries since they 
were first acquainted with Europeans, the Qing rulers never gave up their ‘vanity of an 
usurped national superiority’
91
 or attempted to adopt western science and technology. Instead, 
over the past two hundred and fifty years or so, they had remained ‘averse to all novelties, 
and wish[es] to discountenance a taste for any foreign article that is not absolutely 
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necessary’.
92
 As a result, ‘the Chinese, in some instances, were centuries behind the nations 
of Europe’.
93
 The ‘extraordinary ignorance’
94
 of the Chinese people, hence, became another 
important discovery of the British embassy. 
        According to the observations of these British travellers, the ignorance of the Chinese 
people generally ‘has no bounds’.
95
 Dinwiddie claimed that, ‘In no country, perhaps, do 
popular errors and prejudices prevail so much [as] in China’.
96
 In particular, the Chinese were 
said to ‘have scarcely an idea of there being any other country than their own’.
97
 They 
believed themselves ‘the only enlightened people, and that all other nations are barbarous; 
that China is situated in the middle of the earth, and all other countries scattered round it’.
98
 
Staunton once heard that Holland was considered by the ministers of China as ‘bearing a 
political weight proportioned only to its size’
99
 and the same rule was applied to Britain. He 
was also informed that, in the opinion of the Chinese court, a key scale for judging the 
relative importance of other nations was the degrees to which they tended to accept the 
superiority of the Chinese sovereign. It was for these reasons, Staunton inferred, that Britain, 
as a small island country whose ambassadors did not even know how to perform kowtow, 
failed to establish equal diplomatic relations with the Chinese empire.
100
 In respect of science, 
the British commentators were also convinced that ‘the Chinese are certainly far behind the 
European world’.
101
 They claimed that ‘no branch of natural philosophy is made a study, or a 
pursuit, in China’,
102
 because ‘as soon as the product of any art or manufacture has appeared 
to answer the general purpose for which it was intended, it seldom happens that the 
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Chinese … endeavour to make any further progress’.
103
 For instance, although, in Chinese 
superstition, much importance was attached to astrology, ‘not a single Chinese, nor a Tartar, 
who shewed themselves there, were possessed of the slightest knowledge of astronomy, nor 
one who could explain any of the various phenomena of the heavenly bodies’.
104
 Moreover, 
‘Of pneumatics, hydrostatics, electricity, and magnetism, they may be said to have little or no 
knowledge’.
105
 In the art of navigation, Chinese maps were ‘so confused and incorrect’
106
 that 
‘they have no means whatsoever of ascertaining the latitude or the longitude of any place’.
107
 
Instead, ‘The present system of Chinese navigation is to keep as near the shore as possible; 
and never to lose sight of land, unless in voyages that absolutely require it’.
108
  
        With regard to the military and civil infrastructures of China, members of the Macartney 
embassy also obtained rather negative impressions. Chinese military displays were 
considered to be ‘always unsoldierlike, and their march tumultuous. Bows, sabers, and 
matchlocks, were the only distinguishable weapons’.
109
 Their guns were described as 
‘nothing more than a piece of hollowed wood’
110
 and proper cannons were never seen 
throughout the journey except for a few ‘rude, ill-sharpen[ed], and disproportionate pieces’
111
 
in Beijing, Hangzhou and on the frontier of Canton. In addition, there were basically no 
inland roads in China, insomuch that ‘there is scarcely a road in the whole country that can be 
ranked beyond a foot-path’.
112
 Chinese carriages, even though they were the best ones the 
Qing government could provide for the use of the British mission, were deemed as 
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‘extremely uncomfortable’ and ‘the most uneasy vehicles that can be imagined’.
113
 As for the 
imperial palace in which the British stayed in Beijing, Anderson commented that ‘I could see 
nothing that disposed me to believe the extraordinary accounts which I had heard and read of 
the wonders of the imperial residence of Pekin’.
114
 He thought that the architecture of that 
palace was ‘not only destitute of elegance, but in a wretched state of repair’, and generally 
‘unworthy the residence of the representative of a great monarch’.
115
 Even the dwelling of the 
emperor and the grand hall in which he held audiences, ‘when divested of the gilding and the 
gaudy colours with which they are daubed, are little superior, and much less solid, than the 
barns of a substantial English farmer’.
116
 Moreover, compared to European cities, Barrow 
noted that Beijing had no ‘conveniences of common sewers, to carry off the dirt and dregs 
that much necessarily accumulate in large cities’.
117
 Hence, ‘a constant disgusting odour 
remains in and about all the houses the whole day long, from the fermentation of the 
heterogeneous mixtures kept above ground, which, in our great cities, are carried off in 
drains’.
118
 In the rural areas, contrary to the notion that the Chinese excelled in agricultural 
techniques, it was found that the Chinese approach to farming was in fact ‘incapable of 
performing the operations of husbandry to the greatest advantage’.
119
 Not only were some of 
the implements which they made use of the same as those employed two thousand years ago, 
but ‘They have no knowledge of the modes of improvement practiced in the various breeds of 
cattle; no instruments for breaking up and preparing waste lands; no system for draining and 
reclaiming swamps and morasses’.
120
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        With respect to Chinese arts and literature, it was believed that, first of all, Chinese 
painters ‘can be considered in no other light than as miserable daubers’.
121
 Barrow 
maintained that the Chinese were ‘unable to pencil out a correct outline of many objects, to 
give body to the same by the application of proper lights and shadows, and to lay on the nice 
shades of colour, so as to resemble the tints of nature’.
122
 Even with regard to the paintings in 
the imperial collection, ‘none of the rules of perspective were observed, nor any attempt to 
throw the objects to their proper distances’.
123
 The Chinese mode of education, Barrow went 
on to claim, focused too much on the classical works of Confucius, ‘who lived about 450 
years before the Christian era’.
124
 As a result, ‘little improvement seems to have been made in 
the last two thousand years’
125
 in Chinese literature. Since the examinations to be passed for 
the attainment of government office were principally confined to the knowledge of the 
language, no progress in science was likely to be fostered in such a system. Even with respect 
to the high civility of the Chinese, which was well-known to European readers, Dinwiddie 
asserted that, the previous authors of China must ‘have made out their description from 
Confutzee what ought to be, rather than what is’,
126
 because, throughout their journey, the 
British travellers failed to form such an impression. Instead, ‘We have experienced … the 
most violent fermentation of passions, throwing stones, boxing on the highway, frequent 
wrangling in the palace, and impudent boys’.
127
 With reference to such discoveries, it can be 
observed that the accounts published as a result of the British embassy of 1793 presented a 
very different image of China compared to those which readers might have previously found 
in print. These British commentators who had served on the Macartney embassy, regardless 
of their social class, basically held the same view of Chinese civilisation. They agreed that no 
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matter what high degree of perfection the Chinese had achieved in the distant past, they had 
failed to develop and had even taken some retrograde steps in recent times. With regard to the 
progress of science and technology in recent centuries, Britain had leaped far ahead of China. 
Both Staunton and Macartney claimed that, 
 
when China was visited by Marco Polo, the natives of it had already reached their 
highest pitch of civilization, in which they were certainly much superior to their 
conquerors, as well as to their European contemporaries;
128
  
…  
but not having improved and advanced forward, or having rather gone back, at 
least for these one hundred and fifty years past, since the last conquest by the 
northern or Manchu Tartars; whilst we have been everyday rising in arts and 
sciences, they are actually become a semi-barbarous people in comparison with 
the present nations of Europe.
129
  
  
        To account for the underdevelopment of China, the British travellers formed another key 
perception that explained why the Chinese had failed to keep pace with the western world. 
They maintained that, the fundamental reason for this was that the Chinese government had 
established a range of maxims that swayed the sentiments and actions of its people. In 
particular, the principle of filial piety had been instilled throughout their history to such an 
extent that a system of universal obedience towards superiors pervaded every branch of 
China’s public service. In this respect, Barrow commented that, ‘Filial duty is, in fact, in 
China, less a moral sentiment than a precept which by length of time has acquired the 
efficacy of a positive law; and it may truly be said to exist more in the maxim of the 
government than in the minds of the people’.
130
 Since the entire submission of children to the 
will of their parents was inculcated ‘from early childhood amongst the lowest as well as 
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highest classes of society’,
131
 the strength of parental authority gained much ground by 
precept and habit. As a result, ‘it gives to the parent the exercise of the same unlimited and 
arbitrary power over his children that the emperor, the common father, possesses by law over 
his people’.
132
 To strengthen this long-established precept, ‘The laws of the empire, to 
corroborate the disposition to filial obedience, furnish an opportunity for punishing any 
breach of it, by leaving a man’s offspring entirely within his power’.
133
 In addition, the 
government of China employed many intellectuals to write extensively on this subject, in 
order to impress upon the minds of the people the similarity between the authority which the 
emperor exercised over his subjects and that which a parent wielded over his children. As a 
consequence of such measures, not only was the emperor’s image as ‘the common father of 
his people’
134
 further strengthened, but the reasonableness and the justice of patriarchal 
authority at national and family levels were fully established. Thus:  
 
Conformably to this system, founded entirely on parental authority, the governor 
of a province is considered as the father of that province; of a city, the father of 
that city; and the head of any office or department is supposed to preside over it 
with the same authority, interest, and affection, as the father of a family 
superintends and manages the concerns of domestic life.
135
 
 
        Although this system of patriarchal government sounded just and reasonable in theory, it 
generated a variety of problems in practice. First, since ‘the heavy hand of power has 
completely overcome, and moulded to its own shape, the physical character of the people, 
and that their moral sentiments and actions are … almost under the entire dominion of the 
government’,
136
 there did not exist in China a middle class of men whose independent ideas 
gave them weight and influence in their country. Neither were there an ‘enlarged sphere of 
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public life’
137
 or any friendly societies or cultural associations in which the transactions of 
government could be freely and openly discussed as in Britain. On the contrary, there were 
‘no other than the governors and the governed’
138
 in the entire empire of China. Second, this 
resulted in a situation in which ‘everything is at the instant command of the state’.
139
 The 
officers of government, although by the constitution they were supposed as agents between 
the emperor and the people, instead became ‘the greatest oppressors’ of the latter.
140
 The 
supposed fatherly affection they were supposed to show, in reality, turned out to be exercises 
in tyranny and oppression. As a consequence, ‘The poor and private individuals in China, 
who have no means of communicating their complaints, or declaring their sentiments on the 
conduct of their particular rulers, are left in great measure at their mercy’.
141
 The ordinary 
Chinese people rarely had any means of redress, or of conveying their complaints to the 
imperial ear. Particularly, on the grounds of paternal authority, the maxims of the government 
commanded and the opinions of the people accepted that every officer of the government was 
entitled to inflict corporal punishment on the people. It created in the latter a natural dread of 
the former and established, overall, a system of universal servility in Chinese society. Barrow, 
for example, maintained that:  
 
In a government, where every man is liable to be made a slave, where every man 
is subject to be flogged with the bamboo, at the nod of one of the lowest rank of 
those in office, and where he is compelled to kiss the rod that beats him, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, to thank the tyrant on his knees for the trouble he has 
taken to correct his morals, high notions of honour and dignified sentiments are 
not to be expected. …The condition itself of being dependent upon, and subject to, 
the caprice of another, without the privilege of appeal, is such a degraded state of 
the human species, that those who are unfortunately reduced to it have no further 
ignominy or sense of shame to undergo.
142
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        The third conclusion reached was that, due to the arbitrary nature of this unique system, 
mutual confidence among the Chinese people was permanently destroyed. Instead, everyone 
was ‘reserved and suspicious of his neighbour’
143
 and, as a result, caution and suspicion 
became an integral part of the Chinese national character. In this respect, it was maintained 
that, unlike in Britain, where laws afforded security for the possession of private property and 
hence stimulated individuals to amass a fortune by all legal means, the government of China 
failed to provide that security for its people. As a matter of fact, every Chinese person was 
afraid of being considered as wealthy and,  
 
If a man, by trade, or industry in his profession, has accumulated riches, he can 
enjoy them only in private. He dares not, by having a grander house, or finer 
clothes, to let his neighbour perceive that he is richer than himself, lest he should 
betray him to the commanding-officer of the district, who would find no difficulty 
in bringing him within the pale of the sumptuary laws, and in laying his property 
under confiscation.
144
 
 
For this reason, not only ‘the characteristic disposition of the Chinese merchants is that of 
timidity and caution’,
145
 but normal social intercourse within Chinese society was restricted 
to a very small extent. This lack of communication among Chinese people, as well as the lack 
of any stimulus to build personal wealth, made it impossible to promote innovation in China. 
Thus, over the past few centuries, ‘the talent of invention is there seldom exercised beyond 
suggesting the means of providing for the first necessities and the most pressing wants’.
146
 
Last, but not least, the sense of insecurity and feeling of mutual mistrust were not confined to 
the multitude alone, but were shared by the officers of the Chinese government. According to 
Chinese law, mandarins from the ninth degree upwards to the fourth could, at any time, 
administer a gentle ‘correction’ to his inferiors. The emperor ordered punishments to his 
                                                          
143 Ibid., p. 265. 
144 Ibid., p. 261. 
145 Staunton, An Authentic Account, II, 566. 
146 Barrow, Travels in China, p. 119. 
65 
 
ministers, as well as to the other four classes, whenever he might think it necessary. At the 
same time, spies were dispatched from the imperial court into the provinces in order to watch 
over the actions of most mandarins. The other magistrates also kept a steady eye upon each 
other. They, particularly, ‘let no opportunity slip of making unfavourable reports to their 
superiors’,
147
 because ‘it is frequently happens that the informer is rewarded by the office of 
the man he has been the instrument of removing’.
148
 As a result of such policies, it can be 
inferred that mutual suspicion in the Chinese court was even more intense than among the 
common people. These qualities and failings, therefore, not only became a natural 
characteristic of all Chinese people, but produced a culture that was extremely cautious of 
anything new or foreign and hence ‘greatly detrimental to the progress of the arts and 
manufactures’.
149
 
        Despite the tyrannical nature of the Chinese government, the British commentators did 
inform their readers that the emperor had a distinct way of interacting with his people. On the 
one hand, he tended to create a divine and idolised image of himself. To achieve this end, the 
Chinese emperor styled himself not only as the common father of his subjects, but the sole 
agent between the temporal world below and the Heaven above, as the ‘Son of Heaven’. 
Whenever a propitious event occurred, it was always attributed to ‘the joint will of heaven 
and the emperor of China’.
150
 During special festivities, especially on his birthday, the 
emperor commanded his subjects to perform an act of reverence before an altar on which his 
name was inscribed, just in the same way as they paid respect to the deities. In order to 
‘inspire the people with sentiments of respect and duty towards him’,
151
 the emperor seldom 
showed himself in public, because it was thought that ‘A power that acts in secret, and whose 
influence is felt near and remote at the same time, makes a stronger impression on the mind, 
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and is regarded with more dread and awful respect’.
152
 Only on particular occasions did the 
emperor of China exhibit himself at the height of his imperial splendour and magnificence. 
By such means, the reverence that the Chinese felt for their monarch was so much enhanced 
that Staunton could not help noticing that ‘So easily is the delicacy of this people shocked in 
whatever relates to the person of their exalted sovereign’.
153
 By way of contrast, the emperor 
also paid much attention to establishing an amiable and benevolent image of himself. In the 
beginning of every spring, he always held a solemn ceremony with a plough in his hands, 
with the aim of encouraging the nation to participate actively in farming. When the country 
was struck by natural calamities, the emperor would not only step forward to pray for the 
blessing of Heaven, but provide substantial assistance to his people. He believed that it was 
his duty to open the granaries and remit taxes to those who were visited by misfortune, even 
though he was ‘so jealous of retaining the exclusive privilege of benevolence to his subjects, 
that he not only rejected, but was offended at, the proposal once made to him, by some 
considerable merchants, to contribute towards the relief of a suffering province’.
154
 When 
someone was suffering the usual punishment of bamboo, the emperor even made sure that 
‘the culprit may claim the exemption of every fifth blow as the emperor’s coup-de-grace’,
155
 
so that his fatherly kindness would clearly be felt by his subjects. In addition to these 
measures, the emperor also ensured that the examination system for officials was fair and 
impartial. Since these examinations were regarded in China as ‘the ascending steps which 
lead to all the offices and dignities of the state’,
156
 and were open to all classes of men, the 
relationship between the government and the common people was greatly enhanced. For one 
thing, at least in theory, no individual was precluded from attaining high office because of his 
birth, situation or circumstances, and ‘at any rate, the possibility of success is an enjoyment 
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even to those who are never likely to obtain it’.
157
 For another thing, ‘the general 
persuasion … that authority had been acquired through merit, must contribute to insure 
respect and obedience to it’.
158
 By these means, the emperor not only presented himself once 
again as an unbiased Great Father whose affection never overlooked any subject in his empire, 
but effectively diverted the thoughts of the people away from any criticism of the legitimacy 
of his government. 
        Compared to such analytical observations on the Chinese government, society and 
civilisation made by the leading members of the Macartney mission, the discoveries of the 
lower-order British visitors to China were presented in a more descriptive fashion. Although, 
in general, these writers did agree with the other embassy members’ major findings about the 
character of China, it should be noted that their accounts contained relatively more favourable 
remarks on the country. For example, in terms of China’s beautiful landscapes, some of these 
British travellers never attempted to withhold their compliments. When Holmes first entered 
the interior of China, he said that ‘the country presented a more enlivening prospect, and 
charming beyond description. I had formed an idea of it before our landing, not unfavourable 
to the Chinese; but I confess, this exceeded my utmost expectation, in every point of view’.
159
 
Near the city of Hangzhou, Stephen Else, a member of the British ship Hindustan, noted that 
the prospect was ‘as delightful as fancy can conceive’
160
 and that a reasonable level of 
prosperity could be found in this part of China. As for the climate of China, Holmes 
maintained that ‘China is the finest country in the world with respect to its climate and 
production. … there is nothing that is common in any other part of the world but is to be 
found here, and in equal perfection: it is peculiarly happy in the salubrity of the climate’.
161
 
With regard to Chinese material culture, Holmes also admitted that ‘In some things, they 
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certainly excel all other people, such as china ware, porcelain, silks, etc.’
162
 Moreover, the 
flat-bottomed boats the British embassy used in China, were ‘the most convenient and 
commodious that can possibly be conceived’, because ‘the smallest draught of water is 
sufficient, though they will carry a surprising weight of goods’.
163
 Some of China’s state 
policies were also appreciated by these British observers. Else believed that agriculture, 
rather than commerce and industry, produced the ‘only real wealth’ for every nation and was 
pleased that this principle was ‘perfectly understood’ in China.
164
 Edward Winder, one of the 
under-secretaries of the mission, spoke highly of China’s religious policy. He admired the 
fact that state offices in China were ‘impartially open to all’ and that religious toleration 
‘universally prevails throughout all ranks’.
165
 In spite of these positive comments, however, 
China was not considered to be an ideal place to live for the British. When Holmes was 
leaving the Chinese empire, he observed that, ‘though China is one of the finest and most 
desirable countries in the world, yet their manners and way of living bear such a contrast to 
ours, that few would ever wish to stay with them, that had any prospect of living, though in 
the lowest style, at home’.
166
 From these statements, it can be detected that the approach 
through which the lower orders on the Macartney mission viewed China was somewhat 
different from that of the leaders of it. For one thing, material progress did not seem to be the 
sole criterion for assessing the condition of the Chinese empire. To these observers, it was the 
difference between China and Britain that rendered the Chinese way of living unadaptable to 
the British, rather than any other reason that made China an undesirable or unworthy place in 
which to live. Furthermore, although some of their findings did not appear significant enough 
to shape their principal images of the Chinese empire, and these lower-ranked commentators 
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did not attempt to make any overall assessment of Chinese civilisation, nevertheless their 
accounts present a more favourable perception of China. Since these positive comments can 
hardly be seen in any of the major works written by those serving on the Macartney embassy, 
it proves once again that, when those authors were making observations on China, their 
comments and conclusions were undoubtedly so influenced by their personal prejudices that 
some noteworthy facts and sources of information had been selectively documented or 
ignored. 
        Finally, when this very first official British mission to China was drawing to its close, 
only the heads of the embassy, particularly Macartney, offered any detailed analysis of 
Britain’s future relations with China. Based on the belief that this embassy had created 
favourable sentiments among the Chinese, it was reaffirmed that patience and perseverance 
were extremely important to Britain’s future relations with the Chinese empire. Macartney 
maintained that, for the time being, priority should be given to preserving ‘the ground we 
have lately gained’.
167
 He stressed that, ‘I dare say there are many hasty spirits disposed to go 
a shorter way, but no shorter way will do it’.
168
 Given the extraordinary character of the 
Chinese government, ‘it would certainly require in us great skill, caution, temper and 
perseverance’ to achieve favourable results.
169
 Staunton, in this regard, pointed out that the 
emperor’s unprecedented compromise on the kowtow issue was a positive sign to the British, 
because it demonstrated that ‘the mere pleas of custom, however usually and strongly urged 
by the Chinese, would not stand always against reason, accompanied by temper and 
perseverance’.
170
 On the basis of these arguments, it was suggested that, instead of the plan to 
establish a permanent ambassadorship in Beijing, the most practical and effective approach to 
deal with the Chinese government at present was to dispatch a royal minister to reside in 
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Canton. By this means, it was hoped that this minister would not only be able to ‘excuse 
irregularities and clear up mistakes’ through his intercourse with the local authorities, but to 
hold direct communication with the imperial court, so as to ‘awe the regency of Canton and 
keep them within the bounds of justice and moderation’.
171
 Second, with respect to China’s 
future, it was Macartney’s belief that a breakup of the Qing Empire would probably take 
place before too long. He claimed that, ‘Scarcely a year now passes without an insurrection in 
some of the provinces. It is true that they are usually soon suppressed, but their frequency is a 
strong symptom of the fever within’.
172
 Even though, Macartney added, ‘It is possible … that 
the momentum impressed on the machine by the vigour and wisdom of the present Emperor 
may keep it steady and entire in its orbit for a considerable time longer … I should not be 
surprised if its dislocation or dismemberment were to take place before my own 
dissolution’.
173
 Once such an event occurred, Macartney predicted that it would occasion ‘a 
complete subversion of the commerce, not only of Asia, but a very sensible change in the 
other quarters of the world’. Moreover, since entry into the Chinese market would definitely 
be ‘attempted by all adventurers of all trading nations’, it would eventually induce ‘much 
rivalry and disorder’.
174
 Given Britain’s political, marine and commercial strength at the time, 
however, it was Macartney’s conviction that Britain could in any case ‘prove the greatest 
gainer’ in the end and ‘rise superior over every competitor’.
175
 Last, but not least, Macartney 
was also not unprepared for a breakdown in Sino-British relations, even though he was 
particularly opposed to any action that might give rise to such a contingency. If the Chinese 
took the initiative by laying an embargo on their commerce with Britain, or by doing the 
British any material injury, Macartney observed with confidence that,  
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we certainly have the means easy enough of revenging ourselves, for a few 
frigates could in a few weeks destroy all their coast navigation and intercourse 
from the island of Hainan to the Gulf of Pei-chili. … We might probably be able 
from Bengal to excite the most serious disturbances on their Tibet frontiers by 
means of their neighbours there … we might make a settlement in Lantao or Cow-
hee, and then Macao would of itself crumble to nothing in a short time. The forts 
of the Bocca Tigris might be demolished by half a dozen broadsides, the river 
would be impassable without our permission, and the whole trade of Canton and 
its correspondencies annihilated in a season. The millions of people who subsist 
by it would be almost instantly reduced to hunger and insurrection. They must 
overturn the country as beggars or as robbers, and wherever they went would 
carry with them misery and rebellion. 
176
 
 
        In spite of this seemingly belligerent statement, Macartney was by no means an advocate 
of violent measures against China. As a matter of fact, right next to the above comment, 
Macartney clearly stated why a breach of the relationship with China would be clearly 
detrimental to the interests of Britain and its eastern empire. He maintained that, in such an 
event:  
 
Our settlements in India would suffer most severely by any interruption of their 
China traffic which is infinitely valuable to them, whether considered singly as a 
market for cotton and opium, or as connected with their adventures to the 
Philippines and Malaya. 
        To Great Britain the blow would be immediate and heavy. Our great woollen 
manufacture, the ancient staple of England, would feel such a sudden convulsion 
as scarcely any vigilance or vigour in Government could for a long time remedy 
or alleviate. …We should lose the other growing branches of export to China of 
tin, lead, copper, hardware, and of clocks and watches, and similar articles of 
ingenious mechanism. We should lose the import from China not only of its raw 
silk, an indispensable ingredient in our silk fabrics, but of another luxury, or rather 
an absolute necessary of life: tea. 
177
 
 
It was because of these considerations, when Macartney was concluding his comments on 
Britain’s future engagement with China, that he solemnly reaffirmed the necessity of 
avoiding an aggressive course of conduct:  
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our present interests, our reason, and our humanity equally forbid the thoughts of 
any offensive measures with regard to the Chinese, whilst a ray of hope remains 
for succeeding by gentle ones. Nothing could be urged in favour of an hostile 
conduct, but an irresistible conviction of failure by forbearance.
178
 
 
From these lines, it can be clearly shown that, although the resort to force was indeed 
mentioned in his account, Macartney should rather be considered as an advocate of a peaceful 
line of action, rather than being the initial advocate or agitator for a British-Chinese war. 
        In sum, no matter how successful or unproductive the Macartney mission is evaluated in 
terms of its diplomatic achievements, this first official encounter between Britain and China 
produced a great deal of detailed first-hand knowledge about China of a kind never offered to 
the British public before. By and large, these discoveries tended to present an unfavourable 
image of Chinese civilisation at the time. In particular, the extremely suspicious character of 
the Chinese government, as well as its governing maxim established on the principle of 
paternal authority, were seen as the main reasons for China’s underdevelopment. Although, at 
this stage, some senior figures on the embassy had been able to envision a breakup of the 
Qing empire or a breakdown of Sino-British relations, an aggressive line of action against 
China was still considered to be rather inadvisable and definitely harmful to the interests of 
Britain. 
 
III 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some important but understudied aspects of the Macartney 
diplomatic mission to China. Unlike most of the previous research that focused on the 
controversy of kowtow or the embassy’s political implications, this chapter has investigated, 
from a perceptional point of view, the underlying contention among the embassy members on 
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the transactions and legacy of the mission. By comparing accounts left by different orders of 
men who took part in the embassy, it can be shown that some key facts were selectively 
documented or ignored in order to suit a particular author’s own needs and prejudices. 
Although it can be expected that every commentator will have his own particular standpoint, 
it is worth noting that some of the perceptions presented by the principal persons in the 
embassy contain self-serving prejudices and biases that were constructed to justify certain of 
their views and actions. This chapter has also examined various observations that the 
embassy made during the course of its visit, especially during the return journey when its 
participants traversed the interior of China. Through these new discoveries, a variety of first-
hand information about China could be presented to the British public for the very first time. 
This not only signalled considerable progress in the British understanding of China, but laid 
the foundation for Britain’s attitude towards the Chinese empire in the near future. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
British perceptions of China during the Amherst embassy (1816-17) 
 
In 1816, a second British embassy led by Lord William Amherst,
1
 arrived in China and an 
official encounter between Britain and China again took place. This embassy, sent twenty-
two years after the completion of the Macartney mission, was Britain’s second attempt to 
improve its commercial and diplomatic relations with the Chinese empire. Compared to the 
previous embassy, Amherst’s mission has long been regarded as even less successful. One 
historian has even concluded that ‘except for creating ill feeling on both sides, nothing was 
achieved’.
2
 Hence, in contrast to the inaugural British embassy to China, which has been an 
object of considerable scholarly interest, the Amherst mission has attracted much less 
attention. Nevertheless, from a perceptional point of view, this seemingly ‘minor’ event 
provided the British observers with an opportunity to renew or revise their impressions of the 
Chinese empire. As the last British embassy of its kind prior to the First Anglo-Chinese War, 
this mission produced some revised understanding of Chinese affairs, which potentially laid 
the basis for the subsequent conflicts between the two countries. A review of the Amherst 
embassy, in this sense, becomes not only necessary but important, regardless of how 
unsuccessful it was in terms of its official objectives. 
        The number of available primary sources for Amherst’s mission is, rather surprisingly, 
slightly greater than those for Macartney’s. My research has shown that eleven members of 
the Amherst embassy left more than fifteen accounts of it. Lord Amherst apparently kept a 
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diary during his journey, but this cannot be found, probably because of the shipwreck of the 
embassy’s main ship, the Alceste, on its return voyage. Some of Amherst’s remarks on the 
mission, as well as his observations of China, however, can still be found in the India Office 
Library and Records, held in the British Library.
3
 Sir George Thomas Staunton, Lord 
Macartney’s page on the first mission and the son of Sir George Leonard Staunton, served as 
the second commissioner of the Amherst embassy.
4
 As an eminent ‘China expert’ at the time, 
Staunton produced several works that relate to the Amherst mission. His Notes of 
Proceedings and Occurrences during the British Embassy to Pekin in 1816 is a private 
publication that reveals his personal views on the mission and the Chinese court.
5
 
Miscellaneous Notices Relating to China, and our Commercial Intercourse with that Country 
records various occurrences during his long stay in the Chinese empire, not only as an 
embassy member who visited the imperial court, but as an employee of the East India 
Company’s factory in Canton.
6
 In 1856, Staunton published his memoir, in which he recalled 
his experiences with Amherst’s mission and reinforced some of his arguments of forty years 
previously.
7
 Henry Ellis, the third commissioner,
8
 published his Journal of the Proceedings of 
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the Late Embassy to China shortly after he returned to Britain.
9
 This work was widely 
considered as the most official account of the Amherst mission, and more or less an 
equivalent of Sir George L. Staunton’s book on the Macartney embassy. Robert Morrison, 
who served as the chief translator for Amherst’s embassy,
10
 published A View of China
11
 and 
A memoir of the principal occurrences during an embassy from the British government to the 
court of China in the year 1816 in London.
12
 After he died, his wife Eliza Morrison compiled 
a two-volume Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison, D.D., which 
complements Morrison’s observations on China in his earlier works.
13
 John Francis Davis, 
another member of the embassy who had a good command of the Chinese language,
14
 
authored a number of books on China and its people, such as Sketches of China,
15
 which 
includes his journal of the Amherst embassy and The Chinese: A General Description of the 
Empire of China and Its Inhabitants.
16
 Apart from these works, some other members of the 
mission kept dairies of their journey as well, but with specific emphases according to their 
particular assignments. For instance, Clarke Abel, the chief medical officer and naturalist 
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with the embassy, published his Narrative of a Journey in the Interior of China in 1818.
17
 
John Macleod, a surgeon aboard the Alceste, wrote a Narrative of a Voyage in His Ma esty’s 
Late Ship Alceste.
18
 Basil Hall, the commander of HMS Lyra, released his Narrative of a 
Voyage to Java, China and the Great Loo-Choo Island in 1840.
19
 Besides these published 
accounts, some manuscript journals can also be found, such as the Henry Hayne Dairy 1816-
1817, written by Amherst’s private secretary Henry Hayne, which is preserved in Duke 
University’s China through Western Eyes microfilm series.
20
 These narratives, in general, are 
not as comprehensive as the others, but they prove to be useful every now and then with 
regard to some particular findings of the embassy. 
        Despite the existence of these surviving and accessible materials, modern research on the 
second official encounter between Britain and China is very limited. No major historical 
publication deals specifically with this incident. Most studies relating to this period are rather 
descriptive and tend to interpret Amherst’s experiences as even more humiliating than 
Macartney’s, with little new material to add.
21
 Even the more recent work, Asian Empire and 
British Knowledge: China and the Networks of British Imperial Expansion,
22
 and an article 
entitled ‘Narrating the Far East: commerce civility and ceremony in the Amherst Embassy to 
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China (1816-1817)’,
23
 failed to recognise this mission as an important reason for the 
deterioration of Britain’s attitude towards China in the pre-Opium War era. This chapter will 
delve further into the sources available, in order to present the various views of China 
occasioned by Amherst’s embassy. In addition, this mission will be set in a wider historical 
context, which links it to the previous encounter of 1793 as well as the later disputes in the 
1830s. Only when these long-term changes are investigated, can the origin of the Sino-British 
confrontation from 1840 onwards be better understood. 
 
I 
 The occasion of Amherst’s mission 
The prevailing explanation for the occasion of the Amherst embassy is clear and 
straightforward. Christopher Hibbert maintains that ‘neither the merchants at Canton nor the 
British government were content to let matters rest where the failure of Lord Macartney’s 
mission had left them; and on the death of the old Emperor Ch’ien-lung [Qianlong] in 1799 
hope was revived that a satisfactory trade agreement might be negotiated’.
24
 Alain Peyrefitte 
claims that ‘the British, having vanquished Napoleon, now had the means – and the need – to 
try one last diplomatic approach’,
25
 so as to place Britain’s commercial and political relations 
with China on a secure footing. These arguments have indicated the similarities between the 
two British missions, but have overlooked the complexity of the launch of the second 
embassy, particularly with regard to the different expectations entertained by the East India 
Company and the British government. 
        In the two decades after the Macartney embassy, there was no sign that the assurance 
Macartney had allegedly gained on the improvement of British trading conditions was 
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producing results.  No trade barriers were lifted, nor were the tariffs and duties reduced. 
According to the British citizens in Canton, they were in a position that ‘neither protected by 
the physical force of armies, nor by that moral security which is derived from the plighted 
faith of treaties’.
26
 Their commerce with China also continued to be overseen by the ‘highly 
jealous, despotic, and arbitrary’
27
 government of Canton. For the East India Company, its 
trade monopoly in India was terminated in 1815. As a result, the commerce with China, the 
EIC’s only remaining monopoly trade, became more important than ever to the Company. 
Given the perceived character of the local Chinese authorities, the EIC’s Select Committee at 
Canton believed that, in order to maintain its commerce there, they were seriously in need of 
‘a clear signal showing that they had the full support of their sovereign’
28
 and, to achieve this 
end, ‘no other resource remained … but a direct appeal to the court of Pekin’.
29
 Under such 
circumstances, the EIC’s Court of Directors in London pleaded with the British government 
for a royal ambassador to be sent to Beijing. The Amherst embassy, in consequence, was 
formed at the expense of the East India Company.  
        It can be seen that the Amherst mission was largely initiated by the EIC’s anxiety about 
the preservation of its China trade, rather than any broader design of the British government to 
develop further its relations with the Chinese court. For the EIC, the trade in Canton was its 
only concern, because experience had shown that nothing more could be expected under the 
current circumstances. According to the Secret Commercial Committee of the Company, the 
most immediate cause of this embassy was very specific, i.e., ‘the insolent, capricious, 
vexatious proceedings which the local Government of Canton has for some time past held 
towards the Company’s Representatives there, by which they have obstructed, and 
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embarrassed the conduct of the Company’s commerce’.
30
 Staunton even stated in this regard 
that the embassy ‘was sent out for the single purpose of settling the Canton disputes and re-
establishing the trade’.
31
 This sentiment, however, did not entirely coincide with the 
expectations of the British government. Although British authorities in London indeed 
supported the plan of another royal embassy to China, they wished that, in addition to the 
EIC’s goal of defending its commerce in Canton, ‘every opportunity should be taken to 
enquire how the purchase of British manufactured goods in China could be increased’.
32
 John 
Francis Davis, in this respect, noted in his journal that:  
  
It was curious to observe the difference between the instructions received from the 
government and the recommendations emanating from the Court of Directors. The 
former implied that we went simply in search of whatever we could pick 
up, …The Company said, “Have most regard to the effect that the embassy is to 
produce at Canton; complain of the conduct of the local authorities to our 
trade; …”
33
  
 
Although the intention of expanding British trade in China was not entirely contrary to the 
main objectives of the mission, the slight difference between the British government’s and the 
EIC’s expectation for the second embassy turned out to be significant as the mission 
proceeded.  
        In July 1816, when Amherst and his embassy reached the Lemma Islands, which were 
just off the China coast, they were joined by a group of the EIC’s employees in Canton. 
George T. Staunton, president of the Select Committee at the time, was appointed as the 
second commissioner and minister plenipotentiary of the embassy. Other persons who had a 
command of the Chinese language, i.e., Robert Morrison, John Francis Davis, Francis Toone, 
                                                          
30 Letter from the Secret Commercial Committee to the Right Honble Lord Amherst, 17 Jan. 1816, in 
Morse, The Chronicles, III, 284. 
31 Staunton, Memoirs, p.65. 
32 IOLR, Factory Records, G/12/196. Letter from Lord Castlereagh to Lord Amherst, 1 Jan. 1816. Italics 
added. 
33 John Francis Davis, Sketches of China (London, 1841), I, 55-6. 
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Thomas Manning and Alexander Pearson, formed a translation team for the rest of the mission. 
The addition of these EIC’s staff members resulted in a major difference between the two 
British embassies. When Macartney was visiting China, no one in his mission had had prior 
experience of that country. Unassisted with any ‘local inside knowledge’,
34
 Macartney had to 
make most of the decisions himself. Amherst, however, was not as experienced as Macartney 
in foreign affairs. Since these EIC staff members had had ample opportunities to deal with the 
Chinese authorities at Canton, Amherst was well disposed to solicit opinions from these so-
called ‘China experts’. Meanwhile, it can be detected that Staunton, unlike his father, was 
very eager to stress that his own advice was pivotal to every major decision of the embassy. It 
was Staunton’s belief that, ‘from my local experience, and from habits of long and deep 
reflection upon it, I ought to be fully prepared to offer a well-grounded opinion’.
35
 In his 
Miscellaneous Notices, Staunton even implied that Amherst’s opinion was in no way superior 
to his, while all decisions ought to have been made collectively. He wrote: 
 
the principle upon which this embassy was constituted, was extremely judicious. – 
The appointment of a commission in which a nobleman was to preside, with two 
members of the select committee for his assessors, combined two very essential 
requisites upon the occasion, which it was impossible to find centred in any one 
individual, in an equal degree. 
36
 
 
Moreover, because this mission was dispatched chiefly for the wellbeing of the EIC’s 
merchants in Canton, Staunton argued that serious attention should also have been paid to the 
opinions of other EIC’s representatives. To justify this standpoint, he asserted that,  
                                                          
34 Hillemann’s research deals substantially with the relations between local inside knowledge and the 
making of Britain’s empire in Asia. For example, see Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 
77.  
35 Staunton, Notes of Proceedings, p. 31. 
36 Staunton, Miscellaneous Notices, pp. 232-3. Italics in the original. The initial arrangement was that John 
Elphinstone and Staunton, both members of the EIC’s factory at Canton, would serve as the second and 
third commissioners. By the time the embassy arrived, however, Elphinstone had already resigned as 
president of the select committee at Canton and had decided to withdraw from the mission. As a result, 
Staunton was advanced to the second place as deputy to the ambassador. Ellis, originally the secretary to 
the embassy and a former Bengal Company servant, succeeded to the vacancy as third commissioner.     
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It [the embassy] grew so entirely out of the measures which had been adopted by 
the Company's authorities there, to that end, and was so especially designed to 
strengthen their hands, and to obtain, if possible, the emperor's confirmation of the 
provincial adjustment which they had already obtained, that any scheme of an 
embassy which had not included persons who were locally, and in the fullest 
manner acquainted, both with what had been done, and with what was still 
required, would, however complete in other respects, have been obviously worse 
than useless.
 37
 
 
        The reason why Staunton attached so much importance to his own advice and that of 
other EIC staff was that he did not think the Amherst embassy arrived at a good time. 
Staunton contended that, the Company requested a royal mission to be dispatched, ‘when the 
alarm for the safety of the trade was at the highest, with a just and natural anxiety, 
unquestionably, to avert a danger of so serious a character, as that which seemed to be 
impending’.
38
 This situation had changed considerably, however, when the Select Committee 
at Canton was informed that an embassy was on its way. For this reason, Staunton claimed 
that, ‘had the measure however been postponed for six months, it very probably would never 
have been adopted at all; for it would have become evident … that the peculiar ground for 
attempting to re-open a diplomatic intercourse with the court of Pekin … no longer existed’,
39
 
and that ‘on the other hand, a great many new circumstances and events had come into 
operation, which were calculated very much to discourage the attempt’.
40
 Due to these 
concerns, Staunton was quite worried that the currently acceptable condition of the Canton 
trade would be undermined by the new embassy. In accord with his notion that ‘The tide of 
court favour at Pekin was certainly very strong against foreign connections of every kind, in 
the year 1816’,
41
 Staunton maintained that the main purpose of the Amherst mission was ‘not 
to propose any innovation, but merely to secure and consolidate, and to restore, in the event of 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p.233. 
38 Staunton, Notes of Proceedings, p. vii.  
39 Ibid., p. vii.  
40 Ibid., p. viii. 
41 Staunton, Miscellaneous Notices, p. 231. 
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its being found to have been again suspended, the ordinary commercial intercourse between 
the two countries’.
42
 In particular, he deemed it inappropriate to undertake the embassy ‘with 
any special view towards the attainment of additional privileges, such as the opening of a new 
port for the extension of our commerce, or any other of the wild and visionary projects that 
have been sometimes attributed to it’.
43
 Since those with local knowledge all agreed that at 
present the embassy was unlikely to obtain any additional benefits from the Chinese court, 
Staunton declared that the paramount objective should be ‘If it were found, that no good could 
be done; at least, to take especial care to do no harm – Not to lose any of the ground that the 
select committee had gained – not to frustrate the success of the line of policy they had 
adopted’.
44
  
        In reference to Staunton’s view, there is no evidence that Lord Amherst or any other non-
EIC member of the embassy ever raised a straightforward objection. Nevertheless, although 
they indeed showed respect for the advice of these ‘China experts’, they were neither as 
committed to the instructions of the EIC, nor as convinced that no positive good could be 
achieved by this mission. Probably due to the perceptions he gained as a result of the 
Macartney embassy, it appears that Amherst was less prepared for the difficulties he might 
encounter during his visit to China’s imperial court. For instance, as for the negotiations 
preceding the ambassador’s approach to the imperial audience, Amherst claimed that ‘decency 
and regularity of the proceedings’
45
 can be shown from the reports of Macartney’s embassy, 
and that everything relating to court ceremonies was ‘arranged and conducted with order, 
decorum and deliberation’.
46
 In general, the Qing government’s reception of the previous 
British mission was regarded by Amherst in the following light:  
 
                                                          
42 Ibid., p. 239. 
43 Ibid., pp. 237-8. 
44 Ibid., p. 240. Italics in the original. 
45 IOLR, Factory Records, G/12/197/284-5. Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 8 Mar. 1817.  
46 Ibid., G/12/197/284. 
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At that time every thing was orderly and regular. Time was allowed for due and 
decorous preparation. The convenience of individuals was consulted as well as the 
honor of the Embassador. A mutual understanding followed all matters of dispute 
and discussion. Whatever might in reality be intended, appearances at least were 
maintained, and the dignity of the Emperor of China and the King of England 
were alike consulted.
47
 
 
In line with this view, a favourable impression of the Chinese emperor also added to 
Amherst’s relative optimism. Even though Macartney and his retinue had arrived at the 
imperial court in 1793, the vast majority of interested Britons were still left with an image of 
the Chinese monarch that was envisaged rather than learned at first hand. Prior to Amherst’s 
embassy, both the British government and the EIC’s servants at Canton still entertained a 
somewhat enlightened perception of the Chinese sovereign.
48
 This impression was apparently 
derived from the opinions of early Catholic missionaries in China as well as from the views of 
some members of the Macartney embassy. Based on this positive assumption about the 
emperor’s character, the British, including the EIC’s employees at Canton, attributed the 
difficulties in Canton entirely to the fault of the local Chinese authorities. They believed that 
the misconduct of these officers was concealed from the Chinese emperor and, hence, once 
their oppressive actions against foreign merchants were communicated to His Imperial 
Majesty, the grievances in Canton would soon be redressed. Based on this belief, it was 
clearly stated, in the EIC’s instructions to Amherst, that the anticipated outcome of the 
mission was ‘the establishment of the Company’s trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, 
free from the capricious arbitrary aggressions of the local Authorities, and under the 
protection of the Emperor, and the sanction of Regulations to be appointed by himself’.
49
 It 
can be seen that, at this stage, the British had almost taken for granted the favour and kindness 
                                                          
47 Ibid., G/12/197/293-4. 
48 When Staunton met the Qianlong emperor as Macartney’s page, he was only twelve. The emperor 
showed much favour to him on that occasion and Staunton also had a favourable impression of the 
Qianlong emperor. 
49 Letter from the Secret Commercial Committee to the Right Honble Lord Amherst, 17 Jan. 1816, in 
Morse, The Chronicles, III, 285. 
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of the Chinese sovereign. This confidence placed upon the Jiaqing emperor, however, was 
considerably revised as the Amherst mission progressed. 
 
II 
The kowtow dispute renewed  
The Amherst embassy travelled on the Chinese mainland for approximately four months, but 
the most significant intercourse with the Qing government only lasted twenty days or so. As 
soon as this contact began, the British visitors realised that the kowtow dispute was going to 
be renewed. Yet, unlike what occurred on the Macartney mission, the Chinese court under the 
Jiaqing reign seemed even more determined about the performance of this ceremony. To 
achieve this end, serious negotiations between China and Britain were conducted on three 
different occasions, each of which was held by very senior officials of the Chinese 
government and overseen by the supreme authority, the emperor himself. In order to 
understand better the perceptions produced as a result of the second British-Chinese encounter, 
a brief introduction to its official proceedings is necessary.  
        The first major negotiation on the kowtow issue took place in Tianjin on 13 August 1816 
– only four days after Amherst’s mission set foot on Chinese soil. On this occasion, an 
imperial banquet was prepared by two royal legates, Soo (Su Leng’e) and Kwang (Guanghui), 
at the command of the Jiaqing emperor. This event was designed not only to welcome the 
arrival of the British envoys, but to provide them with an opportunity to rehearse the kowtow 
ceremony. For this purpose, a table covered with yellow silk was laid as a symbol of the 
Imperial Majesty’s presence and sangui jiukou
50
 was supposed to be paid by the British 
delegation. Although, according to the instructions given by the British government, much 
                                                          
50 Technically, ‘kowtow’ only denotes the performance of three simple genuflexions, a mode of greeting 
widely practised in China on both public and private occasions. The court ritual that gave rise to the dispute, 
strictly speaking, was called sangui jiukou. It was the utmost form of ceremony in China and implied thrice 
kneeling and nine times bowing the head to the ground. 
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latitude was left to the ambassador’s discretion with regard to the observation of Chinese court 
ritual, Amherst, at this stage, was determined not to prostrate himself before any 
representative of the Chinese sovereign. Instead, he agreed to uncover his head and pay some 
reverential low bows, but without giving any clear promise on what ceremony he was going to 
perform in the presence of the emperor himself. 
        The second test of Amherst’s willingness to comply with the Tartar ceremony
51
 was 
conducted in Tongzhou, twelve miles from the capital. This time, two mandarins of even 
higher rank – Duke Ho (He shitai), brother of the empress and president of the board for 
foreign affairs, and Duke Moo (Muke deng’e), president of the tribunal of ceremonies – were 
deputed by the Jiaqing emperor to meet the British delegation. They were ordered to instruct, 
rather than to consult with, the British envoys on the forms of homage to be practised. In the 
first of the two meetings held, the dukes adopted a haughty and intimidating tone. They 
maintained that under no circumstances would the Chinese court dispense with its established 
usages. When Amherst referred to Macartney’s example of performing the European 
ceremony to the Qianlong emperor, Duke Ho asserted that, for one thing, the emperor had 
declared that he himself had witnessed Macartney’s performance of sangui jiukou in 1793; for 
another, no matter what form of respect Macartney had paid to the previous monarch, that 
precedent was not to regulate proceedings on the present occasion. Five days later, when the 
two parties met for the second time, the dukes’ attitude had become more courteous. Duke Ho 
first asked what the British side expected from this mission. After Amherst informed him of 
the various wishes entertained by the EIC and the British government, Duke Ho suggested 
that all these expectations might be satisfied once the British envoys agreed to comply with 
the kowtow ceremony.
52
 Under this circumstance, Amherst replied that some further 
                                                          
51  It was argued by some Chinese mandarins that the kowtow was more of a Tartar than a Chinese 
ceremony. See Morrison, A Memoir, p. 34.  
52 IOLR, Factory Records, G/12/197/267. Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 28 Feb. 1817.  
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deliberations were needed before he could provide a final answer. When Amherst solicited 
opinions on this subject from Staunton and Ellis, however, contrasting advice was put forward 
by the second and third commissioners. Ellis was inclined to go ahead with the ceremony to 
secure Chinese trade concessions, while Staunton insisted that the Chinese would respect the 
British only if the British stuck to what they had said and done in the past. Although Amherst 
himself was more disposed to agree with Ellis, he eventually decided to ‘shew deference to an 
opinion [advanced by Staunton and] founded on long observation and on local experience’.
53
 
Accordingly, Amherst declared in a short note to Duke Ho that he would adhere to 
Macartney’s precedent of not performing kowtow.  
        After passing this note to Duke Ho, the Amherst embassy began to prepare for an 
immediate return journey, because they no longer expected that the emperor would be willing 
to meet the British ambassador. To everyone’s surprise, however, the British delegation was 
suddenly urged to proceed without delay to Yuen-min-yuen (Yuan-ming-yuan), the imperial 
palace in which the final stage of the kowtow dispute took place. This unexpected news 
created a great deal of confusion within the British embassy. When Amherst asked if his 
message was misunderstood by the Chinese authorities, Legate Kwang amid the hassle stated 
that the Tartar ceremony would be dispensed with as a signal of favour to the British.
54
 After 
an exhausting overnight journey, Amherst and his commissioners were ushered into a small 
ante-chamber, where Ellis claimed to have ‘witnessed a scene … unparalleled in the history of 
diplomacy’.
55
 In this room, Ellis noted that, spectators of all ages and ranks ‘rudely pressed 
upon us to gratify their brutal curiosity, for such it may be called, as they seemed to regard us 
rather as wild beasts than mere strangers of the same species with themselves’.
56
 At the same 
time, the British envoys were notified that the date of the proposed audience had been 
                                                          
53 Ibid., G/12/197/271. Same letter. 
54 Davis, Sketches of China, I, 141. 
55 Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings, p. 177. 
56 Ibid., p. 178. 
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changed. With neither their proper attire nor the king’s letter to the Chinese emperor, Amherst 
and the commissioners were ordered to attend the imperial audience immediately. When 
Amherst refused this unexpected injunction because of ‘fatigue, inanition, and deficiency of 
every necessary equipment’,
57
 Duke Ho became so impatient that he even gripped Amherst’s 
arm to indicate an intention to use force. Although Amherst shook him off at once and no 
further violence was employed by either party, the kowtow dispute finally ended in a mutually 
unpleasant manner. A few hours later, the emperor, incensed by Amherst’s refusal to attend 
the audience, issued an order for the embassy’s immediate departure from his court. The 
official proceedings of the Amherst mission were terminated. 
        It can be seen from the above that the kowtow issue was not only a central cause of 
dispute during the second British-Chinese encounter, but was also a controversial subject 
within the Amherst embassy. Due to the different views of the mission’s ultimate objectives, 
conflicting views were advanced by the leaders of the embassy as to whether they should 
comply with the Chinese court ritual or not. For Amherst and Ellis, since the government 
clearly stated that it was inadvisable to ‘let any trifling punctilio stand in the way of the 
important benefits which may be obtained by engaging the favourable disposition of the 
Emperor and his Ministers’,
58
 their attitudes towards kowtow were more flexible. In particular, 
with Duke Ho’s favourable promise in mind, they tended to believe that too much emphasis 
on the ceremonial details would be injurious to the overall aims of the embassy. For this 
reason, a compromise on formality was considered not entirely unacceptable. Ellis maintained 
in this regard that,  
 
the sole chance of success to the ulterior objects of the embassy exists in 
producing a favourable impression upon the mind of the Emperor; and this can 
                                                          
57 Ibid. 
58 Letter from the Right Honble Lord Castlereagh to the Right Honble Lord Amherst, Jan. 1816, in Morse, 
The Chronicles, III, 281. 
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only be effected by complying with the particular usages of the court and nation, 
as far as a due sense of our own dignity, combined with considerations of policy, 
will permit.
59
 
 
Although, Ellis admitted that, the kowtow ceremony was certainly disagreeable to the sense of 
honour and propriety of every British visitor, ‘it could scarcely be deemed advisable to 
sacrifice the more important objects of the embassy to any supposed maintenance of dignity 
by insisting upon such a point of etiquette, in such a scene’.
 60
 Amherst, as head of the mission, 
basically concurred with Ellis in this point of view. He pointed out that, once the Chinese 
court was offended by the unbending stance taken by the British envoys, it was possible that 
‘not only former grievances would not have been removed, but new misunderstandings would 
have arisen; and new evils would have been incurred’.
61
 On the other hand, Amherst 
contended that ‘a prospect was held out to us of positive good by a compliance with the 
Emperor’s wishes’.
62
 Since ‘the Emperor’s statement of his own recollection of Lord 
Macartney’s proceedings made it difficult to urge an opposite and contradictory account of 
them’, he believed that ‘a yielding on this point might be made the subject of personal 
compliment and courtesy to His Imperial Majesty’.
63
 By these statements, it can be seen that 
Amherst was in some sense attempting to show that he was not biased against either the EIC’s 
or the British government’s interpretation of the embassy’s ultimate objectives. Instead, he 
justified his standpoint not only on the grounds of the British government’s desires, but also in 
the interests of the EIC. On the one hand, Amherst was apprehensive that any insistence on 
not performing kowtow might induce the emperor to treat the EIC’s trade ungraciously in 
future. On the other hand, in order to achieve the ‘positive good’ he desired, he deemed it 
                                                          
59 Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings, pp. 52-3. 
60 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
61 IOLR, Factory Records, G/12/197/269. Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 28 Feb. 1817. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., G/12/197/269-70. Same letter. 
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worthwhile to keep that prospect alive by making a reasonable concession to the Chinese 
emperor. 
        Ellis’s contention on the propriety of performing kowtow, as well as Amherst’s efforts to 
support this opinion, however, were not acceptable to Staunton, the second commissioner of 
the embassy, who possessed profound local experience. In conflict with the above views, 
Staunton, first of all, asserted that, ‘judging from my general knowledge and experience of the 
Chinese character’, compromise on the court ritual ‘would not be likely to promote the 
attainment of any of the objects we have in view’.
64
 In particular, he maintained, based on the 
example of the Dutch embassy in 1795,
65
 it had actually been confirmed that the performance 
of kowtow would not ‘in any way … benefit our national and commercial interests’.
66
 Second, 
with respect to Amherst’s apprehensions about the EIC’s interests at Canton, Staunton 
concluded that ‘our perseverance in the course we have pursued will not entail any serious or 
permanent injury to our interests’.
67
 Again, based on his local knowledge, Staunton 
maintained that ‘It is not agreeable to the Chinese character to have recourse to violent 
measures, or to push matters to extremities unnecessarily, especially when they have (as I may 
safely say, in this case) no color or ground for proceeding’.
68
 To prove this, he referred to the 
Russian embassy in 1806. Although in that year the Russian ambassador refused to kowtow 
and was hence rejected by the Jiaqing emperor, that event ‘did not occasion any interruption 
of the commercial intercourse between the two nations’.
69
 Third, concerning the aim of 
                                                          
64 Staunton, Notes of Proceedings, pp. 31-2.  
65 In January 1795, a Dutch embassy led by Isaac Titsingh (1745-1812) arrived in Beijing. Unlike the 
Macartney mission, members of the Dutch embassy did not refuse to perform kowtow. It, however, did not 
help the Dutch achieve any of their commercial or diplomatic objectives. On the contrary, this embassy 
was treated in a more disgraceful manner than the Qing court’s reception of Macartney’s mission. More 
details about Titsingh’s embassy can be found in Andr  Everard Van Braam, An authentic account of the 
embassy of the Dutch east-india company, to the court of the emperor of China, in the years 1974 and 1795 
(London: R. Phillips, 1798); J.J.L. Duyvendak, The Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court, 1794-1795 
(Leiden: Brill, 1938). 
66 Staunton, Notes of Proceedings, p. 32.  
67 Ibid., p. 100. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., pp. 100-1. 
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achieving certain ‘positive good’ beyond Canton, Staunton alleged that it was certainly an 
unrealistic assumption that favourable actions would result from such a concession. He stated 
that,  
 
I am fully sensible of the importance of the objects of the present mission; but I 
cannot bring myself to believe that their attainment would be in the smallest 
degree be promoted by the compliance in question; and the mere reception, (it 
could be hardly be termed honorable reception) of the Embassy, would, I think, be 
too dearly purchased by such a sacrifice.
70
 
 
As a result of these considerations, Staunton came to the conclusion that ‘a compliance …will 
be unadvisable, even though the refusal should be attended with the hazard of the total 
rejection of the embassy’.
71
 Moreover, ‘under such very singular circumstances, the mere 
ceremonies of a court reception, had they taken place, would have been nothing compared to 
the moral effect which the judiciously sustained proceedings of the British Mission would be 
calculated to produce’.
72
 
        Apart from these arguments, it is interesting to observe how Staunton, in the minority of 
the embassy’s three-man leadership, managed to convince the other two of his viewpoint. 
When the answer to the kowtow question was shortly to be confirmed in Tongzhou, Staunton 
stressed that, because the embassy was sent out to China ‘solely and entirely for the sake of 
the local interests of the Company’, it was ‘not unnatural that the opinion of the persons 
connected with that interest should preponderate’.
73
 For this reason, he stressed that, with 
regard to a subject of such importance, not only were the attitudes of the envoys important, 
but the advice of all the EIC representatives in the embassy should be seriously considered. In 
particular, Staunton noted that, among the five members of the EIC staff who accompanied 
him, four of them ‘had resided nine or ten years in China, and possessed such acknowledged 
                                                          
70 Ibid., p. 32. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Staunton, Memoirs, p. 67. This view was also shared by Davis, see Davis, Sketches of China, I, 56-7. 
73 Staunton, Miscellaneous Notices, p. 211. 
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talents, judgment, and local experience, as must necessarily entitle their opinions to 
considerable weight’.
74
 The fifth man, Davis, ‘though a young servant of the company, had 
displayed talents, and evinced a zeal in his application to the study of the language, which 
entitled his opinions to an attention beyond his years’.
75
 On these grounds, Staunton was 
allowed to consult with these men individually on this particular matter. As might have been 
expected, all of them, either firmly or conditionally, turned out to agree with Staunton that it 
was unwise to comply with the kowtow ceremony under the present circumstances.
76
 By these 
means, it can be seen that Staunton artfully turned his minority position in the dispute with 
Ellis and Amherst into a six-to-two advantage. Through Staunton’s repeated insistence on the 
weight and extent of so-called ‘local knowledge’, Amherst, at length, was obliged to give up 
the idea of performing kowtow and, probably with it, the chance of achieving any ‘positive 
good’. 
        Although it sounds like it was the embassy’s collective decision to proceed according to 
Staunton’s advice, it appears that not everyone in the mission was truly convinced by 
Staunton’s arguments. In particular, previous scholarship on the Amherst embassy has 
overlooked an underlying debate that occurred between Ellis and Staunton after the no-
kowtow resolution had been reached. From Staunton’s accounts, it can be discovered that a 
central aspect of his attitude was to prove that he helped the embassy make a very correct 
decision in 1816. Even four decades later, Staunton did not forget to refer to various sources 
in his memoir, in order to support this point of view. Most remarkably, he selected some 
passages from one of Ellis’s books, in which Ellis had stated:  
 
                                                          
74 Staunton, Notes of Proceedings, p. 102. 
75  Ibid. It should be noted that although these EIC staff members did have richer ‘local’ knowledge 
compared to other members of the embassy, Staunton did not point out that their extended experience in 
China was restricted only in Canton.  
76 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 
93 
 
I do not in the least blame myself for having surrendered my opinion to the 
experience of Sir George Staunton … I must confess that I could not have found 
another person to whose character and acquirements I would have preferred 
yielding the guidance of my actions.
77
 
 
This statement was taken by Staunton as proof that Ellis had willingly yielded his 
unprofessional opinion to Staunton’s considerable local knowledge, but a wider and closer 
examination of the two gentlemen’s accounts suggests that Ellis had never really accepted 
Staunton’s assertions. 
        First and foremost, although Ellis did indeed mention that he did not feel regret for 
complying with Staunton’s suggestion, his account of this was conveyed in a quite different 
tone to that which appeared in Staunton’s memoirs. Ellis, in fact, wrote in his official journal 
that: 
 
I have naturally felt deep regret at the prospect of being denied reception [at the 
Chinese court] from a continued refusal to comply with the wishes of the Chinese, 
and yet I do not in the least blame myself for having surrendered my opinion to 
the experience of Sir George Staunton. I am ready, when called upon to act, to 
yield crude notions to experienced opinion, but regarding the question as matter of 
speculation, my sentiments remain unchanged;
78
 
 
To elaborate on this point, Ellis not only questioned ‘whether a contrary result would have 
been too dearly bought by sacrificing the distinction between nine prostrations of the head to 
the ground upon two knees, and nine profound bows upon one knee’,
79
 but also maintained 
that, even without regard to the major objectives of the embassy, ‘I shall still be inclined to 
                                                          
77 Cited by Staunton, see Staunton, Memoirs, pp. 68-9. Staunton did not give the exact name of the account 
from which he quoted. He only noted that these passages were from ‘Vol. i. p. 233’ and ‘Vol. ii. p. 195’ of 
Ellis’s ‘published narrative’. Although Ellis’s Journal of the Proceedings was reprinted in two volumes in 
1818, these passages cannot be found on the pages.  
78 Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings, p. 151. 
79 Ibid., p. 153. 
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believe, that the irritation produced by protracted contest has been, in some measure, an 
obstacle to their favourable consideration’.
80
 
        Second, it can be seen from the evidence above that Ellis suggested that the inflexible 
and uncooperative stance which the British envoys adopted in their negotiations was harmful 
to the success of the mission. This view produced another underlying debate between the 
second and the third commissioners of the embassy. In contrast to what Ellis stated, it was 
Staunton’s conviction that, when dealing with the Chinese court, the British had not been 
resolute enough, rather than being overly inflexible. He maintained that, despite the fact that 
many people were in favour of the policy that questions relating to Chinese court ceremony 
should be determined on the spot, ‘the delay, which ensued in consequence, was fatal’,
81
 
because    
 
although the point was at length given up by the Chinese, or, at least, professed to 
be so, on the day before the intended audience, the tardiness of this concession 
compelled them to have recourse afterwards to a degree of indecorous and 
unexampled haste, which, as is well known, produced a crisis in the affairs of the 
embassy, which rendered that concession, even if it had been sincerely made, of 
no avail.
82
 
 
Ellis, in his journal, made it very clear that he was opposed to this view. He claimed that, ‘I 
cannot but regret this inevitable multiplication of subjects of ceremonial discussion, for I 
consider every victory upon these points as a diminution of the chances of success upon the 
more material objects of the embassy’.
83
 Although his opinion was not based on any prior 
knowledge and experience, concerning the kowtow question, it had always been Ellis’s belief 
that ‘the time employed in contending for the manner in which the embassy is to be received, 
and the temper generated by even successful inflexibility, are not calculated to dispose the 
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mind of the Emperor, or his ministers, to listen favourably to propositions in which they do 
not see any reciprocal advantage’.
84
 Moreover, Ellis added that, ‘the dismissal of the embassy, 
without access being obtained to the imperial presence, would be a confirmation to the present 
and future Viceroys of Canton, that their own interest is the only check to their extortion and 
injustice’.
85
 Because of these considerations, Ellis’s personal opinion on this issue was never 
influenced by Staunton’s efforts at persuasion. In concluding his explanation, Ellis stated 
distinctly that: 
 
should the reception or rejection of the embassy depend upon an adherence, on the 
present occasion, to the mode observed in the case of all former European 
embassadors admitted to an audience, except Lord Macartney, I should have no 
hesitation in giving up the maintenance of the single exception as a precedent.
86
 
 
        Furthermore, Ellis cast a great deal of doubt on the value of the local knowledge which 
Staunton was so proud of possessing. The third commissioner was also sceptical about the 
allegedly ‘extensive acquaintance with the language’
87
 of the other ‘China experts’, who were 
simply, in Ellis’s opinion, ‘more or less acquainted with the Chinese language’.
88
 Most 
important, Ellis argued that this local knowledge was obtained only from Canton. Since the 
situation in Beijing was vastly different, experiences gained in Canton might not necessarily 
be applicable to every occasion elsewhere in China.
89
 For these reasons, Ellis claimed that he 
was ‘uninfluenced and unaided by local knowledge’,
90
 a statement which probably implies 
that, in his view, the so-called ‘local’ knowledge, if insufficient, might rather mislead than 
assist the possessor’s judgment. To further support his perspective, Ellis took every 
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opportunity to note the instances when Staunton failed to deliver the right message. For 
example, Ellis recorded that, when, amid the haste in Tongzhou, the embassy was unofficially 
informed that the kowtow had already been dispensed with by the emperor, ‘Sir George had 
no doubt that the point was conceded, and that we might be perfectly satisfied’.
91
 This belief 
soon proved to be utterly erroneous. As for Staunton’s interpretation that the kowtow implied 
political submission, Ellis was also suspicious. Instead, Ellis was more inclined to perceive the 
kowtow as mere formality and part of Chinese court conventions. Ellis noted that he was 
informed by a Chinese official that, ‘His Majesty … was not greater, nor we [the British] 
lower, by the performance; that the ko-tou did not constitute us tributaries; and that there was 
a material difference in the treatment of Envoys from tributary states particularly in the point 
of sitting upon cushions’.
92
 In another conversation, Ellis reported that the embassy’s 
conducting officer, Chang (Zhang Wuwei), observed that: 
 
he was aware our resistance arose from a belief that the ko-tou [kowtow] was an 
admission of political dependence, but in this we were mistaken; that if he met a 
friend of superior rank, he went upon his knees to salute him; that however he 
neither considered himself a servant, nor did his friend pretend to be his master; 
the ko-tou was merely a court ceremony, and the Emperor considered it rude in 
the Embassador to refuse compliance.
93
 
 
Although these statements might well be untruthful allegations made by the Chinese 
authorities, Staunton and other EIC representatives never attempted to disprove them, but 
chose to ignore these views in their accounts. Because of his lack of understanding of Chinese 
customs, Ellis was certainly unable to provide a more definite interpretation of the 
implications of performing or not performing the kowtow. His effort to challenge the authority 
of Staunton’s expert knowledge of Chinese customs does, at any rate, offer a new perspective 
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on the Amherst embassy. Similarly, this renewed dispute over the kowtow ceremony, no 
matter whether it was between the two countries or within the embassy itself, gave the British 
observers opportunities to revise their existing perceptions of China and Chinese affairs. 
 
III 
A capricious despot 
One great difference between the Amherst and Macartney embassies was the contrasting 
images of the Chinese emperor that they presented. In 1793, the British visitors to China 
mainly concluded that it was a few prejudiced Tartar ministers who undermined the success 
of the mission, while the emperor himself was a benevolent and compassionate character. 
This impression, however, was completely rejected by members of the Amherst embassy. In 
order to explain the embassy’s failure to secure trade privileges from the imperial government, 
as well as to account for the dishonourable treatment that the embassy suffered in Yuen-min-
yuen, most of the criticisms following the Amherst embassy were directed against the Jiaqing 
emperor, the Qianlong emperor’s son and successor.  
        As with Macartney and G. L. Staunton, Amherst and G. T. Staunton, as heads of the 
embassy, paid particular attention to explaining why their missions had failed to achieve the 
desired goals. Although, on the issue of kowtow, Amherst and Staunton might hold different 
views, they agreed that ‘the personal character of the monarch’
94
 was the primary reason for 
the failure of their embassy. In this regard, Staunton maintained that, ‘the emperor’s violence 
and precipitation must … be considered as the main cause of what has happened. … his 
conduct throughout has certainly been ungracious in the extreme, and totally unlike that of his 
predecessor, upon the occasion of the former embassy’.
95
 In a similar vein, Amherst argued 
that, ‘my want of success is not to be attributed to want either of zeal or discretion in the 
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performance of my duty’.
96
 The real reason for the mission’s failure was, Amherst believed, 
that the Jiaqing emperor, ‘whose reign has been frequently and very lately disturbed by 
insurrections’, was less ready to ‘dispense with outward fame of respect than his Father, 
whose reign was long and victorious, and who, being firm in the possession of real power and 
authority, might attach less consequence to any shew of external homage’.
97
 This explanation 
was generally adopted to explain why the Amherst mission had failed to gain any concession 
in 1816, but it could not account for some specific occurrences, such as the hasty departure to 
Yuen-min-yuen, despite the ambassador’s refusal to kowtow, as well as the unexpected 
summons to an immediate imperial audience. With these extraordinary events in mind, the 
British commentators developed a new image of the Chinese sovereign as a capricious despot. 
        The origin of this impression can be traced back as far as the embassy’s first landing on 
Chinese soil. In Tianjin, Amherst was first told that the emperor demanded the British 
ambassador to leave his musical band behind when he proceeded to Beijing, but this order 
was soon countermanded without prior notice. Ellis commented on this event that, ‘The 
objection made by the Emperor to the band is only so far important as it marks the capricious 
weakness of his character, and shews that he may be expected to adopt measures without any 
apparent or indeed assignable reason’.
98
 A few days later, after the British envoys had 
encountered disorder in the early negotiations, as well as the insults in Yuen-min-yuen, the 
favourable perception of the Chinese sovereign that they inherited from previous European 
observers was weakened further. In particular, the emperor’s rejection of the embassy, 
immediately after a sleepless and exhausting overnight journey, ignited so much indignation 
across the British delegation that no one was willing to withhold his anger toward such an 
inhumane order. Davis, in this regard, claimed that, ‘This certainly was a barbarous, not to 
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say brutal, measure, considering that we had only just arrived from a most fatiguing night 
journey. … The insult offered had been so gross’.
99
 Clarke Abel, who found it impossible to 
explain what had occurred ‘in any probable chain of cause and effect’, wrote that, ‘We could 
only conjecture that we had been hurried to and from Yuen-min-yuen, and subjected to all 
kinds of indignity and inconvenience, to suit the will of a capricious despot’.
100
 Moreover, by 
contrast with the Macartney mission, the Amherst embassy’s criticism of the Chinese court 
centred almost exclusively on the emperor himself, rather than on any of his mandarins. The 
British travellers believed that every transaction between the embassy and the Chinese 
government was manipulated by the Jiaqing emperor, while all his mandarins were simply 
fulfilling the duties imposed upon them. Henry Hayne noted in this respect that, ‘We all felt 
much for the situation of the Mandarins attached to us, having had great reason to be perfectly 
satisfied with their whole conduct toward us, and at the same time extremely zealous in the 
cause of their Emperor’.
101
 Ellis fully concurred with Hayne on this point. He maintained that, 
‘we must consider ourselves fortunate in the Mandarins with whom we had to transact 
business … the rupture must be attributed to the personal character of the Emperor, who is 
capricious, weak, and timid, and the combined effect of these feelings will account for his 
pertinacity’.
102
 
        This production of the Chinese sovereign’s unfavourable image, however, did not cease 
with the dismissal of Amherst’s mission. Instead, it was considerably reinforced by a series of 
happenings afterwards. In the beginning of the embassy’s return journey from Beijing to 
Canton, Amherst was concerned that the emperor’s displeasure would result in much 
inconvenience for his embassy.
103
 Yet, upon his return to Tongzhou, Amherst received a visit 
from Legates Soo and Kwang, who informed him of the emperor’s proposal for a partial 
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exchange of presents.
 104
 This attempt to keep on good terms with the British, together with 
the kindness with which the mission was treated during the rest of the return journey, was 
considered by Amherst as ‘a sort of reparation for its abrupt dismissal from Yuen-min-
yuen’.
105
 Nevertheless, since neither an explanation for the rejection nor a clearly stated 
willingness to preserve good relations with Britain was communicated to the British 
ambassador, the supposed graciousness of the Chinese sovereign did not generate much good 
will on the part of the British. On the contrary, the Jiaqing emperor’s quick change of mind 
was seen as proof of both his caprice and his weakness, as well as an example of his 
inconsistent style of government. Ellis stressed that: 
 
This weak and capricious monarch, soon after the flagrant outrage had been 
committed under the impulse of angry disappointment, may be supposed to have 
become alarmed at the consequences of his own violence, and the habitual notions 
of decorum belonging to Chinese character and usage resuming their influence, 
produced the partial reparation.
106
 
 
Although this interpretation was not founded on solid evidence, to the British, it was the most 
credible explanation of what had transpired on the Chinese side. 
        In addition, the negative image of the Jiaqing emperor was further confirmed by the 
contradictory accounts he provided to explain the dismissal of the British embassy. Although 
the sovereign had never clarified to the British what induced him to reject their mission, he 
did issue a few accounts to different readerships in China on this subject. On 4 September 
1816, the Pekin Gazette (京报; Jing Bao), a state-run bulletin for officers of the Chinese 
government, released an imperial edict, in which the emperor attributed the unpleasant 
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dismissal of the Amherst embassy to the false reports of his ministers, especially Duke Ho. In 
line with his usual cultivated image of a benevolent monarch, the Jiaqing emperor lamented 
that, ‘If, at that time, Ho-she-tay [Duke Ho] had addressed to me a true report, I, the Emperor, 
would certainly have issued my commands, and have changed the period of the audience, in 
order to correspond with their intentions, in thus coming ten thousand lees to my court’.
107
 In 
another edict addressed to the viceroy of Jiangsu, Anhui and Jiangxi, the emperor enjoined 
government officers in this area not only to treat the British with civility and attention, but he 
also personally offered a more detailed explanation for the dismissal of the embassy. 
Although, in this document, the Chinese sovereign dwelt less on the culpability of his 
ministers, his general sentiments on this issue do not seem to have changed. Blame was still 
placed on the misconduct of a few individuals who had engaged with the British mission, 
rather than the actions of the emperor himself or anyone else. The British observers were by 
and large satisfied with these two edicts when they obtained them through unofficial channels. 
In spite of the usual contemptuous tone in which they were addressed, Amherst claimed that, 
‘He [the Chinese emperor] at least absolves me and those who were associated with me from 
having been instrumental to our own dismissal’.
108
 Davis added that, ‘inasmuch as it was a 
public notification that the emperor was sorry for what had passed, [it] was a very good 
supplement to the exchange of presents at Tung-chow, and placed our affairs on the best 
footing that they now admitted of’.
109
 These optimistic views, however, were considerably 
changed when the British envoys later found out that there was another different imperial 
interpretation for what had occurred. Upon his arrival at Canton, Amherst received from a 
source in Macao a copy of the emperor’s edict to the viceroy of Canton. This edict was 
dispatched only two days after the one which had appeared in the Pekin Gazette, but it 
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contained an entirely different account of the incident. In contrast to the previous two edicts, 
the Jiaqing emperor was completely silent about the conduct of his ministers. Instead, he 
pointed out that the dismissal of the embassy was caused by the British ambassador’s refusal 
to observe Chinese court etiquette in the matter of the kowtow. This edict greatly surprised 
the British envoys, especially because the two contradictory explanations had both been 
produced by the sovereign’s own hand within such a short period of time. Although it can be 
speculated that the latter account was created in order to prevent any voice for change being 
expressed by the foreign residents in Canton, the inconsistency between the two explanations 
nevertheless greatly strengthened the belief that the present Chinese emperor possessed a 
capricious and arbitrary character. It was conjectured by Ellis that, ‘either at the suggestion of 
ministers adverse to the semblance of concession to foreigners, or from the returning 
haughtiness of national feeling and personal character, it was determined by the Emperor to 
justify his violence by a false statement’.
110
 Since ‘the edicts were neither addressed, nor were 
they supposed to have come to the knowledge of the Embassador’, Ellis maintained that, 
‘they are therefore only important as evidences of the general disposition of the Chinese 
government, or as instances of fluctuation in a mind known to be at once timid and 
capricious’.
111
 
        Furthermore, based on this belief in the Jiaqing emperor’s capricious character, the 
British observers were convinced that the Chinese sovereign, as well as his courtiers, had no 
wish to pay any respect to truth. Prior to the embassy’s departure from Canton, Amherst 
received a letter from the emperor to George III, via the Prince Regent, in which His Imperial 
Majesty stated that he accepted the ‘profound and sincere devotedness’ of the British nation, 
despite Amherst’s failure to communicate it properly.
112
 This letter was considered as such ‘a 
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very false and distorted account of all the transactions of the Embassy’
113
 that it proved ‘the 
Emperor’s disregard to truth and consistency’.
114
 In particular, the Jiaqing emperor’s 
assertions that Macartney had performed the kowtow ceremony during his embassy and that 
Amherst had first promised to comply with it, but afterwards refused to do so, were 
condemned as ‘unblushing falsehoods’.
115
 The appearance of this letter also reminded the 
recent British visitors to China of other untruthful statements made by Chinese government 
officials. Morrison, when translating one of Duke Ho’s reports, discovered that Duke Ho used 
to inform the emperor that the British ambassador was practising the kowtow with reverence 
on a daily basis. Morrison found this report without a doubt ‘a statement founded on a 
positive untruth’.
116
 Amherst recalled that contradictory allegations on Macartney’s 
compliance with kowtow were also made by Legate Soo on different occasions.
117
 Since 
Legate Soo’s rank was much inferior to that of Duke Ho’s, Amherst supposed that there was a 
‘system which seems generally to prevail in China of framing reports from inferiors, not so 
much with a regard to truth, as to what is conceived to be the wishes of their superiors’.
118
 
Inasmuch as the Jiaqing emperor ‘is said to be as capricious, as his commands are arbitrary 
and his power extensive’, Amherst believed ‘this system may perhaps operate much [more] 
strongly towards the Sovereign’.
119
 By these discoveries and speculations, the caprice of the 
emperor was not only confirmed once again, but was also deemed to be the underlying reason 
for the general disregard for truth that permeated his government.  
        It can be observed from the above that the Amherst embassy created a vastly different 
image of the Chinese sovereign from that which had developed two decades previously as a 
result of the Macartney mission. Unlike the Qianlong emperor, who was perceived to be 
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amicable and caring for the wellbeing of the British, the Jiaqing emperor was represented as a 
capricious despot, as well as being the very reason why the mission had failed to achieve its 
objectives. Despite such treatment, however, Amherst’s embassy was given greater liberty of 
movement during its return journey through the interior of China. As a consequence of the 
new opportunities that this journey provided, these British travellers were able to explore 
China as never before, as well as being in a position to confirm or develop their existing 
impressions of the Chinese empire. 
 
IV 
Renewed and revised impressions on China 
After Amherst’s embassy departed from Tongzhou, its treatment gradually improved. Until it 
reached the province of Canton, a decent level of honour and convenience was provided by 
the Chinese government. In comparison with the treatment of the Macartney mission, whose 
freedom of movement was strictly constrained because of the suspicion of the Qianlong 
emperor’s court, the Amherst embassy enjoyed ‘a greater degree of liberty than had been 
granted to any former embassy’.
120
 These British travellers were allowed not only to ramble 
about in various Chinese cities, towns and rural areas, but also able to have contact with 
different ranks of Chinese people, such as artisans, merchants and others in the middle and 
lower ranks of Chinese society. After their four-month passage through the interior of 
China,
121
 even the so-called ‘China experts’, such as Staunton and Davis, admitted that their 
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curiosity had been ‘very much satisfied’.
122
 In consequence of this unique opportunity that 
allowed these British travellers to observe the Chinese empire so closely, a range of new 
knowledge and new impressions were gained. The previous British perceptions of China, 
accordingly, were both renewed and revised to a considerable extent.  
        An important discovery of Amherst’s embassy was that China was a civilisation in decay 
during the reign of Jiaqing. Staunton, as the only person who had travelled with both British 
missions, maintained that, ‘there can be little doubt that the prosperity of this empire has been 
on the decline under the government of the present emperor, that is, since the period at which 
it was visited by Lord Macartney’s embassy’.
123
 Staunton discovered that ‘in most points, our 
present views and estimation of the country and inhabitants, seem to differ from those which 
were formed by the former party, for the worse’
124
 and he believed that it could be attributed 
to ‘the different state of the imperial finances at the two periods’.
125
 Given the fact that the 
Jiaqing emperor was even compelled to discontinue the refurbishment of his own garden for 
want of funds,
126
 Staunton was convinced that the Chinese empire was indeed declining under 
the present monarch. To prove this, Staunton recorded every sign of poverty and dilapidation 
that he discovered throughout the long journey. As a result, terms such as ‘decay’, ‘decline’, 
and ‘ruinous’ can be frequently found in his journal. Staunton even claimed that ‘almost 
every public building we have seen in our route, has exhibited to us more or less evidence of 
the poverty or negligence of the government’.
127
 For example, in order to illustrate the 
destitution common in the Chinese countryside, Staunton wrote:  
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These hills are perfectly barren, and destitute even of trees – no signs whatever of 
cultivation or inhabitants, except at their feet near the river, or in the lowest parts 
of the intervening vallies. At one, we passed on our left a ruined pagoda of nine 
stories – It seemed wholly abandoned, and had no house or religious establishment 
of any kind in its vicinity. … Some spots had very much the appearance of the 
entrance of mines which, being no longer worked, had been neglected, and closed 
up.
128
 
 
With regard to an average city in Jiangxi Province, he recorded that,  
 
Within the walls we found no improvement in the style of the houses, or any shops 
that attracted our attention – the walls were low and ruinous … a range of 
buildings … in the style of a large joss-house, but at present in a ruinous state, and 
wholly untenanted … the tribunals of the Nan-gan-foo or governor, … it is 
certainly at present the poorest and most ruinous … The governor’s tribunal and 
residence, was a lofty and extensive, but neglected pile of building. The tribunal of 
the Hien … appeared in so ruinous a state as to be scarcely habitable … several 
stone pailoos … seemed to denote that this city had once existed in a state of 
comparative splendor, from which it had latterly declined.
129
  
 
        This image of a dilapidated China introduced by Staunton did not differ from the views 
expressed by other members of the embassy. On the contrary, many of them concurred with 
Staunton’s findings, even though they had not, as he had, visited China two decades before. 
Ellis, Staunton’s major opponent in the kowtow debate, when passing Tsing-heen (Qing xian), 
noted that ‘the walls and the town itself are falling to decay’.
130
 In viewing a pagoda near the 
city of Nanchang, Ellis also commented that it was ‘in exceedingly bad proportions’ and 
‘evinced the decay of architecture among the Chinese’.
131
 Davis, subsequent to his visit to 
Wu-yuan, an imperial residence of the Qianlong emperor, did not conceal his disappointment 
about what he saw. He entered into his Sketches of China that, ‘Like almost everything of the 
kind that we had seen in the country, this once decorated abode was in a sad state of 
dilapidation and ruin and calculated to produce no other emotions than those of 
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melancholy’.
132
 After Able paid a visit to the celebrated city of Guazhou, similar scenes were 
also noted and described in his narrative. Abel wrote that, 
 
The city of Qua-tchow [Guazhou] did not answer the expectations raised by its 
advantageous situation. Its streets exhibited no characters of opulence, and its 
walls were in ruins. In the days of Kien-Lung [Qianlong], it flourished under 
imperial favour; … Since these golden days in the history of Qua-tchow, as its 
governor informed Mr Morrison, the Fung-shway [Feng-shui], or “fortune of the 
place,” had gradually declined.
133
 
 
        Based on their conviction that China was in decay, these British travellers became 
increasingly disenchanted with the state of Chinese civilisation. Although, at the beginning of 
the Amherst mission, the embassy was still divided into ‘those who landed with an 
impression that the Chinese were to be classed with the civilized nations of Europe’ and 
others who ‘ranged them with the other nations of Asia’,
134
 this difference had changed 
dramatically by the end of the mission. A general consensus on the backwardness of China 
emerged and this by and large ended the previous divergence of opinion. This unfavourable 
perception of the Chinese empire, first of all, derived from the unrefined image of its people. 
Upon their arrival on the China coast, members of the Amherst embassy were soon 
‘astonished to find the fishermen in their boats as naked as savages, without appearing 
conscious of shame. Sometimes they wore a jacket over their shoulders, but had no clothing 
for the lower part of the body’.
135
 During their travels through the Chinese interior, it was also 
a common view that ‘poor boys to the age of twelve or thirteen were generally naked, 
standing, running about in promiscuous crowds’.
136
 In light of these impressions, the Chinese 
were more and more presented to the readers of their accounts as a barbarian-like people, 
insomuch that, in the accounts of these British travellers, they were frequently compared with 
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animals rather than with other human beings. For instance, when Basil Hall gave the local 
shipmen some dollars as presents, he noted that ‘The captain and his crew assembled in a ring, 
and turned over the pieces from hand to hand, just as I have seen a group of monkeys do 
when puzzled with some new object’.
137
 The residences of ordinary Chinese people, in Abel’s 
opinion, were ‘miserable beyond any thing which England can exemplify’ and ‘more like the 
dens of beasts than the habitations of men’.
138
 Based on these discoveries, ‘dirt, squalidness, 
and extreme poverty’ were identified as the ‘leading characteristics’ of the Chinese 
populace.
139
 In particular, their unhygienic living conditions were highlighted by the British 
observers. Abel found that, in addition to the shortage of clean water and the ubiquity of 
mosquitoes in many parts of China,
140
 ‘The Chinese are less fastidious than perhaps any other 
people in the choice of their food’.
141
 Whenever dead pigs or rotting vegetables were thrown 
overboard from the British ships, there were always some Chinese people rushing to pick 
them up and eat them afterwards. The Chinese were also believed to be a people ‘utterly 
insensible to bad smells’.
142
 When surrounded by the curious crowds at Tianjin, Ellis recalled 
that, ‘there literally prevails a compound of villainous stenches, and this constitutes one of the 
principal inconveniences of the crowd that gather round us’.
143
 On a visit to the famous ‘Bath 
of Fragrant Water’ near Nanjing, Ellis claimed that ‘the stench is excessive; altogether I 
thought it the most disgusting cleansing apparatus I had ever seen and worthy of this nasty 
nation’.
144
 On the same occasion, Abel noted that, ‘There appeared no intention of renewing 
the water [which] thus become saturated with dirt … The steam arising from it, however 
fragrant to the senses of the Chinese, was to mine really intolerable, and drove me away 
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before I could ascertain in what manner the baths were heated’.
145
 By such multi-sensory 
examinations, the Chinese people’s want of cleanliness, as well as their general image as an 
unrefined people, was further confirmed. 
        The British travellers’ disenchantment with Chinese civilisation was intensified by the 
poor condition of the public infrastructures in China. According to the accounts provided by 
the members of Amherst’s embassy, the majority of the streets in Chinese cities were 
‘imperfectly paved, narrow, and saturated with bad smells’.
146
 The road Amherst took in 
Tongzhou, from his residence to the audience hall of Duke Ho, was so ‘dirty and slippery’ 
that ‘the poor creatures who carried the chairs were up to the knees in water’.
147
 The express 
way, which the Chinese promised to be of superior construction, turned out to be simply ‘a 
broad road of hewn granite, which was evidently very old, and in so ruined a state that it 
might have been referred to [in] the days of Yaou and Shun’.
148
 Even the imperial canal, 
which was renowned ‘as an example of the immense power of human labour and human 
art’,
149
 was proved to be much overrated, because most of it was ‘only a natural river, 
modified and regulated by sluices and embankments’.
150
 In a similar way, the vehicles that 
the Qing government provided for the use of Amherst’s embassy were also extremely 
uncomfortable. The boats were said to be ‘ill constructed for comfort in cold weather’
151
 and 
the junks for conveying supplies were ‘the most clumsy looking vessels imaginable’.
152
 The 
Chinese carts were also deemed to be ‘the most execrable machines imaginable’.
153
 Riding in 
these carriages, Morrison noted that, ‘without constant effort to hold by the sides of the 
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carriage, a person’s head was thrown first on one side and then on the other’.
154
 During the 
exhausting overnight travel from Tongzhou to Yuen-min-yuen, Davis expressed his regret at 
having exchanged his horse for one of these ‘wretched little Chinese tilted carts’, because ‘the 
convulsive throes of this primitive machine, without springs, on the ruined granite road, 
produced an effect little short of lingering death; and the only remedy was to get out as often 
as possible and walk’.
155
 Morrison observed that it was probably due to the poor transport 
available in China that Amherst’s British-made carriage attracted so much admiration from 
the Chinese natives and was widely recognised by them as ‘proper for the Emperor’.
156
  
        In addition to such civilian facilities, the British visitors also commented on the state of 
the Chinese military. Many military posts in China, as with other public buildings, were 
considered to be in need of repair. In particular, the British observers found it amusing and 
absurd that some watch-towers in Shandong province, formed entirely of mats, were painted 
to imitate brick or stone. This was regarded by Davis as ‘a most unequivocal proof of the 
unwarlike habits of the nation’.
157
 The British also discovered that ‘the art of war must be in a 
very low state’
158
 in China. Through contacts with various Chinese soldiers and mandarins, 
the British travellers found that, bodily strength and courage were still seen by them as the 
only qualities that were required for military advancement. Bows and arrows, indeed, were 
the most frequently used weapons of Chinese military men. Most of the matchlocks that the 
British saw in China were ‘truly wretched and appeared rusted through, so as not to be fired 
without danger’.
159
 When Chinese soldiers, most of whom were ‘of a very poor and 
inefficient description’,
160
 were using these weapons, ‘they immediately retreat upon applying 
the match, squatting down at a short distance with their backs turned; the iron tube is always 
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placed upright, so that every possibility of danger from the wadding is guarded against’.
161
 
All these findings, in consequence, led the Amherst embassy to believe that the Chinese were 
indeed an unwarlike nation.  
        The British observers’ unfavourable perception of Chinese civilisation was reinforced by 
their discoveries about the knowledge and characteristics of the Chinese people. As with the 
Macartney mission, members of Amherst’s embassy were convinced by their experiences that 
the Chinese were indeed so ignorant that the Europeans ‘can learn nothing from China’.
162
 
Shortly after the embassy landed in China, Morrison realised that, although he had marked all 
the baggage in Chinese characters, the boatmen and porters were unable to read.
163
 Davis also 
noticed that the military mandarin attached to his boat could not even write in Chinese as well 
as he did and that this man’s ‘general ignorance on every subject (beyond the use of his pipe 
and his bowl of rice), made it vain to hope for any information from him’.
164
 When Abel, the 
naturalist, was collecting plants or examining stones during the journey, he was often laughed 
at by the natives and the escorting soldiers, as if he did so only to satisfy his peculiar curiosity. 
When Abel spoke to some of these people, he found the British to them were like ‘inhabitants 
of another world’, because ‘Our features, dress, and habits, were so opposed to theirs, as to 
induce them to infer that our country, in all its natural characters, must equally differ from 
their own. “Have you a moon, and rain, and rivers in your country?” were their occasional 
questions’.
165
 Along with this profound ignorance, the British observers also discovered that 
the Chinese had a deep conviction of China’s superiority over all other nations. In the vicinity 
of Shandong’s northern frontier, the British envoys met the judge of Beizhili, a loquacious 
Tartar man who had a certain amount of knowledge about the world beyond China. Although 
he was ‘better informed respecting the geography and history of European states, than any 
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other Chinese with whom the Embassy became acquainted’,
166
 this gentleman spoke of 
Britain as a country ‘depending altogether on commerce … great by sea, but weak by 
land’.
167
 He also asserted that, in contrast to the inferior position and status of Britain, ‘the 
Chinese empire was in the center of the universe, and the supreme head of all nations’.
168
 For 
this reason, due homage should by all means be paid by the British ambassador to the 
emperor of China in order to win concessions for British traders at Canton. Otherwise, the 
judge was afraid that ‘it might prove the absolute ruin’
169
 of the British nation. To the British 
observers, this understanding of Britain as well as of Sino-British trade was so poor that 
‘ignorance and conceit were perhaps never more strongly combined’.
 170
 Owing to their 
unique sense of self-importance, the Chinese were found to be very reluctant to recognise 
anything foreign that appeared to be superior to their own designs. In terms of the different 
attitudes that the Chinese and the British adopted towards modern science and technology, 
Davis maintained that,  
 
they are too proud to learn any thing about us, while we foreigners of course never 
lose an opportunity of studying them in every relation of life, and have availed 
ourselves to some purpose of the opportunities, (scanty as these may have 
comparatively been,) which years of intercourse afforded us. That "power" which 
consists in "knowledge," therefore, preponderates on our side.
171
 
 
        In addition to their investigations into the Chinese people’s knowledge, members of the 
Amherst embassy also attempted to examine the spiritual state and general character of the 
Chinese nation. To begin with, it was discovered that, compared to the serious and exalted 
religious beliefs in Europe, religion in China ‘has all the looseness and vanity with less of the 
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solemnity and decency of ancient Polytheism’.
172
 According to the observations of these 
British travellers, there were neither particular dates set aside for public worship, nor did the 
Chinese attend temples congregationally. The majority of the Chinese population were utterly 
unselective in the deities to which they paid respect, so long as they believed that the practice 
would help avert mischief from them. Most of the priests in China were found to be 
uninstructed themselves, as well as largely illiterate. As mere performers of ceremonies, they 
neither preached like their counterparts did in Europe, nor were these persons treated by their 
followers with the reverence that was ‘justly and reasonably due to the respectable ministers 
of religion in all countries’.
173
 In view of these facts, Morrison, as the first Protestant 
missionary in China, claimed that,  
 
The general principles of our religion give a tone of elevation and dignity to the 
human mind which is not felt here. …They do not associate under something 
approaching equality for the worship of their gods. …The multitudes of people in 
this country are truly, in a moral and religious view, as ‘sheep without a 
shepherd’.
174
 
 
        Based on such images, the characteristics of the Chinese people were interpreted as 
‘selfish, cold-blooded and inhumane’.
175
 Morrison argued that the professed moral maxims of 
the Chinese were actually ‘ineffectual in regulating their minds and conduct’.
176
 Since the 
Chinese were never ‘nice about a strict adherence to the truth’,
177
 they could, in fact, be 
‘complaisant and servile, or insolent and domineering, according to circumstances’.
178
 For 
instance, ‘When interest or fear do not dictate a different course, they are to the strangers, 
haughty, insolent, fraudulent and inhospitable’. Moreover, ‘A merchant will flatter a foreign 
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devil (as they express it), when he has something to gain from him; then he can be servile 
enough; particularly if he is not seen by his own countrymen’.
179
 For this reason, it was found 
that most of the Chinese were ‘distrustful to a high degree’ and that there was ‘a considerable 
prevalence of scepticism’ in Chinese society.
180
 Abel, in this regard, pointed out that, 
particularly in the trading part of the Chinese community, ‘the principle of cheating is so 
legitimated amongst them by the general practice and toleration of their countrymen, as to be 
considered rather as a necessary qualification to the successful practice of their calling, as an 
immoral quality’.
181
 Because of what constantly occurred to the Amherst embassy, Abel 
added that, ‘If giving false weight, charging centuple prices, and substituting bad articles for 
good, form a species of theft, it is not confined to the sea-coast, but is practised all over the 
empire of China, and is not only tolerated but applauded, especially when foreigners are its 
victims’.
182
 Based on all these findings and experiences, when it came to the general character 
of the Chinese, Ellis contended that they were, ‘half civilized, prejudiced’
183
 and ‘without 
exaggeration’, a ‘nefarious’ people.
184
 As for China’s position compared to other civilisations 
in the world, Ellis concluded that, although it was ‘superior to the other countries of Asia in 
the arts of government and the general aspects of society’, China was undoubtedly ‘inferior 
by many degrees to civilized Europe in all that constitutes the real greatness of a nation’.
185
 
On the question of whether the Chinese could be defined as barbarians, Morrison came up 
with the following statement:  
 
If “barbarity” or being “barbarous” expresses something savage, rude and cruel, 
the present inhabitants of China do not deserve the epithet; if it expresses a 
cunning selfish policy, endeavouring to deceive, to intimidate, or to brow beat, as 
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occasion may require, connected with an arrogant assumption of superiority on all 
occasions, instead of cultivating a liberal, candid, friendly intercourse with men of 
other nations, they are barbarians.
186
 
 
These arguments put forward by Ellis and Morrison fairly represent the common perception 
of the Amherst embassy. It can be clearly seen that the previous disagreements previously 
expressed on this subject had changed dramatically by the end of this second British embassy. 
A consensus on the half-civilised image of China was generally reached by the British 
observers who participated in the Amherst embassy. 
        To account for the backwardness of Chinese civilisation, members of the Amherst 
embassy agreed with Lord Macartney and his earlier mission that the depraved government of 
China was the primary cause. Since, during their return journey, they were given many 
opportunities to visit Chinese cities and villages as well as to communicate with random 
Chinese people, in comparison with their predecessors, these British travellers on the 
Amherst embassy were able to gather much more first-hand evidence to deepen this 
impression and to confirm earlier prejudices. In particular, according to their findings, these 
observers revealed that the suspicious government of China had deliberately designed some 
policies in order to suppress the natural sentiments and pursuits of its subjects. First of all, 
although the leading characteristics of the Chinese appeared to be prejudiced and inhuman, it 
was discovered that they were rather the consequence of the government’s narrow policies, 
than the natural disposition of the whole nation. They maintained that the Qing government 
attached much importance to restricting contacts between foreigners and the Chinese people. 
The country’s foreign trade was hence restricted to the port of Canton. Although the 
Macartney embassy had been permitted to pass through the interior of China, its members had 
not been allowed to make real contact with the local inhabitants. Because of such restrictions, 
the previous western impressions of the Chinese people and the state of Chinese society were 
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drawn mainly from evidence gained at Canton. This allowed Hall to admit that ‘it is 
obviously as unfair to judge of the Chinese by such data, as it would be to estimate the 
character of the English from such materials as Rotherhithe and Wapping might afford’.
187
  
        Over the centuries, in those regions, such as Canton, where frequent engagements with 
foreign people had taken place, or amongst those social classes whose professions and 
activities involved contact with foreigners, a belief in the inferiority of all foreign nations and 
a distrust of their good intentions had been promoted by the Chinese authorities. In 
consequence, a deep prejudice as well as a serious contempt of foreigners had been inculcated 
in the minds of the Chinese people. Despite this, members of the Amherst embassy found that, 
‘in places remote from Canton, and where it is not the policy of the local authorities to 
discourage all inquiry, there is no jealousy or apprehension of strangers’.
188
 When they 
travelled to some places which had ‘probably never before been visited by any Europeans’,
189
 
these British visitors often discerned and benefited from the cheerful disposition and 
hospitality of the local inhabitants. This can be supported by plenty of examples found in the 
accounts produced by members of the Amherst mission. For example, Able noted that: 
 
I was often enabled to get amongst them apart from my friends and usual attendant 
soldiers, and always found them mild, forbearing, and humane.
190
 … especially 
when they were peasants, [they] afforded a pleasing contrast in their simple 
manners and civil treatment of strangers, to the cunning designs of the salesmen of 
Tung-Chow, and the brutal importunity of the courtiers of Yuen-Ming-Yuen.
191
 
 
Ellis added that, when he entered the dwellings of some local residents, ‘No dislike is shewn 
by the people in general to natural inquisitiveness; on the contrary, our momentary intrusions 
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have been met by invitations to sit down’.
192
 Particularly, in contrast with the prevailing 
impression that the Chinese were guarded in their relations with foreigners, these friendly 
natives either pressed them to partake of their meals or supplied them with tea, or even 
invited these visiting strangers to examine the yards and outer apartments of their houses.
193
 
According to these experiences, members of the Amherst mission were further persuaded that 
it was the policies of the Chinese government that greatly transformed the real disposition of 
its people, and they were able to build up impressions which were in essence ‘rather 
favourable than otherwise to the Chinese character’.
194
 
        In addition to its efforts to restrict the nation’s contact with foreign peoples, the Chinese 
government was also found to be promoting tensions and difficulties within the country’s 
hierarchical society. On the one hand, the populace in China was placed in awe of the 
government, because, under the powerful hand of that authority, government officials ‘have 
the knack of rendering life very miserable, and assume the power of bambooing, torturing, 
fining (or squeezing), and every species of oppression short of death’.
195
 Throughout their 
journey, the British travellers witnessed a number of cases where Chinese men and women 
were bambooed or face-slapped due to trifling mistakes. Random poor people were also seen 
to be forced by the embassy’s attendant officials to work without charge for the fleet.
196
 In 
consideration of these facts, it was believed that, ‘China does not enjoy liberty. Her 
government is a military despotism. … The strong arm of power intimidates them’.
197
 In 
consequence, the Chinese people were seriously discouraged from discussing affairs of state, 
or forming any societies which might seek to influence or oppose the government. Moreover, 
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since according to the criminal code of China, ‘an ineffectual attempt to save the life of 
another, under the slightest shade of suspicion, is followed by the punishment of death’,
198
 the 
Chinese were found unwilling to give assistance even if they saw someone’s life was at risk. 
Instead of taking this as an example of the Chinese people’s inhumane character, the British 
commentators attributed it to the ‘absurd and unjust principles upon which the Chinese laws 
are administered by the mandarins’.
199
 Macleod, for example, clearly stated that, ‘It is 
lamentable to observe that the institutions of any nation should have the effect of deadening 
every feeling of sympathy, and of exciting, instead of discouraging, “man’s inhumanity to 
man;” but such is the case in this country’.
200
 On the other hand, the mandarins themselves 
were also not free from concern about their own self-preservation. Their offices and lives 
were totally subject to the will of the monarch, insomuch that ‘not only the more important 
measures of government, but the most trifling details of office, depend for their execution 
upon the supposed irresistibility of the imperial power’.
201
 In particular, the British were 
informed that ‘in the event of any suspicion of a collusion with foreigners’, the emperor’s 
‘single word was sufficient to consign them [the mandarins] to death’.
202
 For the Amherst 
embassy, this perception explained the sharp contrast between the attendant officers’ 
extremely reserved manner in the vicinity of Beijing and the good temper they manifested 
during the rest of the time. In the early stages of the return journey, Amherst believed that 
‘Being now at so short a distance from the Capital, it appeared probable that most questions 
would be decided by an immediate appeal to the Emperor himself’.
203
 Probably for this 
reason, the mandarins appeared quite cautious about entering into any formal conversation 
with the British envoys and nothing could induce them to accept any presents. Nevertheless, 
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it was observed that ‘as we receded from the neighbourhood of Peking, the mandarins had 
become more frequent and less reserved in their visits, very readily accepting any presents 
that were made them’.
204
 On the basis of these discoveries, the British observers were led to 
believe that, just as with the Chinese populace, the government officials in China were 
entirely at the mercy of their sovereign. Their liberty and natural sentiments were greatly 
restricted and constrained by the power and caution of the Chinese emperor.  
        Last but not least, the government of China was viewed by these British observers as the 
chief obstacle to the Chinese people’s pursuit of knowledge and wellbeing, as well as to the 
progress of Chinese civilisation. To justify this conclusion, Macleod maintained that, the 
Chinese government not only made its people believe ‘themselves at the summit of 
perfection’, but also established ‘the absurd tyranny of fettering the human understanding, by 
forbidding all innovation and improvement’.
205
 For instance, although some Chinese people 
did indeed have an interest in astronomy, the study of the human frame, western medical 
practices, and so on,
206
 the Chinese government prohibited the masses from undertaking such 
studies. Instead, it narrowed their ideas ‘by compelling their attention, and attaching 
importance, entirely to the observance of useless forms and ceremonies’,
207
 and ‘by admitting 
of no deviation from one contracted path, even in the simplest transactions of life’.
208
 In 
particular, as Barrow had pointed out two decades previously, Davis agreed that the Chinese 
government ‘habitually inculcate[d] a respectful demeanour on the part of young people 
towards their elders’.
209
 The benefits of such institutions were considered to be so apparent in 
their effects, because ‘In no country of the world does a quiet, easy subordination so 
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extensively prevail as in China’, where the ‘inexperience and headstrong passion of youth’ 
were repressed without inspiring resistance.
210
 Moreover, these British commentators also 
contended that measures taken by the Chinese government were hostile to the welfare of the 
people and restricted the development of China’s civilisation. For one thing, during their 
travel in the Chinese interior, members of the Amherst embassy discovered that, although 
China’s foreign trade was restricted to Canton, there was actually much demand and 
eagerness on the part of the Chinese people to trade with the British.
211
 For another thing, in 
those places where greater engagement with westerners took place, particularly in Canton, the 
British travellers claimed that they were able to discern a distinct air of opulence that was 
hard to see in the rest of China. Ellis noted in this regard that:  
 
Canton, from the number and size of the vessels, the variety and decorations of the 
boats, the superior architecture of the European factories, and the general buzz and 
diffusion of a busy population, had, on approaching, a more imposing appearance 
than any Chinese city visited by the present embassy; nor do I believe, that in the 
wealth of the inhabitants at large, the skill of the artificers, and the variety of the 
manufactures, it yields, with the exception of the capital, to any city in the 
empire. … The whole effect of foreign commerce is here concentrated and 
displayed, and the employment which the European trade affords to all classes of 
the inhabitants diffuses an air of general prosperity, not to be expected where this 
powerful stimulus does not operate.
212
 
 
        With regard to this phenomenon, these British travellers were convinced that it was 
‘owing greatly to hints furnished by our examples’
213
 rather than being due to any positive 
influence exerted by the local government. To prove this, examples were given to 
demonstrate that the communities around Canton had benefited remarkably from modern 
technology introduced by the British. Abel noted in his narrative that:  
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The small pox, which for centuries has at different periods made dreadful havock 
all over the empire, is likely soon to be extirpated by the benign influence of 
vaccination establishing under the auspices of Mr Pierson the principal surgeon of 
the British factory. … Native vaccinators have been appointed and educated under 
the eye of Mr Pierson, and are taking from him the labour of inoculating the 
lowest class of Chinese. I witnessed their operations in a temple near the British 
factory, on some of the children of the hundreds of anxious parents who flocked to 
procure the preservation of their offspring from the small pox, at that time 
prevalent at Canton. If the paternal government of China can free itself from 
national prejudices, it will erect a monument of gratitude to the discovery of 
Jenner, and the services of Pierson.
214
  
 
In contrast to such positive benefits arising from contact with a more advanced civilisation, 
the British observers lamented that similar changes had been rendered impossible in the rest 
of the empire by the policies of the Chinese government. For this reason, the common belief 
was further strengthened that the Chinese ‘have had for some thousand years a dawn of 
civilization’, but, ‘from the operation of the most narrow-minded principles’, it ‘has never 
brightened into day’.
215
 Accordingly, the suspicious Chinese government, as the designer of 
such restrictive principles, was confirmed as the primary cause of China’s backwardness and 
stagnant civilisation. 
 
V 
Beyond the mission 
On 20 January 1817, the Amherst embassy left Canton for Macao. Its intercourse with 
various Chinese authorities finally terminated. From this moment on, members of the 
embassy were able to draw up their overall assessments of their experiences in China, as well 
as proposing new ideas for the future development of British-Chinese relations. At the 
conclusion of their journey, some of these British commentators chose to record their genuine 
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feelings as they took their leave of China. Ellis, for example, could not conceal his 
disappointing experience of travelling through China, which was an extremely uninteresting 
country in his opinion. He noted that:  
 
curiosity was soon satiated and destroyed by the moral, political, and even local 
uniformity; … Were it not therefore for the trifling gratification arising from being 
one of the few Europeans who have visited the interior of China, I should consider 
the time that has elapsed as wholly without return. I have neither experienced the 
refinement and comforts of civilized life, nor the wild interest of most semi-
barbarous countries, but have found my own mind and spirit influenced by the 
surrounding atmosphere of dullness and constraint.
216
 
 
In a similar manner, Davis maintained that this visit to China had not proved to be a very 
rewarding trip. He claimed that:  
 
our protracted stay in the interior of the empire had rather tired us of our Chinese 
life, than reconciled us to it. At the same time, I believe there was not one of the 
party but was well content to have purchased such rare opportunities of 
observation and enquiry, at the expense of some personal discomfort, and 
occasionally not a little mental irritation.
217
 
 
        At variance with these rather adverse comments, Amherst and Staunton, as heads of the 
embassy, shed more positive light on the official proceedings of the mission. Their 
observations, however, were apparently made with the intention of justifying their own 
opinions and actions. Amherst, in his letter to George Canning, admitted the embassy’s ‘want 
of success’,
218
 but refused to acknowledge that it was caused by his own lack of ability or 
indiscretions. Instead, Amherst insisted in another letter that ‘the personal character of the 
two Emperors may have principally influenced the events of the present and preceding 
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Embassy’.
219
 Moreover, contrary to the common notion that the embassy’s dismissal from 
Yuen-min-yuen was an unfortunate occurrence, Amherst asserted that it was ‘the most 
fortunate circumstance which has attended the present Embassy’.
220
 To account for this 
opinion, Amherst maintained that, on the one hand,  
 
Had the negotiation broken off, as it was likely to do, at Tong-choo-foo [Tong-
zhou-fu] on the point of ceremony, I think that not only much serious 
inconvenience might have been felt on our journey to Canton, but that the 
important concerns of the East India Company at that place might have 
experienced, more or less directly, the effects of the Emperor’s displeasure.
221
 
 
On the other hand, however, he stressed that: 
 
the precipitate and unwarranted rejection of the Embassy from the Palace gates 
has left an injury to repair even in the eyes of the Chinese themselves the rules of 
hospitality have been violated. Possibly some apprehension may be entertained of 
the manner in which the transactions will be viewed in Great Britain; and as I have 
attributed the honorable treatment of the Embassy on its return, and the proposal 
for a partial exchange of presents to a wish for reparation in the only way, which 
the pride of the Emperor would allow, so I shall ascribe to the same motive any 
further proposal, if it shall be made, for the acceptance of the remainder of the 
presents, as well as any better security which may be afforded, and I will not 
despair of its being afforded, to the stability of the trade at Canton.
222
 
 
By comparison, Staunton, as the pivotal person who had done so much to shape the 
embassy’s decision on the kowtow controversy, was more reluctant to accept the mission’s 
‘want of success’. Instead, he tended to regard the results of this mission in a most favourable 
manner. For example, in his Miscellaneous Notices published in 1822, Staunton asserted that, 
‘The author flatters himself, … that, taking together the direct and indirect effects of the 
embassy, some considerable good has been accomplished by it. – Those, at least, who judge 
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of events by their result, ought to accept of the state of the trade at Canton, at this present time, 
as no mean evidence in its favor’.
223
 Thirty-four years later, in his Memoirs, Staunton 
reaffirmed this belief by attributing the peaceful state of Canton trade between 1817 and 1834 
to the positive impact of the Amherst embassy. He asserted with confidence that, ‘although 
this mission has often been stigmatised as a failure, it was practically, perhaps, the most 
successful of any that had ever been sent to Pekin by any European power; for it was 
followed by a longer interval of commercial tranquillity, and of freedom from annoyance, 
than had ever been experienced before’.
224
 Staunton’s claim was shared by Davis, who was 
also disposed to evaluate the achievement of the embassy from the subsequent state of the 
British or EIC’s trade at Canton. Davis believed that, ‘the resistance made by the embassy to 
the haughty conduct of the Peking court was the best possible result that could have been 
obtained’, while ‘the mere reception, followed by the supercilious dismissal of the mission, 
would have been far too dearly purchased by compliances which a former British ambassador 
very wisely refused’.
225
 Moreover,  
 
The impression produced by the spirit and firmness which had just been displayed, 
even under the personal frown of the despot, continued long to exercise its 
influence at Canton; and if such temerity in foreigners surprised the ignorant 
Chinese, it was at the same time calculated to remove some portion of their silly 
prepossessions concerning the universal supremacy of the celestial empire. The 
effects, at least, were visible in the rapid increase of our valuable intercourse with 
Canton.
226
 
 
        Along with these overall assessments of Amherst’s mission, these British observers also 
seriously analysed the lessons they had learned from their embassy experience. First, the 
grounds for sending another royal embassy to China in the near future were seriously 
challenged. Amherst, based on his experiences during the embassy, suggested that China’s 
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current financial circumstances, combined with the character of the present emperor, rendered 
such a mission unwelcome to the Chinese. He maintained that, 
 
The disordered state of the Imperial Finances would make it an object to save the 
expense attending the transport of a numerous company of persons from one 
extremity of the Empire to the other; and the same reason added, I believe, to the 
personal fears and jealousies of the Emperor would probably retrench a great part 
of the train of any future Embassador.
227
 
 
Ellis also pointed out that it was actually not very sensible to attempt to strengthen Britain’s 
commercial links with China by sending out another complimentary embassy. He contended 
that,  
 
Royal embassies, avowedly complimentary, but really directed to commercial 
objects, are perhaps, in themselves, somewhat anomalous, and are certainly very 
opposite, not only to Chinese feelings, but even to those of all Eastern nations; 
among whom trade, although fostered as a source of revenue, is never reputed 
honourable.
228
 
 
In light of such advice given by the ambassador and the third commissioner, we can 
understand why the Amherst embassy did indeed become the last mission of its kind that 
Britain sent out to the imperial court of China. 
        Second, from their daily contacts with officials of the Chinese government, members of 
the Amherst embassy accumulated some useful knowledge on how to deal with the Chinese 
authorities in future. In particular, it was discovered that, under most circumstances, in order 
to achieve an objective in China, the best way to do so was simply to ignore government 
authorities and not request formal approval before proceeding to business. For example, as 
had frequently happened on their return journey when the British had desired to land and 
walk for exercise or to satisfy their curiosity, the most effective approach was to ‘go straight 
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forward, without putting difficulties into the people’s heads, by seeming to imagine any 
permission necessary’.
229
 For this reason, Hayne was fully convinced that ‘by experience we 
have found beyond a doubt, that to obtain an end in China, is to ask no question, and if there 
is no real objection, it will pass unnoticed’.
230
 Experience had also shown, ‘At least during 
this voyage, whenever we began by soliciting leave to walk into the country or to look at 
anything, our request was almost invariably refused’.
231
 By contrast, these British observers 
also found that, on those occasion when British interests were neglected, such as when daily 
supplies were deficient or unevenly furnished, it was important for the British to make their 
voice heard, and if necessary, to express their demands in a resolute manner. Davis 
maintained in this regard that it was a well-proven fact that every time the British 
remonstrated strongly and officially, their grievances were not only soon redressed, but were, 
on most occasions, handled with greater care and attention. Hence, to produce a favourable 
response, a ‘determined step was the more requisite’.
232
 
        Finally, the various experiences drawn from the minor aspects of the embassy seemed to 
have influenced some of the subsequent broader ideas which British observers proposed 
should be adopted in future British-Chinese relations. Most remarkably, according to the 
advice coming from the members of the Amherst mission, it was advisable to demonstrate a 
more powerful and steadfast image of Great Britain to the imperial court of China. Ellis, for 
instance, suggested that if ‘it still be deemed advisable to assist our commerce by political 
intercourse’,
233
 the British authorities should look to their possessions in Hindostan and Nepal, 
whose boundaries proximate to Tibet, and use ‘the supreme government of Bengal as the 
medium of that intercourse’.
234
 By this means, he expected that  
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there the representative of armed power will encounter its fellow; and if ever 
impression is to be produced at Pekin, it must be from an intimate knowledge of 
our political and military strength, rather than from the gratification produced in 
the Emperor's mind by the reception of an embassy on Chinese terms, or the 
moral effect of justifiable resistance terminating in rejection.
235
 
 
Macleod, in this regard, advocated more coercive measures. He wrote with assurance that, 
‘The removal of our trade for a single year, and the appearance of a few of our lightest 
cruisers on their coasts, would throw the whole of this celestial empire into confusion’,
236
 
because  
 
they are not prepared for the loss that would occur in the one case, nor to meet the 
tumult and convulsion that would be excited by the destruction of their fisheries 
and coasting trade in the other. So feeble is their naval power, that, after warring 
with the pirates for many years, who chased their vessels up the river, and sacked 
the towns and villages within a few miles of Canton, they were at last obliged to 
compromise with them, bribing the whole to be quiet, and making their chiefs 
first-chop mandarins.
237
 
 
Although some similarity can be drawn between this statement and Macartney’s aggressive 
comments in 1794,
238
 it is worth noting that, unlike Macartney, no preference for forbearance 
was supported by Macleod at this time. On the contrary, next to the above passage, Macleod 
quoted a remark by Krusenstern, a Russian navigator who had experienced similar vexation 
in China and had alleged that ‘the forbearance and mistaken lenity of the greater civilized 
powers have emboldened these savages, not only to consider as barbarians all Europeans, but 
actually to treat them as such’.
239
 With reference to this statement, it can be observed that not 
only was China again being viewed as an isolated ‘other’ from the civilised European 
countries, but Macleod was implying that the wrong approach had been adopted by western 
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nations in their relations with China. Although plans to demonstrate British power and 
resolution were not yet under serious consideration at this stage, the previous effort to curry 
favour with the Chinese emperor had been shown to be ineffective and unpromising. 
        In conclusion, although the Amherst mission failed to fulfil its original objectives, it was 
still significant if we take into account its contribution to the developing British perceptions 
of China. Since better opportunities were provided to the British observers on this second 
embassy to explore the interior of the country and to communicate more fully with the 
Chinese government and people than ever before, renewed and revised impressions of China 
were obtained. In particular, owing to the revised opinions of the Chinese emperor and the 
unrefined state of Chinese civilisation, those unfavourable impressions that already existed 
with regard to Chinese politics and society were further strengthened. Compared to the reign 
of Qianlong, China was now regarded as being in serious decay under his successor. This 
sovereign, who was seen as a capricious despot, and his style of government, were seen to be 
the primary cause of China’s present backwardness. Moreover, based on this revised opinion 
of Chinese affairs, China was increasingly envisioned as an isolated ‘other’ that could not be 
communicated with by the normal diplomatic means used in relations with the civilised 
countries of Europe. Accordingly, the despatch of another complimentary embassy was 
considered to be an inappropriate way to conduct Britain’s future relations with China. 
Instead, a demonstration of Britain’s power and firmness was deemed more effective in 
achieving the desired commercial objectives. For these reasons, the Amherst embassy should 
not be viewed simply as a clear diplomatic failure. It not only promoted new developments in 
British attitudes to China, but in some senses laid the foundation for important future changes 
in British-Chinese relations. 
129 
 
PART II 
CHAPTER THREE 
The debate on the EIC’s monopoly: 
British perceptions of China in the early 1830s 
 
When Lord Amherst and his embassy were traversing the interior of China, they were not 
aware that significant changes were taking place quietly along the coast. Most of these 
changes originated from the East India Company Act 1813 (also known as the Charter Act of 
1813), by which Parliament renewed the Company’s charter for a further twenty years, but 
deprived the EIC of its commercial monopoly in India except for the tea trade and trade with 
China.
1
 This partial opening of the Indian trade had far-reaching effects on Britain’s 
intercourse with the East. Among others, a remarkable consequence was that British capital 
and enterprise poured into India in the next two decades and thereby brought a considerable 
number of British private merchants unprecedentedly close to China. Thought to be highly 
lucrative, access to the China trade had been a constant objective for many of these laissez-
faire-minded traders. Although, in theory, they were still prohibited from having direct 
intercourse with trading communities in China, some of these merchants had succeeded in 
approaching China by different means. They either paid the Company a great deal of money 
for a license to conduct the so-called ‘country trade’,
2
 or they bypassed the EIC’s control by 
signing up with foreign trading companies, in order to transact their business openly at 
Canton under other European flags.
3
 Since, following the Amherst mission, no more royal 
embassies were dispatched from Britain to the Qing court, these British merchants who 
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traded with China gradually replaced diplomatic visitors as the main interpreters of China’s 
image.  
        In the beginning, these private merchants, who claimed to be ‘free traders’, were not 
able to pose any serious challenge to the EIC. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in the volume 
of their trade, which nearly doubled between 1817 and 1830,
4
 gradually changed this 
situation. Particularly, in parallel with the EIC’s regular commerce with the Hong merchants, 
these British country traders developed a highly lucrative ‘unauthorised trade’
5
 with the 
Chinese unlicensed merchants, who clandestinely engaged in foreign trade, mainly of opium, 
along China’s southeastern coast. At a time when the Company was struggling to find a 
market for British goods in China so as to defray the cost of its growing import of tea, it was 
mainly this trade conducted by the country traders that offered a solution to the long-lasting 
commercial deficit problem. Hence, as Greenberg states, ‘its vital role as the indispensable 
means of providing funds at Canton for the tea investment and furnishing a channel of 
remittance from India to England’
6
 gave these newly-arrived merchants growing influence in 
China.  
        Despite the considerable influence they had, the private merchants of Britain were still 
subject to some constraints in their commerce with China. Compared to the servants of the 
EIC, they did not have the military, financial and administrative backing that the Company 
provided for its factory in Canton. This circumstance made the private merchants’ position 
less secure in China, especially for those Britons who ‘adopted’ other nationalities in order to 
reside in Canton during the offseason. Since the business of the country traders was not 
safeguarded by the government of either side, nor by the EIC representatives at Canton, their 
commercial activities were in constant jeopardy. For this reason, from the country traders’ 
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standpoint, both the EIC and the Chinese monopolies were obstacles to the extension of their 
commerce. It had long been their desire that one day these constraints would be removed. 
        It was, however, too early for the country traders to anticipate either of these restrictions 
being removed in the 1810s and early 1820s. For one thing, after two unsuccessful embassies, 
the British government adopted a ‘hands-off’ policy which gave the Company considerable 
freedom to conduct its Chinese affairs as it saw fit. For another, the EIC, at this time, still 
possessed significant influence over Britain’s commerce with China, even though its trading 
supremacy was increasingly being challenged. The Company’s trade, through the medium of 
Hong merchants, was after all the only authorised form of commerce between Britain and 
China. Its representatives at Canton were also regarded by the Chinese as the most reliable 
partners, who were not only responsible for the conduct of the Company’s own servants, but 
also for the behaviour of all British subjects trading with China. This, unavoidably, included 
some ‘free traders’, who were in essence ‘a turbulent lot who gave a good deal of trouble’,
7
 
and whose irregularities often brought the Company into disfavour with the Chinese. In this 
context, until the termination of EIC’s China monopoly in 1834, it was the Company’s Select 
Committee at Canton that stood between the British country traders and the Chinese 
authorities. Both sides believed that it was the EIC’s duty to act on behalf of each of them 
against the unlawful behaviour of the other, but, in fact, whenever a serious dispute occurred, 
the committee had no effective power to place a check on either side.  
        A serious dispute of this kind did not break out until the very late 1820s. From the end of 
Amherst’s embassy in 1817, there was only a short period when the Select Committee 
continued its relatively firm stance towards the local authorities of Canton. As soon as the 
report about the embassy reached London, the EIC’s Court of Directors strongly disapproved 
of the posture previously taken by its representatives in China. Shortly after that, they decided 
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to prohibit their servants at Canton from remonstrating on their own initiative with the 
Chinese government, unless clear-cut guidance from London was first received. For the EIC’s 
directors, the absolute priority in China was the continuance of the valuable tea trade. With 
the purpose of securing this trade, they deemed it necessary to adopt a policy of conciliation 
in the EIC’s intercourse with the Chinese. In their letters to Canton, the Court of Directors 
affirmed that it was the Select Committee’s duty to observe the utmost caution in order to 
avoid any possible dispute with the Chinese government, while any deviation from this 
instruction would invite the court’s ‘serious displeasure’.
8
 According to this order, the 
Company’s representatives at Canton were obliged to restrain their personal irritation with the 
Chinese government. In consequence, there followed twelve years of relative harmony in 
relations between the two countries and, during this period, the EIC’s China trade continued 
without any notable interruption.
9
 
        Despite the policy of conciliation laid down for the EIC’s agents, the ‘free traders’ on the 
China coast were under no such restraint. As the country trade continued to grow, they 
gradually realised that the ‘oppressive and corrupt system’
10
 of the Chinese government was 
indeed a great obstacle to their commerce. These traders believed that nothing was to be 
gained by obedience to the Chinese. Instead, much might be obtained ‘by means of an appeal 
to their fears’.
11
 Owing to this attitude, the private merchants wished the EIC, since it was 
understood by the Chinese as the highest British authority in China, to act more aggressively 
on their behalf against the local Chinese authorities. This plea was, clearly, in opposition to 
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the instructions emanating from London. As the Select Committee was unable to offer any 
assistance in this regard, much dissatisfaction with the Company was stimulated among the 
British private merchants. With the rapid growth of the country trade, this displeasure with 
the EIC increased correspondingly during the course of the 1820s. As a consequence, the 
private merchants’ attitude towards the EIC openly ‘gave place to one of rivalry if not of 
hostility’.
12
 
        In 1829, the Sino-British trade came to a turning point. Due to the spread of bankruptcy 
among the Hong merchants, which gave rise to the question of debts to the EIC’s merchants, 
serious trade friction broke out between the EIC and the Chinese commercial communities. 
The attitude of the Select Committee towards the Chinese authorities hence became strained. 
Although some members were still disposed to adhere to the policy of conciliation, the 
majority tended to accept the views of the country traders. They agreed that, in order to 
establish British-Chinese trade on a more secure footing, the Committee’s dissatisfaction with 
the Chinese government could no longer be endured and a complete change of China policy 
was imperative. Accordingly, in 1829 and 1831, without informing the Court of Directors in 
advance, the EIC’s agents at Canton strongly petitioned the local authorities, demanding a 
reform of China’s commercial system. When the Court of Directors was later notified of this 
action, it not only strongly rebuked the majority of the Select Committee for their 
noncompliance with the standing order, but demoted those held responsible and reaffirmed 
the importance of adhering to the policy of conciliation.
13
 Particularly, in response to the 
committee’s claim that they were ‘the representatives, not only of the East-India Company 
but of the British nation,’
14
 the Court of Directors solemnly pointed out that ‘you are not the 
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representatives of the British nation, but of the East-India Company’.
15
 This declaration of 
the Select Committee’s role in China contrasted with the will and interests of the country 
traders.  
        Notwithstanding this clear direction given about its future conduct, there was, at this 
time, a real possibility that the future of Britain’s China trade would no longer depend on the 
attitude of the Company. This was because, once again, the charter of the East India 
Company was on the point of expiring and, after twenty years of continued growth in ‘free 
trade’, the call for the termination of EIC’s China monopoly became overwhelming. The 
private merchants, in coalition with a group of opinion formers back home, not only 
petitioned Parliament for full commercial freedom in China, but waged a pamphlet war 
against the EIC. This debate on the EIC’s monopoly and Britain’s future China policy went 
hand-in-hand with a controversy over rival images of China. In order to defend their 
respective standpoints, the EIC and the free trade advocates raised vastly different images of 
the Chinese government, society and people to suit their own purposes. Although the 
termination of the EIC’s China monopoly has been examined in various contemporary 
studies,
16
 this underlying debate about China’s images remains little researched. 
 
I 
The EIC on its monopoly and the image of China 
As a result of the rise of the country trade, the East India Company was no longer the only 
actor who directly encountered the Chinese ‘on the spot’. Their employees at Canton, hence, 
ceased being the only voices that presented images of China and the China trade. In the early 
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1830s, with respect to the abolition or extension of the EIC’s trade monopoly in China, the 
private merchants, backed up by a number of supporters at home who saw the same interests 
and opportunities, challenged the Company in a variety of ways. An anti-EIC propaganda 
campaign was hence triggered across the British empire. In order to defend their position in 
China, first and foremost, the EIC and its advocates endeavoured to justify the economic 
necessity of its trading monopoly. 
        According to the propaganda issued by the country traders, since the India trade was 
opened in 1813 based on the doctrine of free trade, it was unreasonable to maintain the EIC’s 
China monopoly.
17
 Opposed to this argument, the Company’s main justification was that 
‘however true in general’ this theory sounded, ‘the peculiar circumstances’ of the China trade 
rendered these principles of international commerce ‘wholly inapplicable’ to the case of 
China.
18
 To account for this point of view, the EIC’s campaigners pointed out that, first of all, 
it would be unrealistic to expect that the opening of China trade from the British side could 
produce any material effect, so long as ‘the institution of the local monopoly among the 
Chinese Hong merchants remains unaltered’.
19
 In this respect, Henry Ellis, the third 
commissioner of Amherst’s mission who now spoke in favour of the EIC,
20
 maintained that:  
 
The peculiar circumstances under which the trade of foreigners is placed by the 
laws of China, … have led me to reject, as fallacious, the anticipations of those 
who consider the surprising effects produced in India by unrestricted intercourse, 
as indicative of equal results in China.
21
 
 
For this reason, Ellis believed that, under the present circumstances, ‘it is impossible to admit 
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that the opening of China trade can be affected’.
22
 Moreover, ‘until some change takes place 
in both these respects, the extension of the British trade contemplated by the merchants and 
manufacturers who have petitioned parliament on the subject, is hopeless’.
23
  
        Based on the unique nature of the China trade, the EIC’s supporters continued to 
maintain that, since, under the current system, ‘The China trade is at present carried on with 
profit and with a certain degree of security’,
24
 there was an ‘absolute necessity for an 
undisturbed continuance of the Company’s factory at Canton’.
25
 It was stated that, through its 
lawful and extensive commercial activities, the EIC had, over the decades, developed a 
wholesome system that:   
           
diffuses the profits and advantages of a great and well-regulated commerce, in 
equitable proportions, directly or indirectly, over the whole of the British 
community; first, by its regular and secure contributions to the revenue… 
secondly, by its satisfactory abundant supply of an universally desired article of 
daily, consumption; thirdly, by its distinguished success in extending the sales and 
maintaining the credit of British manufactures and productions;
26
 
 
Moreover, due to their long-lasting trade with the Hong merchants, the Company’s 
representatives at Canton were said to have developed considerable power and influence. 
Particularly, ‘by the extent of their dealings, the unerring regularity of their transactions, their 
proverbial probity, and the duration of their connections with China’,
27
 these British 
merchants were believed to have possessed ‘high character and augmented influence’
28
 in the 
minds of the natives. As a consequence, the EIC was not only able to secure ‘the best supply 
of its merchandize at the cheapest rate’,
29
 but acquired the legitimate means of ‘either 
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27 Anon., ‘The American Commerce with China’, The Asiatic Journal, 27 (Jan. 1829), 2. 
28 Staunton, ‘Considerations on the China Trade’, The Asiatic Journal, 28 (Dec. 1829), 683. 
29 Anon., ‘The American Commerce with China’, The Asiatic Journal, 27 (Jan. 1829), 3. 
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favouring or counteracting the views of the Chinese government’, as well as of ‘influencing 
the proceedings of the licensed Chinese merchants’.
30
 For instance, in terms of the EIC’s tea 
trade, not only was the price unified, but the British were given the right of selection before 
all the tea was brought to market. Furthermore, to a great extent, all forms of foreign trade in 
China ‘[had] been greatly benefited by means of that influence’.
31
 Even the private 
merchants’ country trade was in a sense ‘under the protection of the Company’s trade’, 
because ‘by the influence of the Company, searches of country ships have been prevented, 
and difficulties in the prosecution of their transactions removed’.
32
 
        In addition to these statements on the Company’s positive impact, the EIC’s supporters 
emphasised that the Company was the only party which was able to guarantee ‘the present 
prosperity and comparative security of the China trade’.
33
 In opposition to the free traders’ 
assertion that it was time to leave the China trade to the unrestricted application of individual 
enterprise, advocates of the EIC insisted that, given the uniqueness of this trade, nothing 
could prevent ‘the exercise of arbitrary and dictatorial powers over the trade, on the part of 
the Chinese merchants, but the present system’.
34
 To prove this, they endeavoured to create 
an image that the whole international trade in China would be endangered if the current EIC 
system ceased to operate. Ellis, for example, pointed out that: 
           
There can be no doubt that, in the first instance, the announcement that the East 
India Company were no longer the representatives of the British nation, and were 
no longer responsible for the conduct of persons trading to China, would shake the 
confidence of the Chinese; and that no consul, with the usual powers attached to 
the office, could establish for himself the confidence and influence now attached 
to the Company’s factory. All that might be lost in these respects by the 
supercargoes, would be turned to the advantage of the local government and of the 
                                                          
30 Staunton, ‘Considerations on the China Trade’, The Asiatic Journal, 28 (Dec. 1829), 686. 
31 Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company: 
China Trade (1830), in Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 131. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Staunton, ‘Considerations on the China Trade’, The Asiatic Journal, 28 (Dec. 1829), 690. 
34 Ibid., 686. 
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Hong merchants, and consequently to the injury of the foreign trade in general.
35
 
 
Martin added that, from an imperial perspective, the termination of the EIC’s China 
monopoly might give rise to even greater detrimental effects. He claimed:  
 
that instant change would, most probably, be productive of ruin to the Indian, as 
well as to the English, Chinese commerce; and that with a diminishing 
government revenue, increasing public burthens, a possibility of general war, and 
a variety of taxes pressing on the industry and comfort of the people.
36
 
 
        To justify further this claim that an alternative mode of commerce in China was not 
going to be beneficial to the British nation, the experience of American merchants was 
brought to bear in order to show that ‘though exclusive privileges may be prejudicial, to 
throw open the English China trade might prove still worse in its consequence’.
37
 It was 
maintained that, although the America traders in China, unlike the British country traders, 
were ‘unfettered on one side by monopoly’,
38
 they were, in the meantime, unable to ‘maintain 
either their pretensions as traders, or to protect the life of an American subject through the 
official authority of a consul’.
39
 For this reason, these American traders were practically at the 
mercy of the Chinese Hong merchants and, ‘as might be expected, very jealous of the 
superior influence possessed by the Company’s factory’,
40
 by which ‘the absurdity of the 
Chinese laws is mitigated, the extortion of the Mandarins resisted, and the combination of the 
Hong merchants and tea-dealers prevented’.
41
 To the EIC and its supporters, the predicament 
of American traders evidently showed that, while the system of a Chinese monopoly 
                                                          
35 Ellis, A Series of Letters, p. 43. 
36 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 4. 
37 This quotation is said to be from ‘a celebrated modern and liberal writer, who resided eight years in 
China, and travelled a great deal in the country’, in Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 10. Italics in the 
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38 Ellis, A Series of Letters, p. 38. 
39 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 
40 Ibid., p. 41. 
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remained unchanged, the trade of private merchants in China would by no means prosper. On 
the other hand, the East India Company acted, in fact, as ‘a most valuable protection to all 
British interests’,
42
 rather than as an obstacle to the extension of British-Chinese commerce. 
Since ‘by the present constitution and instrumentality of the East India Company, a vast 
empire is administered … without charge on the national resources; a trade with a 
government remarkable for jealousy of foreigners, and for indifference to foreign commerce, 
is conducted with certainty and advantage’, the EIC’s advocates firmly believed that it would 
be ‘impossible to treat lightly such important benefits’ and ‘most unwise to deal hastily with 
the system by which they are secured’.
43
 
        Nevertheless, in an era when criticism of the EIC’s administration in India and of its 
negative impacts on the economy was considerable, arguments in favour of the Company 
needed to be supported from other standpoints. In particular, in order to justify the assertion 
that it was impossible to apply the theory of free trade to the unconventional case of China, 
the peculiarity of Chinese commercial and political culture was highlighted by the EIC’s 
advocates. The complete otherness of the Chinese government, people and society was hence 
greatly strengthened in this campaign. To start with, the pro-EIC campaigners asserted that 
the long history of China’s self-contained economy had persuaded the Chinese to believe they 
stood ‘in no need of intercourse with other countries’.
44
 As the Qianlong emperor had clearly 
pointed out in this letter to King George III, ‘we [the Chinese] have never valued ingenious 
articles [from Britain], nor do we have the slightest need of your country’s manufactures’.
45
 
For this reason, it was maintained that the Chinese did not value external trade as much as 
Europeans did. Since ‘The attention of the government has, from the earliest ages, been 
                                                          
42 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 127. 
43 Ellis, A Series of Letters, pp. 56-7. 
44 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 6. 
45 Imperial edict from the Qianlong emperor to King George III of Britain, in An Embassy to China: Being 
the  ournal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch’ien-lung 1793-1794, ed. J.L. 
Cranmer-Byng (London: Longmans, 1962), p. 340. 
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directed to render the intercourse between the different provinces of the empire easy and 
secure’,
46
 the Chinese empire had long been ‘enjoying within its own territories all the 
necessaries and conveniences, and most of the luxuries of life’.
47
 Because of this highly 
developed internal trade, it was believed that ‘the resources of that Empire had been 
abundantly developed by her native inhabitants, long before even an idea of British 
connection existed’.
48
 As a result, throughout Chinese history, ‘neither the necessities of the 
people, nor the policy of the government, have looked to commerce with other nations as a 
main source of individual wealth, or of imperial revenue’.
49
  
        Moreover, the Chinese empire’s political isolation, as well as its caution against 
foreigners, was also seen as the product of China’s unique culture and history. The EIC’s 
advocates maintained that it was because ‘the Chinese had acquired the art of living in a state 
of high mental cultivation and social enjoyment … long before they could have the remote 
idea of intercourse’ with foreign nations,
 50
 that the empire of China ‘openly and arrogantly’ 
had proclaimed ‘its total independence of every nation in the world’ during much of its 
history.
51
 This unique situation was believed to have resulted from the fact that the benefits of 
international communication had never been cultivated in China. Instead, ‘the safety of the 
state is considered to rest upon an insulation of the national existence’.
52
 On the basis of this 
attitude, communication with foreign nations, unlike in European countries, was deemed in 
China as ‘having a positive tendency to corrupt the morals and derange the harmony of those 
institutions, political and domestic’.
53
 For this reason, ‘To restrict intercourse with foreigners, 
nationally and individually’, quite simply became ‘the great maxim of state policy in 
                                                          
46 Ellis, A Series of Letters, p. 28. 
47 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 6. 
48 Thomas Fisher, ‘Statistical Notices of China’, The Gentleman’s Magazine, 103 (Apr. 1833), 296. 
49 Ellis, A Series of Letters, p. 29. 
50 Fisher, ‘Statistical Notices of China’, The Gentleman’s Magazine, 103 (Apr. 1833), 296. 
51 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 7. 
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China’.
54
  
        Furthermore, not only were China’s diplomatic views, but many of its domestic 
institutions were interpreted in the light of China’s cultural differences. For example, the 
principle of strict subordination and control in the Chinese government, as well as the laws of 
China, which ‘have their foundation in the edicts of the Emperors’ and in essence ‘repugnant 
to justice’,
 55
 were regarded as signs of China’s backwardness in the opinion of many 
westerners. Contrary to this common view, Staunton spoke from his local experience that, 
‘however despotic and oppressive the operation of this principle may appear in our eyes, in 
those of the Chinese it has invariably been considered as one of the first requisites of a good 
government, and one of the surest tests of a civilized people’.
56
 Since this principle pervaded 
not only the government of China, but also the Chinese people’s domestic lives, Staunton 
further stated that, in fact, ‘in the same manner as the magistrate controls and is responsible 
for the conduct of the inhabitants of his district, the master of each family is supposed to 
control, and required to be responsible for, his relations, connections, and dependents’.
57
 By 
pointing out these facts in a genuine Chinese context, it seems that Staunton, as someone who 
had considerable experience in China, was suggesting that it was China’s cultural ‘otherness’, 
rather than its backwardness, that differentiated the Chinese from the British people. Since, 
after all, ‘this immense Empire’ was ‘so efficiently governed’ by its own unique means,
58
 the 
fairness of the unfavourable judgments that the free traders made of Chinese institutions were 
questionable.  
        Based on these ‘different’ perceptions of Chinese culture and institutions, it can be seen 
from the EIC’s campaign that, in contrast to the critical image of the Chinese government 
presented by many of the free traders, a certain degree of reverence was shown for Chinese 
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laws and usages. Instead of promoting a rather barbaric image, the Chinese were seen by the 
EIC’s supporters as a ‘highly civilized and polished’,
59
 or at least ‘semi-civilized’,
60
 people, 
who had a clear right to regulate their own affairs. As the EIC’s Court of Directors made very 
clear in its instructions to the Select Committee: 
          
We cannot, in fairness, deny to China the right which our own nation exercises as 
she sees fit, either by prohibiting, restraining, or subjecting to certain laws and 
regulations its commercial dealings with other countries. China must be 
considered free in the exercise of her affairs, without being accountable to any 
other nation;
61
 
          
In terms of the application of the so-called ‘natural’ law of free trade to the case of China, the 
EIC’s advocates denied that the British private merchants had a legitimate right to demand 
that China open its ports on these grounds. As Martin wrote, the principle of ‘free trade’, first 
and foremost, depended on ‘the disposition, wants, or reciprocal feelings of a separate, and 
perhaps, rival or hostile state’.
62
 Moreover, 
 
freedom in politics, and freedom in commerce, are two distinct things; that they 
are not … at every period called for by all countries; and that, although political 
liberty is essentially requisite in domestic commerce, and highly advantageous in 
foreign trade, particularly for a manufacturing community such as that of 
England, yet, that it is not considered paramountly necessary by every nation.
63
 
 
        In line with these principles, the EIC’s advocates strongly disagreed with some private 
merchants that a more coercive line of action should be employed in Britain’s future relations 
with China. In order to justify their view that a conciliatory approach needed to be 
maintained, they not only asserted that, ‘any attempts to force upon this singular people an 
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60 Martin, The Past and Present State, p. 128. 
61 Letter from the Court of Directors to the Select Committee, 13 Jan. 1832, in Martin, The Past and 
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unacceptable intercourse with us, by outraging their laws or institutions, would … only 
render profitable intercourse with them more difficult’,
64
 but promoted a peaceful and 
reasonable image of the Chinese people and their government. For instance, Fisher claimed 
that, ‘The educational bias of the Chinese disposes them on all occasions to appeal to reason’, 
an attitude which induced the Chinese to develop a disposition towards ‘mildness and 
urbanity, with a wish to show that their conduct is reasonable, and generally a willingness to 
yield to what appears to be so’.
65
 Even the government of China, according to the same 
author, was ‘at the utmost pains to make it appear to the people that its conduct is reasonable 
and benevolent on all occasions’ and  ‘by the experience of many ages’, it had found that ‘it is 
necessary for them to do so’.
66
 This interpretation of the Chinese people’s natural willingness 
to appeal to reason, obviously, corresponded with the EIC’s conventional view that a forceful 
course of action was on no account helpful to British commerce with China, when, 
conversely, ‘a temperate and judicious appeal on the most objectionable points’ might ‘effect 
a modification of those provisions’.
67
 To the EIC and its advocates, this peaceful and 
reasonable image of the Chinese became another reason why Britain’s commercial 
intercourse with the Chinese empire could be improved only ‘by evincing a disposition to 
respect their regulations’,
68
 rather than by challenging that authority or by holding them in 
sheer defiance.   
        Finally, it can be observed that as the EIC was presenting a seemingly objective and 
genuine perception of China’s cultural otherness, it was, at the same time, suggesting the 
peculiarity of China was beyond the comprehension of anybody else. For example, one of the 
EIC’s representatives openly stated that:  
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We alone are acquainted with the Chinese people; We alone have established any 
relations with the Chinese government. That people is incomprehensible by any 
but our servants; that government hates and despises all foreigners, except only 
our supercargoes of the factory at Canton.
69
  
 
These statements clearly show that the EIC’s advocates were attempting to portray the 
Company as the exclusive authority in interpreting and dealing with Britain’s commercial 
relations with China. In fact, by its introduction of China’s cultural otherness, it can be 
maintained that the EIC was disposed to promote a two-fold impression of China. First, in 
spite of China’s uniqueness, the Chinese empire, as a sovereign state, was by no means too 
depraved to be respected. Second, China’s peculiarities, in fact, were not entirely inexplicable 
as long as a deep understanding of China’s history and culture was mastered. Nevertheless, it 
was also because China was so distinct from western nations, that the EIC and its advocates 
maintained that commercial and diplomatic relations with the Chinese needed to be 
conducted by those professionals who were equipped with profound local experience, that is 
by the EIC alone. Since over past decades, the East India Company had accumulated 
abundant knowledge about this unique nation and, at the same time, had achieved a 
‘progressive amelioration in the circumstances of our commercial intercourse with the 
Chinese people’,
70
 there was certainly no reason to abolish such a system that had proved 
‘upon trial so safe and so efficacious’.
71
 As Staunton confidently affirmed, although there 
seemed no immediate danger to British-Chinese commerce at present, past experience 
indicated that ‘the means by which it has been averted are excellent’ and, therefore, on all 
accounts, the current EIC system should ‘be diligently traced, and carefully adhered to’.
72
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II 
The Free trade advocates on the EIC’s monopoly and the image of China 
While the East India Company was sparing no effort to justify its trade monopoly in China, it 
was operating in a context of an ever-growing challenge posed by free trade theory. Assisted 
by this attitude, advocates of free trade contended that it was ‘the extreme of tyranny to 
deprive the public of the rights and privileges’
73
 to trade with the Chinese empire. For this 
reason, the renewal of the EIC’s charter, which was in essence ‘granting to the 2,500 partners 
of the East India Company, and refusing to the other 25 millions of British subjects’
74
 a right 
to which every individual was entitled, was on no account reasonable, justifiable or 
acceptable. In this context, British private merchants, together with some evangelical 
missionaries in China and other supporters of a laissez-faire attitude, created an anti-
monopoly environment which aimed to abolish the EIC’s charter. They not only propagated 
the idea that the removal of the EIC’s China trade monopoly ‘would be an undoubted 
advantage to the commerce and manufactures of Britain’,
75
 but widely contested the 
Company’s arguments in favour of its commercial monopoly. In particular, it was pointed out 
that, in order to mislead the public, the EIC and its campaigners had purposely presented 
some false, or very biased, views of the China trade. 
        To begin with, in opposition to the EIC’s statements about its positive impacts on the 
China trade, it was maintained that the Company’s actual records, ‘so far from showing what 
                                                          
73
 [John Crawfurd], ‘East India Company – China Question’, The Edinburgh Review, 104 (1831), 282. John 
Crawfurd (1783-1868) was a Scottish orientalist and colonial administrator in southeast Asia. He paid 
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they assert, show the very reverse of it’.
76
 Crawfurd stated that, unlike what the Company’s 
supporters had claimed, ‘the trade of the East India Company’, in fact, ‘affords no very 
satisfactory prospect either for the investment of additional capital, on the part of the 
merchant, or for augmentation of the public revenue on the part of the State’.
77
 For example, 
in terms of the Company’s tea trade, not only was the price of the EIC’s teas ‘raised to so 
exorbitant a pitch’, but those teas that were so overcharged were ‘in no respect superior in 
point of quality to those used in the United States and the Continent’.
78
 With regard to the 
EIC’s performance in the past two decades, it was asserted that:   
 
They show that the supply of tea is, in proportion to the population of the United 
Kingdom, considerably less than it was twenty years ago. They show that within 
the same time the exports of British produce and manufactures to China have 
fallen off from a million sterling per annum to much less than one-half of that 
amount. … the same records show that the nation has been taxed during the cur-
rency of the present charter to the extent of 40,000,000l, sterling, in consideration 
of this monopoly which by the Company is modestly stated to have been 
exercised not for its own exclusive interest ‘but likewise for the benefit and 
advantage of England and of India’.
 79
 
 
        In addition to this direct attack on the Company’s economic ‘contribution’, the free trade 
advocates also pointed out that the EIC had intentionally exaggerated the strictness of the 
Chinese monopoly, in order to persuade the public to believe that so long as China’s Canton 
system remained unchanged, it would be meaningless to remove the restrictions only on the 
British side. Moreover, the restrictions presented by the Chinese were not as significant as the 
Company had claimed. In particular, the EIC’s campaigners were accused of having 
concealed the importance of the ‘unauthorised trade’,
80
 which was widely conducted by the 
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country traders on the China coast. According to the supporters of free trade, in the 
controversy over the renewal or abolition of the EIC’s charter, the Company had been trying 
to fix public attention exclusively on the authorised trade conducted between itself and the 
Chinese Hong merchants. These observers contended that it was because the EIC was fully 
aware that once the specifics of the unauthorised trade were revealed to the public, ‘the 
Company's monopoly of the British market would be considered doubly unjust and injurious 
to the nation’.
81
 No matter how hard the EIC had attempted to hide the truth, it was 
undeniable that the China trade was by no means so restrictive as the EIC described it in its 
own propaganda. As a matter of fact, although, in theory, the country traders’ commerce in 
China was not sanctioned by the Qing government, it had been openly operating to such an 
extent that a substantially ‘free’ trade on the Chinese side had already been established. In 
spite of the so-called Chinese monopoly, which was presented by the EIC as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the application of the free trade principle, 
 
Individuals are, however, at perfect liberty to deal with any Hong merchant … or 
with any outside merchant, that is, with any Chinese merchant not belonging to 
the Hong. So that, though there are only eight or ten Hong merchants at Canton, 
there is, notwithstanding, quite as extensive a choice of merchants with whom to 
deal in that city as in Liverpool or New York.
82
 
 
As a result of this considerable commercial freedom, the scale of the unauthorised trade had 
greatly exceeded the Company’s regular trade, so that its total volume in the early 1830s even 
reached ‘nearly three times as great as the Company’s entire trade put together’.
83
 Moreover, 
against the EIC’s contention that serious trade disputes would arise because of the private 
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merchants’ want of discipline or experience, Crawfurd declared that this opinion was utterly 
‘futile and visionary’.
84
 He insisted that this unauthorised trade had actually been conducted 
with great order and mutual confidence. On the one hand, the facilities and efficiency that the 
port of Canton provided to the country traders were regarded as ‘decidedly superior in both 
these respects to London’.
85
 On the other hand, in past decades, ‘the private traders have 
never experienced the slightest inconvenience from any tumults between their sailors and the 
natives’,
86
 nor had other western independent traders, such as the Americans, Dutch and 
Danes, who had already been ‘free’ traders, ever met any ‘interruption or obstacle of any sort’ 
when they traded with the Chinese.
87
 
        It can be seen from such arguments that, in the opinions of the free traders, the EIC had 
been promoting an incorrect, or at least incomplete, image of the China trade by grossly 
ignoring the unauthorised trade and exaggerating the difficulties created by the Chinese 
monopoly. Given the dynamic of this important trade, however, the EIC’s monopoly in 
China, instead of the Canton commercial system, turned out to be the major constraint on the 
application of laissez-faire principles, as well as the extension of individual commercial 
enterprises into the Chinese empire. In order further to prove that it was worthwhile to free 
the China trade from the monopoly of the EIC, the free trade campaigners continued to 
challenge other images of China presented by the Company, such as the peculiarity of the 
Chinese people and the necessity to respect the Chinese government and its laws. In 
particular, a clandestine voyage to some northern ports of China, which was dispatched by 
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the EIC’s Select Committee in 1832, provided solid support for the free traders’ arguments.
88
 
Although the chief objective of this voyage was to gather intelligence on the practicability of 
opening trade with these ports,
89
 discoveries from this journey, especially those made by 
Hugh Hamilton Lindsay,
90
 who was in charge of this voyage, and the Prussian missionary 
Charles Gützlaff,
91
 greatly reinforced the free traders’ claim that the Chinese were by no 
means a ‘peculiar’ nation.   
        Contrary to the EIC’s assertion that China’s unique history and cultural otherness had 
rendered ideas of international communication, in both commerce and politics, unacceptable 
to the Chinese, campaigners for free trade maintained that the universal laws of commerce 
and international relations were found to be entirely relevant to the case of China. This point 
of view was bolstered by the following claims: first, just as with the British, the Chinese were 
in fact ‘a highly commercial people’.
92
 During the voyage along the China coast, the 
travellers had accumulated much evidence that the local inhabitants were not only ‘able and 
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willing to trade’, but ‘desirous of an extended intercourse with foreigners’.
93
 According to 
Gützlaff, the natives whom he met generally appeared ‘anxious to gain a livelihood and 
accumulate riches’
94
 and they sometimes ‘complained bitterly of the system of exclusion’.
95
 
Lindsay also noted that even some mandarins, who were supposed to suppress unlawful 
contacts between foreigners and local Chinese people, had acknowledged in private that vast 
advantage ‘would be desirable from foreign intercourse’.
96
 In this respect, a remarkable case 
occurred in the vicinity of Amoy, where the admiral of a local station gave clear signs that he 
wished to purchase some opium, but ‘seemed to be much disappointed when we had none to 
sell’.
97
 These first-hand experiences in China enabled Crawfurd to claim with confidence 
that: 
 
It appears quite certain that the Chinese, a money-making and money-loving 
people, are as much addicted to trade, and as anxious as any nation on earth to 
court a commercial intercourse with strangers. The government and its officers 
perhaps not less anxious for foreign commerce than the people themselves, could 
they see their way to admit it without danger.
98
 
 
        Second, instead of being a hostile population, the Chinese were seen to be in essence a 
friendly and ‘kind-hearted race of people’,
99
 who desired free intercourse with foreigners. 
During the course of the voyage, ‘the kindness with which the common people are disposed 
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to receive strangers’
100
 was carefully noted by the foreign visitors, so that it appeared to them 
that ‘the Chinese are not the jealous and suspicious race they have been generally 
imagined’.
101
 On the contrary, ‘the Chinese character in its true light’, was ‘that of 
friendliness and kindness towards foreigners’.
102
 For example, Gützlaff noted in his journal 
that, although some natives ‘lived in the most wretched hovels imaginable, and were filthy 
and rude in appearance’, their hospitality ‘formed a striking contrast to their extreme poverty, 
for they invited us into their dirty hovels, and shared with us their scanty supper’.
103
 
Particularly, as one of the very few quotations cited from conversations with the Chinese 
people, the following statement was minutely recorded by the Prussian missionary: ‘How 
gladly … would we, if permitted, [have] cultivated amicable intercourse with you! But we are 
always forbidden to obey the impulse of our hearts!’
104
 With the assistance of these vivid 
images, advocates of free trade were further convinced that ‘whatever peculiarities may 
attach to the Chinese, an antipathy … to strangers is not one of them’.
105
 
        Third, the Chinese people, in general, held an open attitude towards knowledge about 
the external world. In particular, they were believed to be very keen to possess information 
about Christianity and the character of the British people. This impression was formed chiefly 
because, during the journey up the China coast, Gützlaff and Lindsay distributed among the 
local inhabitants various pamphlets, which included different religious tracts, a brochure 
entitled A Brief Account of the English Character,
106
 as well as some scientific and moral 
booklets. Since all these tracts were widely sought after whenever the foreigners distributed 
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them, it was interpreted as a positive sign that ‘There exists among the people of China an 
unquenchable thirst after knowledge’.
107
 To Gützlaff, who was dedicated to spreading the 
word of God among the Chinese population, the demand for the Gospels ‘not only affords an 
inviting field, but presents claims – claims which ought not to be disregarded’.
108
 For this 
reason, he deemed it ‘truly distressing’ that the Chinese people were ‘anxious for the word of 
eternal life, but unable to obtain it’.
109
 The Chinese were therefore seen as ‘victims’ who were 
really in need of ‘a moral renovation’.
110
 Hence, it was lamentable that ‘the worship of the 
only living and true God has been thereby excluded from this vast empire’.
111
 
        While holding these views that the Chinese people had no antipathy to commerce, 
strangers or foreign knowledge, the free trade advocates nevertheless maintained that the 
Chinese government, as well as the laws of China, did not deserve respect. Most important 
was their claim that the current Chinese government did not promote the interests or express 
the voice of the people. As with the observers on the Macartney embassy, these campaigners 
for free trade in the early 1830s tended to interpret the Qing government as a case of very few 
Tartar conquerors ruling over many millions of Han Chinese. In the country traders’ petition 
to Parliament, they clearly stated that, in China, ‘so many millions of comparatively civilized 
human beings were subdued by its bitterest enemies, and yielded implicit obedience to a tribe 
of rude and ignorant barbarians’.
112
 Lindsay even contended that ‘the mere will of a despot … 
for the last century … separate near 400,000,000 of human beings from all communication 
with their species’.
113
 On the basis of these images, the government of China was represented 
as a suspicious body that paid ‘unceasing attention’ to ‘limiting the intercourse between 
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foreigners and Chinese’.
114
 To prove this claim, the Tartar ruling class was believed to be 
‘disliked by the people, and living in constant fear of rebellion which may drive them out of 
China’.
115
 Since ‘They know, though reluctant to admit it, that some barbarians are more 
warlike than themselves … and that in the event of a war with them, they themselves would 
be an unequal match for them’,
116
 the present government of China regarded foreigners ‘with 
constant suspicion’
117
 and made every effort to ‘exclude barbarians from all intercourse with 
the inhabitants of the middle kingdom’.
118
 For this reason, to promote ‘a sort of national 
antipathy’ between its subjects and foreign residents in China became ‘the main object of the 
Chinese government’.
119
 This government, on the one hand, gave foreigners ‘the worst ideas 
of the stupid and treacherous natives’,
120
 while, on the other hand, endeavoured to prepossess 
its people, particularly in Canton, against foreigners by ‘representing them as addicted to the 
most revolting crimes, with no other object than to stamp them in the eyes of the people as a 
barbarous, ignorant, and depraved race, everyway inferior to themselves, thereby exciting the 
lower orders to treat them with habitual insolence’.
121
 To account for their belief that the local 
contempt of foreigners in Canton was more the result of the government’s prejudiced policy 
than the natural disposition of the people, travellers on the voyage maintained that, outside 
the province of Guangdong, ‘instead of the rudeness and insult which is but too frequent near 
Canton, we had met with nothing but expressions of friendship and good will’.
122
 Moreover, 
‘whenever beyond the reach of government’, the Chinese people always became ‘solicitous 
to cultivate friendship with strangers’
123
 and, in general, ‘foreigners in China were better 
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liked the less they were known’.
124
 Such evidence, once again, strengthened the idea that 
politics in China was, in essence, a ‘government of the few’ against ‘the interests of the 
many’.
125
 Instead of being such a respectable institution as presented by the EIC, the 
government of China was an obstacle that stood between foreigners and the vast majority of 
the Chinese people, both of whom were desirous of free communications. 
        Based on this unfavourable image of the Chinese government, the laws of China were 
perceived by the free trade advocates as equally unworthy of respect. With regard to ‘the 
Chinese laws of exclusion’,
126
 Gützlaff wrote that, ‘it was not our wish to oppose the laws of 
the empire, but we could not believe that there were any laws compelling to such 
misanthropy’.
127
 In consequence, Gützlaff created an impression that the unnatural laws of 
China were in opposition to the divine law of the God. He contended that, ‘All mankind are 
created and upheld by the same God … therefore have a natural right to claim fellowship. 
The refusal of it is a transgression of the divine law of benevolence, which is equally binding 
upon all the nations of the earth’.
128
 With the introduction of this image, the Chinese people 
were seen to be constantly under the ‘the thraldom of Satan’
129
 and in need of being rescued. 
All negative aspects of China, such as the poverty and moral depravity of the Chinese 
populace,
130
 were therefore attributed to one universal cause – the harmful effects of the 
Chinese laws, which not only brought ‘ruin and impoverishment’
131
 to the Chinese nation, 
but reduced these people to ‘nothing more than semi-barbarians’.
132
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        In addition, other laws of China, which were designed to regulate the country’s internal 
affairs, were also seen to be highly questionable. Gützlaff observed that many theoretical 
laws of China ‘read excellently, but cannot be reduced to practice’.
133
 They were either too 
old to be ‘adapted to existing circumstances’,
134
 or ‘so numerous also and strict, that it is 
impossible to be a subject and not a transgressor’.
135
 Due to their impracticable nature, it was 
found that very few Chinese laws were observed strictly by the people. Instead, ‘all the 
restrictive laws of the Celestial Empire receive their validity from interpretation of the 
mandarins instructed with them, and … this depends upon the force at their command to 
enforce them’.
136
 In this respect, Gützlaff recalled that, during the voyage, although the edicts 
‘were generally in a very solemn manner proclaimed to us, and we were enjoined implicitly 
to obey them’, the mandarins ‘retained to themselves the full power either of overlooking 
some parts or neglecting the whole’.
137
 For example,  
 
In the imperial edict, … all barbarian ships are forbidden to approach the coast of 
Fuh-keen [Fujian] and Che-keang [Zhejiang] provinces; they are not allowed to 
anchor for a moment, but ought to be driven away. We anchored for several days, 
and nobody even endeavoured to drive us away. The barbarians are not allowed to 
go on shore. We went into the city, and in every direction, and his Excellency 
never took effectual measures to prevent it.   No boat was allowed to approach in 
order to trade, but no punishment mentioned; and people who dared to look at us 
were punished very severely. Nobody could therefore make us believe that his 
Excellency was strictly executing the imperial orders.
138
 
 
In view of this inconsistency between theory and practice in Chinese laws, the foreign 
travellers were led to believe that ‘bribery with all its concomitant evils’
139
 would definitely 
pervade the government of China. Moreover, in general, ‘there is no officer … whose hands 
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are clean, or who is not at all times ready to infringe the law which it is his nominal duty to 
uphold.’
140
 As a consequence of this perception, the poor image of Chinese laws was further 
confirmed. 
        After demonstrating that it was unnecessary to hold in esteem a government which did 
not represent its subjects, or the impracticable laws that were not observed even by its own 
officers, the conciliatory course of conduct towards China, which the EIC favoured, was 
opposed by these free trade advocates. They maintained that, on the one hand, ‘no 
government has a right to seclude its subjects from all foreign intercourse’
141
 and, on the 
other hand, ‘we have a right to require from China, at least just and equitable treatment and 
protection to the persons and property of British subjects’.
142
 For these reasons, it proved 
doubly legitimate to challenge the authority of the Chinese government for the ultimate 
benefit of both British and Chinese people. Moreover, unlike the EIC’s campaigners, who 
maintained that a moderate line of action was the most suitable to adopt in the case of China, 
the free trade advocates believed that ‘much more may be gained by an appeal to their fears 
than to their friendship’.
143
 They claimed that, ‘The result of two British Embassies’ had 
indicated ‘how little is to be gained in China, by any of the refinements of diplomacy’.
144
 
Moreover, throughout history, ‘those objects which foreigners have sought by means of 
reason and persuasion, and especially by a show of respect, have scarcely ever been attained; 
whilst a tone of defiance, more particularly when backed by any display of physical force, 
has nearly always proved successful’.
145
 In particular, the recent voyage had provided fresh 
evidence that ‘it is a Chinese maxim to trample on the voluntary submissive and abject, while 
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they respect firmness and decision’.
146
 As Gützlaff discovered, ‘even the least thing was 
refused when we humbly asked for it’,
147
 but, ‘as soon as the mandarins perceived that we 
were firm and reasonable in our demands, they became polite, and yielded’.
148
 On the basis of 
such findings and experiences, the free trade advocates were convinced that it was ‘most 
erroneous to suppose that a submissive course of conduct’
149
 would improve Sino-British 
relations, whereas more ‘firmness and reason’
150
 would definitely prove useful to Britain’s 
future relations with China. 
        Last, but not least, although, in general, the free trade advocates desired a more firm and 
determined attitude towards China, two slightly different approaches were proposed. Some of 
these advocates maintained that ‘to command the slightest attention or respect in China, you 
must appear with an appropriate force’.
151
 For example, based on the impression of the 
‘weakness and timidity of the Chinese government’,
152
 Lindsay believed that:  
 
if four or six Indiamen and one of His Majesty’s frigates had entered the port of 
Fuh Chow-foo [Fuzhou], captured the war-junks, proceeded to Mingan, and 
thence sent the option to the government of friendship or hostility, trade or war, 
that the freedom of British intercourse would have been established in perpetuity, 
without any expenditure either of blood or money.
153
 
 
In comparison, other supporters of free trade, such as Gützlaff, agreed that a more steadfast 
stance was necessary, but they ‘highly disapprove[d] of violent measures to obtain an object, 
which might be gained by firmness and resolution’.
154
 The American merchant, C. W. King, 
who was closely associated with British merchants in Canton, also claimed that, ‘We would 
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not trample down the custom of China with cavalry, nor cut up her prejudices with the sabre, 
nor carry our point and her cities by storm’.
155
 Instead, he proposed that ‘the mild 
interference of those commercial nations of Europe and America … by the united expression 
of their desires’
156
 might prove a better tactic. Nevertheless, no matter whether a violent 
measure was considered advisable at this point in Canton, the demand for a more determined 
attitude towards the Chinese government became more vociferous than before. The 
foundations for a change in British-Chinese relations, as a result, had been established to a 
considerable extent. 
 
III 
Epilogue 
It can be observed from the evidence presented above that, in the debate of the early 1830s, 
the free trade advocates introduced various images of China and the China trade that 
contrasted with those created by the supporters of the East India Company. In an age 
increasingly dominated by the commercial doctrine of laissez-faire, it was not surprising that, 
as Crawfurd believed, ‘All that the Company and its advocates have said about their 
monopoly being necessary, because of the peculiar nature of the Chinese character and 
institutions, falls to the ground’.
157
 Winning this debate, however, did not necessarily mean 
that the views and images presented by the free trade advocates were completely 
unprejudiced. At least, from the following perspectives, some of their contentions deserve 
further consideration. 
        First and foremost, although it seems that some of the essential findings about China 
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derived from first-hand experiences of the voyage, similar opinions did exist prior to 1832. 
Since the late 1820s, the Chinese government had been widely criticised by the mercantile 
and missionary communities in Canton. In 1830, a group of British traders even petitioned 
Parliament for ‘the direct intervention of His Majesty’s Government’
158
 on their behalf, but at 
that time they obtained no positive response. For this reason, more convincing arguments, or 
evidence, about the character of the Chinese government and people had been desired before 
the voyage, in order to persuade the British government to take action in China. Since the 
major persons on the voyage, i.e., Lindsay and Gützlaff, were personally inclined to agree 
with the country traders in many respects, it is very difficult to determine whether their 
‘discoveries’ in China were entirely independent from any possible predispositions or 
prejudices. 
        Second, although, as a result of some evidence gained on the voyage, the free trade 
advocates asserted that the Chinese people were naturally friendly to foreigners and that they 
were keen to know about Christianity, it could well be a biased report based on the personal 
prejudices of these travellers. In Gützlaff’s accounts, he made every effort to note down how 
many of his religious tracts were wanted by the natives and how hospitable they were to 
foreigners whenever they were beyond the reach of the Chinese government.
159
 Gützlaff took 
it for granted that all these signs were representative of the Chinese people’s genuine 
dispositions, but he never seriously questioned whether they were occasioned by other 
motives, such as their desire for commerce, or simply their ‘curiosity and the hope of gain’,
160
 
of which Gützlaff was in fact not unconscious. In this respect, Lindsay pointed out that it 
might be the free medical services that Gützlaff provided for the local inhabitants that gave 
rise to the ‘the extraordinary degree of respect and friendship shown to us by all classes of 
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Chinese’,
161
 but no such connection at all was made in Gützlaff’s report. Moreover, although 
some occurrences that might have challenged Gützlaff’s conclusions were recorded in his 
own accounts, no further analysis was made to explain these phenomena. For instance, 
Gützlaff once noted that:   
 
We had had a long conversation with the owner of a house, who had posted 
himself right in the way to prevent our entering his dwelling. I now thought it high 
time to make them a present of some books. When they found that I really 
intended to give these to them, they changed their tone, became friendly and 
hospitable.
 162
 
  
Examples such as this one may well indicate that the claimed friendliness or hospitality of the 
locals were not necessarily the result of the sincere feelings or innate character of the Chinese 
people. Nevertheless, when Gützlaff came to present the ‘genuine’ character of this nation, all 
of these occurrences were simply ignored. 
        Third, despite the fact that these travellers were aware that there was some duplicity in 
the Chinese character and that ‘they are not nice about a strict adherence to truth’,
163
 they 
tended to blame this trait exclusively on the Chinese government rather than on the Chinese 
people. In order to suit their view that the Qing government did not represent its subjects, the 
free trade advocates alleged that, although there was a ‘friendly disposition on the part of the 
natives’,
164
 the mandarins had a ‘lying spirit’
165
 and that ‘habitual deception’
166
 pervaded the 
whole system of the Chinese government. Even on the occasions when they were treated in 
the same favourable manner by the mandarins as by the local Chinese people, the travellers 
immediately pointed out ‘there was more of policy than sincerity’ in the mandarins’ 
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‘professions of friendship’.
167
 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that not only was this 
duplicitous character charge never employed to account for the behaviour of ordinary 
Chinese people, but the mandarins’ ‘duplicity’ was selectively applied only to those cases that 
could be used to support the free traders’ arguments. On some other occasions, the travellers 
were rather satisfied with the comments or actions of the mandarins, insomuch that they 
never attempted to uncover their underlying motives. For example, following the orders of 
the Chinese emperor, the mandarins were everywhere anxious to drive the foreign visitors out 
of their own districts. Probably in order to avert an open conflict, some officials ‘agreed upon 
the reasonableness’ of foreign trade, ‘but as the laws of the Celestial Empire prohibited trade 
with foreigners’, they wished the visitors to retreat from their districts without delay, although 
‘as for themselves, they would be highly desirous that the trade was opened’.
168
 In this case, 
the mandarins’ favourable remarks on foreign trade, no matter whether they were sincere or 
not, were taken as evidence of the general eagerness in China for free trade and as proof that 
even government officials were no exception to this rule. No attention, however, was paid to 
why these mandarins acted in this way, nor was it related to their supposedly duplicitous 
character at all.  
        Fourth, when these travellers were endeavouring to convince the British public that the 
Chinese government was indeed extremely suspicious of foreigners, some important 
contextual evidence was concealed in their accounts. In particular, it should be noted that a 
few months before the voyage, a serious quarrel broke out between the men in the EIC’s 
factory at Canton and the local Chinese authorities. As a result, ‘it was publicly known that 
the former had actually demanded assistance from the Governor General of India’.
169
 Instead 
of fully explaining this context, the travellers focused solely on the fact that the Chinese 
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mandarins whom they met were ‘always suspicious that we [the British] design to attack 
them’,
170
 as if this fear were totally unfounded. In addition, since these travellers attempted to 
disguise their connection with the EIC throughout the voyage, but carried no opium for sale 
as had most ships belonging to foreign traders, it probably gave the government officials 
more reasons to suspect that these unusual visitors were ‘the precursors of an armed force, 
which were coming to take possession of some part of the country’.
171
 Although this context 
may not be sufficient to overthrow completely the argument that China possessed a 
suspicious government, it at least suggests that the anxiety and suspicions exhibited by the 
Chinese authorities were not entirely incomprehensible in this particular case. 
        Last, in the accounts of the free trade advocates, it was widely contended that the 
Chinese were ‘a very commercial nation’
172
 and that they were ‘in the Eastern what the 
Hollanders are, or rather were, in the Western world’.
173
 These arguments, however, were no 
more than speculation based on limited evidence rather than being based on a wide-ranging 
survey. For one thing, foreigners in China had extremely restricted access to the Chinese 
people other than the coastal trading communities, which only made up a small proportion of 
the population in China. It was, therefore, obviously unfair to assess the ‘national’ character 
of such a vast population based on findings about one particular group. For another thing, 
even with respect to the characteristics of the Chinese mercantile class, some of the views 
were not drawn from those who lived within Chinese territory, but from Chinese emigrants 
and traders in southeast Asia. Discoveries about these people, whose lives were by and large 
disconnected from mainland China, were often taken to be representative of the character of 
all Chinese trading communities, or even of the general disposition of the entire Chinese 
nation. For instance, the following conjectures were quoted and widely publicised in the 
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writings of the free trade campaigners:  
 
Mr John Deans, … who resided twenty years in the Eastern archipelago … 
[claimed:] ‘The Chinese of the Archipelago, who, I believe, do not differ from the 
Chinese in their native country, are very sensible of the importance of commerce, 
and are, as I have already observed, the keenest speculators perhaps in the 
country’.
 174
  
 
Robert Rickards, Esq. [claimed:] 
‘I believe that the Chinese are a perfectly commercial people. Wherever the 
Chinese have been established in Singapore, in Java, in Borneo, and in the other 
eastern islands where they are settled in great numbers, they are found to be the 
principal traders, and the most industrious people in the country. I therefore take 
the Chinese, generally speaking, to be a perfectly commercial people, and 
exceedingly anxious to extend their commercial dealings, in spite of any 
restrictive regulations that may be imposed upon them by the Chinese 
government’.
 175
 
 
From such comments, it can be clearly seen that these ‘beliefs’ were no more than purely 
personal speculations on the character of the mainland Chinese. Moreover, although some of 
these commentators had never visited China, their highly personal opinions were employed 
indiscriminately as proven facts in the campaign waged by the free traders, merely because 
these people had some experience of the East that supported the arguments being presented 
by the free trade advocates. This subtle but important difference between opinions and facts 
might have greatly misled the British public with regard to the real character of the Chinese 
people. It could therefore be another underlying reason for the victory of the free trade 
advocates in the debate waged in the early 1830s.  
        In conclusion, although the campaigners for free trade quite successfully challenged the 
images of China constructed by the EIC, their own interpretations should not be too readily 
accepted. According to the evidence produced above, the free traders’ principal notions of the 
Chinese, such as their friendly and commercially-oriented disposition, as well as their natural 
                                                          
174 Ibid., 300-1. Italics added. 
175 Anon., The Foreign Trade of China, p. 36. Italics added. Similar examples can be found in the same 
book that the general commercial spirit of the Chinese was interpreted by different individuals from their 
experience in Batavia, Cochin China, Java, Penang and Singapore. See pp. 24-38. 
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suspicion of their own government, were by no means as indisputable as they asserted. 
Hence, their overall impressions of China, particularly that the Chinese government was the 
principal obstacle to free intercourse between two highly commercial and open-minded 
people, deserve some re-evaluation. Moreover, it can be seen that, in the controversy over the 
EIC’s monopoly in China, both the Company and the free trade advocates had endeavoured 
to create an image of China that would suit their own commercial interests and would justify 
their own actions. Therefore, no matter whose opinions prevailed in the end, it needs to be 
borne in mind that neither side presented an entirely reliable and unprejudiced image. Since 
the types of encounter between Britain and China continued to change, especially after the 
abolition of the EIC’s China monopoly in 1834, British perceptions of China as well as its 
diplomatic policies based on these perceptions, would change accordingly. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
‘The Napier Fizzle’ and beyond: 
British perceptions of China in the mid-1830s 
 
In August 1833, Britain abolished the East India Company’s monopoly of China trade by Act 
of Parliament. It provided that, after 21 April 1834, trade with China would finally be open to 
all British subjects. This decision resulted in a series of changes to British-Chinese relations. 
Most important, instead of using the EIC’s Select Committee at Canton, the British 
government had to represent the British merchants in China and deal directly with the 
Chinese authorities. In this context, a new trade commission was quickly established. William 
John, 9th
 
Lord Napier,
1
 a Scottish peer with no prior experience of China, was appointed to 
be the ‘Chief Superintendent of Trade’. John Francis Davis and Sir George Robinson, both 
the EIC’s supercargoes, were named as the second and third superintendents, in order to assist 
Lord Napier’s mission to ‘protect the interests of British subjects in China in the peaceful 
prosecution of all lawful enterprises’.
2
  
        As to what transpired as the ‘Napier Fizzle’, a descriptive account can be found in quite 
a number of modern works.
3
 In brief, in July 1834, Napier arrived at the harbour of 
Whampoa in a British warship without receiving any prior permission to do so from the 
                                                          
1 William John Napier, 9th Lord Napier (1786-1834) was lord-in-waiting to his former shipmate King 
William IV, who was a personal friend of Napier and helped him to get the post. See Harry G. Gelber, The 
Dragon and the Foreign Devils: China and the World, 1100 BC to the Present (London: Bloomsbury, 
2007), p. 180; Susanna Hoe and Derek Roebuck, The taking of Hong Kong: Charles and Clara Elliot in 
China waters (Aberdeen; Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), p. 32. 
2 Extract from the Royal Sign Manual Instructions to the Superintendents of Trade in China, Dec. 31, 1833, 
in Correspondence Relating to China, presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her 
Majesty (London: T. R. Harrison, 1840), p. 3. 
3 See Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 vols., London: Longmans, 
1910-18; reprinted, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), I: The Period of Conflict 1834-1860, 118-44; 
Maurice Collis, Foreign Mud: being an account of the Opium Imbroglio at Canton in the 1830’s and the 
Anglo-Chinese War that followed (London: Faber, 1964), pp. 108-65; Christopher Hibbert, The Dragon 
Wakes: China and the West, 1793-1911 (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 90-102; Harry G. Gelber, 
Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain’s 1840-42 War with China, and its Aftermath (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-18. 
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Chinese government. This unauthorised entry into the Celestial Empire was followed by an 
approximately two-month stay at Canton, for which an additional permit was required. 
During this period, Lord Napier, assuming himself to be the representative of the British 
crown, refused to accept Hong merchants as the proper channel of communications. Instead, 
he insisted on writing directly to Chinese officials. In his correspondence, Napier resolved to 
abandon the normal heading of ‘pin’ (petition), which implies subservience, in order to 
suggest equality between himself and the Chinese viceroy, Lu Kun, the highest authority at 
Canton. After several attempts to deliver this letter at the city gate had been rejected, the 
situation escalated into a crisis. The Chinese stopped all trade with Britain and demanded 
Napier’s immediate departure. Napier, in response, adopted some strong measures. He not 
only circulated in Canton a proclamation accusing the viceroy of ‘ignorance and 
incompetence’,
4
 but also ordered two British frigates to force a passage to Canton when he 
was put under house arrest by the Canton government. After a standoff of a few days, on 21 
September, Napier’s weakened health compelled him to withdraw. He died shortly afterwards 
in Macao, partly due to the very slow journey there in a Chinese boat, the only means by 
which he was allowed to leave Canton. 
        In some ways, the Napier mission can be viewed as the first effort by a British authority 
to employ a firm hand in its dealings with the Chinese government. For this reason, it has 
been widely maintained that Napier’s conduct signalled the beginning of a ‘forward policy’, 
which was designed to compel the Chinese government to grant the British increased 
commercial facilities.
5
 Although, recently, by examining the private papers of British officials 
and unpublished Foreign Office records, Glenn Melancon has pointed out that ‘the British 
                                                          
4 Correspondence Relating to China, p. 29. 
5 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-42 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1951), p. 191; Collis, Foreign Mud, pp. 108-25; Brain Inglis, The Opium War (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1976), p. 89. Some historians even falsely make no distinction between a ‘forward policy’ and 
a war, see Murray A. Rubinstein, ‘The Wars They Wanted: American Missionaries’ Use of The Chinese 
Repository Before the Opium War’, American Neptune, 48 (1988), 271-82. 
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government had no policy of aggression toward China’
6
 in 1834, his argument has not proved 
strong enough to remove entirely the commonly held perception, which sees the Napier affair 
as a prelude to the Opium War.
7
 The reasons for this are, first, historians who have written on 
this subject have focused either on the ‘Napier Fizzle’ itself or the immediate causes of the 
Opium War, while little attention has been paid to the period in between, i.e., the mid-1830s. 
Without a detailed knowledge of this interim period, however, any research that examines the 
Napier incident as a free-standing event is unable to overthrow the prevailing view of its 
direct connection with the outbreak of the Opium War. Second, although Melancon has 
shown that no member of the British government was interested in waging a war against 
China in 1834, he and some other modern historians, such as Harry G. Gelber,
8
 have 
examined only one side of the story, i.e., opinions of the decision makers in the British 
government. Public reactions to the Napier incident and the discussion within the British 
community in China concerning Britain’s future course of action were generally overlooked 
in their works. Third, despite the fact that, in the mid-1830s, British residents in China, as 
well as the concerned merchant and legal communities in London, were not a politically 
significant group,
9
 their attitudes have, in the past, been seen too much as expressing a single 
                                                          
6
 Glenn Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions: the First British Trade Commission in China, 1833-5’, Historical 
Research, 73 (2000), 47. Melancon elaborates on this point of view in his book Britain’s China Policy and 
the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003). 
7 Ulrike Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge: China and the Networks of British Imperial 
Expansion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 92; Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams 
and the Making of China (London: Picador, 2011), p. 8. 
8 Chapter Two of Gelber’s book Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals deals specifically with the general 
outlook of the British government in London. See Harry G. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: 
Britain’s 1840-42 War with China, and its Aftermath (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 19-39.  
9 Greenberg argues that, perhaps ‘the most important consequence of 1834’ was that the weight of the 
home manufacturing interests in Britain was thrown behind a ‘forward policy’ in China. See Greenberg, 
British Trade and the Opening of China p. 195. Nevertheless, no matter whether they are viewed 
individually or as a whole, in the mid-1830s, the British community in China and the concerned interest 
groups in Britain did not yet possess a strong voice in shaping government policies. The British 
government did not take the China question seriously until reports about the opium crisis reached London 
in August 1839. 
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view which ‘clearly had no respect for China’s rulers or their laws’
10
 and was solidly united 
in promoting a policy of coercion towards China.
11
 Without investigating the complex views 
held by these seemingly unimportant opinion formers, a series of questions cannot be 
answered and misunderstandings will remain. For example, apart from those who had direct 
power to decide the nature of Britain’s policy towards China, was a strong-hand policy 
towards China generally justified and promoted immediately after ‘the Napier Fizzle’? Was it 
true that all the British residents in China considered a war desirable from the mid-1830s 
onwards? Were any other policies advocated and, if so, what was their impact? In order to 
answer these questions and to understand British perceptions of China in the mid-1830s 
better, a wide-ranging survey is conducted in this chapter not only of Lord Napier’s own 
views on China, but also on the reactions and attitudes of the British observers outside 
government circles, especially those residing in China. In particular, much attention is paid to 
some previously understudied English-language newspapers published in Canton. Only after 
this evidence has been explored, can we ascertain whether or not the British at large were in 
favour of war in the immediate aftermath of the Napier incident. 
 
I 
Napier on China 
After the voice of the EIC had been significantly weakened by the abolition of its China 
monopoly, a consensus on a negative image of China was gradually reached among western 
communities in Canton. In the beginning of a new era of British-Chinese relations, British 
commentators’ interests in China were no longer restricted to observations on the Chinese 
government, society, people, and so forth, but extended to new subjects. Particularly during 
                                                          
10 Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions’, 47. 
11 Similar opinion can also be found in W. Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars: the 
addiction of one empire and the corruption of another (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2002), p. 32. 
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and after the Napier incident, a variety of opinions were proposed with regard to Britain’s 
future policy towards China. These varied perspectives and attitudes quickly attracted much 
attention in the mid-1830s and, as a result, a new British debate about China was generated. 
        The controversy over Britain’s future course of conduct in China was initiated by no 
other than Napier himself. Although not sanctioned by the British government, Napier’s firm 
line of action coincided with the free traders’ call for a more determined stance. For this 
reason, it seems that Napier was fully convinced by these private merchants on the negative 
perceptions of China,
12
 insomuch that he completely disregarded the instructions from Britain 
and wantonly transgressed the local laws while he was in Canton. Nevertheless, an 
examination of Napier’s correspondence with the British government shows that it was in 
fact a more complex issue. To begin with, if we compare the king’s and the British 
government’s guidance on the conduct of Napier, it can be found that their expectations of the 
Napier mission were not exactly the same. His Majesty’s instructions to the Superintendents 
of Trade were essentially based on the Canton trade. The commission’s main obligations, 
according to the king’s wish, were no other than to ‘watch over and protect the interests’ of 
British subjects in China, to afford them ‘advice, information and assistance … with a view 
to the safe and successful conduct of their commercial transactions’, and to impress on them 
‘the duty of conforming to the laws and usages of the Chinese Empire’ provided that such 
laws were implemented ‘with justice and good faith’.
13
 In contrast, Foreign Secretary 
Viscount Palmerston seems to have been more ambitious. He stated, in a letter to Napier, that: 
 
In addition to the duty of protecting and fostering the trade of His Majesty’s 
subjects with the port of Canton, it will be one of your principal objects to 
ascertain, whether it may not be practicable to extend that trade to other parts of 
the Chinese dominions.    
                                                          
12 Melancon, however, has demonstrated that Napier arrived at this view independently, well before he 
reached Canton. Therefore, the assumption taken by some historians that Napier formed his opinions after 
he talked to Jardine in China is unfounded. Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions’, 41. 
13 Royal sign manual instructions, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 3. 
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           … 
for this end you will omit no favourable opportunity of encouraging any 
disposition which you may discover in the Chinese authorities, to enter into 
commercial relations with His Majesty’s Government. It is obvious that, with a 
view to the attainment of this object, the establishment of direct communications 
with the Imperial Court at Pekin would be desirable; and you will accordingly 
direct your attention to discover the best means of preparing the way for such 
communications.
14
 
 
        This ambiguity in the guidance being given, particularly the latter point,
15
 caused some 
confusion for Napier in his proceedings in China. This fact, although it partly accounts for 
Napier’s actions afterwards, does not mean that Napier himself had no distinct intention 
concerning what means of communication he should employ. In fact, prior to his departure 
from Britain, as well as when in receipt of the aforesaid instructions, Napier had noted clearly 
in his diary that: 
 
the empire of China is my own. What a glorious thing it would be to have a 
blockading squadron on the coast of the Celestial Empire, vessels of a light draft 
of water. Considering that that enormous empire of 400,000,000 hangs together by 
a spider’s web, how easily a gun brig would raise a revolution and cause them to 
open their ports to the trading world. I should like to be the medium of such a 
change.
16
 
 
Perhaps after sensing that Napier held such sentiments, not only the king and Palmerston, but 
also Prime Minister Grey, all stressed to Napier the importance of adopting a cautious and 
moderate policy. His Majesty desired Napier to ‘observe all possible moderation’ and to 
‘cautiously abstain from all unnecessary use of menacing language; or from making any 
                                                          
14 Viscount Palmerston to Lord Napier, 25 Jan. 1834, The National Archives of the U.K.: Foreign Office, 
Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906 [hereafter TNA, F.O.], F.O., 
17/9/55-7. It is worth noting that the king’s instructions would of course emerge from discussions with his 
ministers. It may be that Palmerston did not follow an agreed cabinet policy. 
15  For more details about Lord Napier’s complaints about Palmerston’s instructions, see TNA: F.O., 
17/6/8-24, Lord Napier to Viscount Palmertson, Canton, 9 Aug. 1834.  
16 Napier, 26 Nov. 1833, Private Diary of William John 9th Lord Napier during the Years 1833-4, part ii, 
Papers of Lord Napier and Ettrick, in Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis, p. 35. 
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appeal for protection to our military or naval forces’ unless in an extreme case.
17
 Grey 
demanded that:  
 
Nothing must be done to shock their prejudices and excite their fears. The utmost 
forbearance therefore will be required in any point of difference that may arise, 
and prove injurious to our commercial relations with that country. Persuasion and 
conciliation should be the means employed, rather than anything approaching to 
the tone of hostile and menacing language; and I should rather recommend where 
persuasion and conciliation failed, a submission for a time or till instructions 
could be received from home, than a vigorous enforcement of demands no matter 
how just.
18
 
 
Palmerston, at the same time as setting up additional objectives for the mission, not only 
reminded Napier that ‘peculiar caution and circumspection will be indispensable’,
19
 but also 
forbade him from ‘entering into any new relations or negotiations with the Chinese 
authorities, except under very urgent and unforeseen circumstances’.
20
 The consensus on the 
expediency of prudence and conciliation, as shown here, was an obvious feature of Napier’s 
pre-mission directions from the British authorities. 
        Notwithstanding the unanimous demand for a non-aggressive line of action, Lord Napier 
did not seem to alter his own conviction of the best way to deal with the Chinese 
government.
21
 On his voyage to China, Napier suggested that a coercive policy as well as a 
firm stand were crucial to the success of his mission, because 
 
1st, that every act of violence on our part has been productive of instant redress 
                                                          
17 Royal sign manual instructions, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 3. 
18
 Durham University, GRE/B42/2/5. Political and Public Papers of Charles, 2nd Earl Grey, Grey to 
Napier, 10 Jan. 1834. 
19 TNA: F.O., 17/5/57, Palmerston to Lord Napier, 25 Jan. 1834.  
20 TNA: F.O., 17/5/57-8. Same letter.  
21 It cannot be ascertained, however, what the origins of Napier’s views on the China issue were. Some 
historians presume that Napier adopted ‘a discourse of opposition to tyranny’ from his experiences during 
the Napoleonic wars (see Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 94), but this was rather a 
speculation than a finding based on historical evidence. Perhaps the only point that can be confirmed now 
is that even though Napier was influenced by the free traders’ propaganda with regard to the negative 
images of China, he accepted them, or similar opinions, in Britain well before he reached China, rather 
than during his journey out or afterwards. 
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and other beneficial result; 2nd, that every concession made and every threat used, 
without having it in our power to carry the same into effect, has been followed by 
ensued oppression and spoliation.
22
 
 
Upon his arrival, however, it can be noticed that Napier softened his tone a little in his 
comment on the state of British-Chinese relations, while the most aggressive policy he 
advocated, such as a willingness to resort to violence, was not immediately advanced. In the 
meantime, during his initial intercourse with the Chinese, Napier tended to justify his stand 
against the Chinese from an ‘honour’ point of view. He maintained, on the one hand, that he 
came to China upon the invitation of the previous viceroy,
23
 and, on the other hand, he stated 
that ‘it was quite derogatory to the dignity of the Representative of the King to communicate 
through the merchants’.
24
 The medium of communication through the Hong merchants was 
therefore no longer acceptable under the present circumstances. It was only by means of 
introducing such perspectives that Napier was able to write with confidence that ‘I have, in 
fact, adhered most strictly to those instructions, without compromising the honour of His 
Majesty’s Commission’.
25
  
        As the conflict escalated, Napier’s genuine attitudes towards Chinese affairs were 
disclosed more abundantly in his correspondence with the British authorities. When the 
dispute about honour was increasingly unable to explain the dispute he caused with the 
Canton government, Napier still endeavoured to legitimise his action from various 
perspectives. Among his arguments, we can detect that some of Napier’s existing impressions 
                                                          
22 Napier, 10 Mar. 1834, ‘From the MS. Memoir Vol. 2’, Remarks and Extracts Relative to Diplomatic 
Relations with China, Napier and Ettrick Papers, in Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium 
Crisis, p. 37. 
23 On 16 Jan. 1831, Viceroy Le, after being informed about the possible dissolution of the East India 
Company, issued an edict requiring the Chief of the Factory to pass on the message that ‘it was incumbent 
on the British Government to appoint a Chief to come to Canton, for the general management of 
commercial dealings, and to prevent affairs from going to confusion’. This was frequently cited by the 
British at the time to indicate that it was the Chinese who broke their word. For Napier’s arguments, see 
Napier, ‘Present state of relations between China and Great Britain – Interesting to the Chinese merchants 
– A true and official Document’, Canton, 26 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 33.  
24 Ibid. 
25 TNA: F.O., 17/6/23-4, Napier to Palmerston, 9 Aug. 1834.  
173 
 
of China could account for his actions during the incident. First, Napier’s assertion on the 
validity of a forceful approach derived from a number of impressions he had gained from 
previous writers. In order to justify his views and practices, Napier, on the one hand, avowed 
that the policies recommended by the British authorities were ‘certainly most fitting when 
one has a reasonable people to deal with’,
26
 but, on the other hand, he maintained that, due to 
‘the utter imbecility of the Government, and the favourable disposition of the people, I cannot 
for one moment suppose, that, in treating with such a nation, His Majesty's Government will 
be ruled by the ordinary forms prescribed among civilized people’.
27
 Specifically, in dealing 
with the Chinese government, ‘which is too contemptible to be viewed in any other light than 
that of pity or derision’,
28
 Napier referred to earlier experiences and concluded that ‘success 
has always attended determination’.
29
 For one thing, ‘that Government is not in a position to 
be dealt with or treated by civilized nations, according to the same rules as are acknowledged 
and practised among themselves’.
30
 For another, 
 
What advantage, or what point did we ever gain by negotiating or humbling 
ourselves before these people, or rather before their Government? The records 
show nothing but subsequent humiliation and disgrace. What advantage or what 
point, again, have we ever lost, that was just and reasonable, by acting with 
promptitude and vigour?
31
 
 
        In addition to these considerations, Napier’s confidence in using compulsion was 
enhanced by his conviction that the Tartar rulers and their army had lost their warlike 
character so that concerns about a real military clash between the two nations were 
unfounded. He contended that, the Tartars ‘continually reinforced or invigorated from the 
                                                          
26 Napier to Grey, 21 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 28. 
27 Napier to Palmerston, 14 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, pp. 12-13. 
28 Ibid., p.14. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Napier to Grey, 21 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 26. 
31 Napier to Palmerston, 14 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 14. 
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Steppes, are a wretched people, inconceivably degraded, unfit for action or exertion’
32
 and 
therefore ‘I am sure they would never for a moment dare to show a front’.
33
 This speculation, 
consequently, enabled Napier to write to Palmerston with the assurance that, ‘I am convinced 
that a commanding attitude alone, with the power of following the threat with execution, is 
all that is required to extort a Treaty which shall secure mutual advantages to China and to 
Europe’.
34
 Even if the Chinese authorities would not comply immediately, Napier believed 
that ‘Three or four frigates and brigs, with a few steady British troops, not sepoys, would 
settle the thing in a space of time inconceivably short. … that the exploit is to be performed 
with a facility unknown even in the capture of a paltry West India Island’.
35
 From these 
comments, it can be seen that, instead of acting unscrupulously against the instructions of 
home authorities, Napier selectively referred to local knowledge, particularly certain negative 
images of China that he had been persuaded to accept, in order to support his own contention 
that a firm stance was the best way to conduct relations with the Chinese government. In 
Napier’s opinion, firm action would induce ‘not the loss of a single man; and we have justice 
on our side’,
36
 an argument that doubly justified the expediency as well as the rightness of his 
actions and viewpoint.  
        Second, among Napier’s proposals, one of the most notable was on the necessity to 
bypass the Canton government and to protest directly to the emperor in Beijing. This too has 
its roots in Napier’s established views. In his opinion, the difficulties to which the British had 
been subjected over the past few decades at Canton were occasioned by the misconduct of the 
local authorities, rather than as a result of the intentions of the central government or the 
emperor himself. Napier believed, in general, that it was the ‘unprecedented tyranny and 
injustice … by the said viceroy and fooyuen’ and the ‘absurd and tyrannical assumption of 
                                                          
32 Ibid.  
33 Napier to Grey, 21 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 28. 
34 Napier to Palmerston, 14 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 14. 
35 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
36 Ibid., p. 13. 
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power on the part of the governor and lieutenant-governor’
37
 that handicapped his enterprise 
and prevented a stable trade from being established. In particular, Napier asserted that the 
viceroy ‘is a presumptuous savage’ and ‘has committed an outrage on the British Crown, 
which should be equally chastised’.
38
 For these reasons, he deemed it essential to protest 
‘with firmness and spirit’
39
 to no other than the emperor himself. Supported by his local 
experience, Napier might be implying that, with respect to the instructions on unconditional 
submission to the local government, a little modification was indeed necessary. On the other 
hand, Napier definitely entertained some expectation that justice might be obtained from the 
emperor. It was no wonder that, in his warning to the Canton government, Napier openly 
stated that: 
 
let the Governor or Lieutenant Governor know this, that I will lose no time in 
sending this true statement to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor at Pekin; and that 
I will also report to his justice and indignation the false and treacherous conduct 
of Loo, Governor, and of the present Kwang Chow Foo … His Imperial Majesty 
will not permit such folly, wickedness, and cruelty as they have been guilty of, 
since my arrival here, to go unpunished; therefore tremble Governor Loo, 
intensely tremble!
40
 
 
From this statement, it can be clearly seen that Napier indeed pinned much hope on the 
emperor, whose positive image overall and his impartiality in particular were taken for 
granted. It might be that Napier inherited the idea of a fair-minded Chinese emperor from the 
Macartney mission. It has to be remembered, however, that the Amherst embassy had 
produced an image of the emperor, which was almost the opposite to that provided by 
Macartney. Due to the fact that the British had never managed to hold another meeting with a 
Chinese monarch for four decades, it might be unwise to rely too much on the consistency of 
                                                          
37 Napier to the Hong merchants and Chinese authorities, 8 Sep. 1834, Correspondence Relating to 
China, p. 36. 
38 Napier to Palmerston, 14 Aug. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, p. 15. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Napier to the Hong merchants and Chinese authorities, 8 Sep. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, 
p. 36.  
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the British perceptions of the Chinese emperor. Moreover, it should not be ignored or denied 
that Napier’s adoption of Macartney’s interpretation rather than Amherst’s was based on his 
own choice from a miscellaneous collection of information available to him on the character 
of the Chinese monarch, and it was taken in order to suit his own ideas. In this respect, 
therefore, Napier’s view of Chinese affairs might be considered as part of the ongoing 
process to produce, rather than to inherit, a truthful image of China.  
        Third, Napier’s decision to circulate among the public in Canton a statement, as another 
means of terrifying the viceroy, was based on his assumption that the Tartar rulers were 
disliked by the commercially-minded Chinese people, insomuch that this vast community 
could be encouraged to support his action against the Canton government. Napier was 
convinced that ‘The house of every Chinaman in these extensive suburbs, is a shop of one 
sort or another. … in fact, every man is a merchant’
41
 and ‘the Chinese people are most 
anxious for our trade—from the Great Wall to the southern extremity of the empire,—the 
Tartar Government alone being anti-commercial’.
42
 As a result, he considered it advisable to 
promote the ‘publishing in Chinese, and disseminating far and wide the base conduct of the 
Viceroy in oppressing the merchants, native as well as foreign’.
43
 Clearly, Napier was 
disposed to interpret the Tartar rulers’ management of Sino-British commerce, particularly the 
stoppage of trade, as ‘a cruel and criminal measure on the part of a petty tyranny to annoy the 
merchants’.
44
 He also believed that ‘There is not the slightest fellowship between the Chinese 
and the Tartars’.
45
 These existing perceptions, accordingly, induced him to suggest further 
that, ‘If the Emperor refuses our demand, remind him he is only an intruder; and that it will 
be his good policy to secure himself upon his throne by gratifying the wishes of his people’.
46
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44 Ibid. 
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Apparently, these impressions of Napier’s were drawn from the interpretations advanced by 
British subjects who had previously travelled to or resided in China. The difference now, 
however, is that they finally began to be applied in a British high official’s assessment of 
Chinese affairs and could potentially exert a major influence on Britain’s national policy.  
        To sum up, it is undeniable that Napier’s actions and standpoint were substantially 
influenced by previous British perceptions of China. It ought to be remembered, however, 
that some of these existing impressions were also selectively utilised by Napier in order to 
support his own stance during the incident. For this reason, it would be wrong to suppose that 
Napier had entirely disregarded the instructions he received from the king and the British 
government. On the contrary, Napier spared no effort, on different occasions, to prove that his 
conduct was contrary neither to the honour of the British nation nor to the policies of his 
government and that, in fact, his viewpoint with regard to Chinese affairs was the most 
reasonable and appropriate under the particular local circumstances he encountered. 
Meanwhile, although some of the earlier perceptions were indeed repeated by Napier, he also 
brought a new and important development to the British understanding of China. In 
particular, despite the fact that he declared that, ‘I am the most peaceful of men; I have no 
delight in war’,
47
 Napier also asserted that the Canton authorities ‘have opened the 
preliminaries of war’.
48
 By expressions such as this, an aggressive line of action was 
seriously mentioned in the official documents of the British government for the first time. As 
a consequence, war with China became more imaginable than ever before.  
 
II 
Whose fault? 
                                                          
47 Ibid., p. 14.  
48 Napier to the Hong merchants and Chinese authorities, 8 Sep. 1834, Correspondence Relating to China, 
p. 36. 
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Immediately after the ‘Napier Fizzle’, there followed a heated discussion among those who 
had any interest in or experience of Chinese affairs, particularly the British community in 
Canton. Within a short period of time, various pamphlets and articles on the present state of 
affairs and future prospects for British-Chinese relations were produced and widely 
circulated. This public debate, as well as the images of China that it presented, has previously 
been very little studied. In particular, the reason for the failure of Napier’s commission, one 
of the central topics discussed in this literature, where it was examined from a variety of 
perspectives by different commentators, has never been introduced, analysed and interpreted 
for modern readers.  
        A popular opinion at the time was that Napier’s failure was caused by the ‘treacherous 
and cowardly conduct of the Chinese authorities’.
49
 With regard to what Napier had suffered 
during the incident, a number of British writers became convinced that it was in fact 
unavoidable given the character of the Chinese government, because ‘the Chinese were 
predetermined to insult him … no moderation on his part would have procured for him a 
fitting reception’.
50
 Moreover, many of them were disposed to consider the ‘Napier Fizzle’ as 
a serious insult to the British crown and nation by the Chinese authorities, rather than simply 
being the superintendent’s personal misfortune. For example, G. J. Gordon, in his Address to 
the People of Great Britain, claimed that ‘Our sovereign himself has, in the person of his 
representative at Canton, the late Lord Napier, been insulted by the Chinese authorities’.
 51
 An 
anonymous writer, in The Chinese Repository, asserted that:  
 
the course which the Chinese pursued with regard to Lord Napier, … was most 
barbarous and unjust; … Wrongs and insults have been heaped on the 
representative of a great and powerful nation, seeking an amicable, an honorable, 
                                                          
49 Hugh Hamilton Lindsay, Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston on British relations 
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50 Ibid., p. 3.  
51 G.J. Gordon, Address to the People of Great Britain, Explanatory of Our Commercial Relations with the 
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and a profitable intercourse. … their government has outraged the laws of 
common right and humanity.
52
 
 
        The discussion on the cause of Napier’s unsuccessful diplomacy, from the very 
beginning, was not limited to the incident itself, but was closely connected to the wider 
context in which the Chinese government was censured from a range of perspectives. Most 
remarkably, the Napier mission was described by many commentators as a gracious attempt 
by Britain to meet the commercial and social needs of both nations and, hence, the Chinese 
government was accused of having violated the law of nations as well as natural law, 
especially with regard to economic freedom and freedom of movement. On the principle that 
‘All men ought to find on earth the things they stand in need of. … The introduction of 
dominion and property could not deprive men of so essential a right’,
53
 one of the authors 
lamented that:  
 
Considering all the nations of the earth as one family, we see no reason why one 
of them, because it has remained for ages, occupying so large a portion of the 
common soil, in a state of moral and political idiocy, shall not only deny to the 
surrounding members all the advantages that may be derived from an interchange 
of its various productions, but also insult them when they come to them with the 
most friendly and the most beneficent intentions.
54
  
 
In addition, some of the personal inconveniences to which the British residents in Canton 
were subjected also produced strong complaints. In particular, the prohibition on foreign 
females entering Chinese territory, which compelled British merchants to leave their wives 
during the trading season, really annoyed the foreign community in Canton. It was denounced 
as ‘an insult perfectly gratuitous’ that made them believe ‘the laws of nature are outraged’
55
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in China. The British also attempted to justify their cause from the perspective of the Chinese 
people. They maintained that, as with foreigners, the universal rights of Chinese subjects 
were greatly restricted by their arbitrary government. In an article entitled ‘Universal Peace; 
obstacles to it in the character and government of nations’, it was maintained that: 
 
the government destroys the personal liberty of its subjects; none of whom may 
pass beyond the frontiers of the empire, or hold any intercourse with foreigners. 
Those who presume to disobey these restrictions are declared outlaws, worthy of 
death. In this way all the avenues to the introduction of every species of useful 
knowledge are sealed up; … Moreover, the government affords but very imperfect 
security for the property of the people. In a word, it acknowledges no rights in its 
subjects. Such is the unnatural, the unreasonable, and the unrighteous condition in 
which the monarch of this empire holds his subjects; he robs them of liberty of 
conscience; annihilates their personal rights; and guaranties to them no security.
56
 
 
From such accusations, the view that ‘the Chinese government is in the highest degree 
demoralized’
57
 became increasingly prevalent. Consequently, these attacks created the 
impression that it was the Chinese government that had ruined Napier’s friendly commission 
and they made this opinion more convincing to a wider readership.  
        Despite such strong criticism of the Chinese government, this view was not advanced by 
all British commentators. Some writers were inclined to suggest that Napier’s misfortune 
resulted from his own faults and mistakes. In an article published by The Canton Register, the 
author not only asserted that Napier’s conduct was ‘offensive to the Chinese Government’, 
but lamented that ‘It is to be regretted that a person so inexperienced and ignorant of Chinese 
usage should have been sent to China at the critical moment of opening the British trade with 
that empire’.
58
 Staunton, an old China hand who had been involved in Chinese affairs since 
the Macartney mission, advanced a similar point of view. In a more detailed observation, he 
maintained that ‘the case of Lord Napier is not a tenable position in argument against the 
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Chinese’,
59
 because Napier had infringed Chinese laws in two ways. First, Napier was ‘an 
individual whose first act within the Chinese territories was a violation of its laws’,
60
 
because:  
 
Lord Napier could not be ignorant of the fact, as he had persons of the greatest 
local experience and information joined with him in his commission, that no 
foreigners of any description have ever been permitted by the Chinese 
Government to establish themselves at Canton except in strictly a commercial 
character; and that, moreover, no person, even if habitually resident at Canton in 
such commercial character, was permitted to visit that city from Macao, without 
previously obtaining a certain license or passport. …I fearlessly ask, then, what 
right or pretext had Lord Napier to signalize his first appearance in China by a 
violation of the known and acknowledged regulations of the country?
61
 
 
Second, Napier’s decision to order two British frigates to proceed to Canton was ‘another 
illegal act’.
62
 In this respect, Staunton wrote: 
 
All this was done without any actual need of either their assistance or their 
protection. Lord Napier was perfectly safe —his person was not threatened—he 
had only to go away, and return from whence he came. The object, therefore, 
neither was nor could have been any other than that of aiding him in his resistance 
to the orders of the Government.
63
  
 
        As well as expressing these opinions, Staunton also refuted some of the viewpoints 
which were commonly advanced in support of Napier’s conduct. For instance, against the 
claim that Napier was the representative of the British sovereign in China, Staunton stressed:  
 
He was in no sense whatever the King’s Representative. The fact is, however, that 
as far as the Chinese were concerned, he had no public character at all. No public 
functionary sent to another state can claim, as we have seen, the rights and 
privileges of his appointment till he is recognised. … official station or public 
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privilege he had literally none.
64
 
 
In opposition to Napier’s assertion that he was ‘invited’ by the Chinese government, but then 
not treated accordingly,
 65
 Staunton pointed out that the Chinese authorities’ original intention 
was actually misunderstood and even distorted by Napier and other observers. He maintained 
that:  
 
the Chinese did not contemplate the coming out of an officer from the King, 
claiming new rights and privileges; but expected and required that, 
notwithstanding the abolition of the East India Company’s trade and privileges, 
matters should be carried on at Canton, as far as they, the Chinese authorities, 
were concerned, precisely “as heretofore”.
66
 
 
These opinions, furthermore, strengthened Staunton’s claim that Napier was by no means 
innocent of what had occurred at Canton. It is worth noting, however, that a similar point of 
view to this one was rarely found in other works produced at this time. This was probably 
because, apart from Staunton, very few British observers were able to interpret China-related 
affairs from the Chinese perspective and with a knowledge of the Chinese language. His 
ability to adopt such an approach, therefore, was perhaps one of the reasons why Staunton’s 
views on the Napier incident differed greatly from what became the dominant opinion. 
        Besides censuring Lord Napier, the British government was also blamed by some 
commentators for sending a figure of such a high rank when the Chinese expected only a 
commercial representative,
67
 and for giving ‘foolish’
68
 instructions to the superintendents. For 
one thing, Staunton pointed out that, although he had made it clear to parliament in 1833 that 
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the previous sanction of the Chinese government was indispensable to the appointment of any 
British functionary at Canton, his advice had not been taken. Instead, Napier ‘seems to have 
been simply instructed to proceed direct to Canton, and to assume at once his official cha-
racter there, without the least anticipation of difficulty or discussion, just in the same way as a 
successor would have been appointed to any vacant Consulship in Europe’.
69
 None the less, 
Staunton maintained that, ‘a far greater share of the blame appears to lie with his Lordship's 
instructions, than with himself’.
70
 On the government’s decision to appoint the second and 
third superintendents from the EIC officials remaining at Canton, some observers maintained 
that this sent the wrong signal to the Chinese authorities. According to this viewpoint, the 
appearance of these EIC servants gave the Chinese the impression that ‘the company is still 
paramount though in abeyance, and that the whole of the late proceedings here were a trick to 
terrify them into better terms’.
71
 In consequence, the Chinese authorities were induced to 
think that ‘if they could only eject Lord Napier, they would then be able to preserve the status 
quo of things, and conduct matters as heretofore’.
72
 From this perspective, therefore, not only 
the British government, but the East India Company too, was held ‘indebted for our late 
humiliation, and the death of the first representative of England to China’.
73
 
        In brief, in the years immediately after Napier’s death, the published interpretations of 
the ‘Napier Fizzle’ were quite different. The reasons given for his failure, despite the frequent 
claims that the Chinese government had been at fault, were in fact varied. Quite a few British 
observers, Staunton in particular, not only challenged this standpoint from a variety of 
perspectives, but also suggested that Napier himself, the British government, and even the 
East India Company were responsible for Napier’s misfortunes. These arguments, however, 
did not necessarily indicate that these writers, who advanced such different interpretations, 
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entertained more favourable views of China. On the contrary, the negative image, which had 
been held by British merchants at Canton for a long time, was further confirmed as a result of 
the Napier incident. In this regard, even Staunton clearly referred to: 
 
… the vices of the Chinese national character, and also the vices of their political 
and commercial system. I shall certainly not undertake to defend either. It has 
been my lot, during a considerable portion of my life, to have had ample 
opportunities of witnessing these evils … These evils … I have always readily 
acknowledged and deplored.
74
 
 
Hence, there was no doubt that the enhancement of such an unfavourable image of China 
helped to lay the foundations for some of the opinions expressed in the discussion of what 
future measures should be adopted towards China. 
 
III 
The ‘show of force’ theory 
Apart from the debate on the cause of the ‘Napier Fizzle’, Napier’s failed effort to create fear 
in the Chinese government also excited other discussions among British subjects in Canton. 
Was it wrong to adopt this aggressive approach? Or did it fail because it was still not resolute 
enough? In order to answer these questions, a variety of opinions were raised about which 
approach ought to be adopted with regard to Britain’s future relations with China. Among 
various proposals, the one most prevalent in Canton in the mid-1830s was the ‘show of force’ 
theory. 
        The ‘show of force’ theory was, in essence, a general idea advanced in miscellaneous 
pamphlets and articles that were widely distributed in Canton in the mid-1830s. Despite its 
prevalence, it was neither a policy devised by any British authority nor a rigidly defined 
strategy promoted by certain interest groups. Little is known of who first employed this term, 
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but it is clear that, in the two years after the Napier incident, a number of British merchants, 
missionaries and anonymous writers began demanding the adoption of a more forceful 
attitude towards China in the local English-language press, such as The Canton Register75and 
The Chinese Repository.
76
 Although there was a division of opinion among supporters of this 
theory on what a ‘show of force’ policy exactly involved, they agreed on the fact that ‘The 
time has arrived when a decisive step must be taken’.
77
 In light of the recent experiences of 
Napier, they stressed that a harsher tone had to be adopted by the British government in its 
relations with China, otherwise the present difficulties would never be satisfactorily resolved. 
These advocates proposed that a determined plenipotentiary, granted full powers and 
‘attended by a sufficient maritime force’,
78
 should proceed to the immediate vicinity of the 
imperial residence at Beijing, ‘for the purpose of demanding redress for injuries sustained, 
and negotiating a commercial treaty on a liberal basis’.
79
 Only by these means, they 
maintained, would the Chinese authorities be intimidated and the two nations’ commercial 
relations be ‘easily, speedily, and peaceably placed upon an honourable and secure footing’.
80
 
This ‘show of force’ approach had much in common with Napier’s coercive policy, 
particularly in terms of adopting a firm stand towards the Chinese government. It was, 
however, based on a profound debate conducted over about two years, and therefore the 
justifications for such a strategy were steadily developed and they had a growing influence on 
the images of China that were being constructed.  
        To begin with, in order to make the suggested line of action fully legitimate, supporters 
of the ‘show of force’ attitude tended to reinforce the argument that, insomuch as China had 
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capriciously set itself against the universal laws of nations and the general interests of the 
human race, the British had just cause to protest. For example, in an article in The Canton 
Register, it was maintained that: 
 
We must consider the Chinese either as a civilised nation, and one responsible for 
their own acts, or as barbarians; if as the former, we have an undoubted right to 
demand with the strong hand, ample satisfaction, not only for their present 
conduct, but for a long debt of past indignities; if as the latter, according to the 
usages of nations we see no valid objection to treating them just in the manner 
that our superior military and naval power can enable us to do, even to the 
occupation of a portion of their territory.
81
 
  
With regard to the propriety of employing the discourse of universal laws in the case of 
China, these advocates pointed out that it was absolutely unreasonable to claim that China 
was ‘at liberty to disregard the law of nations, on the ground of her having never deigned to 
recognize it’.
82
 Since the law of nations is but ‘the just and rational application of the law of 
nature to the affairs and conduct of nations’, China, as a large branch of the great family of 
mankind, could not be ‘exempt from the obligations of that law which God himself has 
prescribed for the conduct of his creatures’.
83
 Moreover, since ‘nations are under obligations 
to each other’, China, whose laws ‘are all more or less hostile to a free and amicable 
intercourse with foreigners’,
84
 was certainly ‘in a position of open violation of the law’.
85
 As 
a consequence of such reasoning, taking a strong line towards China was seen as legitimate, 
no matter from which perspective it was viewed. From the standpoint of the British, in 
particular, ‘it is the sacred duty of every government on earth to protect its subjects and 
maintain its own honor in foreign countries’.
86
 From a wider point of view, it was in ‘the 
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interest of all civilized nations’
87
 that China should be ‘compelled to abandon a position so 
hostile to the general interests of the human race’.
88
 In other words, with respect to a ‘show of 
force’ policy, its supporters avowed solemnly that ‘Recent injuries demand this. Humanity 
demands it. And justice will approve of it’.
89
 
        Along with the claim that it was legitimate to interfere in the internal affairs of China, 
advocates of the ‘show of force’ policy also attempted to demonstrate that such a coercive 
policy, supported by a British naval force, was the best course of action to take. This point of 
view was supported from several perspectives. In the first place, experience had shown that 
‘the more forbearance and indulgence are shown to them [the Chinese government], the more 
proud and overbearing they become’,
90
 and therefore the previous conciliatory policy had to 
be abandoned. As James Matheson
91
 maintained, ‘Experience ought by this time to have 
shewn us that it is a foolish and useless policy to attempt to gain the confidence of the 
Chinese by exhibiting, as was constantly enjoined by the East India Company, a servile 
deference to their innumerable and absurd peculiarities and customs’.
92
 Similarly, it was 
asserted in the Canton Petition (1834), a memorial signed by a number of British merchants 
to King William IV in order to call for the adoption of a more forceful policy,  that:   
 
we cannot but trace the disabilities and restrictions under which our commerce 
now labours, to a long acquiescence in the assumption of supremacy over the 
monarchs and people of other countries, claimed by the Emperor of China … we 
are forced to conclude that no essentially beneficial result can be expected to arise 
out of negotiations, in which such pretensions are not decidedly repelled.
93
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According to this viewpoint, if Britain was truly determined to realise its desired commercial 
goals, it was essential to abandon the submissive policy which had previously been adopted 
and to employ entirely different measures.  
        In the second place, advocates of this theory continued to strengthen the notion that in 
dealing with the ‘haughty, semi-civilized, despotic’ government of China, ‘nothing will bring 
them to submission, until they have had demonstrative proofs of the force of British argument 
and reasoning, at the foot of the Imperial throne at Peking’.
94
 This meant that, a show of 
Britain’s strength was crucial to this new policy because only ‘when force is opposed to 
force, their courage fails, and they prefer concession to a doubtful struggle, in which … they 
can never be victorious’.
95
 To support such a view, the Chinese government was compared to 
a village cur, which reduced the image of China to a new low level. It was maintained that:  
 
Timidity and insolence are two prominent characteristics of the Chinese 
government, whose conduct (to compare great things with small) is like that of a 
village cur. The little animal barks furiously, pursues and tries to bite the stranger 
who is unprovided with a stick, particularly if he runs; but when he turns round, 
the cur draws back; if he lifts his stick, the cur flies; if he actually strikes, the cur 
becomes more cautious in future not to be the aggressor, and even endeavors to 
conciliate the offended party by fawning and wagging his tail and licking the hand 
that gave the blow. This is a true picture of the conduct of the Chinese 
government, as every one knows who is familiar with its history.
96
 
 
With the introduction of this particular image, an increasing number of British subjects, as 
well as other foreign residents in Canton, were led to believe that nothing indeed could be 
expected from sending humble petitions to such a government. On the contrary, ‘if we wish 
to have a treaty with China, it must be dictated at the point of the bayonet, and enforced by 
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arguments from the cannon’s mouth’.
97
 
        Last, but not least, the ‘show of force’ advocates were confident that such new strong 
measures could be safely adopted. Because of the timidity of the Chinese, they believed that 
the imperial court would make every sacrifice in order to avoid any dangerous confrontation. 
To reinforce this viewpoint, it was maintained that the Chinese had an innate characteristic, 
which was ‘more apt to waste the idle artillery of words in official interdiction, than to resort 
to serious and really threatening measures’.
98
 In consequence, history had shown that ‘There 
is not … a single instance in which European troops have been attacked by Chinese’ in the 
past two centuries.
99
 Moreover, since the emperor was fully aware of the weakness of his 
empire, as well as ‘the want of loyalty in the people’,
100
 he would certainly not venture to 
resort to any hostile measures, but would seek peace at almost any cost. As one of the articles 
in The Chinese Repository elaborated on this topic:  
 
Taoukwang [Daoguang], the present emperor of China, is a man of the most 
pacific disposition, who instead of annihilating daring rebels, begs their leaders to 
submit, and wages bloodless war against them by means of gold and silver 
bullets. … if the matter was once brought home to his own bosom, which has 
never yet been done, and if he began to see the affair in a serious light and has no 
alternative but acquiescence in our proposals, we are persuaded that he would 
quietly yield to seeming necessity.
101
 
 
As a result of holding such a view, concerns that a serious clash would immediately ensue, if 
the British government adopted a forceful policy towards China, were largely discounted. 
        It can be observed from this kind of evidence that the advocates of the ‘show of force’ 
policy strongly justified the belief that a firm line of action, supported by British maritime 
forces, was certainly the most effective way to deal with the Chinese government. This was 
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because it was founded not only on legitimate and rational grounds, but was also the most 
effective and safest course of actions to be taken in order to force the Chinese government to 
comply with Britain’s just demands. Nevertheless, while agreeing on a general ‘show of 
force’ strategy, these writers did not agree with each other in all respects. In particular, 
although they shared a common view of the advantages of a more aggressive stance, they 
were divided in their attitudes to the actual use of arms and on whether to advocate open war. 
        Notwithstanding the strength of the ‘show of force’ policy, we find that, in the mid-
1830s, there were very few commentators, who ventured to embrace openly the idea of a war 
with China. At least on paper, even The Canton Register and Matheson, who were usually 
considered as major advocates of adopting a forceful policy, were anxious to deny that they 
had ‘any wish or suggestion which was likely to involve the two countries in a war’.
102
 Some 
modern historians, such as Wu Yixiong, have tended to stereotype The Canton Register as an 
organ for the most hardline policy.
103
 Yet, as one of the most influential English-language 
newspapers at Canton, The Canton Register actually published numerous articles which 
contained a wide variety of opinions. It is not appropriate, therefore, to ignore the diversity of 
views expressed in the essays it published. In different issues, its editor explicitly disclaimed 
that the newspaper had ever had any editorial policy of advocating a war against China.
104
 
This fact indicates that, in the mid-1830s, the use of arms was still not a strategy supported by 
a majority of British residents in Canton. 
        Although straightforward appeals for open hostilities were only rarely expressed in 
publications, it should be noted that there was widespread criticism at this time against the 
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idea of war with China.
105
 This suggests that calls for open violence may have been 
informally communicated on a greater scale than they appear in the published sources. The 
fact that there were many more public appeals against a war, however, indicates that no 
matter to what extent open hostilities against China were really wanted, the political climate 
at the time had somehow prevented them from being openly stated through the press. Again, 
it proves that, in the mid-1830s, there was a certain consensus among the British communities 
in Canton that it was not wise to raise this issue at this time.  
        Even though the extent of most radical calls for war was rather limited, it can be shown 
that, after all, there were some articles, in which a clear desire to resort to force was 
expressed. For instance, in September 1835, one commentator wrote, ‘no delicacy should be 
used towards the celestials; and if it be expedient to use power to compel them to our and 
their own goods, we ought not for a moment to hesitate to use it. … But the Chinese are too 
wise ever to give us the pretense’.
106
 Among the available sources, this passage is probably 
the best evidence that indicates at this time that there were indeed some militant British 
commentators who were seeking an excuse to use force against China and who wished to 
push this hardline policy to extremes. As for such a ‘pretense’, some other commentators 
suggested that a stoppage of trade – the usual check applied by the Chinese government on 
foreign merchants – could be regarded as a virtual declaration of war by the Chinese. 
According to this view, if the Chinese ever ventured to repeat that policy, it could provide a 
great opportunity for Britain to avoid the moral responsibility of declaring a war on an 
innocent country. It was claimed that ‘any threat on the part of the Chinese officers to resort 
to their favourite and hitherto too successful policy – a stoppage of trade … should be 
instantly retaliated: for it is a declaration of war, a cartel of defiance, a manifestation of 
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passive hostility’.
107
 In such an eventuality, instead of Britain, it would look as if it was China 
who ‘is determined to precipitate an open rupture’, insomuch that it would ‘surely deserve 
little sympathy’.
108
 For this reason, one commentator was confident enough to write that 
 
If her forts have been dismantled, her troops killed and, her laws and territory 
violated, what induced these acts? her own ignorance, falsehood, treachery and 
cowardice. Let China avenge her own wrongs; let her redress the grievances of 
foreigners and she will remove the cause of too probable future wrongs.
109
 
 
        In contrast to such militant views, the vast majority of the ‘show of force’ advocates, 
although in support of a more determined stance by the British government, were clearly not 
in favour of open hostilities against China. According to the most common viewpoint, any 
step which might lead to bloodshed in China was to be avoided on the grounds of justice and 
expediency. For one thing, some authors maintained, to wage a war for the sake of 
commercial advantage was not only repugnant to people’s feelings, but inconsistent with the 
maxims of international law. In this respect, an article in The Canton Register claimed that 
‘the act of pillaging and destroying the towns and villages of the Chinese people, merely 
because they refuse to enter into any treaty of commerce, alliance, or friendship with us’ 
would be extremely ‘atrocious’ conduct.
110
 In The Chinese Repository, another author who 
agreed with this opinion went on to state that, ‘We abhor bloodshed and that policy which 
would build up its own prosperity on the ruins of others. We advocate no course which is 
repugnant to justice or the laws of nations’.
111
 Moreover, the resort to force was also rejected 
for practical reasons. Some observers were worried that if military action was really taken, 
unexpected consequences might arise and turn out to be ruinous to Britain’s commercial 
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activities. For instance, one commentator pointed out that ‘the Chinese may imitate the 
example of the Japanese, and exclude all foreigners forever, or cut down the tea shrub and put 
an effectual stop to foreign commerce’.
112
 In that case, all British-Chinese trade would be 
endangered. Others, such as the following commentator in The Canton Press, reminded the 
public of the fact that:  
 
this Government … had, still the extraordinary power and influence to order its 
subject to retire … from the coast into the interior of the country to avoid 
intercourse … and to enforce obedience to that order. Suppose that a British force 
were to land at Tiensing and similar orders were given and obeyed, might not the 
Expedition be thereby considerably embarrassed? Or if this is not the case, 
supposing the Emperor sufficiently uncompromising, to render hostilities 
indispensable, is a force of 600 soldiers sufficient to march up to Peking … can it 
for one moment be reasonably supposed that if the Emperor be really willing … to 
oppose his forces to this aggression, that he would not succeed in overcoming so 
very trifling an armament? …The mildest treatment of the Chinese would be to 
confiscate our property as a setoff for damage sustained in the north, and expel us 
for ever from the country. We could in justice not find fault with this.
113
 
 
These considerations in the mid-1830s, by and large, maintained that it would be improper to 
wage war against China. As a result, the vast majority of the ‘show of force’ advocates, as 
well as other British subjects at Canton, were further persuaded that open hostilities against 
China were certainly inappropriate under the present circumstances. 
        For most of the ‘show of force’ supporters, their concerns over the danger of resorting to 
military action did not prevent them from insisting on the necessity of impressing the Chinese 
government with a due sense of the power of Great Britain. Although they tended to identify 
their views as a ‘middle course’ or a ‘half-way measure’,
114
 a fact which has confused some 
modern readers, these observers agreed that neither open violence nor unconditional 
submission should be adopted in Britain’s relations with China. Instead, they were convinced 
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that a firm resolve, attended by a clear demonstration of Britain’s ability to resort to extreme 
measures, was the most effective strategy to adopt. It was widely believed at Canton that, ‘we 
can demand everything from the fears of the Chinese Government, but nothing from their 
good will’.
115
 For this reason, it was vital to dispatch a plenipotentiary, who was ‘firm of 
purpose and strong of nerve, armed with discretionary powers’
116
 to remonstrate with the 
emperor, in order to command respect from the Chinese as well as to ensure that ‘no 
encroachment on our rights or insult to our national honor to pass with impunity’.
117
 This 
course of action was considered by most of these commentators as the surest way to achieve 
success. For one thing, ‘Such firmness carries greater force of conviction to the Chinese than 
the best diplomatic arguments; … the less that proof by words is resorted to, and the more it 
is shown by incontestable facts, that the plenipotentiary is an immovable man, the greater will 
be his success’.
118
 For another, given the present state of China and the character of that 
nation, a ‘show’ of Britain’s naval power would not only require no open violence, but would 
render much assistance to hasten the conclusion of an amicable arrangement with China: 
 
A glimpse of one or two of our men-of-war stationed off the north-eastern coast of 
China, would send a thrill of consternation through the whole empire, and do 
more to incline the Chinese to listen to the dictates of reason and justice than 
centuries of “temporizing” and submission to insult and oppression.
119
 
 
It was concluded by Matheson that ‘the surest preventive of war is an unequivocal 
manifestation of our being neither unable nor unprepared, on its becoming necessary, to resort 
to it’.
120
 
        In sum, although a ‘show of force’ strategy was generally the most prominent policy 
                                                          
115 TNA, F.O., 17/9/148. Gützlaff, ‘Present state of our relations with China’, separate inclosure, Robinson 
to Palmerston, 26 Mar. 1835.  
116 A Wellwisher, ‘Intercourse with China’, The Chinese Repository, 3:9 (Jan. 1835), 403. 
117 Anon., ‘Treaty with the Chinese, a great desideratum’, The Chinese Repository, 4:10 (Feb. 1836), 447. 
118 A Wellwisher, ‘Intercourse with China’, The Chinese Repository, 3:9 (Jan. 1835), 404. 
119 Matheson, The Present Position, pp. 62-3. 
120 Ibid., p. 78.  
195 
 
advocated in Canton in the mid-1830s, there was no agreement on how this strategy should 
be implemented. Among the advocates of this course of action, were those who simply 
wanted the Chinese to recognise the strength of those forces at Britain’s disposal, whereas 
others were much more willing to support the actual use of force. After a detailed 
examination of the sources available, it can be shown that the vast majority of observers in 
Canton were in favour of the former point of view. These commentators, on the one hand, 
insisted that it was absolutely crucial to adopt a resolute and forceful line of action, supported 
by a display of Britain’s maritime power, but, on the other hand, it was unjust and impractical 
to try to resort to a significant use of force or to wage an open war. It can be inferred, 
therefore, that to most of the ‘show of force’ advocates, the significance of this new strategy 
did not rest on any physical harm being inflicted on the Chinese people, but on the 
psychological impact it would produce on the Chinese authorities. What these commentators 
were most concerned about was that, by advocating this new course of action, it would signal 
a change in Britain’s official attitude towards China, indicating a change from unresisting 
submission to firm determination to stand up to the Chinese authorities. It was for this change, 
rather than for direct armed intervention, that the majority of British residents in Canton had 
been waiting and lobbying. 
 
IV 
Alternatives to a ‘show of force’ 
In addition to the widespread discussion of a ‘show of force’ strategy, there also existed in the 
mid-1830s some other views on Britain’s future relations with China. As with the ‘show of 
force’ advocates, those who held these views can be found across different social groups, 
such as the British merchants and missionaries in Canton, as well as some old China experts. 
These observers, on the one hand, concurred with the majority of the ‘show of force’ 
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supporters in opposing open hostilities, while, on the other hand, they also attempted to find 
better approaches than a directly aggressive military response. Amongst these ‘minor’ voices, 
the following are worthy of particular notice. 
        First, instead of advocating a show of strength in the vicinity of Peking, an economic 
blockade was proposed as the most effective way to combat the oppression of British 
merchants by the Chinese government. Some commentators suggested that, if the Chinese 
authorities in Canton ventured to stop the trade again, the British government should respond 
strongly in order to ensure ‘their [the Chinese] own trade will be stopped as long as ours 
continued to be so’.
121
 Gützlaff, the Protestant missionary and foremost China expert in 
Canton, agreed that this was ‘the least bloody and the most efficacious’
122
 way to exert 
pressure on the Chinese government. Because ‘The trade along the coast is enormous and 
feeds myriads; as soon as it ceases … the effects would be dreadful, so much so, that the local 
government, as well as the Court, would pray for the resuming of the trade, with more 
humanity than we ever intend to do’.
123
 In an article in The Canton Register, it was also 
argued that this line of action was indeed a feasible policy to adopt. Because there were 
numerous navigable rivers which led to the most prosperous cities, and the forts along 
China’s coast were ‘in the most defenceless state’, ‘the most important parts of the empire’ 
were actually ‘open to the grasp of a superior maritime power’.
124
 Along with these words, a 
detailed plan was devised by the author to cut off communications between important ports 
along the coast and the rest of China by using only thirteen warships.
125
  All in all, according 
to the supporters of this policy, it was hoped and believed that, through a non-violent but 
resolute economic blockade, the imperial court could be made to realise that the economic 
                                                          
121 A correspondent, ‘Character of the Chinese’, The Canton Register, 7:50 (16 Dec. 1834), 200. 
122 TNA: F.O., 17/9/152. Charles Gützlaff, ‘Present state of our relations with China’. 
123 TNA: F.O., 17/9/150. Gützlaff, ‘Present state of our relations with China’. 
124 A correspondent, ‘Character of the Chinese’, The Canton Register, 7:50 (16 Dec. 1834), 200. 
125 For the details, see A correspondent, ‘Character of the Chinese’, The Canton Register, 7:50 (16 Dec. 
1834), 201. 
197 
 
vitality of its maritime provinces could easily be threatened by British naval power, indeed, to 
such an extent, that its control and influence over the whole country might be endangered. As 
a consequence, it was believed that China’s general attitude as well as its particular policies 
towards Britain would soon be profoundly changed.  
        Second, in Lindsay’s public letter to Palmerston, alongside his references to a coercive 
line of action, he also advanced another proposal. It was to withdraw all political 
establishments from China, only appointing ‘a person of no pretensions’ as agent for the 
customs, whose duty was simply that of ‘registering ships’ papers, and countersigning 
manifests’.
126
 Lindsay maintained: 
 
This mode of procedure will be highly embarrassing to the Chinese authorities, 
who are most anxious to see some recognised chief at Canton for the purpose, as 
they term it, of “managing and controlling all affairs of the English nation;” and 
on the very first difficulty or dispute which occurs, they will most anxiously 
inquire, why no such authority exists. Our reply then is obvious: “It is your own 
fault; for, when we sent one to you, you treated him with insult; and it is 
incompatible with the dignity of England that a representative of her sovereign 
should be subject to such indignity; no chief will, therefore, be sent until you 
promise him ‘proper reception and treatment.’”
127
 
 
        This alternative course of action was applauded by quite a few notable observers. 
Goddard, from an economic perspective, agreed that it was more reasonable to develop a 
purely commercial intercourse than to preserve the expensive, but unproductive, political 
establishments. In his opinion, to leave the trade to the ‘patient, thrifty, dexterous assiduity of 
private and untrammelled enterprise’ would be really helpful to British merchants in Canton. 
As ‘guardians of their own anomalous privileges’, they should be allowed to ‘protect 
themselves in the best way they could against the encroachments of the Chinese’.
128
 Staunton, 
in his Remarks on the British Relations with China, also expressed his support for Lindsay’s 
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second proposal. He acclaimed it was ‘a plan, easy and simple, perfectly peaceable as well as 
legitimate’.
129
 Instead of seeking to put fear into the Chinese, this plan, ‘by a merely negative 
course of proceeding’, placed them ‘in such a highly embarrassing predicament … that they 
must very shortly become most anxious to do that of their own accord, which it is not quite 
certain that all our embargoes and blockades would extort from them’.
130
 In addition, 
Staunton also suggested that, in concert with the policy of political withdrawal, Britain 
should try to set up a trading post beyond the limits of Chinese jurisdiction: ‘there is an 
infinite number of intermediate islands … which might be taken possession of, not only 
without a contest, but without the violation of any right in practical exercise’.
131
 Given the 
commercial-oriented character of the Chinese, ‘the Chinese would not hesitate to trade with 
foreigners there, if they could be assured of receiving protection’.
132
 By establishing such an 
intermediate trading station, Staunton was convinced that British-Chinese relations would be 
put onto a thoroughly satisfactory commercial basis. As a result, the molestation and 
oppression of British merchants by the Chinese government would be prevented, while the 
profitable trade with China would be maintained in the most pacific and lawful manner. 
        Third, a number of observers, who believed in the peaceful benefits of commerce, 
contended that nothing was more trustworthy than the ‘irresistible and expansive energy of 
the free trade’.
133
 They maintained that, since China had ‘sufficient resources’ to ‘isolate 
itself from the rest of the inhabitants of this globe’,
134
 a too precipitate attempt to coerce its 
government would serve only to retard the progress of this mutually beneficial trade.
135
 Since 
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‘the Chinese government and people are not yet sufficiently advanced in civilisation to be 
capable of forming a reasonable commercial treaty’,
136
 an immediate demand for a treaty 
might place unnecessary burdens on the British government, while not producing any 
positive results. The best course of action at this stage, therefore, was simply to trust ‘the 
gradual operation of time’,
137
 so that, with the progress of the trade, the obstacles and 
prejudices in China would ultimately be overcome. To this end, an article in The Canton 
Press elaborated on what would transpire as a result of such a policy. Its author predicted that:  
 
whilst on continuing a course of quiet and unassuming trade, which brings us in 
continual and … extensive intercourse with the mass of the people, these will 
soon become aware of many of the disabilities under which we labour, and from 
which they equally suffer. Such a state of things must lead to evasion of the 
imposed regulations. The people find it their interest to treat us well to secure 
their own welfare, and public opinion among Chinese even is strong enough to 
make itself heard by its rulers. … The rapacity of the Local Government is too 
great to allow so rich a prize to escape without attempting to draw large profits 
from it individually. The consequence will be, that the too heavily taxed 
commodity will not only continue to be smuggled into the ports of the eastern 
coast, but will be sent there in greater quantities than ever … and the Government 
at Peking failed in obtaining the object it had in view, viz, that of preventing 
foreign ships from visiting other ports than Canton will have at no very remote 
date to concede to us the freedom of these ports, in order to enjoy the revenue of 
which under the present system it is deprived.
138
 
 
According to this view, although ‘The process will be slow, the result doubtful’,
139
 the 
advantages that might arise from it would be enormous once the Chinese authorities realised 
the reciprocal benefits of international commerce. It was for this reason, as well as for its 
perfectly peaceful nature, that this course of action was considered by some as ‘the true 
policy of foreign states in their communications with China, and the only policy which the 
Chinese government in its present state of knowledge is likely, or possibly, able to pursue 
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towards foreigners’.
140
 
        Last but not least, some commentators, mostly Protestant missionaries, did not wholly 
agree with those who believed in the progressive influence of commerce. Instead, they 
believed that the spread of Christianity and of useful knowledge were the most just and 
powerful means to adopt in Britain’s future relations with China. These observers contended 
that a purely commercial course of action was more applicable to the uncivilised races of the 
islands than to the comparatively refined continental nations.
141
 In the case of China, 
therefore, the most just and effective line of action should not be to wait passively for the 
long-term results of economic improvement. On the contrary, it might be a much better idea 
actively to ‘attempt the amelioration of the condition of China’,
142
 through ‘the diffusion of 
knowledge and the dissemination of religious truth’.
143
 In their opinion, an intellectual and 
moral darkness was hanging over the empire of China, and all its inhabitants, irrespective of 
their nationality, were the sufferers. For quite a long time, these existing evils, mainly 
occasioned by the Chinese government, not only suppressed or misdirected the genius of the 
Chinese people, but prevented ‘almost entirely that interchange of thought and those kind of-
fices of humanity, which the Almighty has vouchsafed to his creatures as their birth right’.
144
 
For this reason, the Chinese ‘cannot make known their wishes or sufferings to each other, or 
join in any determination to acquire new privileges or redress old wrongs’.
145
 Furthermore, 
the previously advanced Chinese civilisation had more recently fallen far behind the free and 
cultivated nations of the West. In spite of these unfavourable circumstances, these 
commentators continued to maintain that: ‘The Chinese are by no means such a forlorn race, 
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so incapable of improvement’.
146
 What was needed in China was nothing but the moral power 
of Christianity, as well as the knowledge of western sciences and arts. They maintained that it 
was the divine duty of the spiritually advanced nations, particularly powerful Britain, to 
enlighten the minds and secure the salvation of the Chinese nation. Once darkness was 
dispelled and prejudices overcome, the foundations of friendly relations between China and 
western countries would be laid and, as a result, the evils which restricted foreign trade would 
be permanently removed. As one such commentator stated: ‘Truth is our object … we do 
wish and hope and desire to bear a humble part in labours to concentrate the energies of all in 
just and generous efforts to improve the condition of China. This is DUTY’.
147
 In addition, 
‘Knowledge is strength: if we can show our mental superiority, and excite congenial feelings 
in the breast of those to whom we communicate our sciences, we shall marshal the minds of 
the people, and have public opinion in our favour’.
148
 
        In conclusion, apart from support for a ‘show of force’ strategy, a variety of viewpoints 
were raised in the press at Canton regarding the best line of conduct to be employed with 
regard to China. Although individually, none of these ‘minor’ voices was able to contend 
against the former in terms of scale and influence, their impact seems much more significant 
when they are viewed as a whole. Furthermore, as they concurred with the majority of the 
‘show of force’ advocates in opposing open hostilities, it can be inferred that the voices 
against violence were, in fact, in a clear majority, even though a war with China did become 
more imaginable after the ‘Napier Fizzle’. For this reason, the prevailing historical 
interpretation that 1834 marked the beginning of Britain’s pro-war attitude towards China 
deserves serious reconsideration. Since no one at the time could have known that a war would 
break out in just a few years time, we cannot view it retrospectively and maintain that the 
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Opium War had become inevitable from this year onwards. The mid-1830s, therefore, should 
be considered more as a period of confused thinking with regard to Britain’s China policy, 
rather than a clear stage in the preparation for a military conflict.  
203 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
An ‘Opium’ war? British perceptions of China in the late-1830s 
 
Compared with the previous Sino-British encounters, the First Anglo-Chinese War, the so-
called ‘Opium War’, has attracted much more attention from modern historians. Various 
reasons have been advanced to explain its origins, but little has been done from the 
perspective of perceptions and images obtained and established in the immediate run-up to 
this fateful conflict. In particular, there is a commonly held perception that concerns over the 
immorality of the opium trade were the main reason why so many Members of Parliament 
voted against the idea of war. Because the Whig government won the motion for war by only 
a narrow majority (271 votes to 262), Britain’s vigorous invention in Chinese affairs has been 
assumed to have been a highly contentious policy at the time. In opposition to this view, 
however, we can find in the record of this parliamentary debate that one commentator clearly 
stated in the House of Commons that ‘no member was willing to declare himself directly 
opposed to a war with China’.
1
 This evidence suggests that there is certainly something 
missing in our previous understanding of the pre-Opium War period. In order to obtain a 
clearer view of the history of British justification for the First Anglo-Chinese War, it is 
essential to conduct a wide-ranging survey of British perceptions of China in the late 1830s.  
        Unlike previous studies on the origins of the Opium War, this chapter focuses on how 
the images of the opium trade and related Chinese affairs were presented and disputed prior 
to the outbreak of the war, particularly in 1839 and 1840. During this period, the illicit opium 
traffic sparked extensive discussion among not only the British community in China, but also 
among other interested parties and the wider public at home, as well as in the British 
parliament. Notwithstanding the enormous distance that separated the two countries, a 
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number of significant publications, such as translations of Chinese official documents and 
influential pamphlets on this topic, found their way to readers on the other side of the globe. 
This remarkable change, to some extent, resulted in the expansion of the number of those 
who participated in the ideological encounter with the Chinese and, as a result, British 
opinion formers in Canton and at home were able to cooperate with or debate against each 
other about the same questions. In the crisis that led up to the Opium War, they not only 
jointly produced broadly defined ‘first-hand’ knowledge about China, but also served as the 
driving force which persuaded Britain to levy war upon the Chinese empire. Nevertheless, 
these pre-war perceptions and justifications, especially the consolidation of unfavourable 
impressions of China, have not been deeply studied by previous researchers as an important 
cause of the conflict. Based on a variety of pamphlets, local English-language newspapers in 
Canton, official correspondence, as well as the parliamentary debates that eventually 
approved the motion for war, this chapter reveals that, although this conflict was generally 
known as the ‘Opium War’, the controversy over the opium issue was not in essence the 
immediate trigger for hostilities. Moreover, despite the fact that the opium question was 
closely interwoven with the ensuing disputes and confrontations, the debates on the opium 
trade, the proceedings of the opium crisis and the means of the British government’s 
intervention can each be examined in its own right. In this manner, it can be seen more 
clearly that this war was not caused by Britain’s willingness to protect the opium traffic, a 
trade of doubtful morality, but by its determination to defend the safety and property of 
British subjects against the arbitrary government of China, and because of various concerns 
over Britain’s honour and its long-term interests in the Far East. 
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I 
The opium controversy 
Prior to 1796, opium, recognised as a form of medicine, was admitted into China on the 
payment of an import duty. The practice of opium smoking and its injurious consequences, 
however, attracted the attention of the Chinese government.
2
 As a result, shortly after the 
Jiaqing emperor ascended the throne in 1796, he issued a decree which totally banned the 
importation of this drug. This prohibition turned out to be utterly ineffectual however. 
Because of the perseverance of the opium traders, most of whom were British, as well as the 
corruption of the provincial officers at Canton, the supply of opium constantly increased at a 
dramatic rate. By the late 1830s, the quantity imported annually reached 40,200 chests,
3
 
approximately forty times more than the figure when it was declared contraband. The mania 
of opium-smoking that spread rapidly throughout China caused a series of problems for the 
Qing government. Not only were the moral and physical welfares of the people seriously 
threatened by this harmful habit, but the currency of the country was also affected by the 
exportation of a vast amount of native or sycee silver. This increasingly alarming situation at 
length aroused anxiety in the imperial court. After a discussion on whether or not such 
imports should be legalised in order to remedy the financial difficulties, the Daoguang 
emperor opted for adopting stringent measures to eliminate the opium trade entirely. To 
achieve this, extraordinary powers were granted to the Imperial Commissioner, Lin Zexu, an 
energetic and determined man who came to Canton with the sole objective of eliminating the 
evils caused by the importation of this dangerous drug.   
        Quite independent of the drama occasioned by Lin's hardline approach to stamping out 
                                                          
2 Details about the opium culture in Qing China can be found in Zheng Yangwen, The Social Life of Opium 
in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For the suppression of opium, see David 
Anthony Bello, Opium and the limits of empire: drug prohibition in the Chinese interior, 1729-1850 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005). 
3 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-42 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1951), appendix I, ‘opium shipments to China 1800-1839’, p. 221. 
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this unlawful traffic, a controversy over the nature of opium and its trade, as well as the 
character of British opium dealers, occurred among the concerned parties both in Canton and 
in Britain. As early as 1835, the first anti-opium pamphlet, No Opium! Or, Commerce and 
Christianity, Working Together for Good in China,
4
 was published anonymously for Robert 
Philip in London. About a year later, The Chinese Repository in Canton began to present 
diverse views on the opium question, together with translations of some Chinese sources on 
this issue. It was not until 1839, however, that this drug was brought to the forefront of public 
consciousness by A. S. Thelwall’s The Iniquities of the Opium Trade, which drew the nation’s 
attention to the deplorable effects of opium-smoking and the problem this trade posed to the 
extension of Christianity in China. As a consequence of this publication, an Anti-Opium 
Society was formed. A number of pamphlets and articles poured forth
5
 and a debate on opium 
started almost concurrently in both Canton and Britain. 
        The nature of opium was the first subject of dispute. The prominent impression 
introduced by the anti-opium campaigners was that opium was ‘a certain poison’,
6
 whose 
injurious effects threatened the health, morals and lives of millions of people in China. 
Thelwall noted that the immediate consequence of its use was a highly excited imagination, 
which was soon followed by ‘a correspondent lassitude and intolerable depression, which 
scarcely anything but a repetition of the dose can relieve. Thus the habit grows upon the 
wretched victim, till he becomes entirely enslaved to it’.
7
 The more this drug was consumed, 
the greater became the need for it, with the result that opium-smoking diminished the 
                                                          
4 [Robert Philip], No Opium! Or, Commerce and Christianity, Working Together for Good in China: A 
Letter to James Cropper, Esq., of Liverpool (London: Thomas Ward, 1835). 
5
 A comprehensive list of the pamphlets produced by the Anti-Opium Society, as well as those who 
participated in the debate but held opposing views, is included in Ting Man Tsao, ‘Representing China to 
the British Public In the Age of Free Trade, c. 1833-1844’, unpublished PhD dissertation (State University 
of New York at Stony Brook, 2000), pp. 188-90. All these works have been consulted. 
6 Horatio Montagu, A Voice for China: which must be heard (London: Nisbet, 1840), p. 9. 
7 A.S. Thelwall, The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China; Being a Development of the Main Causes 
Which Exclude the Merchants of Great Britain from the Advantages of an Unrestricted Commercial 
Intercourse with that Vast Empire (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1839), p. 5. 
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consumer’s savings and reduced his energy very quickly. Consequently, not only were 
various crimes committed to meet the growing cost of consuming opium, but the lives of 
millions of individuals were destroyed by either the need for or the further use of this drug. 
Although with regard to the nature of opium, there was a claim that it was ‘a medicine of 
incalculable value when properly used’,
8
 anti-opium activists pointed out that the drug sold 
by the British traders was actually ‘deficient in the sedative principle for which opium is 
chiefly valued’.
9
 Compared with Turkish opium, the produce of British India was simply 
‘unfit for medicine, applicable only to purposes of vicious indulgence’.
10
 Moreover, as Sir 
Stephen Lushington stated in the House of Commons, in fact, ‘not a thousandth part of the 
quantity of opium exported from India, and introduced into China, was used for medical 
purposes’.
11
 Hence, in the view of the anti-opium campaigners, the destructive effects of this 
pernicious drug were beyond all doubt. In addition to this, they also asserted, quite unlike the 
use of alcohol, moderation in opium-smoking was almost impossible, because once a person 
was induced to smoke it, ‘the habit fasten[s] itself on him so rapidly, and so forcibly, that 
he … becomes in a short time inveterately addicted to it’.
12
 According to an article from The 
Chinese Repository cited by Thelwall, ‘There is no slavery on earth to name with the bondage 
into which opium casts its victim. There is scarcely one known instance of escape from its 
toils’.
13
 Similarly, in order to stress that opium was highly unwelcome to the Chinese, local 
knowledge was referred to by those who resided in China and made regular contact with the 
natives. For instance, an author in The Canton Press maintained that, ‘I have conversed with 
some thousands of the people on this subject, and I never met with one who would advance 
                                                          
8 Compendium of Facts Relating to the Opium Trade [London, 1840?], in The Dublin Literary Journal, 
(Dublin: Joshua Abell, 1843), I, 221. 
9 Anon., British Opium Trade with China ([Birmingham?]: B Hudson [1840?]), p. 14. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 Apr. 1840, Third series, vol. 53, 855-6.  
12 Anon., ‘Abuse of opium: opinions on the subject given by one long resident in China’, The Chinese 
Repository, 8:10 (Feb. 1840), 517.   
13 Anon., ‘Remarks on the Opium Trade with China’, The Chinese Repository, 5:7 (Nov. 1836), 300. See 
also Thelwall, The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China, p. 22.   
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one plea for the drug. … not a syllable do I even hear in favour of the pipe.’
14
 Another 
concurred with this opinion in The Chinese Repository, where he wrote, ‘So far as we know – 
and we have read and heard the sentiments of thousands of the Chinese – no one ever regards 
the use of the drug in any other light than as a physical and moral evil. … “It is a noxious 
thing,” they say, …This is truth’.
15
 By such means, the image of opium was quite 
successfully constructed as ‘a deleterious drug which ruins those who indulge in it, in mind, 
body, and estate – which depraves and enervates them, physically, intellectually, and morally, 
and finally brings them to an untimely grave’.
16
 
        Based on such assertions of opium’s harmful nature, the illicit trade conducted by British 
merchants in China was condemned from different perspectives. First of all, it was contended 
that, since the introduction of opium was contrary to the laws of China and in open defiance 
of the Chinese authorities, it was ‘highly injurious to the legitimate commerce’ and 
endangered ‘a most important branch of our revenue’.
17
  According to some of the anti-opium 
campaigners, the contraband character of the opium trade justified the Chinese government in 
its policy of exclusion, as well as in treating the British merchants with constant suspicion. As 
a result, not only had Britain’s export of woollens and cottons declined, while that of opium 
had increased,
18
 but the extension of Britain’s legal trade to other ports of China was justly 
prohibited. In the second place, the opium traffic was accused of being ‘dishonourable to the 
British name’
19
 in the highest degree, because so long as a trade with such a notorious 
reputation was carried out in contravention of China’s law, ‘it renders us [the British] 
contemptible in the eyes of the Chinese, or rather it seals and confirms them in that disdain 
                                                          
14 S.S.S., ‘To the Editor of the Canton Press’, The Canton Press, 3:51 (25 Aug. 1838), no pagination.  
15 Anon., ‘Remarks on the present crisis in the opium traffic, with inquiries respecting its causes, and the 
best course to be pursued by those now connected with it’, The Chinese Repository, 8:1 (May 1839), 4. 
16 Thelwall, The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China, pp. 129-30. 
17 William Storrs Fry, Facts and Evidence Relating to the Opium Trade with China (London: Pelham 
Richardson, 1840), p. 6. 
18 Compendium of Facts Relating to the Opium Trade, p. 221. 
19 William Groser, What Can Be Done to Suppress the Opium Trade (London: J. Haddon, 1840), p. 4. 
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with which their pride has always prompted them to regard us’.
20
 Since the British flag had 
been constantly implicated in this export trade which killed tens of thousands of individuals 
every year, the reputation of Great Britain was seriously damaged, and further commercial 
communications between the two nations became even more unattainable. Last, but not least, 
it was widely held that the opium trade was a major obstacle to the introduction of 
Christianity into China. Philip, the author who first raised the opium issue in Britain, 
attributed the failure of the Chinese mission to the fact that ‘our Chinese missionaries have all 
along been counteracted by the influence of the Opium Trade’.
21 To account for this, other 
anti-opium advocates alleged that, for one thing, ‘every individual who is once enslaved by 
the use of Opium, is morally and physically incapacitated from giving any attention to the 
voice of Christian instruction’;
22
 while, for another, ‘the most lamentable part of the present 
state of things’
23
 was that the Chinese at large were not be able to distinguish the hands which 
were stretched out to rescue, or to give them the Bible, from those who offered the opium 
pipe. Instead, the Chinese had to form their own judgment of Christians from the conduct of 
opium merchants. As Thelwall lamented, as a result of this nefarious traffic, ‘how should they 
be able to imagine that any real good or true kindness can come from a nation and people 
whom they look upon as smugglers and dealers in poison, for their ruin and destruction?’
24
 
To demonstrate his point more fully, Thelwall raised a multitude of questions before he 
concluded his book. From these lines, a comprehensive picture of the opium trade was most 
vividly projected. With indignation, he wrote:  
            
I ask of every considerate and reflecting man, Can it be doubted but that the name 
                                                          
20 Anon., ‘Means of doing good in China, or remark upon a few of those expedients of a benevolent kind 
that are still within our reach’, The Chinese Repository, 7:4 (Aug. 1838), 196. 
21 Robert Philip, Peace with China! Or The Crisis of Christianity in Central Asia: A Letter to the Right 
Honourable T.B.Macaulay, Secretary at War (London: John Snow, 1840), p. 4. 
22 Fry, Facts and Evidence, p. 6. Italics in the original. 
23 S.S.S., ‘To the Editor of the Canton Press’, The Canton Press, 3:51 (25 Aug. 1838), no pagination. 
24 Thelwall, The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China, p. 131. 
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and profession of Christianity is grossly dishonoured by the fact (well known 
throughout Eastern Asia), that those who profess and call themselves Christians 
are systematically and perseveringly engaged in this iniquitous and poisonous 
traffic? that our national character is degraded, and covered with infamy too well 
deserved, among the nations of the East? … that the greatest market in the world 
is comparatively closed – and that justly – against the productions of our national 
industry? that we are deservedly excluded from all honourable and comfortable 
intercourse – commercial or diplomatic – with the most populous Empire upon 
earth? that the cause of the glorious Gospel of Christ itself is compromised, and 
the progress of Christian missions among half the population of the globe is 
effectually impeded? and that among three hundred, or rather five hundred, 
millions of our fellow-men, we are justly branded as wholesale corrupters and 
murderers of an unoffending people?
25
 
 
        Since the conduct of British opium traders was widely regarded as ‘utterly derogatory to 
the British name and nation and injurious to British interests’,
26
 it can therefore be seen that 
the image created of these merchants was very unfavourable because of the anti-opium 
campaign. They were denounced, for example, as ‘lawless smugglers’,
27
 ‘greedy and pestilent 
corrupters and poisoners of the Chinese nation’,
28
 and ‘the most deceitful, dishonest, 
grasping, criminal party’.
29
 Since none of the opium-sellers smoked this drug himself, it was 
further shown that nothing but the lust for financial gain induced these merchants to violate 
every obligation of justice, truth and humanity. In this regard, comparisons were drawn 
between the iniquities of the opium traders and those who had conducted the slave trade, 
which was believed to be ‘equally hateful, and equally productive of human misery’.
30
 On the 
foundation of these facts and accusations, the vilest and most sordid characteristics were 
attributed to the opium merchants. A hostile impression of these traders was hence very well 
constructed in pre-Opium War Britain and China. According to T. H. Bullock, these men:  
 
for their own sordid purposes, have not only inundated with a poisonous and 
                                                          
25 Ibid., pp. 173-4. 
26 The Canton Register, 12:44 (29 Oct. 1839), 177. 
27 H. Hamilton Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? (London: James Ridgway, 1840), p. 7. 
28 Anon., British Opium Trade with China, p. 24. 
29 Montagu, A Voice for China, p. 9. 
30 Anon., British Opium Trade with China, p. 22. 
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destructive drug, a country, from which for two hundred years we had drawn 
enormous commercial advantages, and introduced the new vice of intoxication in 
its most revolting form, amongst a sober and industrious people; but have carried 
on this intrinsically nefarious traffic, by a system of evasion of the known laws of 
the realm, maintained by gross bribery and fraud.
31
 
 
        Despite the strength of this anti-opium campaign, the accused traders, as well as those 
who did not share the same opinion as the anti-opium campaigners, were not silent on the 
issue. In direct opposition to the perceptions discussed above, contrasting notions of opium, 
its trade and its participants were also put forward. First and foremost, the opium-trade 
defenders declared that the destructive effects of opium on the human frame were ‘based 
upon gross exaggeration’.
32
 Some argued that instead of being a pernicious poison, opium 
was undeniably ‘one of the most beneficial medicines at present in use’.
33
 As ‘a perfect 
substitute for quinine’,
34
 it was not only ‘one of the most powerful remedies for numerous 
diseases which science had discovered and art applied’,
35
 but a ‘balm’ that heaven ‘bestowed 
upon us … to our suffering bodies and our troubled minds’.
36
 In this way, quite contrary to 
the life-destroying image of opium that its critics had established, the discovery of this 
substance was described as ‘the greatest good to the cause of humanity’.
37
 Some less radical 
supporters of opium, however, did not go so far, but still pointed out that, although the 
excessive smoking of this article might be deleterious, ‘if used in moderation, opium was not 
injurious to morals or health’.
38
 It was not the use, therefore, but the abuse of opium that 
caused the misfortunes its critics had noted. The advocates of opium claimed that the effect 
                                                          
31 T. H. Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, or Another View of the Opium Question: Being in Reply to a 
Pamphlet, by Samuel Warren, Esq., F.R.S., Barrister at Law in the Middle Temple (London: Wm. H. Allen, 
1840), p. 105. 
32 Samuel Warren, The Opium Question (London: James Ridgway, 1840), p. 83. 
33 Anon., ‘Mr. King’s Letter to the British Chief Superintendent, dated Macao, 19
th
 May, 1839’, The 
Canton Register, 13:7 (18 Feb. 1840), no pagination. 
34 Anon., ‘Substitutes for Sulphate or Quinine’, The Canton Register, 11:39 (25 Sep. 1838), no pagination. 
35 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 12 May 1840, Third series, vol. 54, 32. 
36 A resident in China, The Rupture with China and Its Causes; including the Opium Question, and other 
important details: in a letter to Lord Viscount Palmerston (London: Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, 1840), p. 
8. 
37 D. Stewart, ‘Dr. Stewart’s report’, The Canton Register, 13:21 (26 May 1840), no pagination. 
38 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 8 Apr. 1840, Third series, vol. 53, 824. 
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on health and morals of a temperate use, or the actual proportion of good and evil resulting 
from the smoking of opium in China, were questions that could not be determined.
39
 They 
attempted to construct a different image that was based on certain knowledge available to the 
public. As ‘a resident in China’ maintained, ‘the smoking of opium, if not less, was not more 
deleterious than the use of ardent spirits at home; both depending upon the quantity taken’.
40
 
In other words, even if terrible calamities occurred because of the use of opium, these were 
imputed to the over-indulgence of the Chinese themselves, rather than to the nature of the 
products introduced by the British merchants. Moreover, in contrast to the fearful picture of 
opium causing general depravity throughout China, it was maintained that, in fact, ‘the mass 
of the people seem healthy, industrious, and cheerful, where the greatest quantity of the drug 
is consumed’.
41
 On the basis of this impression, opium was further interpreted to be ‘as great 
a national luxury as tea with us’.
42
 Substantial local knowledge, in this respect, was also 
utilised to support this opinion. The natives along the coast were described as ‘flocking on 
board the opium ships, bringing bags of dollars to purchase it’.
43
 It was claimed that, 
 
Their great solace … is the opium-pipe. There is nothing they would substitute for 
it. … They have told me, “Opium is to us what tea is to you. You cannot do 
without tea, and we must have opium. Deprive us of opium, and you drive us to 
despair.”
44
 
 
In this manner, an unwanted poisonous drug according to some was represented by others as 
a largely innocuous article which was greatly desired by the Chinese. 
        Furthermore, the character of the opium trade was also explained in ways that conflicted 
                                                          
39 Anon., Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question; With a Few Suggestions Regarding British 
Claims on China (London: Smith, Elder, 1840), pp. 14-17.  
40 A resident in China, The Rupture with China and Its Causes, p. 4. 
41 Anon., Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question, pp. 12-13. 
42 One long resident in China, ‘The Opium Trade, to John Harsley Palmer, ESQ’, The Canton Press, 
5:16 (18 Jan. 1840), no pagination. 
43 Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? p. 30. 
44 A resident in China, The Rupture with China and Its Causes, p. 33. 
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with the assertions of the anti-opium activists. First, supporters of the opium trade alleged 
that the foreign merchants who conducted this traffic had ‘never themselves introduced the 
Opium into the country’;
45
 instead, opium was delivered to the natives from beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Chinese empire. This was because, in 1820, when Chinese local authorities 
complained that opium was brought into the port of Canton by British ships, all vessels with 
opium retreated to Lintin or Macao, both ports reckoned to be outside the borders of Chinese 
jurisdiction. Since then, although opium was still sold by British merchants in Canton, the 
Chinese purchasers could only receive an order for delivery, but then they had to take their 
own risk in collecting their cargoes from the importing ships anchored in the so-called outer 
waters.
46
 By using these means, it was believed that the opium merchants were completely 
vindicated from accusations that their acts were in contravention of Chinese laws, because, 
clearly, it was the Chinese who bribed the customs officers and introduced the article into 
China, whereas, the British did nothing beyond the ‘undoubted right of every British subject 
to trade in opium on the high seas’.
47 Second, contrary to the lawless and nefarious image 
constructed by the anti-opium campaigners, attempts were made to represent this traffic as a 
de facto regular trade. For instance, it was claimed that ‘such a trade cannot fairly be 
considered smuggling in the ordinary acceptation of the term’,
48
 because it was a fact that 
‘this falsely called smuggling trade had for a series of many years been conducted with 
greater regularity, facility, and mutual confidence, than any trade of similar magnitude in any 
part of the world’.
49
 When comparing it with other legitimate trade, another commentator 
insisted that ‘both were equally regular trades, although differently conducted, each paying 
                                                          
45 Anon., ‘Foreign Relations with China, IV’, The Canton Press, 4:47 (24 Aug. 1839), no pagination. 
46 A Barrister at Law, The Opium Question, as between Nation and Nation (London: James Bain, 1840), pp. 
13-15. 
47 Anon., ‘Mr. King’s Letter to the British Chief Superintendent, dated Macao, 19
th
 May, 1839’, The 
Canton Register, 13:7 (18 Feb. 1840), no pagination.  
48 Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? p. 9. 
49 Ibid., p. 8. 
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the duties, and fees instead of duties, to the government officers, with the same punctuality’.
50
 
In line with this view, ‘the open and undisguised connivance of the local authorities’
51
 was 
highlighted as the very reason why such a mode of trade had subsisted so well over the past 
decades. Although it was debatable whether the imperial Chinese government was indirectly 
involved,
52
 defenders of the opium trade repeatedly reinforced the general opinion that, 
because of the venality of the Chinese officers and the widespread corruption within the 
Chinese system, ‘opium enjoyed the clandestine patronage of the court’.
53
 According to this 
interpretation, the local government officials in China, rather than anybody else, became ‘the 
most blame-worthy parties’.
54
 The supposed responsibility for the evil perpetrated by this 
trade was once again shifted from the British to the Chinese. 
        Last, the legitimacy of Chinese law was highly doubted, insomuch that the boundary 
between justice and unlawfulness was greatly blurred in the case of the opium trade. Its 
advocates contended that, for one thing, due to the vanity of the Chinese government, normal 
diplomatic relations as well as proper commercial treaties could not be obtained by the 
British. As a result, the opium merchants had to subject themselves entirely to the local 
authorities, without any possibility of discovering whether the edicts presented to them as 
Imperial actions, were in fact the laws or the imperial will emanating from Beijing. In 
addition, they maintained that the theoretical and the written laws of China were implemented 
                                                          
50 Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China, since the Opening of the Trade in 1834 (London: 
Smith, Elder, 1840), p. 54. 
51 Dent & Co., et al., ‘To the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs’, The Canton Press, 4:38 (25 May 1839), no pagination. 
52  Some observers maintained that the Beijing government, even the emperor himself, was not only 
perfectly sensible of the situation in relation to the opium traffic, but partly benefited from it. See Anon., 
Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question, p. 24. Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? pp. 9-11. 
Anon., ‘The Future’, The Canton Register, 11:6 (6 Feb. 1838), 24, etc.; while others argued that on account 
of the limited means of information transmitted throughout China at the time, the corruption of local 
authorities could be concealed from the imperial government. See Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, pp. 
75-77. Captain Elliot to Viscount Palmerston, Canton, Nov. 19, 1837, in Correspondence Relating to 
China, presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty (London: T. R. Harrison, 
1840), p. 241. 
53 Anon., ‘Foreign Relations with China, III’, The Canton Press, 4:43 (27 Jul. 1839), no pagination.  
54 The Canton Register, 13:11 (17 Mar. 1840), 58. 
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very differently in practice, to such an extent that  
 
the Chinese say of their own law, it was made for the officers, not for the people; 
it is a net no one can escape if the mandarin throws it; for a fee, anything is 
declared legal, and every thing is illegal to extract a fine, especially as regards 
trade Duties are said among themselves to be almost always matter of bargain, not 
regular established charges;
55
 
 
Under these circumstances, now that the authority was doubtful, and the laws far from being 
practicable, ‘submission to the Chinese law’ became a different and difficult issue. To account 
for this point of view, local knowledge was again applied to demonstrate that in the past, local 
officers did issue ‘so many absurd, frivolous, vexatious, inconsistent, and contradictory 
regulations’,
56
 that the British merchants had no other option but to disregard them. Hence, 
they became more convinced that ‘there are no laws in China demanding conscientious 
obedience – beyond the universal law of truth, justice, and mercy – and that all questions 
there regarding legality or illegality, are questions of prudence, not of principle’.
57
 
        In the light of the arguments above, the commonly perceived iniquitous image of the 
opium trade was interpreted by some commentators in a very different fashion. According to 
the discourse established by the opium traffic defenders, this trade was neither inconsistent 
with the general desires of the Chinese population nor conducted in violation of morality or 
justice. For these reasons, the term ‘smuggler’ was regarded as ‘a stigma on our characters’,
58
 
which should by no means be applied to the British opium merchants. Since opium was 
introduced into China because of the demands of the natives and the business was transacted 
with the tacit and almost open consent of the local authorities, the opium trade’s supporters 
declared that an opium dealer could at most be described as ‘the importer of opium into 
                                                          
55 Anon., Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question, p. 19. 
56 Ibid., p. 23. 
57 Ibid., p. 24. 
58 Lindsay, Is the War with China a Just One? p. 8. 
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Whampoa’ or ‘the disposer of his own property’.
59
 As for the character of these merchants, it 
was asserted that they actually commanded much respect, because they ‘thought it their 
duty … to submit to inconvenience and seeming degradation’
60
 in China, in order to enrich 
‘their country far more than themselves’.
61
 In addition, they were the ‘most intelligent, and 
useful, and charitable persons’,
62
 who not only acquired extensive knowledge of China’s 
coast and its inhabitants, but also ‘dispensed the most munificent charities among the poor 
Chinese’.
63
 Given these justifications, it was maintained that no resemblance at all could be 
drawn between the opium merchants and those engaged in the slave trade.
64
 All accusations 
of the immoral character of these people, therefore, were utterly unfounded. 
        In sum, it can be observed that two sets of conflicting images were presented by the anti-
opium campaigners and their opponents with regard to the nature of opium, the opium traffic, 
and its British participants. Supporters of the opium trade, at this stage, were largely forced 
onto the defensive. While the views of the anti-opium activists did not entirely prevail in the 
controversy, their views were not in the slightest degree inferior to those of the other side in 
terms of their strength and influence. Accordingly, it seems certain that, on opium-related 
issues, the general atmosphere neither leaned towards the opium trade advocates nor were 
any of their arguments able to justify open hostilities against China. This state of things, 
however, was greatly altered when the ensuing crisis is taken into consideration.  
 
II 
The crisis debate 
Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu reached Canton on 10 March 1839. A week later, he issued 
                                                          
59 The Canton Register, 12:11 (12 Mar. 1839), 57. 
60 Anon., Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question, pp. 21-2. 
61 Warren, The Opium Question, p. 78. 
62 Anon., Some Pros and Cons of the Opium Question, p. 21. 
63 Warren, The Opium Question, p. 78. 
64 Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China, pp. 56-7. 
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an edict requiring all opium, including that lying in the outer waters, to be surrendered to the 
Chinese government immediately. In order to enforce obedience to this demand, Lin 
suspended all trade, detained the entire foreign community within their factories, and 
deprived them of all servants and provisions. He also demanded that all foreign merchants 
sign a bond, the breaking of which was punishable by death. Learning of these actions, the 
British superintendent of trade, Charles Elliot,
65
 who was then at Macao, lost no time in going 
to Canton. No sooner had he arrived at the British factory, than he found himself under 
restraint as well. On 27 March, in this ‘imprisoned and harassed condition’,
66
 Elliot yielded to 
circumstances. On the assumption that ‘the safety of a great mass of human life hung upon’
67
 
his decision, Elliot ordered all British subjects to give up their opium stock to Commissioner 
Lin, with a promise of compensation from the British government for their losses.
68
 As a 
consequence, after seven weeks or so, a total of 20,283 chests
69
 of opium were handed over. 
The confinement in Canton then came to an end. Although Elliot and his fellow Britons 
retreated to Macao soon afterwards, the diplomatic crisis between China and Britain was not 
resolved. On 7 July, a riot took place in a village near Hong Kong. Several British seamen 
and a few Americans were involved in the death of a Chinese native named Lin Weixi. 
Commissioner Lin, on this occasion, demanded the surrender of the murderer to Chinese 
justice, but Elliot’s investigation failed to identify this individual and so no one could be 
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delivered up to Commissioner Lin. In response,
70
 Lin cut off supplies for Macao and moved 
2000 troops to an adjacent town. All British subjects, including women and children, were 
compelled to abandon their dwellings in Macao without being given any time to make 
preparations for their departure. They had to seek refuge on board the merchant fleet off 
Hong Kong, where the denial of provisions was repeated in addition to other local irritations. 
On 4 September, an armed conflict took place at Kowloon when the first shots between 
British and Chinese warships were exchanged. Serious intervention from the British 
government now seemed inevitable. In April 1840, the Whig government narrowly won a 
parliamentary motion in support of war. After just three months, a British naval force arrived 
off Macao and the First Anglo-Chinese War began.
71
 
        As with the opium controversy, the crisis in 1839 touched off a heated debate both 
within the British community in China and between concerned parties back home. Various 
viewpoints were raised as to the fairness or injustice of Commissioner Lin’s conduct. In this 
debate, contrasting images of China were produced or reaffirmed in support of the various 
arguments advanced. Eventually, at variance with the contention that China was completely 
in the wrong, a less biased point of view, which saw the insults delivered during the crisis as 
separate from the immorality of the opium trade, met with the most favourable response. 
Serious intervention on the part of the British government, as a result, was legitimised on the 
grounds of the injustice and unreliability of the Chinese authorities.  
        According to the most radical wing of these commentators, who were mainly solid 
supporters of the opium trade, China was entirely in the wrong because ‘a gross infraction of 
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the law of nations’
72
 had been committed. They insisted, first of all, that the principle of free 
trade had been severely violated. On the one hand, since every article was ‘in itself good, 
and … may be cultivated, manufactured, bought, sold, and distributed all over the world’,
73
 
opium was ‘no exception as an article, nor China as a country’.
74
 In particular, given the vast 
population of China, a ‘moderate’ trade in opium at present should by all means be deemed as 
quite proper. On the other hand, no political system had the right to keep out ‘those luxuries 
which the people enjoyed, or were able to purchase, or to prevent the efflux of precious 
metals, when it was demanded by the course of trade’.
75
 Therefore, even though the Chinese 
government had declared opium to be an illicit article and had erected various legal barriers 
to its commerce with the West, foreign merchants were still justified in carrying on the trade 
in any product that was desired by Chinese subjects, ‘with or without her consent, contraband 
or otherwise’.
76
 It was also alleged that a serious insult had been committed ‘not only against 
British subjects and property, but also against the dignity of the British crown’.
77
 For one 
thing, Commissioner Lin’s decision to incarcerate Elliot was a direct affront to the British 
sovereign, because, according to international law, Elliot’s public character as the Queen’s 
representative at Canton was not merely ‘sacred and inviolable, but independent of the 
jurisdiction of the Chinese government’.
78
 For another thing, the forcible detainment and 
expulsion of the British community, as well as the confiscation of their property, without a 
judicial hearing, were unlawful proceedings. Some commentators maintained that these 
merchants came to China ‘under the full protection of the British flag, and under the sanction 
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of British authority … in pursuit of the objects of national commerce’,
79
 but, in the recent 
crisis, they were treated ‘like a parcel of wild animals, and, without … an opportunity of 
pleading the cause’.
80
 Clearly, by seeking to propagate such perceptions, commentators could 
claim that Britain could be justifiably outraged by such attacks on the persons and property of 
its countrymen. The Chinese authorities were blamed as the sole responsible party for this 
crisis in Sino-British relations. Last, but not least, in order to justify the necessity of taking 
retaliatory measures, China was characterised as a capricious ‘other’ that had long held other 
countries in contempt and had often set at defiance the laws of civilised nations. It was 
asserted that, ‘the single fundamental cause’ of the present crisis and also of past disputes was 
the ‘the arrogant assumption of supremacy on the part of China over foreigners’.
81
 Although 
China had no real sense of its relative place in the scale of nations, its rulers believed 
themselves first among nations in knowledge and power, insomuch that they were 
accustomed to acting as the supreme authority, wholly regardless of the laws of international 
society. For centuries, China had displayed to foreigners ‘the petty tyranny of the self-
sufficient pedagogue, and have frequently laid on them the strong hand of the unrestrained 
despot’.
82
 Nevertheless, it was contended that, even though the Chinese empire sought to 
exist in isolation from other nations, in accordance with the maxim that the majority should 
give law to the minority, the Chinese were not entitled to ignore any international law with 
complete impunity. On the contrary, since numerically they were only one third of the human 
race, ‘China, as one, cannot be allowed to oppose the rest of the world, who are two, and 
more particularly when she is asked to do any thing that cannot injure herself, or place her in 
a worse state than she is at present’.
83
 By such means as this, China’s image was confirmed as 
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a presumptuous and arbitrary power which set itself against the rest of the world and acted in 
opposition to the common interests of other civilised societies. Based on this assumption, any 
challenge to China’s authority was justified in the name of protecting international law. 
Especially, in view of the present crisis, in which Britain’s economic interests and national 
honour were both damaged, Foreign Secretary Palmerston accepted such interpretations of 
the crisis. He condemned Lin Zexu’s conduct as ‘totally at variance with international law, a 
course of the most arbitrary kind, and liable to every possible objection’.
84
 In consequence, 
many observers at the time, including Palmerston himself, were convinced that Britain was 
legitimately ‘entitled to demand satisfaction, reparation, and redress’
85
 from the Chinese 
authorities. 
        In opposition to the views outlined above, a number of contrary arguments were raised, 
mostly by the anti-opium advocates. They averred that many of the aforesaid remarks were 
contrary to the truth, while ‘right and justice are entirely on the side of China’.
86
 First of all, 
they pointed out that it was incorrect to regard Elliot as the representative of the Queen. Since 
the Chinese authorities had never acknowledged any official personage at Canton, this British 
agent was, in fact, ‘nothing more than chief commercial agent’.
87
  Moreover, the fact that 
Elliot had to communicate with the local government in China through Hong merchants 
clearly indicated that he had no political authority to represent British interests whatsoever. 
Therefore, as William Gladstone claimed in Parliament, since ‘by the Chinese he had only 
been received as a commercial officer … it was unjust to contend that the Chinese were 
responsible as if they had known him in the character of a regularly-accredited diplomatic 
agent’.
88
 In addition, it was maintained that, although Lin Zexu’s decisions to suspend all 
trade and to act against the whole foreign community sounded cruel and unjustifiable, it was 
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in fact not entirely unreasonable in the circumstances, because, in Canton, there was neither 
the necessity nor the possibility of fixing the guilt on individuals, since ‘the entire British 
community, at Canton, was directly or indirectly implicated in this odious traffic’.
89
 In this 
regard, even Elliot himself admitted that ‘the Chinese Government had a just ground for hard 
measures towards the lawful trade, upon the plea that there was no distinguishing between the 
right and the wrong’.
90
 As to the Lin Weixi incident, since the murderer could not be 
delivered up to the Chinese authorities, China certainly had a right to refuse all those who 
might be concerned in this incident the right to remain on Chinese territory. In particular, in 
light of Britain’s well-known conduct in India, it was perfectly understandable that the 
Chinese government remained suspicious of all westerners, especially the British, and 
excluded the suspicious ones whenever it deemed it to be necessary to do so in order to 
protect its own interests. Moreover, against the general charge of China’s unwillingness to 
abide by the common law of nations, many observers suggested that every nation was entitled 
to choose for itself what contributed most to its own wellbeing. Any interference with this 
right should be considered as an infringement of its liberty. Since the Chinese government 
never formally recognised what the West called international law, the principles of this law 
were by no means applicable to China. Accordingly, with regard to the present crisis, it was 
affirmed that ‘the Chinese Government had the “unquestionable right” … to prohibit the 
importation of Opium … to enforce it by penalties; …The extent of the penalty is left to the 
discretion of the power making the law, and necessarily so’.
91
 Meanwhile, ‘every foreigner 
was bound to pay absolute, implicit, unconditional, obedience’
92
 to these laws, irrespective of 
the grounds upon which they were founded.  
        In line with the direct refutation of the key arguments of the pro-war agitators, these 
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anti-war commentators also pointed out that the public was being misled into believing that 
brutal oppression had long been deployed indiscriminately by the despotic Chinese 
authorities against the British community in Canton. They alleged that this was a false way of 
perceiving and understanding the nature of China and its government. A whole range of 
established impressions needed to be revised. To start with, it was stressed that, as a matter of 
fact, the living and trading conditions of foreigners in Canton were not as harsh as was 
generally supposed. To prove this, there were frequent references to comments made by some 
influential British personages in China. For example, William Jardine,
93
 the famous opium 
merchant, had clearly stated that life and property in China were  
 
more effectually protected by laws than in many other parts of the East, or of the 
world … business is conducted with unexampled facility, and in general with 
singular good faith … for these reasons it was that so many of our country men 
visited this country, and remained there so long.
94
  
 
Elliot himself declared that the Chinese people ‘have great confidence in the good faith of the 
Europeans … they are … the most moderate and reasonable people on the face of the 
earth’.
95
 The local government in China, Bullock suggested, was ‘more lenient to strangers 
than to themselves, constantly making allowances for any infraction of the law, by the 
assumption that the offence had been ignorantly committed, and never overstepping the law 
to punish or injure’.
96
 On the basis of these very different perceptions, it was contended that 
the Chinese, in fact, expressed no enmity and displayed no ill feeling towards the British. As 
far as the recent crisis was concerned, the Chinese government’s intention was simply to put 
                                                          
93 William Jardine (1784-1843) was a Scottish merchant who came to China in 1820 and co-founded 
Jardine, Matheson and Company with Matheson in 1832. By the mid-1830s, Jardine was regarded as ‘the 
most influential British figure at Canton’ and was ‘already a celebrated name in the commercial world of 
London’. After the opium crisis in 1839, Jardine returned to London and pressed Foreign Secretary 
Palmerston for a forceful response. See Jardine, William, in the ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com; 
accessed 22 May 2013. 
94 This was taken from a talk Jardine gave on 19 Jan. 1839, see Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, pp. 19-20. 
95 Captain Elliot to Viscount Palmerston, Macao, 8 Jan. 1839, in Correspondence Relating to China, p. 341. 
96 Bullock, The Chinese Vindicated, p. 27. 
224 
 
down the opium trade, the majority of whose participants happened to be British subjects. 
This action therefore could by no means be taken as support for the widely propagated notion 
that in China there was considerable and widespread antipathy towards Britain. Furthermore, 
even though forcible measures were in the last resort adopted against the opium dealers, they 
were adopted by the Chinese government with the utmost reluctance. In this regard, many 
observers spared no effort in order to show that, despite the fact that the Chinese government 
had a clear right to suppress the illicit trade by any methods it chose, it was only after 
reiterated exhortations and warnings had failed to produce any effective results that the 
penalties of the law were enforced. As George Palmer mentioned in the House of Commons, 
since the Chinese ‘had given ample warning of their intentions preceding the carrying them 
into execution … it was too bad to turn round on them now and attack them for its 
exercise’.
97
 Last, against the charge that Commissioner Lin had exceeded the limits of 
international obligations, it was stated that, on the contrary, the Chinese authorities had 
implemented their anti-opium campaign with much forbearance and leniency. For one thing, 
to place Elliot, who had illegally forced his way to Canton without permission ‘under 
gentlemanly restraint in his house’ was ‘the mildest possible’ means by which Lin Zexu could 
possibly achieve his objectives.
98
 This fairly moderate detention could in no sense be 
interpreted as a harsh or unjust imprisonment. Moreover, over the years, the opium merchants 
had been treated by the Chinese government ‘with more kindness than if they had been 
proceeded against either according to the spirit of the English or of Chinese law’.
99
 On the 
present occasion, it was indisputable that the Chinese, at any rate, had a right to drive these 
individuals from their territory because of their obstinate persistence in this illegal trade. For 
this reason, William Gladstone maintained in the parliamentary debate, ‘I do not know how it 
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can be urged as a crime against the Chinese that they refused provisions to those who refused 
obedience to their laws whilst residing within their territories’.
100
 
        These very different interpretations presented a fairly positive image of the Chinese. 
Bullock wrote in The Chinese Vindicated: 
 
the security of the merchants in China has never been violated, nor placed in 
jeopardy, by any capricious or oppressive measure of the Chinese. … There has 
been no wrong, no oppression, no cruelty – no life has been taken, no property 
seized, no person injured – but life and property have been inviolate, and under 
gross provocation, the greatest forbearance exercised towards those whom they 
affectingly call the “far travelled foreigner.”
101
 
 
In such a light, China could no longer be portrayed as a tyrannical and arbitrary power that 
mistreated innocent foreign merchants. On the contrary, the Chinese government had been 
careful in its efforts not to offend the British. When China exercised its laws against 
persistent opium traders, its sole aim was to protect Chinese subjects from a highly dangerous 
product. The enforcement of Chinese laws, in this manner, was justifiable and was exercised 
in a very lenient fashion. None of China’s international obligations had been violated to any 
great extent. In fact, blame deserved to be placed entirely on the British opium merchants. 
They were characterised as the real aggressors and as men who had applied double standards 
in their dealings with the Chinese. It was maintained that these opium traders continued to 
defy and systematically violate the laws of China, in selfish pursuit of their own financial 
interests. When China was compelled to take legal measures against their unlawful conduct, 
they unjustly sought to impose upon her ‘the international laws of Europe’,
102
 which China 
had never recognised, in order to justify their actions as well as seeking to provoke the British 
government’s intervention on their behalf. In view of these facts, Montagu announced in A 
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Voice for China: 
 
China … is not the aggressor, nor the first to violate the laws of God or man. It is 
our own country which is the first to commit this crime, … China is “innocent and 
unoffending” to us; until we first seduced, bribed, provoked, and poisoned them 
into resistance and aggression, by our guilty, lawless, violent, unchristian, Opium 
smuggling…. No nation in defending itself is an aggressor. Doubtless this fearful 
carnage must be traced, not to China as the first to act on the offensive, but to 
England as the violator of her laws, and thereby compelling China to act both on 
the defensive and offensive.
103
 
 
In this spirit, a lot of observers at this time were persuaded that there had been no violation of 
international law on the part of the Chinese and, hence, any act of hostility or aggression 
against China on these grounds was entirely unjustified. 
        In spite of these different views for or against the Chinese government, the most popular 
approach taken in Britain in order to evaluate the opium crisis was to concentrate on the 
insults offered to Britain by the Chinese authorities rather than on the injustice or immorality 
of the opium trade. Supporters of this attitude were not necessarily advocates of the opium 
traffic, nor opponents of the opium traders, but, from a less biased standpoint, they generated 
a more influential case, which to a great extent produced Britain’s decision to intervene in the 
dispute with China. Against the assertion that justice was entirely on China’s side, it was 
maintained that those who upheld that point of view ‘very foolishly, mix up the insult and 
violence with the illicit trade’.
104
 It was stressed that the essence of the present crisis was that 
‘a legitimate end is no  ustification of illegitimate means’.
105
 Although it was undeniable that 
China had the right to stamp out a contraband trade for its own safety and well-being, ‘the 
circumstances of severity under which it took place’,
106
 were a great wrong and a serious 
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insult to British subjects and their property, as well as to the honour of the British crown. 
Despite the fact that the seizure of contraband goods found within the jurisdiction of the 
Chinese government was a lawful act, the coerced surrender of opium without its 
jurisdictional limits, especially before these goods had actually been smuggled into China, 
could not be understood in the same light. Staunton, the China expert who translated Ta Tsing 
Leu Lee (大清律例; The Penal code of China), proclaimed in his parliamentary speech: 
 
there was absolutely no law authorizing the confiscation of goods, under any 
circumstances, outside the port. The opium lying in the receiving ships at Lintin, 
was no more liable to confiscation by any existing fiscal law of the Chinese, than 
if had been lying in the river Thames.
107
 
 
As Staunton was never a friend of the opium trade and ‘yielded to no Member of the House 
in his anxiety to put it down altogether’,
108
 his view in this respect was very well received. 
Moreover, it was widely held that, in Canton, Lin Zexu never attempted to distinguish the 
participants in the opium trade from those involved in the legal trade, but placed both traffics 
under one common suspension and the whole foreign community in arbitrary confinement. In 
consequence, and not only from a commercial point of view, ‘the innocent and the guilty 
have both had to suffer – and in some cases it may be the former have sustained greater losses 
than the latter’,
109
 but, most important, all British men in Canton,
110
 whether they were 
implicated in the opium trade or not, were indiscriminately taken hostage. In a period of 
seven weeks, they were threatened with capital punishment, as well as being deprived of food 
and servants. Even Britain’s chief officer in China, no matter if he was regarded as the 
sovereign’s representative or not, was not excepted from such harsh treatment. A few months 
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later, when Elliot was unable to identify the murderer of Lin Weixi, not only British men, but 
British women and children, who certainly had no involvement in any illegal activities, were 
treated with equal severity. They were expelled from their residences at only three hours’ 
notice, with all means of subsistence cut off. Commands were even given to natives along the 
coast to fire upon and seize the British whenever they went on shore to purchase provisions. 
Under these circumstances, there was no doubt that the lives and property of quite a number 
of law-abiding British subjects were put in jeopardy at the hands of the tyrannical Chinese 
authorities. With the introduction of these specific examples, a rather deplorable spectacle 
concerning the occurrences in China was presented to the public. For example, as an article 
of The Canton Press illustrated:  
 
our sovereign has been styled the “respectful and submissive tributary of China”. 
Her representative has been seized, imprisoned and his life threatened, our 
merchants innocent and guilty have been confounded together, and the lives of the 
whole put in imminent peril, our women and children, who never committed any 
crime, have been expelled from these shores almost at the sword’s point, edicts 
have been published by which the peaceable people of this country are incited to 
take up arms and shoot any Englishman who might go ashore in quest of food as 
if he were a wild beast, and hostilities have actually been waged against our fleet 
of merchantmen, by far the greater number of which were lying pacifically at 
anchor and contravening no law either of this empire or any other.
111
 
 
        In light of these opinions of Chinese conduct, some commentators firmly believed that, 
although China had a right to seize any contraband goods smuggled into its dominions, or 
even inflict death on the detected smugglers in compliance with its own laws, Lin Zexu’s 
forcible measures to punish the innocent with the guilty had already crossed the line of 
acceptable conduct. Even although China was not bound by international law, its recent 
proceedings were contrary to the most ordinary sense of justice, as well as ‘every principle of 
justice and eternal truth … which must exist so long as man and man had the power of 
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conversation and intercourse with one another’.
112
 On such grounds, in opposition to the 
claim that China was not the aggressor, it was maintained that, ‘from the moment British 
subjects at Canton were placed in prison to the danger of their lives, the Chinese became the 
aggressors’.
113
 Since the British government had a natural and legal obligation to protect ‘the 
sacredness of British life, liberty, and property, from sudden and most unjustifiable 
aggression’,
114
 it was absolutely right and necessary to take immediate and vigorous counter-
measures against the crimes committed by the Chinese. To legitimise further the actions of 
the British government, supporters of this view made considerable efforts to distinguish the 
evil of the opium trade and the injustice of Lin Zexu’s actions as two quite separate issues. 
They maintained that, ‘the question between us and the Chinese, in a national point of view, 
has nothing to do with the immorality or the impolicy of the trade’.
115
 The British 
government had never had any intention of protecting those who violated Chinese law by 
engaging in that illicit trade, but, at the same time, it also could not disregard the insult and 
injuries that the Chinese had unjustly inflicted upon the honour of the British nation and the 
interests of British merchants. As to the present crisis, despite the fact that China had 
formerly been on the right side when it commenced its campaign to drive out opium, ‘the 
Chinese had now put themselves in the wrong’.
116
 It was these latter outrages, rather than the 
earlier trade whose justice was very doubtful, to which Britain was responding. T. B. 
Macaulay, in his celebrated speech, which to some extent set the tone for the parliamentary 
debate on this issue, made it very clear:  
 
that government had a right to keep out opium, to keep in silver, and to enforce 
their prohibitory laws, by whatever means which they might possess, consistently 
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with the principles of public morality, and of international law; and if, after having 
given fair notice of their intention, to seize all contraband goods introduced into 
their dominions; they seized our opium, we had no right to complain; but when 
the government, finding, that by just and lawful means, they could not carry out 
their prohibition, resorted to measures unjust and unlawful, confined our innocent 
countrymen, and insulted the Sovereign in the person of her representative, 
then … the time had arrived when it was fit that we should interfere.
117
 
 
        Based on these impressions, the image of the Chinese government was once again 
characterised as that of an arbitrary and unreliable power upon which no real trust could be 
placed. Accordingly, serious intervention by Britain became even more crucial, not merely in 
response to the sufferings of the past, but ‘for the effectual prevention of the like dark 
proceedings’
118
  in future. Because of the importance of the China trade, as well as the 
perception that ‘British commerce can never safely be carried on, and certainly can never 
flourish in a country where our persons and property are alike at the mercy of a capricious 
and corrupt Government’,
119
 many opinion formers at this time clearly concurred on the 
justice and necessity of making alterations to Britain’s relation with the Chinese empire. They 
either strongly urged ‘very prompt and powerful interference of Her Majesty’s Government 
for the just vindication of all wrongs, and the effectual prevention of crime and wretchedness 
by permanent settlement’,
120
 or, at the least, accepted ‘with great reluctance’
121
 that Britain 
was certainly entitled to demand redress for the injuries suffered in the recent crisis, and to 
‘ensure for the future that justice and protection to commerce, which has hitherto been 
withheld by extortionate restrictions and disabilities’.
122
  
        It can be seen from the above that, after the opium crisis of 1839, a remarkable change 
                                                          
117 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 Apr. 1840, Third series, vol. 53, 717. 
118 Captain Elliot to Viscount Palmerston, Canton, 13 Apr. 1839, in Correspondence Relating to China, p. 
389. 
119 Dent & Co., et al., ‘To the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs’, The Canton Press, 4:38 (25 May 1839), no pagination. 
120 Captain Elliot to Viscount Palmerston, Canton, 6 Apr. 1839, in Correspondence Relating to China, p. 
387.  
121 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 12 May 1840, Third series, vol. 54, 43. 
122 Chinese Commerce and Disputes, from 1640 to 1840 (London: W. Morrison, 1840), p. 5. 
231 
 
occurred in the British debates on Chinese affairs. Contrary to the previous controversy, 
which was based solely on the opium question, the focus of the debate was now diverted 
from the character of the opium trade to the nature of the Chinese government’s actions. To 
assess what the Chinese authorities did to British subjects, rather than what the British 
merchants did to Chinese subjects, became the main concern of all parties. As a result, those 
who formerly had to defend the legitimacy of the opium trade gained much ground, because 
their demand for a forcible response by the British government happened to coincide with the 
views of a more disinterested group, who had less connection with or sympathy for the opium 
merchants, but saw this crisis as quite distinct from the immorality of the opium trade. They 
jointly produced an impression that the lives and property of British subjects had been 
subjected to gross insults offered by an arbitrary and presumptuous Chinese government. This 
view eventually overwhelmed the voices that had been raised on the other side, which now 
adopted a defensive position and was in any case unable to convince the public that all of Lin 
Zexu’s proceedings had been based on just grounds. Accordingly, after this debate, a prompt 
British response was not only regarded as legitimate, but crucial to the future of the British-
Chinese relations. A significant change in perceptions had occurred and a vigorous response 
was finally going to be made. 
 
III 
War 
According to the traditional arguments on the causes of the Opium War, Britain’s economic 
interests were seen as the fundamental driving force.
123
 This conflict was considered as 
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inevitable, because Britain’s industrial expansion and need for new markets were in essence 
irreconcilable with China’s untimely policy of restricting foreign imports. In 1971, Peter Fay 
claimed that some neglected short-term causes, such as Elliot’s unauthorised promise to 
compensate the opium traders’ loss on behalf of British government, and the Protestant 
missionaries’ resolution to ‘open’ China, were crucial to the outbreak of the war.
124
 
Melancon, more recently, has maintained that national honour, as well as the domestic 
political crisis facing the Whig government,
125
 were the prime reasons for the British-Chinese 
confrontation.
126
 Although these historians have suggested the general importance of 
economic interest and national honour, neither of them has sufficiently investigated what 
specific perceptions of the nation’s interests and honour led Britain to interfere so violently in 
China’s internal affairs, nor did they discuss the various means advanced as the best way to 
carry out this interventionist policy. Discussions on these subjects, however, were such an 
essential part of the pre-Opium War debates that they deserve greater attention than they have 
received. 
        One of the most important but neglected factors that accounts for Britain’s determination 
to intervene in Chinese affairs was the anxiety felt about the need to preserve the Indian 
empire. In this respect, some commentators have argued that the present crisis in China was 
chiefly a financial problem, because, approximately ‘one-sixth of the whole united revenue of 
Great Britain and India depended on our commercial relations with that country’.
127
 The 
greater part of the East India Company’s revenue was derived from the opium trade. To the 
                                                          
124
 Peter W. Fay, ‘The Protestant Mission and the Opium War’, Pacific Historical Review, 40 (1971), 145- 
61. 
125
 Melancon maintains that in 1839 there was a crisis of confidence in the Melbourne ministry. Because of 
the government’s weakness, a small group of Radicals held the balance of power in the Commons. This 
minority took advantage of the government’s desire to maintain its position and pressed for war. See Glenn 
Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honour, 
1833-1840 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 138-9. 
126
 Glenn Melancon, ‘Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839-1840’, 
International History Review, 21 (1999), 855-74; Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis, 
pp. 5-6, 133-9. 
127 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 Apr. 1840, Third series, vol. 53, 670. 
233 
 
merchants of India, this traffic also employed a large amount of capital as well as a good 
many ships. If the trade with China was destroyed, it would be ‘one of the greatest calamities 
which could befall the East India Company and the nation’.
128
 In addition to this financial 
concern, other commentators believed that the China question had become a serious security 
matter for the maintenance of the British empire in the east. They alleged that, if Britain 
submitted to the recent outrages and commercial degradation without any attempt at 
defending its interests and its honour, it would not only be ‘degrading in the eyes of the world 
generally, but especially destructive of that respect and confidence among our Indian fellow-
subjects, which maintains our empire of opinion in the East’.
129
 In particular, given the 
vicinity of China to the Burmese empire, ‘the peace of India greatly depended on our 
vindicating British supremacy before China’.
130
 Otherwise, as Staunton firmly believed, ‘the 
day is not far distant when the consequences will be visited on our great empire in India, and 
our political ascendancy there will be fatally undermined’.
131
 Clearly, from this perspective, 
the China question was no longer an isolated issue, but was undoubtedly associated with 
important matters about the safety and preservation of the British empire. Since Britain’s 
interests and honour in the east were so much interwoven with each other, an alteration in its 
relations with China became vitally necessary. 
        Meanwhile, in this debate leading up to the First Anglo-Chinese War, some favourable 
perceptions of the Chinese emperor and his people were seriously challenged, so that nothing 
else seemed reliable to the British, but their own actions. The British government, for this 
reason, had to take positive steps in order to protect the interests and honour that were so 
much at risk. Previously, no matter how hard the British had censured the local authorities of 
Canton, they had more or less entertained a relatively positive image of the Chinese monarch. 
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The emperor had long been assumed or imagined to be a merciful and impartial sovereign 
who was kept in ignorance of the evils committed in Canton. Even shortly before the entire 
British community was driven out of Macao, Elliot still pinned his hope of establishing 
‘peace and honourable trade on a permanent footing’ on making ‘known to the Emperor the 
falsehood, violence, and venality of the Mandarins’.
132
 This impression of the situation in 
China, however, changed dramatically during the opium crisis. For one thing, it had become 
well-known that the Daoguang emperor attached much importance to the opium question. In 
order to eradicate the opium trade, he had selected Lin Zexu and had appointed him to an 
imperial commissionership, an office of very high honour and extreme significance that had 
only been conferred four times before in the history of the Qing dynasty. Unlike the local 
public officers of Canton, therefore, Lin was clearly seen as ‘the interpreter of the Imperial 
wishes and of the principles that actuate the administration’.
133
 Moreover, intelligence also 
confirmed the view that His Imperial Majesty had indeed quite unkind intentions against the 
British. For instance, during the crisis, the emperor had forwarded to Lin Zexu a memorial, 
presented by another mandarin, that proposed to ‘call out the best swimmers and divers … 
cause them at night to divide into groups, to go diving straight on board the foreign ships, and 
taking the said foreigners unawares, massacre every individual among them’.
134
 When such 
information, as well as the actions that did occur during the crisis, reached the wider British 
public, it was no wonder that ‘a resident in China’ deplored the fact that:  
 
Opinion had commonly gone with Captain Elliot’s views as to the disposition of 
the Emperor, or Supreme Government, to do justice to foreigners … But how 
could he be warranted in the expression of such a reliance, after what he himself 
and our countrymen had so lately suffered from the local officers, acting under the 
authority of the Imperial orders, and how can any of us continue of our former 
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opinions? 
… 
how greatly should we appreciate the Emperor’s tender mercies towards us, past, 
present, and future, when he has lent his sign manual and signet to give authority 
to such a document!
135
 
 
In consequence, the previously favourable image of the Chinese emperor was now 
challenged. Many British commentators began seriously to doubt if the Chinese emperor 
could be, or indeed had ever been, a reliable protector of Britain’s interests and honour in 
China. 
        Likewise, in the immediate run up to the war, the general character of the ordinary 
Chinese people was also reexamined. In the past, many British visitors to China had tended to 
regard the Chinese middle and lower classes as being friendly and commercially-minded 
people, possessed of a good temper and a cheerful disposition. As more intercourse with them 
took place, however, some British observers began to claim that they had been deluded by the 
Chinese people’s outward forms, because, on a closer inspection, ‘nothing is visible but 
fraud, hypocrisy, and falsehood’.
136
 According to these new attitudes, ‘a disregard for veracity 
is so common among the lower orders of Chinese, and those a little above them’,
137
 while 
‘personal profit and convenience is all they look to; and so long as we contribute anything to 
pamper that selfish feeling, they will profess themselves to be our friends. But hollow are 
their promises, and fragile the ties that bind them to us’.
138
 For these reasons, even though it 
was still believed that the Chinese people were passionately interested in commerce, it had to 
be remembered that, their professed friendship and pretended hospitality were by no means 
genuine or trustworthy. For these seemingly straightforward people, in order to gain an end, 
‘no pretense is too barefaced, no lie too monstrous, to be resorted to’.
139
 Moreover, the British 
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commentators also affirmed that the morality of which the Chinese boasted was essentially a 
pretence, while cruelty was another major characteristic of these people. In China, it was 
noted, infanticide was widely practised and daughters of lower class families were often sold 
as prostitutes or slaves.
140
 On quite a few occasions, so it was claimed, when a Chinese man 
fell into water, no rescue effort was made at all by his fellow countrymen. Instead, they 
simply looked on with indifference. In consequence of such inhumane acts performed by 
ordinary Chinese people, who were observed to show no mercy to their own children or 
compatriots, the previously held image of China’s populace as being essentially kindhearted 
was further eroded. Since neither the Chinese monarch nor his subjects were now considered 
as dependable at all in terms of establishing or sustaining honourable and profitable relations, 
the British both in Canton and at home became increasingly convinced that ‘there is no 
security for us in future but the strong hand of power, such as we can wield for our own 
protection’.
141
 As a result, the need for the British government to become directly involved in 
Chinese internal affairs was further confirmed.  
        It can be seen from the above that the pressing necessity of the British government’s 
intervention in China was significantly justified from a variety of perspectives. A general 
inclination to interfere had been reached to a considerable extent. Although, in April 1840, 
the idea of war was supported in the British Parliament by only a narrow majority, the 
disparity of views over the propriety of ‘intervention’ was actually not as great as has been 
commonly presumed. In other words, the actual inclination to interfere in the affairs of China 
was in fact much greater than what the voting results in Parliament appear to indicate. For 
those who approved of a war plan, the narrow majority in Parliament did not really arise from 
their position in the controversy over the nature of the opium trade. For those in the minority, 
the decision to vote against the war at this time did not necessarily indicate their acceptance 
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of Lin Zexu’s conduct. What divided opinions, on this crisis, was not whether it was 
legitimate for Britain to involve itself in Chinese affairs for the sake of the opium trade, but 
the disagreement inside and outside Parliament on whether an immediate large-scale war 
against China was the best option for the British government to take. In this respect, various 
viewpoints were put forward on what specific means should be adopted in future British 
operations. 
        First and foremost, in the late-1830s, it was notable that the actual use of force was 
much more favoured in comparison to the attitude taken a few years earlier. Probably in 
consequence of the opium crisis, quite a number of commentators now insisted that the 
response to the injuries delivered to Britain’s honour and interests, as well as the desire to 
extend peaceful commerce, ‘must be enforced at the cannon’s mouth’.
142
 They suggested that 
since China had inflicted upon Britain intolerable insults and injuries, it deserved ‘the most 
signal chastisement in our power’.
143
 To achieve this end, ‘a powerful armament’
144
 should be 
sent to China, first of all, to blow up ‘every fort at the mouth of the Canton river’,
145
 and 
then, to ‘demand, in the highest tone, defined treaties, both political and commercial, or the 
alternative to China of an aggression on her territory, or the occupation of an island, to secure 
the due protection of our subjects and their property’.
146
 Accordingly, to those who concurred 
with this point of view, the proposed response was fully justified because previous relations 
between the two countries had proved that it was utterly useless to attempt to conciliate the 
Chinese authorities. Only a firm military response would check their insolence and compel 
their submission. Under the present circumstances, these commentators believed that open 
violence would help to create such a great sensation that the Chinese government would 
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certainly be forced to make concessions. Otherwise, ‘as long as the forts are allowed to 
remain in the hands of the Chinese, all negotiation will be useless’.
147
 In other words, in order 
to obtain justice from the Chinese, the use of military force was an absolute prerequisite. 
Aligned with this opinion, these commentators also argued that the present crisis had 
provided ‘a golden opportunity’
148
 to give the Chinese a lesson. For one thing, unlike the case 
of Lord Napier, the conduct of Commissioner Lin Zexu had provided ample grounds for 
legitimising the British government’s forcible intervention in Chinese affairs. Moreover, since 
the imperial government of China had adopted force to compel compliance with its demands, 
the British, with equal justice, were undeniably entitled to adopt a similarly vigorous policy. 
Probably in consideration of these same points, Elliot declared that ‘a more just, necessary, or 
favourable conjunction for action never presented itself’.
149
 Soon after the crisis escalated in 
Macao, he wrote to Palmerston again as follows:  
 
I am more and more convinced, my Lord, that the late crisis, and the just ground 
of interference afforded to Her Majesty's Government, will enable it to interpose, 
under the most favourable circumstances, for the establishment of regular and 
honourable trade on a firm basis, … for the effectual check or regulation of a 
traffic, which by the present manner of its pursuit must every day become … more 
discreditable to the character of the Christian nations, under whose flags it is 
carried on.
150
 
 
Given an awareness of these arguments and perceptions, the prevalence of pro-war 
sentiments becomes increasingly comprehensible: since justice was clearly on the British 
side, and force was the most effective means of responding to Chinese actions, the present 
opportunity should not be lost if Britain’s relations with China were to be placed on a 
satisfactory footing. 
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        In comparison with the mid-1830s and even before then, another notable difference in 
the position adopted in the late-1830s was that, at least a significant number of those in 
favour of open hostilities against China were no longer disposed to underestimate the 
difficulty of overawing the Chinese. Ever since Lord Macartney’s time, British commentators 
on Chinese affairs had entertained a rather sanguine outlook on the weakness of the Chinese 
defences. Up until the mid-1830s, many observers who supported the ‘show of force’ option 
still believed that a small-scale demonstration of Britain’s naval force would be sufficient to 
frighten the timid Chinese court, which would then unreservedly yield to the demands of the 
British. By the time the country was almost on the brink of war, however, this view had been 
significantly altered. Quite a few observers accepted that ‘the conviction [that] the Chinese 
are a nation of cowards, is a very unwarranted and a very unsafe one’,
151
 and admitted that 
‘we are equally erroneous in our estimate of their resources and their power’.
152
 On the basis 
of these revised perceptions, it was proposed for the first time that, in the anticipated 
expedition to China, not only as many warships and armed vessels as possible should be 
deployed, but a sufficient military force was also desirable.
153
 To justify this proposal, some 
observers contended that, after all, China possessed ‘a people unbounded in population, 
animated by the purest patriotism, and by the most enthusiastic attachment to the laws and 
institutions under which they had enjoyed prosperity and peace’.
154
 It was therefore difficult 
to imagine that such a people would succumb to an invasion by a foreign country without 
offering stiff resistance. Moreover, in order to produce a favourable effect upon these people 
and their government, it was vitally important to make sure that the British expeditionary 
force sent out to China succeeded in all its undertakings, so that the Chinese would be 
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sufficiently impressed with and overawed by Britain’s formidable military and naval strength. 
In this regard, an author in The Canton Press, expounding on this argument, advised that:  
 
In putting any of our military or naval plans in execution, we employ such 
numbers and such moyens militaries as always to make victory certain, so that on 
no occasion may we allow the Chinese the slightest pretext for claiming the 
smallest advantage over us … if we permit the Chinese to beat us even if the odds 
be twenty to one, still if they beat us, our prestige of superiority is gone, and our 
cause lost even before we have well begun it.
155
 
 
According to these views, a war against the Chinese empire not only became more 
conceivable than ever before, but it became more widely accepted that if an expedition were 
to be launched, it should definitely be composed of sufficient forces to ensure ultimate 
success. 
        Contrary to those who were vehemently calling for a large-scale war, however, some 
other observers pointed out that, although there were just grounds to intervene in Chinese 
affairs, and the success of open violence was almost certain, a war against China might not be 
the most appropriate way of establishing proper relations with the Chinese government. 
These observers reckoned that a war was a threat to the safety of the Chinese people, as well 
as to Britain’s long-term interests in the Far East. Hence, these observers proposed that ‘every 
peaceful resort must be exhausted, before force is employed against China’.
156
 Even if the 
most extreme measures had to be adopted eventually, the scale of Britain’s initial operations 
should be limited. It should be remembered that the purpose of Britain’s response was to 
demand reparations from the Chinese for the insults and injuries inflicted on British interests, 
rather than to seek aggrandisement or promote aggression of any kind. Otherwise, British 
power might become over-extended: ‘if we once planted our flag and built a fort within the 
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Chinese dominions, circumstances would compel us to extend our limits, and our career of 
British India would be repeated in China’.
157
 Since China was not only much bigger than 
India, but also very different, any attempt to obtain territorial acquisitions in that country 
might create an incredible burden for Great Britain as well as for its existing empire in the 
east. Moreover, it was pointed out that, as the ultimate object of this action was to improve 
commercial intercourse between the two nations, every care should to be taken to preserve 
amicable relations with the Chinese people. For the sake of Britain’s trade in future, any 
hostile measures taken against China should be designed to involve ordinary citizens as little 
as possible. In order to avoid rousing vindictive feelings among the Chinese populace, in 
particular, it was vital to restrict bloodshed to ‘the mandarins and military who would come 
to interfere with our works’,
158
 while, at the same time, endeavouring to ‘protect, cherish, and 
refrain from injuring, the Chinese people’.
159
 Even though a war against China might be 
inevitable, it should not therefore be ‘a war of blood and of reprisals’,
160
 nor should the 
means applied to obtain justice exceed what was necessary to achieve Britain’s limited 
objectives. Politicians such as Sir Robert Peel strongly urged Parliament: 
 
do not enter into this war without a becoming spirit – a spirit becoming the name 
and character of England. Do not forget the peculiar character of the people with 
whom you have to deal, and so temper your measures that as little evil as possible 
may remain. … It is your duty to vindicate the honour of England where 
vindication is necessary, and to demand reparation wherever reparation is due. But 
God grant that all this may lead to the restoration of amicable relations with 
China.
 161
 
 
Those adhering to this opinion believed that the long-term effects of open hostilities had to be 
taken into consideration. Although the prospect of war was not absolutely unacceptable, any 
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military action against China should proceed with the utmost caution and prudence.         
        Compared to the number of observers holding the views just described, those who 
completely disagreed with the idea of going to war were in a small minority. As in the crisis 
debate, the main grounds of the arguments advanced by these commentators were still the 
sheer iniquity of the opium trade. They contended that, in order to diminish the evil inflicted 
upon the Chinese, the only just method of intervention was to ‘prohibit the growth of the 
poppy and manufacture of opium in British India’,
162
 and, meanwhile, to cooperate with the 
Chinese government in efforts to ‘seize all smugglers from henceforth, and deal with them as 
with pirates’.
163
 With regard to a potential war against China, it was considered not only 
indefensible ‘upon the principles of justice and humanity’,
164
 but injurious to Britain’s 
interests and honour in the east. These commentators maintained that, although violence had 
been employed by the Chinese, the Chinese authorities should not be regarded as being the 
unjust party just because of these actions. It was stressed that what the Chinese had done ‘was 
only a reciprocation of outrage and violence. … the crime does not originate in secondary, 
but in primary causes … these reciprocal injuries are but symptoms of that evil disease our 
people have carried into the land of others’.
165
 It was therefore indisputable that the opium 
traffic was ‘the sole cause of the war’.
166
 For this reason, if open hostilities were to be 
adopted against China, it would not only be ‘a most unjust and unfair attack upon the 
Chinese, who had done nothing more than we had compelled them to do’,
167
 but it would 
‘add another gross insult to humanity, and to the laws of nations’
168
 by the British 
government. Moreover, some of these commentators claimed that, quite separate from any 
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concern over the immorality of the war, it was impractical to believe that the war could be 
terminated in a single campaign. Once operations commenced, it ‘would be no little war’.
169
 
Since ‘an independent nation will always resent any condition imposed upon it at the point of 
the Bayonet’,
170
 a war of conquest would turn out to be necessary in order to achieve 
Britain’s ultimate commercial goals. Since it was obvious that Britain was simply not strong 
enough to complete the conquest of China, the consequences of starting such a war would be 
disgrace to the honour of Britain and danger to Britain’s commercial interests in China. 
Furthermore, in the long term, if China was awakened from its present dormant state, ‘the 
combined nations of Europe, would hardly compete with her single and united power’.
171
 As 
a consequence, not only Britain’s rule in India, but its influence across the whole British 
empire might be placed in jeopardy. 
        In spite of the existence of these arguments, it is clear that they were expressed by only a 
small minority in the pre-war discussions on how to respond to China’s actions. It can be 
observed that the main ground on which these arguments were based, i.e., the immorality of 
the opium trade, did not vary greatly from that employed in the earlier debates on British-
Chinese relations. This fact, to a great extent, determined that those whose arguments against 
going to war were so much in the minority that some commentators even openly stated that, 
in Parliament, ‘no member was willing to declare himself directly opposed to a war with 
China’.
172
 All in all, it can be concluded that, in the late-1830s, the discussions on the best 
course of conduct that Britain should adopt towards China differed markedly from those 
advanced in the past. In contrast to the ‘show of force’ theory, by this time, a war against 
China was substantially justified by various commentators anxious to defend Britain’s 
economic interests and national honour in the Far East. Although there was not yet entire 
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added. 
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agreement on the scale and specific means of military intervention in China, a general 
agreement was reached on the justice and viability of adopting a reasonably strong stance 
with regard to China. This significant change of attitude, by and large, arose from the altered 
circumstances and from the changed British perceptions of China occasioned by Lin Zexu’s 
strong-arm policy during the opium crisis. After this incident, many British commentators 
believed that no Chinese person, from the emperor down to the lowest official, was any 
longer capable of protecting Britain’s interests and honour. As a result, a vigorous 
intervention became almost inevitable because to so many Britons it seemed the only 
effective way for the British government to respond to Chinese actions against British 
subjects. 
 
IV 
Conclusion 
It can be seen from this chapter that, in the complexity of pre-Opium War controversies over 
China and over opium-related issues, although the debates on the subjects of opium, crisis 
and war were considerably interwoven with each other, they can also be viewed separately 
and in their own right. In each of these discussions, the impact and relative strength of 
different viewpoints varied greatly. Initially, the British arguments against the opium trade 
were not at all weak, but, after the opium crisis had arisen, the case for British intervention 
gradually gained the upper hand. Although, in April 1840, the Whig government won the vote 
on its motion for war by only a small majority, there was in fact greater common ground 
among concerned observers in support of Britain adopting a policy of vigorous intervention 
in Chinese affairs. War against China, at any rate, became an acceptable prospect, even 
though, in the opinions of many commentators, it was still not the country’s best option. In 
contrast, those, who insisted that justice was entirely on the Chinese side, and hence a war 
245 
 
was by no means advisable, were reduced to a small minority. On this basis, it has been 
shown in this chapter that general support for government intervention in Chinese affairs was 
not justified in order to protect the opium trade. There were in fact very few commentators 
who attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of war solely on the basis of the economic 
importance of this traffic. Instead, the immorality of the opium trade was often viewed apart 
from the injustice of the recent actions taken by the Chinese. It was on the latter ground, 
rather than the former, that different interpretations of justice and legality were disputed. 
Eventually, notwithstanding the notoriety of the illicit opium trade, the necessity and 
timeliness of dispatching a military expedition to China was justified, on the grounds of 
various concerns over the long-term and short-term interests and honour of Britain and her 
empire, as well as on the determination to protect the lives and property of British subjects 
from a capricious Chinese government and its unreliable people. In the short term, since 
before the late-1830s, there had been no general disposition to expect or advocate a war and, 
hence, the commencement of hostilities between Britain and China can be viewed as the 
result of specific and unexpected developments. Although this conflict was originally derived 
from the opium question, it was Lin Zexu’s decision to suppress this illegal trade by coercive 
means, rather than anything else, that can be viewed as the immediate trigger for hostilities. 
In the long run, however, the outbreak of this war can be attributed to the consolidation of an 
unfavourable image of the Chinese empire developed because of changing circumstances. 
Although we should not maintain that the negative and untrustworthy impressions of the 
Chinese emperor, government and people had rendered the Opium War inevitable, a British-
Chinese war would probably not have been conceivable, justifiable and acceptable without 
these developing perceptions and prejudices in Britain that were gradually constructed over 
the course of the previous five decades.   
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PART III 
CHAPTER SIX 
Britain through Chinese eyes: 
Chinese perceptions of Britain during the early Sino-British encounters 
 
The previous five chapters have shown that the outbreak of the Opium War could not have 
been possible without the developing perceptions acquired and produced by British observers 
and commentators who were directly involved with Chinese affairs. Along with the 
discoveries and image-building from the British perspective, some general knowledge about 
China’s internal history of this period, as well as an introduction to the Chinese people’s early 
notions of Britain, can help us appreciate how accurate and realistic were British perceptions 
of China. Although a balanced comparative study is not the aim of this thesis, nor is it really 
practicable given the relatively limited Chinese sources available, it is certainly helpful to set 
this half-century of encounters between Britain and China in the context of Chinese history. 
This chapter, mainly based on materials in the Chinese language, explains the major 
developments occurring in China over these decades and investigates how Great Britain was 
known to and perceived by the Chinese government and people before the country was 
forcibly thrown open by war. It also explains the problems facing the Qing government in 
this increasingly troublesome period and it then shows that, although the imperial 
government was not entirely unaware of the potential threat from Britain, serious attention 
had not been paid to studying this approaching outsider. Instead of undertaking an intensive 
state-sponsored investigation, it was through trade and some individual efforts that some 
initial understandings of Britain and the British people were obtained by the Chinese 
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government and people. This superficial and scattered knowledge provides a sharp contrast to 
Britain’s growing comprehension of China and interest in Chinese affairs during this period. 
 
I 
The Chinese context: dynastic decline 
Lord Macartney came to the Qing court at the very end of the Qianlong reign. It was around 
the same time that a range of social and economic problems became increasingly clear in 
China as early signs of the Qing dynasty’s decline. Overpopulation, land shortage, the fiscal 
weakness of the government, and unceasing rebellions became the major themes of China’s 
internal history in the half century before the Opium War. For these reasons, when the British 
people attempted to discover or began to dispute what the ‘real’ China was in this period, it 
should be noted that China itself was changing fast and experiencing a variety of crises. 
Alongside the challenges brought by westerners based on the country’s southeast coast, these 
internal changes not only increased the difficulty the British had in understanding China, but 
also accounts for some of the different observations they made at different times. 
        In the history of the Qing dynasty, the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns, which 
covered the period from 1662 to 1795, are known as ‘Kang-Qian shengshi (康乾盛世; the 
prosperous age of the Kangxi until the Qianlong reigns)’. During this period, with the 
consolidation of Manchu rule, the conquest and subsequent integration of vast western 
territories into the Chinese state, as well as the expansion of the country’s external and 
internal trade, the Qing dynasty reached the apogee of its power. Nevertheless, as Philip A. 
Kuhn has stated, when the Qianlong emperor (1711-99, r. 1735-95) ‘proudly bequeathed 
Jiaqing a “prosperous age” in which Chinese people had doubled in number, and Beijing’s 
control had penetrated deep into Central Asia’, ‘his son inherited not prosperity, but a cascade 
248 
 
of troubles’.
1
 The enormous cost of Qianlong’s military campaigns, as well as the increasing 
luxury of official lives, on which the Qianlong emperor himself set the tone, seriously 
depleted the Chinese treasury’s once healthy finances.2 Moreover, the abundance of silver 
drawn in by foreign trade over the past two centuries fuelled a steady inflation of prices in the 
Chinese economy. After the 1780s, in particular, with local government becoming 
increasingly costly, but the means of meeting these costs remaining unchanged, the rising 
expenses of government became a pressing problem for the Qing rulers. Under such 
circumstances, in order to slow the drain of revenues from the treasury, a remarkable feature 
of the Jiaqing (1760-1820, r. 1796-1820) and the subsequent Daoguang (1782-1850, r. 1820-
50) reigns was ‘a highly publicized effort to reduce spending by curbing waste and 
conspicuous consumption at court’.3 The Jiaqing emperor, in particular, not only halted the 
annual tributes presented by provincial officials in border provinces, but, through his own 
example, ended the imperial tradition of southern tours to the lower Yangzi delta, China’s 
most advanced economic region.4 These extravagant ‘tours of inspection to the south (南巡; 
nanxun)’, especially those conducted by the Qianlong emperor, were known to have resulted 
in lavish expenditure and a drain on resources.5 Along the route of these tours,6 local officials 
                                                          
1 Philip A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 
3. Unlike most of the emperors in Chinese history, the Qianlong emperor abdicated the throne in 1795 
when his reign reached sixty years, in order to pay respect to his grandfather, the Kangxi emperor, who had 
ruled for sixty-one years. Qianlong, however, continued to rule behind the scenes until 1799, in which year 
he died at the age of eighty-eight. 
2 Wei Kewei 魏克威, ‘Lun Jiaqing zhongshuai de yuanyin’ 论嘉庆中衰的原因 (‘On the reasons for the 
Qing dynasty’s decline during the Jiaqing reign’), Qingshi yanjiu, 2 (1992), 39-40. 
3 Susan M. Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, ‘Dynastic decline and the roots of rebellion’, in The Cambridge 
History of China, ed. John K. Fairbank, et al. (15 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), X, 
118. 
4  Chen Xulu 陈旭麓 , Jindai Zhongguo shehui de xinchendaixie 近代中国社会的新陈代谢  (The 
metabolism of modern Chinese society) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1992), p. 41.  
5 The Kangxi and Qianlong emperors each undertook six such tours in their respective reigns. The motives 
behind the Qianlong emperor’s southern tours are much debated. Xiao Yishan maintained that these tours 
were in essence self-aggrandizing pomp, simply to please the Qianlong emperor. See Xiao Yishan 萧一山, 
Qingdai tongshi 清代通史 (A general history of the Qing period) (5 vols., Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 
II, 73. Others contended that these tours of inspection were instruments of Qianlong’s administration and 
policy-making, especially in terms of water control. See Xu Kai 徐凯 and Shang Quan 商全, ‘Qianlong 
nanxun yu zhihe’ 乾隆南巡与治河 (‘Qianlong’s southern tours and (the Yellow) River conservancy’), 
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and wealthy merchants competed to curry favour with the emperor by presenting gifts and 
building luxury accommodation. For example, it was recorded that, in order to receive the 
Qianlong emperor during a visit to Yangzhou, 5,154 palatial rooms and 196 pavilions were 
erected or refurbished and, in general, this pattern was repeated in almost every urban centres 
in which the Qianlong emperor was accommodated.7 As most of these lavishly decorated 
buildings remained largely unattended after Qianlong’s last southern tour in 1784, when they 
were visited by the two British embassies, whose return journey from Beijing to Canton 
covered much of this route, very different views were presented. In 1793, some initial signs 
of disrepair shown on these buildings did not rouse much attention from Macartney’s 
embassy. As has been discussed in chapter two, however, when largely the same route was 
taken by the Amherst mission in 1816, thirty-two years after the Qianlong emperor last sailed 
down the Grand Canal, the dilapidation of Chinese buildings, including these ones, became a 
noticeable feature of the Jiaqing reign. It was also as a result of this discovery that the British 
travellers first detected the decline of Qing power. 
        Another striking phenomenon of mid-Qing China was the immense growth of 
population, which has been regarded as ‘the root cause of nearly every ill that affected the 
Qing dynasty’.8 Since the beginning of the Qianlong reign, the relative peace and stability of 
that period saw China’s population triple from around 140 million to over 420 million within 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Beijng daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 北京大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) (Journal of Peking 
University (Humanities and Social Sciences)), 6 (1990), 99-109; Michael G. Chang, ‘Fathoming Qianlong: 
Imperial activism, the southern tours, and the politics of water control, 1736-1765’, Late Imperial China, 
24 (2003), 51-108. Nevertheless, it has been widely accepted that these tours to the lower Yangzi delta 
caused so much waste of resources that the expenditure exceeded what this region could produce. 
6 For each of Qianlong’s southern tours, the emperor and his royal party travelled overland from Beijing to 
Qingkou in Jiangsu, where they crossed the Yellow River and then sailed along the Grand Canal, passing 
through Yangzhou, Suzhou, Hangzhou, etc. The return route passed through Jiangning (Nanjing), where 
the Qianlong emperor paid tribute to the mausoleum of emperor Taizu of the Ming dynasty. The entire 
journey covered nearly 2,800 kilometres.   
7 ‘The Southern Expedition of Emperors Kangxi and Qianlong’, China Heritage Quarterly, 9 (Mar 2007). 
See http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?issue=009; accessed 28 May 2013.  
8 Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1987), p. 223. 
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approximately 120 years.9 Despite the remarkable economic growth in the ‘prosperous age’, 
by the end of the eighteenth century, ‘there was every indication that the Chinese economy, at 
its prevailing technological level, could no longer gainfully sustain an ever-increasing 
population without overstraining itself’.10 Prices rose, food shortages threatened, and villages 
became so crowded that there was not enough land for everyone. With the importation of new 
crops from the Americas, such as sweet potatoes, maize and peanuts, which could be grown 
in relatively poor soil,11 the eighteenth century turned out to be ‘China’s greatest age of 
internal migration’.12 Landless farmers from densely settled southern areas not only moved 
into the hilly uplands, but to the frontiers of central and western China in search of 
agricultural land. This massive migration, in consequence, gave rise to various interethnic 
conflicts between Han settlers and the aboriginal societies of these regions. As the following 
table shows, between 1795 and 1840, most of China’s major uprisings took place in the 
recently-settled areas where the Chinese state was weak and ethnic and religious minorities 
were strong. The Qing government’s unrelenting suppression of these rebellions, hence, 
became a major theme of this period. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Huang Aiping 黄爱平, ‘Qianjia shiqi de shehui bianhua yu jingshi zhuzhang’ 乾嘉时期的社会变化与经
世主张 (‘Social changes and the statecraft school of thought during the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns’), 
Qingshi yanjiu, 2 (1997), 101-2. Official data of Qing population between 1741 and 1850 can be found in 
Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China 1368-1953 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1959), appendix I, pp. 281-2. 
10 Ho, Studies on the Population of China, p. 206. 
11 Some historians have attributed the demographic expansion to increased food production, which in part 
resulted from the appearance of these crops that helped feed more people. See Dwight H. Perkins, 
Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 13-26; 
Ho, Studies on the Population of China, pp. 137-68. Song Xuwu and Zhao Shanxuan, however, do not 
agree with this view. They maintain that the long period of internal peace was the main reason for the 
demographic boom. See Song Xuwu 宋叙五, Zhao Shanxuan 赵善轩, Qingchao qianjia zhihou guoshi 
shuaitui de jingji yuanyin 清朝乾嘉之后国势衰退的经济原因 (The economic causes of Qing dynasty’s 
decline during and after the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns) (Hong Kong: Shue Yan College, 2004), pp. 28-
32.    
12 Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State, p. 6. 
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Major Domestic Uprisings, 1795-1840 
Case   Period Affected region 
Miao aboriginal uprising   
White Lotus sect uprising 
The rampage of Pirate Cai Qian 
Eight Trigrams uprising 
Sancai timber workers uprising 
Yi aboriginal uprising 
Muslim uprising 
Tibetan and Mongol uprising 
Blue Lotus sect uprising 
Li aboriginal uprising 
Yao aboriginal uprising 
Heaven-Earth society uprising 
Prebirth sect uprising 
Yao aboriginal uprising 
Yi aboriginal uprising 
1795-1806 
1796-1803 
1800-9 
1813 
1813-15 
1817-21 
1820-8 
1822 
1826 
1831 
1832 
1832-3 
1835 
1836 
1837 
Southwest China 
Sichuan, Hubei, Shannxi 
Southeast coast 
North China 
Northwest China 
Southwest China 
Xinjiang 
Qinghai 
Southeast coast (Taiwan) 
Lingnan 
Lingnan 
Southeast coast (Taiwan) 
Northwest China 
Middle Yangzi 
Upper Yangzi 
 
Source: Adapted and modified from Table 4, in Naquin and. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth 
Century, p. 228, and ‘Appendix Table’ in C.K. Yang, ‘Some Preliminary Statistical Patterns of Mass 
Actions in Nineteenth-Century China’, in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Frederic 
Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), p. 209. 
 
        Moreover, in the traditional core areas such as the urbanised lower Yangzi delta and the 
Pearl River delta, the effects of demographic pressure were also considerable. Most notably, 
while the population more than doubled, the number of official posts in the Chinese 
government did not increase accordingly. This situation caused ‘an overproduction of literate 
men in relation to the capacity of the economic and political systems to absorb and reward 
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them’.13 Since the Ming dynasty, a Chinese man’s primary path to upward mobility had been 
through education and the imperial examination system. As the population continued to grow, 
however, this formerly effective mechanism for mobility was seriously undermined. A large 
number of educated men were rendered jobless in their search for official employment, for 
which they were technically qualified. As with the land-poor farmers, frustration, insecurity, 
and dissatisfaction with the government by these educated men were constantly on the rise. In 
part, as a result of these common sentiments, the early decades of the nineteenth century saw 
a surge of secret societies across many parts of the Chinese empire. As with the White Lotus 
Society and its numerous sub-sects,14 these organisations not only offered spiritual support to 
those whose traditional social ties had been weakened, but provided mutual aid and a safety 
net under a pseudo-kinship structure. As many of these secret societies were associated with 
the persistent Ming loyalism whose political orientation was to ‘overthrow the Qing and 
restore the Ming (反清复明; fanqing fuming)’, the Qing government in the early nineteenth 
century was extremely cautious to guard against threats from these difficult to control 
societies. Especially after the Eight Trigrams uprising of 1813, when a contingent of the 
Heavenly Principle Society (天理教; Tianli jiao) even penetrated into the Forbidden City,15 
the Qing rulers became particularly alarmed at any potential disturbance that might be excited 
in Beijing. This context, in addition to the fact that self-preservation had always been the 
Qing court’s primary concern, may account in part for the Jiaqing emperor’s indifferent 
attitude towards the Amherst mission in 1816. Since any contact between the militarily 
                                                          
13 Jones and Kuhn, ‘Dynastic decline and the roots of rebellion’, in The Cambridge History of China, X, 
110. 
14 The White Lotus Society was a popular religious sect whose origin dated back to the eleventh century. 
The rebellion it led against the Qing regime between 1796 and 1804 was frequently cited as the turning 
point of the Qing history. In the following decades, numerous sub-sects of the White Lotus continued to 
harass the Qing government. See Johns and Kuhn, ‘Dynastic decline and the roots of rebellion’, in The 
Cambridge History of China, X, 136-44; Naquin and Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 
227. 
15 Details about this incident can be found in Qing shi 清史 (History of the Qing dynasty), ed. Li Zhiting 李
治亭 (2 vols., Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2002), II, 1404-8. 
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powerful foreigners and China’s local society had been considered by the Chinese authorities 
as a dangerous signal, the Qing government’s general suspicion of foreigners, especially of 
those who came into the interior of China, became one of the most notable impressions that 
British observers obtained from their visits to China.  
        In brief, during the half century before the Opium War, there had been clear signs of 
Qing dynastic decline. The task of maintaining order over an expanding and increasingly 
belligerent population became more and more difficult for the financially troubled imperial 
government. It was around the same period, as the previous chapters have shown, that 
China’s contacts with western nations, especially Britain, greatly increased. The three major 
Sino-British encounters between 1793 and 1840, i.e., the Macartney and the Amherst 
embassies and the lead-up to the Opium War, occurred in the three different reigns over this 
timespan. In the rest of this chapter, details about the Chinese people’s and government’s 
perceptions of Britain in each of these reigns will be introduced and analysed. 
 
II 
Chinese perceptions of Britain in the Qianlong period 
Although the periodisation of modern Chinese history as beginning with the Opium War has 
been challenged, research on Chinese understandings of Britain before this fateful dispute 
remains inadequate. Probably because of China’s enormous population, Chinese knowledge 
about Britain in this period was often believed to be minimal or even negligible. Although, at 
this time, the vast majority of the Chinese people might indeed have had no impression of the 
British, the initial encounters between the two peoples and governments did make some 
Chinese aware of this nation from afar. 16  In general, the early notions of Britain were 
                                                          
16 There has recently been a debate between some western and Chinese historians on the Qing dynasty’s 
multi-ethnic identity. These western scholars tend to emphasise that the Qing dynasty was a multi-ethnic 
empire that was not entirely synonymous with ‘China’. While partly agreeing with this opinion, some 
Chinese historians point out that the difference between China and ‘the Great Qing’ has been overstated 
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introduced into China through two channels: one was the imperial government in Beijing, the 
other was the local elites and merchants in the southeast coastal areas. As a consequence of 
their respective contacts with the British, credible as well as inaccurate information about 
these ‘outsiders’ was produced. With the engagements between the two nations increasingly 
strengthened, China’s attitudes towards Britain were also gradually changing. Due to the lack 
of a state-directed effort to understand these foreigners, however, these perceptions that grew 
in the court and on the coast sometimes had an impact on each other, but sometimes remained 
largely separate and distinct. 
        In the reign of Qianlong, the southeastern coastal Chinese reached a deeper 
understanding of Britain, largely because of their easier access to western traders and 
products, while similar progress in knowledge was not so clearly seen in the imperial court at 
Beijing. From the latter part of the seventeenth century, Britain’s commercial intercourse 
with China had increased steadily. During the Qianlong period, Britain replaced Holland as 
China’s biggest trading partner from Europe and British merchants who came to trade with 
China considerably outnumbered those from other western nations. Although, according to 
Chinese law, commerce with foreign countries was restricted to only a limited number of 
ports,17 the smuggling of British goods was in fact widespread along China’s southeast coast, 
especially near the ports of Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai. In these areas, growing 
commercial activity enabled local residents to have more contacts with British people and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
according to this view and that, in fact, the Manchus’ ethnic identity was not so much in opposition to their 
national identity as ‘Chinese’. In this regard, an international conference on ‘Politics and national identity 
in the Qing dynasty’ was held in Beijing in 2010. Scholars from both sides attended this conference and 
the proceedings of this conference have been published. See Qingdai zhengzhi yu guojia renting 清代政治
与国家认同 (Politics and national identity in the Qing dynasty), ed. Liu Fengyun 刘凤云, Dong Jianzhong 
董建中, Liu Wenpeng 刘文鹏 (2 vols., Beijing: Sheke wenxian chubanshe, 2010); Huang Xingtao 黄兴涛, 
‘Qingdai manren de “Zhongguo rentong”’ 清代满人的“中国认同” (‘The Manchus’ national identity in 
Qing dynasty’), Qingshi yanjiu, 1 (2011), 1-12; Critical Han studies: the history, representation, and 
identity of China's majority, ed. Thomas S. Mullaney, et al. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2012). 
17 In 1757, the Qianlong emperor ordered the closure of all these ports to foreign trade with the exception 
of Canton. 
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their culture. In consequence, not only were British commodities more welcomed in this 
region than in the rest of the Chinese empire, but Britain as a nation was also generally better 
understood.  
        In particular, because of the western products, which were generally known as yanghuo 
(foreign stuff), that were introduced mainly by British merchants, Chinese people in these 
coastal areas acquired some positive impressions of Britain. Since these commodities, such as 
fragrances, glasses, matches, ‘singsongs’ 18  and so on, were usually delicately made and 
reasonably priced, they were not only greatly admired and sought after, but eventually came 
into vogue in this region. 19  In general, everything relating to Britain or the West was 
considered to be in good taste. In Guangdong, for example, in order to satisfy the region’s 
great demand for tasteful yanghuo, some factories were established to fabricate comparable 
products. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, ‘whatever was valuable and finely crafted was 
referred to as western goods’,
20
 even if they were not really made by westerners. Compared 
with Chinoiserie, the almost concurrent British interest in Chinese goods and Chinese-
inspired artifacts, this Chinese craving for western commodities, although largely restricted in 
the country’s southeast, seemed to be more extensive among the ordinary populace. As Guan 
Tong, a famous scholar from Jiangning, recalled, ‘Yanghuo were heatedly talked about, so 
                                                          
18 ‘Singsongs’ most typically refers to ‘a clock, watch or fantastically shaped mechanical toy, such as a 
snuff box that conceals a jewelled bird which sings when the lid is open’, see Zheng Yangwen, The Social 
Life of Opium in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 73. 
19 Details about British exports to China and the circulation of yanghuo in China can be found in Patrick 
Conner, The China Trade, 1600-1860 (Brighton: Royal Pavilion Art Gallery and Museums, 1986), pp. 
141-7; Zheng Yangwen 郑扬文, ‘Qingdai yanghuo de liutong yu chengshi yang pinqian de chuxian’ 清代
洋货的流通与城市洋拼嵌的出现 (‘The circulation of foreign goods and the emergence of the foreign 
urban mosaic during the Qing’), in Cong chengshi kan Zhongguo de xiandaixing 从城市看中国的现代性 
(The City and Chinese Modernity), ed. Wu Renshu 巫仁恕, Paul Katz, Lin Meili 林美莉 (Taipei: Institute 
of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2010), pp. 37-52. 
20 Bao Shichen 包世臣, Da xiaomeisheng shu 答萧枚生书 (1828), in Jindai Zhongguo renshi xifang jiqi 
lieqiang ziliao huibian 近代中国认识西方及其列强资料汇编 (Collected materials on modern Chinese 
impressions on the Western powers, hereafter Collected materials), ed. Hu Qiuyuan 胡秋原 (2 vols., 
Taiwan: Academia Sinica, 1972), I, 800.  
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much so that even the poorest wanted to exhaust their money in order to follow this trend’.
21
 
Since Britain was constantly examined and looked upon favourably from a material point of 
view, an interest in other aspects of Britain was naturally aroused in this region. As a result, 
greater knowledge about Britain and the British people was introduced into China by 
residents on China’s southeastern coast.  
        First, Huangqing siyi kao (皇清四裔考; The Qing imperial examination of the outside 
peoples), a book compiled from the oral accounts of a Cantonese sailor who had travelled to 
Britain, was a notable contribution to Chinese knowledge of Britain at this time. According to 
Yang Xianyi, the author of Huangqing siyi kao landed near Liverpool and visited the north of 
England.
22 
In a few sentences, this Chinese sailor not only gave a brief description of what he 
saw in Lancashire and Hampshire, but introduced some details about Britain such as the 
succession to the British throne from George I to George III. This kind of first-hand 
knowledge about Britain had never been communicated to China before, especially by a 
Chinese person. In addition, it was also from the Qianlong period onwards that visual images 
of British people began to be circulated among the Chinese. In Huangqing zhigong tu (皇清
职贡图; The Qing imperial illustrations of tributaries), two portraits of a British ‘barbarian’ 
male and female were included (as shown below).23 It is not known whether these pictures 
were drawn from life or, perhaps more likely, from some imported images. Since no British 
man or woman had ever travelled to Beijing at this time, nor was any extensive Sino-British 
commerce conducted in north China, it is almost certain that these images were introduced 
into China thanks to the early commercial contacts between the British and the southeastern 
coastal Chinese. This was the first time that British figures were illustrated in an official 
                                                          
21 Guan Tong 管同, Jin chuan yanghuo yi 禁川洋货议 (1833), in Collected materials, I, 819.  
22 Yang Xianyi 杨宪益, ‘Shiba shiji guanyu yingguo de Zhongguo jizai’ 十八世纪关于英国的中国纪载 
(‘The 18th-century Chinese records on Britain’), Yiyu Oushi 译余偶拾 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1983), p. 
141. 
23 Huangqing zhigong tu, ed. Fu Heng 傅恒, Dong Gao 董诰, et al. (9 vols., 1761; reprinted, Changchun: 
Jilin chuban jituan, 2007), I, 121-2.  
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Chinese publication, by which the physical appearance of British men and women was 
presented to a wider readership across the country. 
  
              (‘A barbarian man from Ying-ji-li’)      (‘A barbarian woman from Ying-ji-li’)  
        Despite this advance in knowledge of Britain achieved in some southeastern maritime 
provinces, a similar grasp of British facts or collective interest in British products was not so 
clearly seen in other parts of the Chinese empire. Even though the Qianlong emperor was 
known for his appetite for and interest in foreign artifacts, the imperial court in Beijing did 
not seem to have a strong interest in investigating western nations, let alone Britain. The 
state-funded Daqing yitong zhi (大清一统志; The great Qing gazetteer)24 did not mention the 
country of Ying-ji-li at all. Although Qinding huangqing wenxian tongkao (钦定皇清文献通
考; Imperial comprehensive investigations based on literary and documentary sources), a 
later official work published in 1787, noted some British social customs, such as ‘Its people 
believe in the Christ’, ‘Their marriages are based on the agreement of the two sides’, 
                                                          
24 This gazetteer was edited under the order of the Qianlong emperor and was published in 1784. 
258 
 
‘Concubinage is prohibited’, ‘In greetings, people take off their hats and shake hands’
25
 and 
so on, it seems to be a collection of random findings obtained through actual contacts with 
British people rather than a careful and in-depth survey of Britain’s social, political, or 
military situation. Given the enormous size of this work, the tiny section that was devoted to 
introducing knowledge about Britain shows how little attention or interest was attached by 
the Qing government to studying Britain at this time.  
        Although it remains debatable whether the Qianlong emperor was really unaware of the 
potential threat from Britain,26 some clear signs of the imperial court’s attitudes towards 
Britain can still be found in the manner in which it received the Macartney mission. In the 
late eighteenth century, despite the early signs of Qing’s dynastic decline, the Chinese empire 
still possessed a vast territory and a huge population that easily dwarfed that of any European 
country. As Mark Elliott has pointed out, with the confidence derived from ‘an 
unprecedented period of peace and wealth’, there was ‘no pressing reason’ for the Qing court 
to be curious about European matters, nor did the Qianlong emperor ‘need to be interested in 
them’.27 Probably for this reason, in 1792, when the Qing court was first informed of the 
proposed visit from a British royal embassy, no official in Beijing was certain from which 
country this embassy was despatched or its exact geographical location.28 It was with the help 
                                                          
25 Qinding huangqing wenxian tongkao, ed. Zhang Tingyu 张廷玉, et al. (300 vols., 1787; reprinted, 
Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2000), CCXCVIII, 7471. 
26 Mosca has pointed out that not until the mid-1830s the Qing government had been holding a ‘regionally 
fragmented worldview’. According to this research, although ‘links between different frontiers were 
occasionally recognized’ by the Qing court, they were not systematically pursued. ‘Each remained a 
distinct field of strategic analysis; the empire’s overall strategic position was not considered’. See Matthew 
W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of 
Geopolitics in Qing China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 164.  
27 Mark C. Elliott, Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World (New York: Longman, 2009), pp. 
140-2. Italics in the original. 
28 Mark Elliott, however, maintains that the Qianlong emperor ‘was unquestionably familiar with Western 
geography’, particularly because he had a world map painted as a mural upon a wall in the Yuanming yuan 
palace. This viewpoint does not seem tenable, however, because Elliott did not take into account that even 
though the Qianlong emperor possessed some world maps, it did not necessarily mean that he knew where 
exactly particular European countries were located on them. Since Elliott could not explain why the 
Qianlong emperor inquired of Macartney how far Britain was from Russia and whether Italy and Portugal 
were not near Britain and tributary to it, Elliott suggested that the Qianlong emperor might have asked 
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of some European missionaries that they found out that ‘It is just the country of the Red Hair. 
It is situated in the north of the west ocean, and to the northwest of our celestial empire’.29 As 
the Macartney mission was despatched under the pretext of presenting congratulations on the 
Qianlong emperor’s eightieth birthday, the Qing government was largely unaware of the 
embassy’s real commercial and diplomatic intentions. Although, as Hevia and Mosca have 
suggested, the Qianlong court might have known something of Britain’s influence, 30 
particularly in India and in the vicinity of China’s southwestern frontiers, the British envoy 
was nevertheless regarded as a tribute bearer and was received in the traditional Chinese 
court manner. In this respect, it can be clearly seen that, no matter how much the Qing 
government really knew of Britain in 1793, or how much the Qianlong emperor was offended 
personally by Macartney’s refusal to kowtow, the imperial court was keen to represent 
Britain as a sincere and reverent barbarian state which admired Chinese civilisation. For 
instance, the Qianlong emperor stated in his letter to the British monarch:   
 
Although your country, O King, lies in the far oceans, yet inclining your heart 
towards civilisation you have specifically sent an envoy respectfully to present a 
state message, and sailing the seas he has come to our court to kowtow and to 
present congratulations for the imperial birthday, and also to present local 
products, thereby showing your sincerity.31  
 
In line with this tone, Macartney’s refusal to comply with the kowtow ceremony was 
interpreted in a tolerant light. According to the Qing government’s representation, it was the 
unique British custom rather than the envoy’s personal feelings that prevented the British 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
these questions deliberately in order to conceal his knowledge about Britain. No evidence, however, has 
been presented to support this conjecture. See ibid., p. 140.  
29 Zhanggu congbian 掌故丛编 (The Collection of Historical Anecdotes, hereafter ZGCB], ed. Department 
of Historical Anecdotes, the Palace Museum 故宫博物院掌故部 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), p. 616. 
30 Hevia, Cherishing men from afar, pp. 181-91; Matthew W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign 
Policy, pp. 127-160.  
31 Imperial edict from the Qianlong emperor to King George III of Britain, in An Embassy to China: Being 
the  ournal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch’ien-lung 1793-1794, ed. J.L. 
Cranmer-Byng (London: Longmans, 1962), p. 337. 
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visitors from performing kowtow, because ‘It is this country’s custom to bind people’s legs 
by cloth. This practice makes prostrations very difficult for them. They are ignorant of the 
ritual of paying respect by kowtows’.
32
 Since kowtow in Chinese culture was such an 
essential ritual that required every polished person’s observance, those who were notified of 
this official explanation, but were out of touch with the British mission or merchants, might 
reasonably infer that Britain was just an uncivilised country. 
        In sum, during the Qianlong reign, compared to the imperial government in Beijing, the 
southeastern coastal Chinese achieved a deeper understanding of Britain. Although some of 
this new knowledge might have been communicated to Beijing, the Qing government was 
largely unaware of Britain being a rising global power or of its real purpose in sending the 
Macartney mission. In consequence, no serious attention was paid to studying this major 
partner in external trade. Instead, whether intentionally or not, the Qianlong court tended to 
imagine and believe that Britain was but one of the many barbarian countries that admired 
and revered the refined and sophisticated Chinese culture. In other words, no matter how 
much it believed this itself, the Qing government at this time was certainly eager to promote a 
twofold image of this little known country: first, in terms of civilisation, uncivilised Britain 
could not compare with the great Middle Kingdom; second, this peaceful and submissive 
barbarian state could not pose a threat to the existing order of China’s ‘world’. 
 
III 
Chinese perceptions of Britain in the Jiaqing period 
As shown above, it can be seen that the limited Chinese perceptions of Britain, whether along 
the southeastern coast or within the imperial court, were without serious negative elements 
during the Qianlong period. These impressions, however, began to change at a rapid pace 
                                                          
32 ZGCB, p. 671. 
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during the reign of Jiaqing. As Britain and its merchants continued to strengthen their 
presence in south China, tensions between the two nations gradually built up. For this reason, 
not only did some of the coastal Chinese but so did the Qing government itself begin to feel 
concerned about the difficulties for China that the British might cause. Possible challenges 
from Britain became imaginable. Even though the Jiaqing emperor and his courtiers remained 
optimistic about China’s ability to check Britain in any emergency, the image of a deferential 
and peaceful Britain was quickly diminishing. Instead, the British were increasingly viewed 
as insolent and crafty savages.  
        British merchants had come to dominate China’s foreign trade through Canton not long 
after the Macartney mission left China. On the one hand, they contributed eighty per cent of 
the tariff paid to Canton customs (approximately 900,000 taels33 of silver per annum around 
1816).
34
 On the other hand, the number of economic and civil disputes between British 
merchants and coastal Chinese people increased significantly. Perhaps as a result, among the 
well-informed people in the southeast, their image of Britain shifted from a focus on the 
attractiveness of British goods to a consciousness of Britain’s maritime influence as well as 
its powerful military strength. For example, it was reported by Wang Dahai, a Fujian native 
who travelled around southeast Asia, that Britain ‘predominates in northwest Europe in terms 
of military instruments’,
35
 and that it ‘occupies the most crucial forts on the world’s main 
trade sea-routes; … Countries like Holland and France are often harassed by them’.
36
 In 1820, 
a Cantonese sailor named Xie Qinggao verified these facts as a result of his visit to Britain. In 
                                                          
33 The tael of currency at Canton was treated as equivalent to 6s. 8d. It was a hypothetical coin of pure 
silver used only in the East India Company’s accounts and in all cotton transactions. The basic circulating 
coin in foreign commerce at Canton during this period was the Spanish dollar, with an intrinsic value of 4s. 
2d. and an exchange value ranging from 3s. 11d. to 5s. See Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the 
Opening of China 1800-42 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951), p. vii. 
34 Report from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor (1816), in Qingdai waijiao 
shiliao (Jiaqing chao) 清代外交史料 (嘉庆朝) (Qing dynasty diplomatic documents (the Jiaqing period), 
hereafter QWS), ed. The Palace museum 故宫博物院 (6 vols., Taiwan: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), I, 22. 
35 Wang Dahai 王大海, Haidao yizhi 海岛逸志 (Lost gazetteer of the islands in the sea) (6 vols., 1806), III, 
6, Ying-ji-li section, in Collected materials, I, 752. 
36 Ibid., 751. 
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Hai lu (海录; An Account of the Seas), his maritime record, Xie confirmed the widespread 
opinion that ‘Britain vies to obtain all profitable places within the seas … it uses powerful 
military forces to back its mercantile activities’.
37
  
        In addition to this apprehension among the Chinese coastal people, causes of discontent 
with Britain were also beginning to influence the Jiaqing government. In 1802 and 1808, in 
particular, in order to take advantage of the chaotic situation resulting from the Napoleonic 
wars, as well as to secure its trade with China, Britain made two attempts to occupy Macao, 
the Portuguese settlement near Canton.38 These expeditions, although unsuccessful, greatly 
heightened the Qing court’s concern over Britain’s naval ambitions. From then on, in the 
official letters that the Jiaqing emperor received from Canton, positive words about Britain 
can rarely be found. Instead, the character of the British was represented in a clearly 
unfavourable light. In contrast to what was noted in the Qianlong period, the British were 
now denounced as ‘crafty (狡诈; jiaozha)’,39 ‘greedy (贪利; tanli)’,40 ‘fierce and cunning (强
横奸诈; qiangheng jianzha)’,41 ‘interest-oriented (利欲熏心; liyu xunxin)’42 and they were, in 
general, ‘the most harsh and cruel barbarians (诸番中最为桀骜 ; zhufan zhong zuiwei 
                                                          
37 Xie Qinggao, Hai lu (c. 1820), in Wei Yuan 魏源, Haiguo tuzhi 海国图志 (Illustrated treatise on the 
maritime kingdoms) (100 vols., 1852; reprinted, Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2011), LII, 1432. Hai lu was 
edited from Xie Qinggao’s oral accounts. 
38 Details about these two expeditions can be found in Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East 
India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834 (5 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), II, 357-72, III, 76-
95; Ma Lianpo 马廉颇, Huang Dingping 黄定平, ‘Shilun Jiaqing qi nian yingguo jiyu aomen shijian’ 试论
嘉庆七年英国觊觎澳门事件 (‘On British invasion of Macao in the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign’), 
Guangdong minzu xueyuan xuebao 广东民族学院学报 (Journal of Guangdong Institute for Nationalities), 
1 (1996), 21-7. 
39 Report from the governor of Guangdong to the Jiaqing emperor on Britain’s occupation of Macao, 28 
Oct. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), in QWS, II, 35. 
40 Report from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor on the cause of Britain’s 
intrusion into Macao, 20 Sep. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), in QWS, II, 
28. 
41 Report from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor on the current state of 
Britain, 8 Apr. (lunar calendar), the fourteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1809), in QWS, III, 6. 
42 Report from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor on the British ships’ 
intrusion into Macao, 13 Oct. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), in QWS, II, 
32. 
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 ie’ao)’,43 who ‘live[d] by plunder (劫掠为生; jielue weisheng)’.44 Although, at this time, 
neither the central government nor the coastal Chinese had pointed out that the British might 
be able to threaten the order of the Chinese empire, an awareness of some potential challenge 
from Britain became embedded in the minds of the Jiaqing emperor and his courtiers.  
        In this context, when the Amherst embassy arrived in 1816, the Chinese government 
was no longer deluded about the British mission’s pretence that it had come to pay respect to 
the emperor. Instead, it was assumed that the crafty British must have some ulterior motives. 
The Jiaqing emperor, for example, openly stated that:  
 
In the letter of Ying-ji-li’s tributary bearer, it is alleged that their people are 
adorers of the Middle Kingdom’s morals and greatness. This is the barbarians’ 
usual statement. They travelled an extremely long distance to my court under the 
name of paying respect, but in fact they must have other intentions and 
demands.
45
 
 
The Jiaqing emperor’s suspicions about the intentions of this British mission were increased 
by Amherst’s refusal to comply with the Qing court ritual. The British envoy’s claimed 
reverence for the Chinese empire was hence further distrusted. For this reason, Amherst’s 
insistence on not performing kowtow was not interpreted in as tolerant a spirit as it had been 
in Macartney’s case. On the contrary, it strengthened the Jiaqing emperor’s personal dislike 
of the British, who His Majesty had already found ‘disgusting in the extreme (可恶极矣; 
kewu jiyi)’.46 In consequence, contrary to the Qianlong emperor’s declared willingness to 
                                                          
43 Letter from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor on Britain’s intrusion into 
Macao and the stoppage of Britain’s trade, 4 Sep. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign 
(1808), in QWS, II, 23. 
44 Report from the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi to the Jiaqing emperor on the mission to drive out 
the British barbarians, 27 Oct. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), in QWS, II, 
35. 
45 QWS, V, 5. 
46 The Jiaqing emperor’s remark on the viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi’s report on the cause of 
Britain’s intrusion into Macao, 20 Sep. (lunar calendar), the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), in 
QWS, II, 27. 
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receive more British missions after the Macartney embassy, the Jiaqing emperor clearly 
stated in his letter to the Prince Regent, the future George IV, that:  
 
Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an Ambassador so far, to be at the 
trouble, passing over mountains and crossing seas. If you can but pour out the 
heart in dutiful obedience, it is not necessary at stated times to come to Court, ere 
it be pronounced that you turn towards the transforming influences (which 
emanate from this Land).
47
  
 
From these words, it can be observed that the Qing court’s attitude towards Britain had 
indeed changed remarkably by the Jiaqing reign. The image of a sincere and deferential 
Britain that had previously been held by the Qianlong court had largely been discarded. 
        In spite of this changed view of the British character, the Jiaqing government did not 
entirely abandon all earlier notions about Britain. In particular, the Qing court considerably 
overestimated the importance of the tea trade to Britain, so that it was still believed that the 
British were unable to afford to lose this crucial trade by challenging the authority of the 
Chinese empire. According to John Francis Davis, one of the ‘China experts’ who 
participated in the Amherst embassy, some Chinese officials even claimed to him privately 
that it was only through the tea trade, which was granted by the benevolent Chinese emperor, 
that all the British people were able to survive.
48
 On the basis of these unfounded 
assumptions, the Jiaqing emperor and his courtiers gained the impression that, even though 
the British might dare to cause some disturbances, they could be checked with ease simply by 
applying some pressure on Britain’s tea trade with Canton. Confirmation of this can be found 
in the well-known conversation between the Jiaqing emperor and Sun Yuting, who recorded 
it when he was the governor of Guangdong:  
 
                                                          
47 The Jiaqing emperor’s letter to the British monarch, in Morse, The Chronicles, III, 302. 
48 John Francis Davis, Sketches of China (2 vols., London: Charles Knight,1841), I, 179.  
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The Jiaqing empeor: Is Britain wealthy and powerful? 
Sun Yuting: This country is larger than other west ocean countries, therefore 
powerful. Its power is owing to its wealth, which is derived from China. 
The Jiaqing empeor: Why is that?  
Sun Yuting: This country trades at Canton. It exchanges its goods for our tea. It 
then resells the tea to its neighbouring small countries in the west ocean, thus 
becoming wealthy and powerful. Yet, tea to the West is like rhubarb to Russia. If 
we put an embargo on tea exports, that country will fall into poverty and its 
people into sickness, then how can it be powerful?
49
 
 
Because of this perception, Britain’s power and influence were once again seen as being 
significantly overshadowed by the imagined might of the vast empire of China. This 
optimism in the Jiaqing court, to some extent, did not differ greatly from the well-established 
notion in the Qianlong period that Britain was not capable of posing a serious challenge to 
China. In consequence, as in the previous reign, no effective measures were taken by the 
Chinese state either to prevent potential British aggression or to learn more about this 
emerging western power. 
        In the reign of Jiaqing, therefore, some negative perceptions of Britain quickly took root 
in China. Both the central government in Beijing and informed people in the coastal areas 
gained clearer views of the character, ambition and military strength of the encroaching 
British. China’s attitudes towards Britain, especially the notion that Britain was a peaceful 
and submissive state, changed significantly compared to the views previously held during the 
Qianlong period. Nevertheless, both China’s ability to check Britain by restricting its tea 
trade, and the way the British would most likely respond to this threat from the Chinese state, 
were greatly exaggerated. For this reason, the Chinese government during the Jiaqing reign 
was still not alarmed about the critical external threat that might be posed by the British. This 
                                                          
49 Sun Yuting 孙玉庭, ‘Jipu laoren ziji nianpu’ 寄圃老人自记年谱 (‘Sun Yuting’s biographical annual 
accounts’), in Yanlitang ji (fu)  延厘堂集(附) (The collection from the Yanli studio (Appendix)), see Qiu 
Ke 邱克, ‘Biguan shidai Zhongguo ren de xifang zhishi’ 闭关时代中国人的西方知识 (‘Chinese people’s 
knowledge about the West in the closed-door age’), Jinan xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 暨南学报 (哲
学社会科学版) (Journal of Jinan (Philosophy and social sciences edition)), 2 (1988), 50. 
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conviction of Britain’s inability to cause China any trouble was soon to change, however, 
during the Daoguang period. 
         
IV 
Chinese perceptions of Britain in the early Daoguang period (prior to 1840) 
In September 1820, the Daoguang emperor, son of the Jiaqing emperor, ascended the 
imperial throne. In the first two decades of the Daoguang reign, China became more 
conscious of Britain’s worldwide influence as well as more aware of the severe domestic 
problems which rose from the opium trade. Under such circumstances, some perceptive 
individuals within and without the Chinese government made considerable progress in 
learning about Britain. A growing number of British studies were produced both in Beijing 
and in the southeastern coastal areas. Although, as a result of these individual efforts, the 
uncivilised image of the British, which had been a key element in the Qing government’s 
earlier propaganda, was greatly modified, this increase in knowledge of Britain still did not 
result in a state-directed search for reliable intelligence about Britain. Some of the Qing 
government’s misunderstandings about Sino-British relations even misled the public, 
including some coastal elites, into underestimating Britain’s ability to strike against the 
Chinese empire.  
        In the 1820s and 1830s, as discussed in chapter five, the rampant opium smuggling 
caused a range of social and financial crises for the already declining Qing empire. As the 
harmful effects of the opium trade became progressively serious, not only did the Chinese 
government, but many coastal Chinese people, came to believe that this trade was in fact a 
British plot against the Chinese empire. In this regard, Yao Ying, a famous scholar-official 
from Anhui, maintained that, ‘Ying-ji-li has malicious intent. With the aim of poisoning 
China, it produces opium and tobacco. They not only exhaust our nation’s wealth, but also 
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drive our people to sickness’.
50
 Apart from this impression of Britain’s ‘sinister’ intentions 
towards China, Britain’s influence all over the world was also better known to the Chinese as 
contacts between the two peoples continued to increase. Xiao Lingyu, a Jiangsu geographer 
working for the Canton provincial government, stated that: 
 
[Ying-ji-li] has a practical tradition, and is very interest-oriented. It lives on its 
commerce at sea. They try to take control of every seaport that they may take 
advantage of. They build powerful ships and cannons to serve this purpose.
51
  
             … 
In the later Qianlong period, it has already had strong influence overseas; its 
power grows progressively in the Jiaqing reign. … The British have garrison 
forces in all its possessions in America, India, and southeast Asia, where they 
impose taxes and annual tributes.
52
 
  
Britain’s occupation of Singapore in 1819 and its expansion in southeast Asia in the 1820s, in 
particular, made the menace from the British more perceptible than ever to the better-
informed people in the coastal areas of China. For example, He Dageng, a Zhejiang scholar 
who resided in Canton, claimed that:  
 
The British influence used to be thousands of miles northwest from us. Since 
Britain is extraordinarily distant from the Canton sea, it did not pose an immediate 
concern to the Middle Kingdom. At present, however, all maritime countries in 
the south ocean [Indian ocean] … are compelled to pay tribute to the British. … 
Britain’s ambition is growing day by day. When are they going to be satisfied?
53
 
 
Yan Sizong, another intellectual from Guangdong, also expressed his apprehension of the 
looming threat from Britain. He maintained that:  
                                                          
50 Yao Ying 姚莹, ‘Haidao yizhi’ 海岛逸志 (‘Lost gazetteer of the islands in the sea’), in Yao Ying 姚莹, 
Zhongyou tang quanji kangyou jixing 中友堂全集康輶纪行 (Travel report of an emissary) (16 vols., 
1845), X, in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian 近代中国史料丛刊续编 (Sequel to the collection of 
materials on modern Chinese history), ed. Shen Yunlong 沈云龙 (100 vols., Taiwan: Wenhai chubanshe, 
1974-82), VI, 3327-8.  
51 Xiao Lingyu 萧令裕, Ji Ying-ji-li 记英吉利 (Treatise on Britain) (1832), in Collected materials, I, 509.  
52 Ibid., 766. It can be seen that Xiao Lingyu was interpreting Britain according to the Chinese practices. 
British gains were actually by trade rather than by tribute.  
53 He Dageng 何大庚, Yingyi shuo 英夷说 (An account of the British barbarians), in Wei Yuan, Haiguo 
tuzhi, XV, 578. 
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Throughout history, no commerce has been supported by military forces in such a 
way as the British barbarians are doing at present. … Despite the distance up to 
thousands of miles, Britain now does not differ greatly from a bordering 
nation. … Its ambition is … to monopolise the Chinese market, so that all other 
countries can be within its grasp.
54
 
 
        Because of these concerns over a potential British threat, a number of perceptive 
individuals, whether they were independent of or working for the Qing government, pointed 
out the importance of learning more about Britain as well as about current affairs in the 
western world. For instance, Yan Sizong stated that, ‘in order to contain these barbarians, 
first and foremost, we ought to know about their circumstances; thereafter we will be able to 
subdue their insolent spirit’.
55
 Cheng Enze, an eminent scholar-official, also declared that, 
‘Attention should be paid to the information that was formerly ignored … in case warfare 
should happen … This knowledge could then be used as guidance for tens of thousands of 
people’.
56
 Ye Zhongjin, another Anhui scholar in Canton, specifically mentioned that it was 
advisable to collect and study the foreign-language publications that were being circulated in 
China, because ‘they provide intelligence on foreign affairs and hence cannot be overlooked 
by the coastal defence’.
57
 Perhaps due to similar concerns, when Commissioner Lin Zexu 
reached Guangdong in 1839 on his mission to stamp out the opium trade, ‘on a daily basis, 
[he] sent people to pry into western affairs, to translate western books, and to buy their 
newspapers’.
58
 
                                                          
54 Yan Sizong 颜斯综, Nanyang lice 南洋蠡测 (A brief examination of the south ocean), in Collected 
materials, I, 798.  
55  Yan Sizong 颜斯综 , Haifang yulun 海防余论  (Additional observations on the coast defense), in 
Collected materials, I, 797. 
56 Cheng Enze 程恩泽, Cheng shilang yiji 程侍郎遗集 (The collected works of the late Cheng Enze), ed. 
Wang Yunwu 王云武 (10 vols., Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1935), VII, 142. 
57 Ye Zhongjin 叶钟进, Ying-ji-li guo yiqing jilüe 英吉利国夷情纪略 (A Brief account of the condition of 
the British barbarians) (c. 1834),  in Collected materials, I, 792.  
58 Wei Yuan 魏源, ‘Daoguang yangsou zhengfu ji’ 道光洋艘征抚记 (‘Daoguang’s campaign against and 
soothing the foreign ships’) in Wei Yuan ji 魏源集 (A collection of Wei Yuan’s works) (2 vols., Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1983), I, 174. 
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        As a result of this growing awareness of the necessity to learn more about Britain, a 
number of studies on Britain were produced in China in the 1820s and 1830s.59 Various 
hitherto unrevealed facts were introduced to the Chinese for the very first time and 
knowledge about Britain hence increased significantly. Compared to what was known 
previously by even quite well-informed Chinese people, these works referred to different 
aspects of Britain’s politics, society, and economy, which generally showed that Britain was 
not at all backward in terms of its civilisation. For example, in Yingguo luelun (英国略论; 
Brief observations on Britain), British parliamentary politics, insurance system, and modern 
industrial techniques were noted: 
 
Important issues are discussed in the parliament, where members exchange their 
viewpoints. The aristocracy [of the House of Lords] is categorised into five 
classes: duke, marquis, earl, viscount and baron. They are the masters of the 
parliament. In addition, residents of each city are able to elect one or two trusted 
representatives to participate in the meetings at the nation’s capital. If the monarch 
would like to impose a tax, he would have to have the permission of the gentry. If 
the gentry do not approve, the monarch will not be allowed to do so. 
… 
As the safety of ships and cargoes is always uncertain, there are persons in Britain 
who are paid to take the risk. The principle is, if the ship arrives safely, three to 
four hundred taels of silver would be paid out of every ten thousand. That is to say, 
if somebody’s cargo is worth twenty thousand taels, he pays eight hundred in 
advance to insure its safety. If his ship sinks, all twenty thousand would be paid 
back to him. 
…  
In mills, fabrics are not manufactured by people’s hands or feet. Machines are 
powered by fire and smoke instead of human power. They produce textiles from 
wool and cotton smoothly and swiftly. … Fire-powered ships sail through rivers 
and seas, regardless of the wind and water conditions. Railways are made for 
trains to travel on. The speed [of these trains] could reach 180 li per hour.
60
 
                                                          
59 For example, Xie Qinggao, Hai lu (c. 1820); Li Zhaoluo 李兆洛, Haiguo jiwen xu 海国纪闻序 (An 
introduction to the accounts of overseas countries) (1821); Bao Shichen, Da xiaomeisheng shu (1828), 
Xiao Lingyu, Ji Ying-ji-li (1832), Ye Zhongjin, Ying-ji-li guo yiqing jilüe (c. 1834), Tang Yi 汤彝, Ying-ji-
li bingchuan ji 英吉利兵船记 (A note of Britain’s military and naval power] (1834);  Tang Yi 汤彝, Jue 
Ying-ji-li hushi lun 绝英吉利互市论 (On the stoppage of Britain’s trade) (1835); Liang Tingnan 梁廷枬, 
Ying-ji-li-guo ji 英吉利国记 (On the country of Ying-ji-li) (1838), etc.  
60 [Xi Li 息力], Yingguo lüelun 英国略论 (Brief observations on Britain) (1835), in Wei Yuan, Haiguo 
tuzhi, LI, 1408-9. One li equals 0.5 kilometre and a Chinese hour at that time is two hours by western 
standards. 
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The landscape and social life of London, as well as British education and patent systems, 
were introduced to Chinese readers by Ye Zhongjin: 
 
Its [British] monarch resides in the city of London. Bridges are built over rivers. 
Horses and vehicles travel above; boats and ships sail below. Affluent families all 
have their own gardens. … Oil lamps are hung all over the streets in the 
evening. … There are comedies performing from nightfall onward. They are 
prohibited during the day because they may disturb people’s work. 
… 
The state sets up universities. Counties found middle schools. Towns build 
primary schools. [These institutions] extend teaching to the people to make sure 
they can read. … If somebody has a brilliant invention, he will obtain a patent for 
thirty years. During this period, others are not allowed to copy it.61 
 
With regard to British social customs, Xiao Lingyu described marriage in Britain and some of 
the British court’s rituals: 
 
Women are entitled to choose their husbands. They have their own property. 
Husbands are prohibited from taking concubines. Below the Crown, more respect 
is paid to women rather than men. When ministers greet each other, they take off 
their hats. The supreme form of salute is to put a hand on the forehead. They stand 
upright even when the monarch is present.62 
 
        It can be observed from these examples that, in the first two decades of the Daoguang 
reign, both the deferential and the uncivilised images of Britain, which were advocated by the 
Qianlong government, were considerably revised. Despite this notable progress, it should be 
noted that this new knowledge was being obtained through some individual efforts made by a 
small number of perceptive and well-informed people, rather than through a state-directed 
effort for the sake of improving the nation’s defence. As a matter of fact, the Daoguang 
government was more concerned to exterminate the immediate evils occasioned by the opium 
                                                          
61 Ye Zhongjin, Ying-ji-li guo yiqing jilüe, in Collected materials, I, 787-8. 
62 Xiao Lingyu, Ji Ying-ji-li, in Collected materials, I, 767. For China’s male ruling class, however, this 
might not necessarily be a positive sign of Britain’s civilisation, because it indicated that the British people 
did not pay sufficient respect to social hierarchy and deference, which were more highly admired in China.   
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trade than make preparations to meet any future British threat. In this respect, no direct 
government involvement was made in China’s search for accurate intelligence about Britain, 
in spite of rising concern over the opium trade. As a result, the majority of the Chinese people, 
including some of the aforementioned persons in and out of the government, were unaware of 
some of their critical misconceptions about Britain. For these reasons, if China’s knowledge 
of Britain before the 1840s is examined from a utilitarian or defensive point of view, it was 
weakened by some mistaken views and was inadequate to meet China’s defensive needs. 
        First, although a looming British threat was perceived by a number of Chinese scholars 
and officials, it was still widely believed that, despite or even because of their maritime 
dominance, the British ‘are on the ocean all the time. [They] rise up and fall down with the 
wave every day, hence they cannot stand firmly when they are on land’, and that ‘their legs 
are bound so they can hardly bend … These barbarians will lose their skills as soon as they 
reach land’.63 On account of such misconceived assumptions, the British were regarded as 
being incapable of launching an attack on China.  
        In addition, the overestimation of the importance of the China trade to the British 
economy, as during the Jiaqing reign, led most influential Chinese to believe that the British 
would not be bold enough to invade the Chinese empire. Even though it was known to some 
informed Chinese that ‘its [Britain’s] strategy is to … hang up cannons on the masts and set 
fire on land’,64 there was no real anxiety on the part of the Chinese that the British might 
apply the same violent approach to China. In this respect, even Yan Sizong alleged that, if 
China stopped the British trade in Canton, ‘where could their piece goods and Indian cotton 
                                                          
63 Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang chao) 筹办夷务始末 (道光朝) (Complete record of the management 
of barbarian affairs (the Daoguang period)), ed. Wen Qing 文庆, et al., (80 vols.) VIII, 7, in Jindai 
Zhongguo shiliao congkan 近代中国史料丛刊 (The collection of materials on modern Chinese history, 
hereafter The collection of materials), ed. Shen Yunlong 沈云龙 (100 vols., Taiwan: Wenhai chubanshe, 
1966), LVI, 516. 
64 Yan Sizong, Haifang yulun, in Collected materials, I, 797. 
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be sold? Where could they purchase tea and other Chinese products? In consequence, would 
not it matter greatly to the survival of the British nation?’
65
 
        In particular, with regard to the British demand for Chinese tea, the Qing court’s 
misunderstanding of its significance to British society did not lessen in the early Daoguang 
period. On the contrary, the notion that the British people could not live without Chinese tea 
became even more engrained in the Chinese imagination and even some local elites in the 
coastal areas were influenced by this opinion. For example, just as with some government 
officials who reported to the Daoguang emperor that ‘If the barbarians do not use our tea and 
rhubarb, they will get blind in a few months, with intestines blocked. Their whole nation, 
therefore, can hardly survive’,
66
 Ye Zhongjin was convinced that ‘Tea and rhubarb are indeed 
crucial to their lives’.
67
 Xiao Lingyu, furthermore, developed the idea that ‘The [British] 
barbarians are fond of milk and cheese, which block their stomach and intestines. Only 
Chinese tea and rhubarb can dissolve them. Once the barbarians fail to obtain [them], they 
will fall into illness’.
68
 As a consequence of these gross misunderstandings, a stoppage of the 
tea trade had long been regarded as the most effective means of compelling the British to 
return to a position of obedience should a conflict break out. For this reason, in both Beijing 
and the coastal areas, the general belief that the British could be handled with ease was 
strengthened, regardless of the fact that a threat from Britain was becoming more conceivable 
than ever. This belief seemed justified when minor disputes occurred in the decades before 
the Opium War and China was not subject to attack, but, in this regard, both the Qing 
government and the southeastern elites oversimplified the reasons why the British 
compromised on these occasions. Since no intensive state-directed investigation was 
undertaken to understand British power and objectives, when a serious challenge from Britain 
                                                          
65 Ibid.  
66 Chouban yiwu shimo (Daoguang Chao) II, 10, in The collection of materials, LVI, 115. 
67 Ye Zhongjin, Ying-ji-li guo yiqing jilüe, in Collected materials, I, 792. 
68 Xiao Lingyu 萧令裕, Yuedong shibo lun 粤东市舶论 (On foreign trade and shipping in Canton), in 
Collected materials, I, 776.  
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did occur in the form of the Opium War, both the imperial court and the majority of coastal 
elites were caught unprepared for the scale and extent of British power. 
        In conclusion, it can be seen from the evidence provided in this chapter that, from the 
Qianlong reign to the eve of the Opium War, although knowledge of Britain in China was 
indeed limited, this was not a period in which Chinese perceptions of Britain were entirely 
negligible or unchanging. As the British increased their influence on China’s coastal areas, 
Chinese understanding of Britain advanced accordingly. Both the local elite in the 
southeastern coastal areas and the elite at the imperial court in Beijing obtained credible as 
well as inaccurate information about Britain and its people. In this regard, the Qing governors 
and some perceptive individuals gradually realised that Britain was by no means a submissive 
and uncivilised state and, as a result, potential threats from Britain became increasingly 
imaginable. Despite this progress in understanding British power and the British character, in 
the pre-Opium War era, China did not seek to institute a state-directed investigation of British 
power and influence. Since active state involvement was crucial to almost every major 
undertaking in late imperial China, Chinese perceptions of Britain prior to the 1840s, from a 
defensive point of view, were still superficial and fragmentary, and were undermined by a 
variety of mistaken views. Some seriously misconceived perceptions, such as the 
overestimation of the importance of the tea trade to the British economy and to the health of 
British people, ensured that the Qing government was poorly prepared to meet the serious 
threat which Britain posed in the early 1840s. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Opium War lasted a little longer than the British government had expected. This was 
partly because the British forces encountered more resolute resistance than anticipated from 
the Chinese army and people, partly because the British did not launch a full-scale attack 
because of Charles Elliot’s ‘fight-and-talk’ strategy. In August 1841, as Sir Henry Pottinger 
arrived in China and replaced Elliot as the plenipotentiary, Britain’s determination to win this 
war by force became evident. Within a year, the British troops stormed up China’s south 
coast, blockaded the Grand Canal, and occupied the large island of Zhoushan at the mouth of 
the Yangzi, as well as several ports to the south, including Canton, Amoy, Ningbo and 
Shanghai. Despite the fact that the Chinese soldiers fought with great bravery and even 
desperation, they were clearly no match for British arms and discipline. When the British 
expedition pushed on to the walls of Nanjing, the second city of the empire, the Qing court 
sued for peace. On 29 August 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed aboard the Cornwallis, 
the British fleet’s flagship moored in the Yangzi River. The First Anglo-Chinese War had 
come to an end.  
        The Treaty of Nanjing, with its supplementary agreement signed in October 1843, has 
been widely regarded as ‘the most important treaty settlement in China’s modern history’.1 
According to these historic documents, Britain achieved all that it had failed for so long to 
obtain by diplomacy. The restrictive Canton Cohong system was eventually abolished and 
five ‘treaty ports’ were opened to British trade and residence. Twenty-one million dollars had 
to be paid by the Chinese government to Britain as compensation for the war costs as well as 
the previously destroyed opium. The island of Hong Kong, in addition, was transferred to 
                                                          
1 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York; London: Norton, 1999), p. 160. 
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British sovereignty as Britain’s long-desired permanent base near China. No matter how 
widely the ‘barbaric’ image and behaviour of the British had spread over China as a result of 
the war, derogatory and subordinate terms of address were no longer to be used against the 
British in China’s official correspondence with Britain. As the British had wished and 
insisted upon for more than half a century, the equality between officers of the British queen 
and those of the Chinese emperor was formally acknowledged by the Qing government.2 To 
the Chinese, the conclusion of the Opium War, as well as the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing, 
not only meant that their once secure and self-contained empire was forced to open, it also 
signified that the era when it was China which determined the terms of Sino-British relations 
was now over. Instead, China was ushered into a century-long period of ‘Western domination 
and increasing Chinese humiliation’,3 in which the Qing court gradually lost control of the 
key elements of its commercial, social, and foreign policies. As Gregory has stated, from the 
middle years of the nineteenth century, ‘the Chinese world began to be turned upside down’.4 
        This thesis has traced British-Chinese encounters in the half century before the Opium 
War, a medium-term period that existing research has failed to scrutinise in sufficient depth. 
Unlike previous studies on China’s early relations with Britain or the West, this thesis has 
focused closely on perceptions and attitudes, with emphasis on British people’s knowledge of 
and attitudes towards China developed as a result of a series of recent encounters. It has 
shown that British perceptions of China, by and large, became increasingly adverse and 
critical over this period. These developing unfavourable views, to a great extent, became 
important underlying forces that helped justify Britain’s decision to embark on a war against 
China. In retrospect, members of the Macartney embassy tended to believe that it was a very 
few hostile ministers in the Qing court that had obstructed the mission’s official business in 
                                                          
2 Full details of the treaty can be found in Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese 
Empire (3 vols., London: Longmans, 1910-18; reprinted, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), I, 298-302. 
3 John S. Gregory, The West and China since 1500 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 73. 
4 Ibid., p. 88. 
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1793, while the emperor himself was an amicable and open-minded figure who was prepared 
and determined to protect Britain’s trade. Even though some of these British observers, 
during their travels across the Chinese empire, had discovered that the patriarchal 
government of China had rendered Chinese civilisation stagnant, they still held significant 
respect for that regime. Despite the fact that the Macartney mission failed to achieve its 
commercial and diplomatic objectives, Macartney and Staunton, as leaders of the embassy, 
did not find anything inappropriate in the course of conduct that Britain had adopted in its 
approach to the Chinese government. Instead of suggesting a radical change of policy, they 
maintained that patience and perseverance were extremely important in Britain’s future 
relations with China. They were convinced that the Chinese government ‘would not stand 
always against reason’ 5  and that, ‘by time and management’, 6  favourable results would 
eventually follow, while ‘no shorter way will do it’.7 Macartney, in particular, pointed out 
that an aggressive line of action against China was inadvisable, because it would be harmful 
to the interests of Britain and its eastern empire. Although Macartney also mentioned a 
possible breakdown in Sino-British relations, he asserted that ‘nothing could be urged in 
favour of an hostile conduct, but an irresistible conviction of failure by forbearance’.8    
        When the Amherst mission visited the Qing court in 1816, the impressions these men 
formed of China were rather different. In particular, the benevolent image of the Chinese 
emperor, which was promoted by Macartney’s embassy, was completely overthrown. Instead, 
the Chinese sovereign was perceived as a capricious despot whose ‘personal character’ was 
                                                          
5 George L. Staunton, An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor 
of China (2 vols., London: W. Bulmer, 1798) II, 219. 
6 Ibid., 334. 
7 An Embassy to China: Being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor 
Ch’ien-lung 1793-1794, ed. J.L. Cranmer-Byng (London: Longmans, 1962), p. 210. 
8 Ibid., p. 213. 
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regarded as the very reason for the failure of Amherst’s mission.9 Moreover, as renewed 
opportunities were provided for British travellers to explore the interior of China, the 
backward state of Chinese civilisation was increasingly exposed to British eyes. As a result, a 
general consensus was reached among the embassy on the half-civilised image of China and 
the Qing government was further seen as the primary cause of China’s decay or lack of 
progress. This discovery not only lowered these British observers’ respect for the current 
Chinese government, but provided new perspectives for Britain to deal with in its relation 
with China. Since experience had shown that, to obtain an objective in China, it was more 
effective either to ignore the authority of the government or offer a firm remonstration, the 
previous conciliatory line of action advised by Macartney was seen as problematical. 
Accordingly, complimentary embassies were no longer considered helpful. Instead, in order 
to produce favourable results, a ‘determined step’ was deemed to be ‘more requisite’.10 Even 
though plans to adopt coercive measures were still not popular at this time, a change of 
attitude towards China, as well as a demonstration of Britain’s steadfast image, first appeared 
on the agenda. 
        Not long after the Amherst embassy, British merchants who traded with China replaced 
diplomatic visitors as the main providers and interpreters of images of China. In the early 
1830s, the debate on the renewal of the East India Company’s China trade monopoly touched 
off a heated controversy over the China question. To justify the claim that the free trade 
theory was inapplicable to the case of China and that the Company was irreplaceable in 
dealing with the Chinese, the EIC and its supporters stressed the peculiarity, or cultural 
otherness, of China. They maintained that China’s unique history and self-contained 
economy had determined its people to believe they were ‘in no need of intercourse of other 
                                                          
9 British Library, London: India Office Library and Records: India Office Amherst Correspondence, Lord 
Amherst’s Embassy, 1815-17, G/12/197/295. Letter from Amherst to George Canning, 8 Mar. 1817; 
Henry Ellis, Journal of the Proceedings of the late Embassy to China (London: John Murray, 1817), p. 122. 
10 John Francis Davis, Sketches of China; partly during an inland journey of four months between Peking, 
Nanking, and Canton (2 vols., London: Charles Knight, 1841), II, 143. 
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countries’. 11  Since Chinese institutions were simply different from, but not backward 
compared to the European models, the EIC’s campaigners considered it necessary to respect 
the Chinese government and its laws, as well as China’s sovereignty in regulating its own 
affairs. Given the Chinese people’s natural disposition to ‘appeal to reason’,12 persuasion and 
a peaceful approach were regarded as more useful than any aggressive course of action in 
increasing Britain’s commerce with China. In contrast, the free traders, who wished the 
Chinese market to be opened to all, presented diametrically different views. They insisted 
that the eternal and universal laws of commerce could certainly be applied to the China trade, 
because the Chinese people were, in fact, friendly, commercially-minded, and desirous of 
communication with foreigners. The principal problem for China was that the current 
government, which by no means represented the voice of the people, had set itself against the 
interests of both the Chinese and foreign people. For this reason, the free trade advocates 
supposed it to be fully legitimate to challenge the authority of the Qing government and to 
hold its restrictive laws in defiance. Since ‘it is a Chinese maxim to trample on the voluntary 
submissive and abject, while they respect firmness and decision’,13 the notion that ‘much 
more may be gained by an appeal to their fears than to their friendship’ 14  was widely 
promoted. Although, at this time, opinions were divided on whether a display of military 
force was appropriate, with the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly in 1834, the necessity for a 
more determined stance against China was strengthened.   
        In the mid-1830s, Napier’s failed effort to create fear in the Chinese government excited 
new discussions on Britain’s future policy in China. British communities in Canton alleged 
                                                          
11 R. Montgomery Martin, The Past and Present State of the Tea Trade of England, and of the Continents 
of Europe and America (London: Parbury, Allen, 1832), p. 6. 
12 Thomas Fisher, ‘Statistical Notices of China’, The Gentleman’s Magazine, 103 (May 1833), 389. 
13 Charles Gützlaff, Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832, & 1833 (London: 
Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1834), p. 12. 
14 Hugh Hamilton Lindsay’s Report, in Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China, 
in the Ship Lord Amherst: extracted from papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, relating to 
the trade with China (London: B. Fellowes, 1833), p. 57. 
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that it was now time to abandon officially the conciliatory course of conduct and to adopt a 
‘show of force’ policy. According to this view, the key to success was to impress the Chinese 
government with a sense of Britain’s power and firmness. To achieve this end, a determined 
plenipotentiary, ‘attended by sufficient maritime force’,15 should be sent to the vicinity of 
Beijing, in order to demand a mutually beneficial commercial treaty. Given the perceived 
timidity of the Chinese government, it was assumed that once such an approach was pursued, 
the Qing court would make every sacrifice to avoid a clash with the formidable force at 
Britain’s disposal and thus speedily to comply with Britain’s just demands. Although the 
‘show of force’ advocates proposed an aggressive stance and a display of Britain’s naval 
force, it should be noted that very few of them supported the actual use of arms. The majority 
of British residents in China at this time, as with the British government, regarded it as unjust 
and impractical to resort to a significant use of force against China or to wage an open war. 
Due to the fact that the ‘show of force’ theory aimed only to intimidate the Chinese 
authorities by the presence of British force and clearly to avoid armed conflict and open 
hostilities, the mid-1830s cannot be viewed as the beginning of Britain’s pro-war attitude 
towards China, even though it made a war with China more imaginable than ever.  
        In the late-1830s, the ever-growing opium trade on the China coast and the ensuing 
crisis, in which Commissioner Lin Zexu suppressed the opium traffic with a strong hand, 
brought Chinese affairs to the forefront of British attention. Although, by and large, the 
opium merchants’ arguments in favour of their trade were not well supported, they 
successfully produced an impression that the British nation was suffering gross insult in 
China as a result of Lin’s actions. In this context, since history had repeatedly proved that it 
was utterly useless to attempt to conciliate the Chinese authorities, the actual use of arms was 
much more favoured by the British than it has been a few years earlier. On the basis of this 
                                                          
15 Anon., ‘British authorities in China’, The Chinese Repository, 3:8 (Dec. 1834), 363. 
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general sentiment, and because of a variety of concerns over the honour and interests of 
Britain and its empire, the justice, necessity and timeliness of a war against China were 
finally approved by the British government. A new chapter in British-Chinese relations 
unfolded. Although this fateful conflict between Britain and China was indeed derived from 
the controversy over the opium trade, it was Lin Zexu’s conduct that endangered the lives and 
property of British subjects, rather than the trade itself which had lasted for decades, that 
immediately triggered Britain’s decision vigorously to involve itself in Chinese affairs. The 
underlying causes of this war, from a perceptional point of view, can be attributed to the 
constant reinforcement of various negative images of China, as well as to the notion that the 
Chinese government could not be communicated with by appeals to reason. These 
impressions, of course, had not determined the outbreak of the First Anglo-Chinese War, but 
open hostilities with China would very probably not have appeared justifiable or acceptable 
without these perceptions that had slowly evolved from the Macartney mission to the eve of 
the Opium War.   
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